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In reaching the conclusions reflected in its report, the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America had the 
benefit of numerous papers prepared by consultants, expert 
witnesses and its own staff. The Commission decided that 
publication of some of this material in the fo.rm of an appendix 
would provide useful background to the report. 
Due to space limitations it was not possible to publish 
more than a fraction of the documents the Commission made use 
of in more than five months of intensive deliberations. The 
selection offered here is by necessity arbitrary; inclusion or 
exclusion of a particular paper should not be taken as 
indicating any measure of relative significance. The 
Commission's records are being delivered to the National 
Archives (except for administrative material that will be held 
by the Department of State) and will be available to the 
public, as provided by law. 
Brief explanations are in order as to what this appendix 
contains and what it does not contain. Sections III and IV 
provide basic documents on the Commission's mandate and the way 
it went about its work. The document in Section V, the 21 
points put forward by the Contadora group as the objectives to 
be reached in a regional peace settlement, is included as an 
addendum to Chapter 7 of the Commission's report. 
Members of the staff prepared the country papers in Section 
VI at the Commission's request. These papers were not meant to 
be authoritative or comprehensive studies of the complex 
societies of the region. Rather, the purpose was to furnish 
some perspective in looking at the individual nations of 
Central America and to highlight issues of importance. The 
country papers were informally reviewed by the Commission and 
suggestions from some of the members have been incorporated in 
the drafts as they appear here, although the staff bears full 
responsibiity for their overall content. 
In going about its work, the Commission selected a pair of 
lead consultants to organize sessions on each general set of 
issues: social, economic, political, security and diplomatic 
-- as well as on the question of u.s. interests in Central 
America. In addition to helping enlist witnesses, most of the 
lead consultants prepared papers of their own. These are to be 
found in Section VII in the order in which the Commission took 
up the topics they treat. Section VIII contains four 
additional studies prepared by other consultants to fill 
specific needs encountered in the Commission's deliberations. 
1. 
Most of those invited to meet with the Commission in 
Washington supplied written as well as oral presentations. 
Section IX offers a selection of these papers reflecting to 
some degree the diversity of views to which the Commission was 
exposed. 
With the exception of a brief statement by the Peace Corps 
and a Department of State paper on legal reform, the appendix 
includes no documents from the U.S. Government. The Department 
of State, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the staff of the National 
Security Council all provided full briefings to the 
Commission. These were clearly important in terms of the 
information they made available to the Commission --
information which contributed to the report's findings. But 
because of the classified nature of those briefings it was not 
possible to include any of that material. In addition, the 
Agency for International Development furnished to the 
Commission an extraordinary amount of data, analyses and 
proposals. Space limitations made it impossible to include 
these valuable submissions. 
As indicated in the report, the Commission met with 
government officials and a broad spectrum of private citizens 
during its travels to eight Central American and Contadora 
countries. In a few cases these discussions were accompanied 
by written statements, but problems of time, space and language 
led the staff to omit those papers in compiling this appendix. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that they as well as the 
numerous meetings on the trips contributed significantly to the 
Commission's report. 
Finally, although the Commission's conclusions are entirely 
its own, the members do wish to acknowledge their debt to the 
hundreds of individuals who as consultants, witnesses or 
through corespondence made their views known on Central 




NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COr.!HISSION 
ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and in 
order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), 
the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, it is 
hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Establishment. (a) There is established the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The 
Commission shall be composed of not more than 12 members 
appointed or designated by the President. These members shall 
be drawn from among distinguished leaders of the government, 
business, labor, education, Hispanic and religious commu-
nities. No more than seven members shall be of the same 
political party. 
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among 
the members of the Commission. 
Sec. 2. Functions. (a) The Commission shall study the 
nature of United States interests in the Central American 
region and the threats now posed to those interests. Based on 
its findings, the Commission shall provide advice to the 
President, the Secretary of State and the Congress on elements 
of a long-term United States policy that will best respond to 
the challenges of social, economic, and democratic development 
in the region, and to internal and external threats to its 
security and stability. The Commission also shall provide 
advice on means of building a national consensus on a com-
prehensive United States policy for the region. 
3. 
2 
(b) The Commission shall report to the President by 
December 1, 1983. 
Sec. 3. Administration. (a) The heads of Executive 
agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the 
Commission such information as it may require for purposes of 
carrying out its functions. 
(b) Hembers of the Commission shall serve without 
compensation for their work on the Commission. HoHever, 
members appointed from among private citizens of the United 
States may, subject to the availability of funds, be allowed 
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as 
authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the 
government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707). 
(c) The Secretary of State shall, to the extent 
permitted by law, provide the Con@ission with such 
administrative services, funds, facilities, staff and other 
support services as may be necessary for the performance of 
its functions. 
Sec. 4. General. (a) Notwithstanding any other 
Executive Order, the functions of the President under the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, which are 
applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the 
Secretary of State, in accordance with guidelines and 
procedures established by the Administrator of General 
Services. 
(b) The Commission shall, unless otherwise extended, 
terminate 60 days after submitting its final report. 
TilE WHITE HOUSE, 
July 19, 1983. 
4. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, 
including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended 
(5 u.s.c. App. I), it is hereby ordered that Section 2(b) 
of Executive Order No. 12433, establising the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central America, is amended to 
provide as follows: 
"(b) The Commission shall report to the President by 
February 1, 1984.". 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
November 18, 1983. 
5. 
CHARTER OF THE 
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
I. AUTHORITY 
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was 
established by Executive Order No. 12433 of July 19, 1983 ("the 
Order"}, and is governed by the provisions of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act ("the Act"}, 5 u.s.c. App. I, which sets 
forth standards for the formation, use, and operation of 
advisory committees. 
II. PURPOSE 
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was 
established to study the nature of United States interests in 
the Central American region and the threats now posed to those 
interests. Based on its findings, the Commission will provide 
advice to the President, the Secretary of State and the 
Congress on elements of a long-term United Stat:es policy that 
will best respond to the challenges of social, economic, and 
democratic development in the region, and to internal and 
external threats to its security and stability. The Commission 
will also provide advice on means of building a national 
consensus on a comprehensive United States policy for the 
region. 
III. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP 
A. MembershiE· Pursuant to section l(a} of the Order, the 
Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the 
President from among distinguished leaders of the government, 
business, labor, education, Hispanic, and religious 
communities. No more than seven may be members of the same 
political party. 
B. Officers. Pursuant to section l(b} of the Order, the 
President shall designate one of the members of the Commission 
to be the Chairman. The Chairman may appoint, from among the 
members of the Commission, other officers as he deems 
appropriate. 
C. SubgrouEs· The Chairman may establish formal or 
informal subgroups as he deems appropriate to carrying out the 
work of the Commission. 
6 . 
IV. SENIOR COUNSELLORS 
The President may designate Senior Counsellors to the 
Commission, who, based on their individual experience and 
expertise, shall each be available for consultation at the 
request of the Chairman. Such Senior Counsellors may include 
up to eight Members of Congress, drawn in equal numbers from 
the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
V. SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 
A. Provision of Support. Pursuant to section 3(c) of the 
Order, the Department of State shall, to the extent permitted 
by law, provide administrative services and other necessary 
support to the Commission. Expenses of the Commission shall be 
paid from funds available to the Secretary of State. 
B. Assistance from Executive Agencies. Pursuant to 
subsection 3(a) of the Order, heads of Executive agencies 
shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission 
such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying 
out its functions. 
C. Staff. The Under Secretary for Management of the 
Department of State shall designate an officer or employee of 
the Department of State to serve as Executive Director of the 
Commission, and other persons to serve as Counsel to the 
Commission and to fill such other staff positions as he deems 
appropriate. 
VI. OPERATIONS 
A. Functions of the Chairman. In accordance with the Act, 
the Chairman shall: 
(1) call meetings with the concurrence of the 
Executive Director; 
(2) prepare or approve the agenda for meetings; 
(3) preside at meetings; 
(4) provide for the keeping of detailed minutes of 
meetings of the Commission; 
(5) provide for the maintenance and retention of the 
records of the Commission; and 
(6) certify the accuracy of the minutes of meetings of 
the Commission. 
B. Functions of the Executive Director. In accordance with 
the Act, the Executive Director shall: 
(1) attend each meeting of the Commission and adjourn 
such meetings if adjournment is in the public interest; 
(2) call or concur in the calling of all meetings of 
the Commission; 
7 . 
(3) serve as contact point for the public to provide 
current information concerning the operations of the 
Commission; and 
(4) under the general direction of the Commission and 
its Chairman, supervise the operations of the staff. 
C. Meetings of the Commission. No quorum for meetings is 
required. All meetings of the Commission will be open to the 
public unless a determination has been made, in accordance with 
section lO(d) of the Act and 41 CFR 101-6.1023, that a meeting 
or a portion of a meeting should be closed to the public. All 
necessary measures shall be taken to protect information of a 
classified nature. Unless otherwise expressly directed by the 
Chairman, attendance at closed meetings shall be limited to 
Commissioners and Commission staff and, at the invitation of 
the Chairman, Senior Counsellors and those called by the 
Commission to testify or consult on a particular matter. 
Unless otherwise determined by the President for reasons of 
national security, timely notice of each meeting, whether open 
or closed, shall be published in the Federal Register stating 
the name of the Commission, the time, place, and purpose of the 
meeting, and the name, address, and telephone number of the 
designated Government employee that members of the public may 
contact for further information. Except in exceptional 
circumstances, such notice shall be published at least 15 days 
in advance of the meeting day. If shorter notice is given, the 
reason must be stated in the notice. It is estimated that the 
Commission will hold approximately 40 meetings. 
D. Records of the Commission. The Commission's records 
will consist of all papers, documents, and other materials 
pertinent to its establishment and activities, including its 
charter, agendas of meetings, determinations for closed 
meetings, minutes, reports, and all documents related to its 
proceedings and those of its subgroups, including working 
papers, drafts, studies or other documents made available to or 
prepared for or by the Commission or its subgroups. These 
records shall be available for public inspection and copying to 
the extent required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
552. These records shall be maintained by the Commission for 
the term of its operations, and shall be deposited with the 
Department of State upon the termination of the Commission. 
E. Minutes of Meetings. Detailed minutes shall be kept of 
each meeting of the Commission, which shall include a record of 
the persons present, a complete and accurate description of 
matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all 
reports received, issued or approved by the Commission. The 
accuracy of such minutes shall be certified by the Chairman. 
8 . 
F. Public Participation. At any meeting of the Commission 
open to the public, but not at closed meetings, interested 
persons shall be permitted to attend and, at the discretion of 
the Chairman, to make an appearance before or to file written 
statements with the Commission. 
VII. REPORT 
The Commission shall make a report to the President as• 
provided by Executive Order. 
VIII. COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS 
Pursuant to subsection 3(b) of the Order, members of the 
Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on 
the Commission. However, members appointed from among private 
citizens of the United States may be allowed travel expenses, 
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized for 
persons serving intermittently in the government service (5 
u.s.c. 5702-5707), to the extent funds are available therefor. 
IX. ESTIMATED COSTS 
Subject to the availability of funds, the estimated cost 
for operating the Commission, including travel expenses for 
members but excluding staff support, is $475,000. Estimated 
staff support required is five man-years, at an estimated cost 
of $225,000. 
X. TERMINATION 
Pursuant to subsection 4(b) of the Order, the Commission 
shall, unless otherwise extended, terminate 60 days after 
submitting its final report. 
p{\~6_-/ 
9. 
Secretary for Management 
LIST OF APPEARANCES BEFORE THE 
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
AUGUST 10 - DECEMBER 12, 1983 
August 10 - 11* 
Judge Hilliam Clark, National Security Adviser, and others, 
National Security Council briefing 
Mr. Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs, and others, Department of State 
briefing 
Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense, and others, 
Department of Defense briefing 
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator, and others, AID 
briefing 
August 31 - September 1 
Secretary Cyrus vance 
Secretary Alexander Haig 
President Gerald Ford 
Ambassador Thomas Mann 
Ambassador Sol Linowitz 
Secretary Hilliam P. Rogers 
Secretary Dean Rusk 
President Jimmy Carter 
September 7 - 8 (Session on Social Development) 
Mr. Edward Marasciulo, Executive Vice President, Pan 
American Development Foundation 
Dr. Loy Bilderdack, California State University at 
Fresno 
Dr. Russell Davis, Littauer School, Harvard University 
Mr. Ronald Scheman, Assistant Secretary for Management, 
OAS 
Mr. Leveo Sanchez, Development Associates, Inc. 
Ms. Loret M. Ruppe, Director, Peace Corps 
Mr. William Doherty, Executive Director, American Institute 
for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) 
Mr. Richard Hough, AIFLD 
Dr. Roy Prosterman, University of Hashington 
Ms. Mary Temple, The Land Council 
Dr. Nevin Scrimshaw, MIT 
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator 
Central Intelligence Agency briefing 
* President Reagan met with the Commission at the White 
House on August 11, October 21, 1983 and January 11, 
1984. The Commission also met on several occasions with 
Secretary of State Shultz. 
10. 
September 12 - 13 (Session on Economic Development) 
Mr. Alan Stoga, First National Bank of Chicago 
Dr. Sidney Weintraub, University of Texas 
Dr. Raul Prebisch, Economic Commission for Latin America 
Mr. Samuel F. Segnar, Inter-North Corporation 
Mr. Seymour Milstein, United Brands 
Mr. Lawrence Harrison, Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University 
Mr. Fred Bergsten, International Institute of Economics 
Mr. Monteagle Yudelman, World Bank 
Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Schweitzer Professor of the 
Humanities, City University of New York 
Ambassador John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras 
September 21 - 22 (Session on Security) 
Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense 
Mr. Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs 
Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, SAIS 
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Dr. Gregory Treverton, Harvard University 
Dr. Edward Luttwak, Center for Strategic International 
Studies 
Dr. Jiri Valenta, Woodrow Wilson Center 
Dr. Richard Millett, Air War College 
Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor-Ridruejo, Special Repporteur for 
UN Human Rights Commission on El Salvador 
Mr. Keith Kreul, National Commander, American Legion 
Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Assistant to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Mr. Sam Dickens, New World Dynamics Co. 
Dr. Jack Child, American University 
General Gordon sumner (USA Ret.) 
September 28 - 30 (Sessions on Political Development and 
Diplomatic Options) 
President Richard M. Nixon 
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky, Georgetown University 
Dr. Howard Wiarda, American Enterprise Institute 
Dr. Roland Ebel, Tulane University 
Dr. Ronald McDonald, Syracuse University 
Dr. William LeoGrande, American University 
Dr. Tom Farer, Woodrow Wilson Center 
11. 
Dr. Allen Weinstein, The Demoracy Program 
Mr. Robert L. Bernstein, Americas Watch 
Mr. Aryeh Neier, Americas Watch 
Mr. Orville Schell, Americas Watch 
Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
Mr. Bruce McColm, Freedom House 
Mr. Mark Benenson, Attorney, New York City 
Ambassador Richard Stone, Ambassador at Large for Central 
America 
Dr. Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute 
Dr. Robert Hunter, Georgetown University 
Dr. Robert Pastor, University of Maryland 
Mr. William Hyland, Carnegie Endowment 
Ambassador Deane Hinton, former Ambassador to El Salvador 
Dr. Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University 
October 7 (Session on Additional Economic Topics) 
Mr. Carlos Manuel Castillo M., President, Central Bank of 
Costa Rica 
Mr. Gert Rosenthal, United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America 
Mr. Marc Leland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator 
October 21 - 22 (Session on U.S. Interests) 
Ambassador J. William Middendorf II, u.s. Permanent 
Representative to the OAS 
Mr. David Rockefeller 
James A. Hickey, Archbishop of Washington 
Mr. Carl s. Gershman, United States Mission to the UN 
Ambassador Hilliam H. Luers, former Ambassador to Venezuela 
Dr. Luis Aguilar, Georgetown University 
Dr. Jorge Dominguez, Harvard University 
Dr. samuel Huntington, Harvard University; Woodrow 
Hilson Center 
Mr. Ed Gonzalez, Rand Corporation 
Mr. Brian Jenkins, Rand Corporation 
Mr. David Ronfeldt, Rand Corporation 
Mr. Cesar Sereseres Rand Corporation 
Mr. Norman Podhoretz, Editor-in-Chief, Commentary 
Mr. David Aaron, Vice President, Oopenheimer & Co. 
12. 
November 2 
Mr. James H. Michel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs 
Mr. L. Craig Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs 
Mr. Philander Claxton, The Futures Group 
Mr. John Stover, The Futures Group 
Mr. Arnoldo Torres, National Executive Director, League of 
United Latin American Citizens 
Dr. Seymour Rubin, Executive Director, American Society of 
International Law 
Dr. Ronald Lohrding, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Dr. Verne Loose, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Dr. Rey Morales, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Dr. John Whetten, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Msgr. Jose Joaquin Salcedo, Accion Cultural Popular 
Dr. James Murphrey, agricultural expert 
Dr. Louis Roberts, agricultural expert 
Dr. E.T. York, Board for International Food and 
Agricultural Development, AID 
November 16 - 17 
Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs 
Mr. L. Craig Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs 
Mr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning 
and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, DOS 
General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, World Council of Churches 
Mr. Michael Novak, American Enterprise Institute 
Central Intelligence Agency briefing 
December 9 
General Eugenio Vides Casanova, Defense Minister 
of El Salvador 
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave, former Senior Editor of Newsweek 
magazine 
13. 
Participants in Individual Meetings in the United States 
with Members of the Commission 
Alfredo Cesar Aguirre, former President of the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua 
Juan Agurcia, Ambassador of Honduras 
Diego Aria, former Governor of Caracas 
Nicholas Ardito Barletta, Vice President, Latin American and 
Caribbean Region, World Bank 
Belisario Betancur, President of Colombia 
Luis Boorstein, Costa Rica 
Aquilino Edgardo Boyd, Ambassador of Panama 
Adolfo Calero, member of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN• 
Francisco Campbell, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua 
Gonzalo Carias, President of Central Bank of Honduras 
Mario Carvajal, Minister of Exports and Investments, Costa Rica 
Lawrence Chewning, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Panama 
Manuel Cordero, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Nicaragua 
Arturo Corleto, Minister of Finance, Honduras 
Arturo Cruz, former Junta member, Government of National 
Reconstruction (GRN• , Nicaragua 
Jorge Espinosa de los Reyes, Ambassador of Mexico 
Frederico Fahsen, Ambassador of Guatemala 
Alvaro Gomez, Ambassador of Colombia 
Luis Guardia, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Costa Rica 
Antonio Jarquin, Ambassador of Nicaragua 
Archbishop Pio Laghi, Papal Nuncio to the United States 
Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, President of the Costa Rican Commission 
on Central America 
Jose Montes, Political Counselor, Embassy of Guatemala 
Angel Navarro Deshon, former Vice Minister of Agriculture, 
Nicaragua 
Martin Peretz, Editor, The New Republic 
Marciel Perez Chiriboga, Ambassador of Venezuela 
Carlos Andres Perez, former President of Venezuela 
Diego Pizano, Economic Secretary to the President of Colombia 
Ernesto Rivas Gallont, Ambassador of El Salvador 
Leonel Poveda Sediles, former Vice Minister of Interior 
Commerce, Nicaragua 
Fernando Soto Harrison, Ambassador of Costa Rica 
Guillermo Ungo, President of the Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(FDR. 
Norma Vasquez, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Guatemala 
Francisco Villagran, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Guatemala 
Xavier Zavala, Secretary, Permanent Commission on Human 
Rights, Nicaragua, and Mrs. Ann McCarthy Zavala 
14. 
PANAMA 
Individuals Consulted During Trip 
To Central America 
National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America 
October 9 - 16, 1983 
President Ricardo de la Espriella 
Oyden Ortega Duran - Foreign Minister 
Mario de Diego - Minister of the Presidency 
Carlos Hoffman - Minister of Commerce 
Jose Menalco Solis Rivas - Minister of Planning 
Gabriel Castro - Minister of Finance 
Arturo D. Melo - Minister of Labor 
Hector Alexander - Vice Minister of Planning and Economic 
Development 
Ricaurte Vasquez - Vice Minister of Finance and Treasury 
Luis Anderson - Vice Minister of Labor 
Nander Pitty Velasquez - Legal advisor to various government 
agencies 
Francisco Rodriguez - Comptroller General 
Jorge Canto - Vice Minister of Agriculture 
Carlos Ozores Typaldos - Ambassador to the United Nations 
Nicholas Barletta - Regional Vice President for Latin American 
Caribbean, \vor ld Bank 
Luis Pabon - General Manager, Panama Savings Bank 
Alfredo Muschette - Presidential Assistant 
Paulino Romero - Director General IFARHU 
Fernando Manfredo - Canal Commission 
Archbishop Marcos McGrath - Archbishop of Panama 
Ceferino Sanchez- Rector of the University of Panama 
Luis Anderson - Vice Minister of Labor 
General Antonio Noriega - Commander of the Defense Forces of the 
Republic of Panama 
Col. Marcos Justine - Deputy Chief of Staff 
Major Aristedes Valdonedo - Defense Force Staff 
Major Armando Palacios - Defense Force Staff 
Lt. Commander Jesus Antonio Correa - Commander of the Panamanian 
Navy 
Major Teodoro Alexander - Commander of the Panamanian Air 
Force 
Lt. Col Alberto Purcell - Civic Action 
Major Luis Ruiz - General Staff 
Lt. Col Julio Ow Young - General Staff 
Lt. Col Bernardo Barrera - Chief of Defense/Security Commission 
15. 
PANAMA (cont.) 
Ruben Dario Carles - Member of Molinera National Directorate 
Joseph L. Saltiero - President of the Panamanian Bankers 
Association 
Frederico Humberto Azcarraga - President of Panamanian National 
Fisheries Association 
Jorge Abadia Arias -Secretary General PRD 
Raul Pedro Brostella - Vice President PRD 
Nils Castro - National Directorate PRD 
Berta Torrijos de Arosomena - President of PRD 
Ricardo Arais Calderon - President of Christian Democratic Party 
Hilderbrando Adames - First Vice President Authentic Panamanian 
Party 
Juan Medrano - Labor Party Political Commission 
Roger Decerega - Labor Party Training Secretary 
Jose Renan Esquivel - Presidential Candidate Leftist Coalition 
Dominador Baldomero Bazan - President of Chamber of Commerce 
Ricardo Monterrey- President of the Panamanian Confederation of 
Workers 
Antonio Reina - Secretary General AFSCME 
Leroy Jackson - Assistant Secretary General of Confederation of 
Panamanian Workers 
Gabriel Galdeano - Organization Secretary-Confederation of 
Panamanian Workers 
Delfin Galvez - Rector, Catholic University 
Paulino Romero - Institute of Human Resources 
Ambassador Briggs 
General Gorman - SOUTHCOM 
General Woerner - SOUTHCOM 
General McAuliffe - Panama Canal Commission 
COSTA RICA 
President Luis Alberto Monge 
Fernando Volio - Foreign Minister 
Alberto Fait - First Vice President 
Armando Arauz - Second Vice President 
Manuel Carballo - Minister of the Presidency 
Alfonso Carro - Minister of Government and Police 
Angel Edmundo Solano - Minister of Public Security 
Frederico Vargas - Minister of Finance 
Francisco Morales - Minister of Agriculture and Livestock 
Marco Antonio Lopez - Minister of Economy and Commerce 
Eugenio Rodriguez - Minister of Public Education 
Juan Jamarillo - Minister of Health 
Guillermo Sandoval - Minister of Labor and Social Welfare 
Hernan Gonzalez - Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports 
Carlos Jose Gutierrez - Minister of Justice 
Calixto Chaves - Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mines 
Joe Manuel Salazar - Minister of Agrarian Development 
Claudio Volio - Minister-Director of OFIPLAN 
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COSTA RICA (cont.) 
Mario Carvajal - Minister-Counselor of Exports 
Rodolfo Silva - Minister Counselor of Finance and External Debt 
Armando Vargas - Minister Counselor of Information and 
Communications 
Rafael Angel Rojas - Presidential Advisor for Cooperative 
Development 
Oscar Aguilar Burgarelli - UNIDAD Leader in the Legislative 
Assembly 
Danilo Chaverri - Deputy UNIDAD leader in the Legislative 
Assembly 
Rodrigo Mora - PLN leader in the Legislative Assembly 
Miguel Guillen - Deputy PLN leader in the Legislative 
Assembly 
Rodolfo Navas - PLN Congressman 
Fabio Araya - President of the Legislative Assembly 
Gilbert Brown - Secretary General of the National Con-
fede~ation of Workers 
Eduardo Irias - President of the National Confederation of 
workers 
Guido Miranda - General Manager of Social Security 
Rodrigo Madrigal - Chairman of the Costa Rican Counterpart 
Commission 
Jorge Manuel Dengo - Member of the Costa Rican Commission 
Fernando Soto Harrison - Ambassador to the United States 
Ronald Garcia - Vice Minister of Exports. 
Minor Vargas - Advisor, Ministry of Exports 
Carlos Pacheco - Member of the Costa Rican Commission 
Daniel Oduber - Former Foreign Minister 
Gonzalo Facio - Former Foreign Minister 
Msgr. Roman Arrieta - Archbishop of San Jose 
Eduardo Ulibarri - Editor of La Nacion 
Rodrigo Fournier - TV Commentator 
Guido Fernandez - TV Commentator 
Alfonso Robelo - leader of Nicaraguan group, ARDE 
Oliver Castro -General Manager, Central Bank 
Eduardo Lizano - Dean, School of Economics, University of 
Costa Rica 
Fernando Naranjo - Executive Director, Costa Rican Coalition 
for Development Initiatives 
Jorge Torres - Vice Minister of Agriculture 
Francisco Murrillo - Director General, Inter-American Institute 
for Agriculture Cooperation 
Rodolfo Quiros - Former Minister of Agriculture 
Guillermo von Breymann - General Manager, BANEX 
Richard Breck - President, CINDE 
Sam Stone - CIAPA 
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COSTA RICA (cont.) 
Jose Figueres - Former President 
Oscar Arias - Secretary General of the PLN 
Rafael Angel Calderon - Leader of UNIDAD Coalition 
Rafael Grillo - Vice-President of Central American Christian 
Democratic Parties 
Francisco Saenz - President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Rafael Villegas - Director of the Civil Registry 
Constantino Urcuyo - Head of Political Science Department, 
University of Costa Rica 
Carlos Saenz Pacheco - President of FERTICA 
Enrique Cheverri - former manager of Agrarian Development Inst. 
Guido Nunez - Deputy Secretary General of National Workers 
Federation 
Luis Paulino Echeverri - President of Union Solidarista 
Marcelo Marten - son of founder of Solidarismo 
Jose Marica Crespo - businessman 
Alfo Piva - Rector of the National Univeristy 
Jaime Ordonez - President of the Student Federation of the 
University of Costa Rica 
Carlos Jose Gutierrez - Minister of Justice 
Jose Luis Monteil - Representative of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Migration 
Ambassador Winsor 
EL SALVADOR 
President Alvaro Magana 
Fidel Chavez Mena - Foreign Minister 
Francisco Guerrero - Minister of the Presidency 
Jose Napoleon Duarte - Christian Democratic Party 
Roberto D'Aubuisson - President of the Constiuent Assembly 
General Flores Lima - Acting Minister of Defense, service 
commanders and members of the General Staff 
Monsignor Kada - Papal Nuncio 
Monsignor Freddy Delgado - National Human Rights Commission 
Manuel Lainez Mendez - Human Rights Commission 
Mario Luis Velasco - Human Rights Commission 
Bejamin Cestoni - Human Rights Commission 
Francisco Quinonez - Peace Commission 
Guillermo Trabanino - Peace Commission 
Monsignor Marcos Rene Revelo - Peace Commission 
Roberto Murray - Economic Foundation 
Conrado Lopez - Chamber of Commerce 
Rigoberto Monge - President National Association of Private 
Enterprise 
Alberto Benitez - President, Central Bank 
Roberto Escobar - PAISA 
Fortin Magana - Democratic Action 
Raul Molina - Party of National Reconciliation 
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El SALVADOR (cont.) 
Jorge Ruiz Camacho - President ACOPAI 
Ramon Aistides Mendoza - Salvadoran Campesino Union 
Salvador Carazo - Secretary General of the Construction Workers 
and Transportation Workers Federation 
Gregorio Rosa Chavez - Auxiliary Bishop of the Archdiocese of 
San Salvador 
Ignacio Martin Baro- Vice Rector, Central American University 
Ambassador Pickering 
GUATEMALA 
Chief of State Brig. General Oscar Mejia Victores 
Fernando Andradae Diaz - Foreign Minister 
Haroldo Cabrera - Acting Minister of the Interior 
Brigadier General Hector Mario Lopez Fuentes and other members 
of the General Staff 
Arturo Padilla Lira - Minister of the Economy 
Col. Leonardo Figueroa Villate - Minister of Finance 
Mare! Martinez - Secretary General Guatemalan Confederation for 
Labor Unity (CUSG) 
Juan Francisco Alfaro - Legal Advisor CUSG 
Adolfo Hernandez - Adjunct Secretary General CUSG 
Felix Zarazua - Cachiquel Indians 
Fortunato Pablo Mendoza - Quiche Indians 
Monsignor Ramiro Pellecer Samayoa - Interim Vicar 
Monsignor Eduardo Ernesto Fuentes Duartes - Bishop Coadjutor 
of Solola 
Domingo Guitz Cuxil - Protestant Leader 
Guillermo Percy Galindo Ordonez - Protestant Leader 
Rudolfo Estrada - former Vice Minister of Agriculture 
Raul Sierra Franco - Secretary General of Central American 
Economic Integration 
Gilberte Secaira - CABEI 
Carlos Enrique Rivera - Executive Secretary of Central American 
Federation of Chambers and Associations 
Industry 
Luis Alberto Archila - President of the Bar Association 
Arturo Herburgher - President Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Jaime Caceres Knox - Private Business Consultant 
Jorge Skinner Klee - Supreme Court Justice 
Roberto Herrera - Former Foreign Minister 
Leone! Gonzalez Bolanos - Planning Council Director 
Miguel von Hoegen - Planning Council 
Ariel Rivera Irias - Planning Council 
Ronald Dent - President of the Chamber of Commerce 
Jose Miguel Gaitan Alvarez - Professor Rafael Landivar 
University 
Twenty three representatives of pre-party committees attended a 




President Roberto Suazo Cordoba 
Edgardo Paz Barnica - Foreign Minister 
Carlos Flores Facusse - Minister of Presidency 
General Gustavo Alvarez - Chief of the Armed Forces 
Leticia Ma Tay - Minister of Economy and Commerce 
Arturo Corletta Moreira - Minister of Finance and Public Credit 
Gustavo Alfaro - Special Economic Advisor to the President 
Luis Flores - Executive Secretary of Superior Economic Planning 
Council 
Gonzalo Carias Pineda - President of the Central Bank 
Ubudoro Arriaga Iraheta - Director of the National Agrarian 
Institute 
Jose Azonca del Hoyo - Liberal Party Congressman 
Donald Suzao Tome - Nationalist Party Congressman 
Carlos Lopez Contreras - Foreign Ministry Advisor 
Leo Vallardes Lanza - Foreign Ministry Advisor 
Jorge Hernandez - Foreign Ministry Advisor 
Mauricio Villeda Bermudez - Honduran Human Rights Commission 
Oswaldo Ramos Soto - Rector, University of Honduras 
Carlos Roberto Reina - President of the Inter-American Human 
Rights Court 
Paul Vinelli - President, Banco Atlantica 
Roberto Galvez - Government Debt Negotiator 
Jaime Rosenthal -· Bank President 
Dante Ramirez - President of Central American Bank of Economic 
Integration (CABEI) 
Felix Martinez - CABEI 
Victoria Diaz - CABEI 
Frandisco Guerrero - President, North Coast Workers Federation 
Adan Benitez - President, Honduran Federation of Free Workers 
Mariano de Jesus Gonzalez - Secretary General, Honduran 
Confederation of Workers 
Mario Belot - San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce 
Fernando Larzibal - Council of Private Enterprise 
Miguel Facusse - Pro-Honduras Association 
Lt. Col Juan Lopez Grijalva - Chief, Armed Forces Intelligence 
Col. Jose Bueso Rosa - Chief of Joint Staff 
Walter Lopez - Air Force Commander 
Col Ruben Montoya - Honduran Navy Commander 
Werner Blatter - UN High Commission on Refugees 




Enrique Bolanos - COSEP 
Ramiro Gurdian - COSEP 
Benjamin Lanzas - COSEP 
Andres Zuniga - COSEP 
William Baez - COSEP 
Ernesto Palazio - COSEP 
Jaime Bengochea - COSEP 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro - La Prensa 
Jaime Chamorro - La Prensa 
Roberto Cardenal - La Prensa 
Luis Rivas Leiva - Social Democratic Party 
Miriam Arguello - National Coordinator of Democratic 
Conservative Party 
Mario Oviedo - Secretary General Constitutional Liberal Party 
Augustin Jarquin - President, Social Christian Party 
Edgardo Rivas Gasteazoro - President of Democratic Coordinating 
Council 
Jose Altimi~ano - Nicaraguan Workers Central 
Augustin Rodriguez - Nicaraguan Workers Central 
Alvin Guthrie - Confederation of Labor Unification 
Jose Espinosa - Confederation of Labor Unification 
Xavier Zavala - Permanent Commission on Human Rights 
Line Hernandez - Permanent Commission on Human Rights 
Monsignor Obando y Bravo - Archbishop of Managua 
Commandante Daniel Ortega - Coordinator of the Junta, and member 
of the National Directorate of the 
FSLN 
Miguel D'Escoto - Foreign Minister 
Nora Astorga - Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Victor Tinoco - Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sub-Commandante Rafael Solis - Vice President of the Council of 
State and other members of the 
Council 
Two other small groups sessions were devoted to economic and 
human rights issues from the GRN-FSLN perspective 
Julio Ramos - Sandinista Army Intelligence 
Saul Arana - Foreign Ministry Official 
Antonio Jarquin - Ambassador to the U.S. 
Ambassador Quainton 
21. 
Individuals consulted During Trip 
To Mexico and Venezuela 
National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America 
December 12-15, 1983 
Mexico City (December 12-13) 
In addition to Ambassador John Gavin and his staff, the 
Commission met and consulted with the following: 
President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado 
Bernado Sepulveda Amor, Secretary of Foreign Relations 
Under Secretaries of Foreign Relations: 
Alfonso de Rosenzweig-Diaz 
Victor Flores Olea 
Ricardo Valero Becerra 
Jorge Eduardo Navarrette 
Jesus Silva Herzog Flores, Secretary of Finance and 
Public Credit 
--Francisco Suarez Davila, Under Secretary of Finance 
Members of the Mexican Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
Sen. Miguel Gonzalez Avelar 
Sen. Celso Humberto Delgado Ramirez 
Sen. Alfonso Zegbe Sanen 
Sen. Victor Manzanilla Schaffer 
Sen. Humberto Hernandez Haddad 
Sen. Hugo B. Margain 
Sen. Raul Salinas Lozano 
Sen. Jose Ramirez Gamero 
Sen. Antonio Martinez Baez 
Sen. Gonzalo Martinez Corbala 
and other Senators: 
Sen. Riva Palacio 
Sen. Millan Escalante 
Sen. Gonzalez Garredo 
Sen. Sobarzo Loaiza 
Academic/Intellectual Leaders: 
Dr. Olga Pellicer de Brody 
Lie. Sergio Raimond-Kedilhac 
Dr. Lorenzo Meyer 
Dr. Eduardo Borrell Navarro 
Dr. Miguel Gonzalez Carranca 
22. 
Private Sector Leaders: 
Antonio Ruiz Galindo 
Claudio X. Gonzalez 
Jorge Chapa 
Jacobo Zaidenweber 
Manuel sosa de la Vega 
Gabriel Alarcon, Jr. 
Caracas (December 14-15) 
In addition to Ambassador George Landau and his staff, the 
Commission met and consulted with the following: 
President Luis Herrera Campins 
President-Elect Jaime Lusinchi 
Members of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs (CARE): 
Gustavo Planchart 
Ignacio Arcaya 
Ignacio Iribarren Borges 
Aristides Calvani 
Luis Esteban Rey 
Jose Angel Ciliberto 
Luis Herrera Marcano 
Gustavo Gonzalez Eraso 
Rafael Emilio Marquez 
Efraen Schacht Aristiguieta 






Carlos Guillermo Rangel 
Labor leaders: 
Manuel Penalver 





Luis Raul Matos Azocar 
Hector Hurtado 
Luis Ignacio Mendoza 





Jose Rafael Revenga 
24. 
THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION 
ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
LEAD CONSULTANTS 
u.s. Interests 
Ambassador William H. Luers 
Mr. Carl s. Gershman 
Economic Development 
Mr. Alan Stoga 
Dr. Sidney Weintraub 
Social Development 
Mr. William c. Doherty, Jr. 
Mr. Edward Marasciulo 
Political Develooment 
Security 
Dr. Howard J. Wiarda 
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky 
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes 
General Gordon Sumner 
Dr. Gregory Treverton 
Diplomatic Options 
Dr. Mark Falcoff 
Dr. Robert Hunter 
25. 
STAFF ORGANIZATION 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 
Chairman 
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger 
Ms. Chris Vick, Personal Assistant to Dr. Kissinger 
Executive Director 
Ambassador Harry w. Shlaudeman 
Mr. Gerald M. Sutton, Deputy Executive Director 
Editor 
Mr. Raymond K. Price 
Congressional Relations 
Mr. Tom c. Korologos, Director 
Ms. Jonna Lynne Cullen, Assistant Director 
Public Affairs 
Mr. Herbert E. Hetu, Director 
Mr. Charles A. Black, Jr., Assistant to Director 
Staff 
Mr. Joshua B. Bolten, Executive Assistant 
Mr. John Cavallaro, Administrative Officer 
Ms. Colleen Getz, Research Analyst 
Mr. Robin Little, Assistant Research Officer 
Ms. Diane Maimone, Secretary to Executive Director 
Ms. Sharon Mussomeli, Staff Assistant 
Ms. Barbara Rangel, Secretary to Deputy Director 
Mr. Timothy Stater, Assistant Research Officer 
Mr. J. Raymond Walser, Research Officer 
Military Aides 
Maj Edward J. Robarge 
CMSgt Gary Glaeser 
MSG Roger Goodman 
YNC Jerry Zarecky 
YNl Paul Heine 
26. 
Contadora/Central Anerica Docunent of Obiect~;es 
At their Septe~ber 7-10, 1983 ~eeting in Panama, the 
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Four and the Central 
Anerican countries agreed ~D the following objectives for 
continuing negotiations o~~the Central American problem: 
1. To promote detente in the area while avoiding any action 
that jeopardizes the political trust needed for an effective, 
peaceful dialogue. 
2. To put an end to conflicts by making a political cornmit~ent 
to the achievement of regional peace and stability by avoiding 
any action that might hinder these objectives. 
3. To resolve controversies by peaceful means on the basis of 
mechanisms commonly agreed on. 
4. To curb the arms race in all its forms and to initiate 
negotiations on the control and reduction of the current arms 
inventory and the number of armed troops. 
5. To ban in their territories the presence of foreign forces, 
facilities, or military bases. 
6. To reach agreements in order to reduce, with an eye to 
eliminating, the presence of foreign military or other advisers 
who might be used for military and security purposes. 
7. To eliminate the arms traffic for persons, groups, or 
organizations trying to destabilize the Governnents of Central 
America, and to establish control mechanisms for this purpose. 
8. To prevent the use of their territories and to abstain from 
either lending or permitting either military or logistical 
support to those individuals, groups, or organizations trying 
to destablize Central American governments. 
9. To abstain from either fomenting or endorsing terrorist or 
sabotage actions in the area countries. 
10. To organize ~ixed security commissions and coordinate 
direct communications systems to prevent and, if needed, 
resolve incidents between bordering and nonbordering states. 
11. To respect and guarantee the exercise of human, political, 
civilian, economic, social, religious, and cultural rights. 
27. 
12. To adopt measures guaranteeing the improvement of pooular 
consultation methods and the people's effective participation 
in the decision-making process as regards the political conduct 
of the states: also, to guarantee the free access of the various 
political currents to the electoral processes. 
13. To promote national reconciliation actions in those cases 
where profound divisions ~~ve taken place within society by 
establishing representative and pluralistic systems. 
14. To foster suitable conditions for the voluntary 
repatriation of Central American refugees or, if such were the 
case, to offer the necessary facilities for their integration 
or relocation under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refuges or other similar international organizations. 
15. To endorse actions undertaken to obtain material aid for 
Central Anerican refugees. 
16. To set in motion economic and social development programs 
to achieve greater welfare and an equitable distribution of 
wealth. 
17. To revitalize and normalize economic integration 
mechanisms to achieve sustained development based on solidarity 
and mutual benefit. 
18. To make joint efforts to obtain foreign monetary resources 
to insure additional resources with which to finance the 
reactivation of intraregional trade, to o~ercome the serious 
balance of payment problems, to attract funds for working 
capital, to endorse programs for expanding and restructuring 
productive systems, and to foment medium- and long-term 
investment plans. 
19. To make joint efforts to obtain better and broader access 
to international markets in order to expand the trade flow 
between Central American countries and the rest of the world, 
especially the industrialized countries; through a revision of 
the commercial practices, the elimination of tariff and 
nontariff barriers, and the guarantee of profitable and just 
prices for regional exports. 
20. To make joint efforts toward obtaining technical 
cooperation mechanisms for the planning, programming, and 
execution of varied plans for commercial investment and 
promotion. 
21. To begin immediate negotiations to conclude the treaties 
and other international documents needed to formalize the 
co~itments included in this document and to guarantee the 











u.s. Economic Assistance 
Fiscal Year 1983 
(Development Assistance, 
ESF, PL 480) 
Perspective 
NICARAGUA 





90 percent of total adult population 
none 
Nicaragua is the largest in land area and the most thinly 
populated of the five republics - only 43 persons per square 
mile. It is also the Central American country with the most 
turbulent history. Bloody conflicts bet\veen Liberals and 
Conservatives, and among factions of these parties, attracted 
repeated foreign intervention in the last century and the early 
decades of this one. British penetrations along the Mosquito 
coast dated from colonial times and left a legacy of language 
and culture important in that area to this day. 
In 1855, a Tennessee-born freebooter, William Walker, 
invaded Nicaragua vvith the intent of converting all of Central 
America into a slave-holding colony of the United States. 
Combined military forces from the five republics drove Walker 
out two years later. Trying again in 1860 he was caught and 
executed in Honduras. Although Halker was disavowed by the 
U.~. Government from the outset, this episode left a deep fear 
of u.s. intervention and helped shape Central American 
attitudes toward this country down through the years. 
From the 1840's on the United States Government took a 
particular interest in Nicaragua as the possible site of an 
inter-oceanic canal. (The existence of Lake Managua meant in 
theory that a canal could more easily be dug across Nicaragua 
than elsewhere on the isthmus.) Involvement in Nicaragua's 
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internal affairs and rivalry with the British for influence 
there followed from that interest. In 1893 the Liberal Party 
strongman, Jose Santos Zelaya, seized power in Nicaragua and, 
among other forceful moves, cancelled a concession held by a 
u.s. company to build a canal. Continuing turbulence in the 
region, in large part created by Zelaya's ambitions, led the 
TctLt Administration in cooperation with Mexico to promote a 
series of central American treaties directed at limiting 
armaments, prohibiting the export of revolution and 
establishing arbitration agreements to settle disputes. These 
efforts did not prevent Zelaya in 1907 from invading Honduras 
with a 16,000-man army and occupying Tegucigalpa. 
In 1909 the United States intervened openly in Nicaragua, 
landing Marines and deposing Zelaya. The succeeeding 
Conservative regime was unable to establish internal peace and 
the Marines returned in 1912 to stay, with one brief 
interruption, until 1933. The United States pursued the 
elusive goal of political stability in Nicaragua during those 
years, concerned that turbulence and the country's inability to 
pay its debts would offer an opportunity for the intervention 
of another power. In the background of this policy was the 
continuing preoccupation with Nicaragua as the site for a 
canal. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, signed in 1914, granted the 
United States the sole right in perpetuity to construct a 
canal. By this time, with the Panama Canal in operation, the 
objective was to preempt any other nation with an interest in 
such a project. The circumstances in which the Treaty were 
negotiated and its terms constituted over the years a 
humiliation in the eyes of many Nicaraguans and other Central 
Americans. (The treaty was abrogated in 1972.) 
The withdrawl of the 100-man Marine legation guard from 
Matl~gua in 1925 touched off a new round of fighting between 
Liberals and Conservatives. The Marines came back once again 
the following year. u.s. mediation was successful, leading to 
elections and an end to the fighting in 1928, except on the 
part of the forces led by Agusto Sandino who remained in the 
field against the Marines until their departure in 1933. In an 
effort to ensure future stability, the u.s. authorities created 
a single National Guard with responsibility for all police and 
defense functions. This was the instrument Anastasio Somoza 
used after the end of the occupation to impose the dictatorship 
of the Somozas, a corrupt and repressive rule that lasted 45 
years. The precise degree of u.s. responsibility for the 
imposition and long survival of the Somoza regime is a matter 
of dispute. But that many Central Americans, especially 
Nicaraguans, have associated the dictatorship with u.s. 
intervention and subsequent u.s. support is clear. This 




Nicaragua developed economically in the pattern we have 
identified with Central America, although with somewhat greater 
diversification, including mining, lumber, cocoa and livestock 
production. The average per capita growth rate between 1960-78 
of over 6 percent was one of the highest in the region and 
income calculated in a per capita basis was superior to that of 
Honduras or El Salvador. But again in the ECLA formulation, 
national income \vas distributed in a "flagrantly inequitable 
manner." In 1978, the upper five percent of the population 
received approximately 40 percent of the national income. 
Social conditions paralleled those we have seen elsewhere in 
the region: pervasive illiteracy (40-50 percent), a high 
infant mortality rate (around 120/1,000 per live births) and 
widespread malnutrition among the urban and rural poor. 
The Somoza dictatorship was, of course, Nicaragua's 
distinctive feature in political terms. The concentration of 
military, economic and political power in the hands of the 
family made the structure of authority ultimately more 
vulnerable than in other Central American societies where power 
was dispersed among the members of larger elites and their 
military allies. (The Somozas, for one example, controlled 
about half of the country's agricultural production.) The 
personalistic nature of this repressive dictatorship also 
converted it into a repugnant anachronism for the outside world 
-- a symbol of an age of tyrants now passed in Latin America. 
That perception made the regime an object of international 
opprobrium in its later years and encouraged outside 
intervention in Nicaragua's affairs as internal opposition grew. 
A major force in that opposition was the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Sandinista movement 
emerged from the universities in the usual fashion of 
clandestine Latin American opposition. In 1961 a group of 
about 20 students founded the FSLN, enlisting the name of the 
hero of guerilla resistance to the u.s. Marine occupation. (It 
should be noted that Augusto Sandino himself was an ardent 
nationalist, but not a Marxist. At one point he expelled 
Farabundo Marti from his forces for being a communist. Marti 
is, of course, the revered martyr of today's Salvordoran 
guerilla movement.) The FSLN had ties to Castro's Cuba from 
the outset through its leading figure, Carlos Fonseca, who for 
a time lived in Havana in exile. The Sandinistas staged a 
series of terrorist attacks through the 1960's, but were 
several times virtually wiped out by Somoza's security forces. 
Before 1978 they made little headway, either in attracting 
popular support or shaking the grip of the regime. 
The murder in January 1978 of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, 
editor of the opposition newspaper in La Prensa and implacable 
foe of the Somozas, set off what has aptly been called a 
"national mutiny" against the regime, Nicaraguans across the 
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entire spectrum of society came together in a common effort to 
bring the regime down. With the death of Chamorro the 
Sandinistas emerged as the symbol of opposition to Somoza. 
Other opposition forces were fragmented. Many Sandinistas had 
been trained for guerrilla combat in Cuba and, with their own 
supply of Cuban arms, were well positioned to take the 
leadership of the upheaval, even though they constituted only a 
minority of the movement. They formed a people's militia and 
recruited large numbers into their fighting forces, many of 
these youngsters, some of no more than 12 years. The barbarous 
cruelties committed by Somoza's forces greatly aided that 
recruitment. 
Representatives of the FSLN joined with political parties, 
business and professional groups to establish in 1978 the Broad 
Opposition Front (FAO). This association \lith democratic, 
non-Marxist groups enabled the guerrilla leaders to present 
themselves as heading a democratic movement and to obtain 
external material and political support that might not 
otherwise have been forthcoming. That was particularly the 
case with the Socialist International, some Western European 
governments, as well as with human rights, church and political 
groups in the United States. The FAO had virtually dissolved 
by early 1979 because of tactical differences among its member 
groups and as the conflict became increasingly militarized 
under Sandinista leadership. But the front had clearly served 
its purpose. 
The Sandinista-led forces initially were no match for 
Somoza's professionally-trained National Guard. But they 
enjoyed distinct advantages in external support and in the 
progressive internal collapse of the Somoza dictatorship. The 
government of President Carazo in Costa Rica permitted the use 
of that country's territory for guerrilla recruitment, staging 
and safehaven. Financial support and arms came to the 
Sandinistas from Venezuela, Panama and Colombia. The United 
States, the country the Somozas had long advertised -- for much 
of the time erroneously -- as friend and ally, had already cut 
off the regime's supply of arms and ended several aid projects 
in January of 1979. In the spring of that year, after the end 
of Carlos Andres Perez's presidential term in Venezuela, Fidel 
Castro took over as the principal outside supporter of the 
rebellion. 
In March 1979, after more than a year of efforts under 
Castro's guidance, the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) announced the unification of its three guerrilla 
factions. During the next three months, Cuba escalated its 
military involvement, trans-shipping through Panama to Costa 
Rica 450 tons of weapons for use in the Sandinistas' final 
offensive. The Cubans also provided the FSLN with some 200 
military advisers, who manned the heavy artillery and other 
sophisticated weapons, and with an "internationalist brigade" 
drawn from Central and south American left-wing revolutionary 
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groups. In addition, an intelligence center was set-up at the 
Cuban Embassy in San Jose under the control of Julian Lopez, 
the intelligence officer sent to Costa Rica the previous year 
to coordinate Cuba's assistance to the FSLN. 
Critical diplomatic support for the rebellion was also 
forthcoming. In the Organization of American States, Venezuela 
led the effort to isolate the regime. At a climactic meeting 
of the hemisphere's foreign ministers on June 21, 1979 the OAS 
condemned Somoza and called for him to step down in the 
interests of peace and democracy, an unprecendented event in an 
organization dedicated to non-intervention. The United States 
did not oppose that call, but its proposals for a peace-keeping 
force under OAS auspices and the formation of a broadly-based 
provisional government in Nicaragua were not accepted. The 
policy of the Carter Administration from the outset of the 
crisis in Nicaragua was to support measures which would open 
the way for a democratic alternative to the Somoza 
dictatorship, while preserving significant elements of the 
National Guard as a barrier to the conquest of power by the 
extreme left. 
In early July of 1979 the Sandinistas established in San 
Jose, Costa Rica a Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) 
prepared to take power once Somoza fell. Heading the GRN was a 
junta composed of three leaders of the FSLN (Sergio Ramirez, 
Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan) and two prominent 
representatives of Nicaragua's democratic forces (businessman 
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro, widow of the murdered 
Pedro Joaquin). On July 9 the junta issued the "Basic statute 
of the Republic of Nicaragua," which purportedly still serves 
as Nicaragua's fundamental law. It guarantees the 
"organization of a truly democratic government" and all 
fundamental human rights, including the right to organize 
political parties "without ideological discrimination," full 
freedom of expression and information, freedom of religion and 
freedom to organize labor unions. On July 17 the junta 
dispatched a letter to the Secretary General of the OAS 
reiterating the guarantee of fundamental rights and promising 
to hold "the first free elections our country has known in this 
century." 
The Government of National Reconstruction assumed office in 
Nicaragua on July 19 following Somoza's departure and in the 
aftermath of the bloodiest conflict in Central American 
history. Estimates of the dead vary, but some experts put the 
cost in lives as high as 50,000 -- a staggering total in a 
country of only 2.7 million people. In its early stages the 
new government enjoyed massive popular support and aroused 
genuine popular enthusiasm. Virtually all outside observers 
were in agreement that the atmosphere in Nicaragua after the 
success of the revolution and through the early months of 1980 
was one of optimism -- of high hope, that a bright new day had 
dawned for the country. The energies of young Nicaraguans --
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and they make up the majority of the population -- were 
enlisted in the cause of promised reform and the building of a 
just society. 
The Government of National Reconstruction launched 
campaigns against illiteracy and the chronic health problem of 
the poor -- the twin curses of the impoverished two-thirds of 
the population. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated in the 
1980 "Literacy Crusade." They reportedly helped 400,000 of 
their fellow citizens to learn to read and write. The 
"Crusade" reduced overall illiteracy by 15 percent according to 
government figures. 
As set forth in testimony to the Commission, the Somoza 
regime seems to have been largely indifferent to the health 
problems of the rural poor. One of the first measures of the 
new regime was to iodize the table salt distributed in the 
country in order to eliminate widespread endemic goiter. 
Nicaragua was the last country in Central America to take this 
step. Drives similar to the literacy campaign to eliminate 
preventable disease have reportedly eradicated polio, reduced 
maleria from 120,000 cases in 1980 to 7,000 in 1983, cut infant 
mortality from 120/1,000 in 1980 to 90/1,000 in 1982 and raised 
life expectancy from 55.2 years in 1978 to 57.6 years in 1982. 
The United states initially provided funding for these 
efforts. And the Catholic Church supported and participated in 
some features of these campaigns. 
In appearance the new government was pluralistic. Two of 
the five members of the junta were not members of the FSLN; and 
according to the basic statute, representatives of 19 political 
parties, labor federations, private sectors organizations, the 
National University and the church, along with members of the 
FSLN, were to serve on the Council of State. It soon became 
apparent, however, that real power resided in the nine-man 
National Directorate of the FSLN. 
In 1975, during its underground existence, the Sandinista 
movement had become embroiled in arguments over tactical 
theories of armed revolution -- although not over the ultimate 
objective of a Marxist-Leninist state to which the principal 
leaders were all committed. Three so-called "tendencies" 
emerged: one favoring a prolonged guerrilla war of the Chinese 
variety (the GPP); another advocating a sudden mass rising in 
the urban centers (the "proletarians"), and a third, more 
pragmatic, seeking wider alliances outside the movement (the 
terceristas). (Divisions along the same lines and over very 
much the same theories also occurred in El Salvador's FMLN). 
Under heavy pressure from Fidel Castro, who reportedly 
threatened to withdraw all assistance if the Sandinista high 
command did not unify, the three factions agreed in May of 1979 
to appoint three members from each to a joint national 
directorate. The nine members of the Directorate have since 
operated in a collegial style. No tendency or leader has 
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achieved primacy as far as can be determined. Daniel Ortega of 
the terceristas, Tomas Borge of the GPP and Jaime Wheelock of 
the "proletarians" are the most prominent in terms of public 
exposure. 
The FSLN in Power 
The Government of National Reconstruction took a form 
contrary to that envisaged in the basic statute of July 9, 
1979. That document, as we have seen, provided for the 
creation of a Council of State on which representatives of the 
political parties opposed to Somoza and a broad range of other 
existing organizations would sit. It was envisaged that the 
Council of State would act as a legislative body. Alfonso 
Robelo and other democratic leaders saw the Council in 
particular as the body that would write a constitution for the 
new state and undertake the legal and other preparations 
necessary to hold the promised elections. But the FSLN 
Directorate postponed naming the Council of state until May of 
1980, expanded the membership from the 33 planned to 47, packed 
it with Sandinista representatives of the so-called mass 
organizations and initially gave the Council only advisory 
functions. By this time Robelo and Violeta Chamorro had 
already resigned from the junta. And then Humberto Ortega, 
speaking for the Directorate in August of 1980, announced that 
there would be no elections until 1985 and that these would not 
have a "bourgeois character." 
A key element in the Sandinista drive for domination was 
the establishment of mass organizations designed to mobilize 
support for the regime in all sectors of Nicaraguan society. 
These appear to have been modeled on those previously developed 
in Cuba with the ultimate objective of replacing all 
independent intermediate institutions. In Nicaragua the 
sandinista-controlled mass organizations run from a children's 
movement (the ANS), to an association of women (the AMNLAE), to 
the Sandinista Workers Central (CST), to the Association of 
Campesino Workers (the ATC). These and other organizations, 
including pro-FSLN professional associations, are vehicles for 
indoctrination and control. Most important in this latter 
respect is the system of Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) 
established throughout the country down to the level of the 
local block unit. The CDSs provide the regime with what 
official Sandinista statements have described as "revolutionary 
vigilance," keeping watch on Nicaraguans in every neighborhood 
and identifying purported counter-revolutionaries. They are 
also charged with distributing ration cards, a formidable 
source of power in a country increasingly plagued by severe 
shortages of food and consumer goods. 
The Sandinistas have employed the mass organizations in the 
series of literacy and health campaigns to which we previously 
referred. Cuban teachers and doctors played a major role in 
mobilizing and directing the mass organizations in these 
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campaigns, which also featured heavy doses of indoctrination. 
The factor of ideology vvould explain why the Sandinistas chose 
to rely on the Cubans and ignored an offer of Peace Corps 
assistance in the literacy and public health efforts. 
The Sandinistas assert that the mass organizations create 
the basis for popular participation in government. But these 
organizations are in fact directed from the center by the 
FSLN's Department of Mass Organizations and there would appear 
to be little room for local or individual initiative. The 
drive for mass mobilization has encountered considerable 
resistance. Democratic trade union federations -- the 
Christian Democratic Workers Central of Nicaragua (CTN) and the 
Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS) with ties to the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions -- have 
struggled to maintain their independence. An umbrella 
private-sector organization, COSEP, attempts to promote the 
views of its members. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, 
and independent human rights group, the newspaper La Prensa and 
the remnants of Nicaragua's democratic political parties speak 
out as best they can. The independent labor unions, private 
sector and most opposition political organizations are loosely 
banded together in a front under the name Coordinadora 
Democratica. 
On the labor front, the government has made use of the 
state of emergency decreed in March of 1982 to suspend 
indefinitely the right to strike. Leaders of the democratic 
federations have been threatened, harassed and jailed. The 
objective of doing avvay with all rival labor organizations has 
been freely discussed by leaders of the Sandinista Workers 
Central. The CST already enjoys a monopoly in some sectors of 
the work force, including the only teachers union. COSEP, the 
umbrella organization of Nicaragua's private sector, played a 
leading role in the resistance to Somoza, but is now in a 
precarious position similar to that of the independent labor 
federations. Former junta member and a dominant figure in 
COSEP, Alfonso Rebelo, was forced into exile. Jorge Salazar, 
for a time acting president of COSEP, was shot and killed by 
Sandinista security agents in November of 1980. Other COSEP 
leaders have been jailed at various times, and current members 
live with the threat of confiscation of their properties if 
they are seen as exceeding the limits the Sandinistas impose on 
opposition activity. 
The most sweeping and ominous measure for the mobilization 
and control of the Nicaraguan people came in 1983 in the guise 
of the so-called "Law of Patriotic Military Service." It 
provides that all male citizens from 18 to 40 years will be 
required to perform active or reserve military training. 
(Females are invited to do so voluntarily.) The Sandinistas 
argue that such conscription is necessary because of the joint 
threat posed by anti-Sandinista guerrillas (labeled as the 
contras by the Sandinistas) and the revival of the Central 
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American Defense Council (CONDECA). (At the initiative of 
Guatemala, defense ministers of that country, El Salvador and 
Honduras met on September 30 last year to reconstruct CONDECA 
without Nicaraguan participation. The Commander of the Panama 
Defense Force also attended, as did the Commander in Chief of 
the u.s. southern Command.) But Nicaragua already has the 
largest armed force in Central America, and the potential to 
put more men under arms than all its neighbors combined. 
Conscription is thus perceived by many Nicaraguans as the 
ultimate means to militarize the society and bring it under 
totalitarian control. 
The conscription issue has for that reason particularly 
concerned the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
Archbishop of Nicaragua, Msgr. Obando y Bravo, was a firm 
opponent of Somoza and supported the revolution. But he spoke 
out early against Sandinista attempts to curtail personal and 
religious liberties and to foster divisions along class lines. 
The FSLN responded by denying him the use of the radio for his 
homilies. More direct efforts at intimidation followed. The 
FSLN-controlled media launched vitriolic personal attacks on 
members of the hierarchy beginning in 1982; mobs (turbas) of 
Sandinista supporters harassed and abused priests; and FSLN 
cadres in an action unprecedented anywhere shouted down the 
Pope during his visit last March to Managua. 
In September of last year the Nicaraguan Episcopal 
Conference attacked the conscription law as serving the 
interests of a party and of an ideology opposed to human rights 
rather than the interests of the nation. The Sandinistas 
reacted by sending their mobs to invade churches and to 
interrupt services. A religious demonstration on October 9 was 
broken up by gunfire and the Archbishop found it necessary to 
cancel all religious activities on the Day of the Dead 
(November 2) because of additional mob actions against Church 
services. A number of foreign priests allied with the 
Archbishop were deported at the same time. 
On the religious front, as elsewhere, the Sandinistas 
apparently have in mind replacing an existing institution with 
one under their own control. Priests who support the 
Sandinistas have created a "popular church" where the radical 
"liberation theology" -- a mixture of Marxism and Christianity 
-- is preached, as well as loyalty to the FSLN. Two men of the 
cloth who follow that theology, Fathers Miguel D'Escoto and 
Ernesto Cardenal, hold posts in the GRN cabinet. The "popular 
church" is well financed and includes a number of foreign 
priests. But the majority of priests in Nicaragua apparently 
still remain loyal to the established Church hierarchy. 
The symbol of free expression today in Nicaragua, as it has 
been for more than 40 years, is the newspaper La Prensa. It 
has fared even vwrse under the current regime than it did under 
Somoza. The paper was shut down by the authorities at various 
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times in 1980 and 1981, its plant invaded by a mob and its 
advertising, newsprint and circulation restricted. From March 
of 1982 until December of 1983 La Prensa was subject to 
comprehensive prior censorship.--With the government's monopoly 
of television and its effective control over all radio 
broadcasting, La Prensa is the last remaining independent voice 
capable of reaching a mass audience. That the paper survives 
at all seems to be due to Sandinista sensitivity over the 
regime's international image. 
Democratic political parties also hold on to a precarious 
existence. Twelve of them, including the traditional 
Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats and the Social 
Democrats have requested registration under a new political 
parties law. They are prohibited for now from campaigning and 
have access only to roadside billboards to disseminate their 
messages. The FSLN Directorate continues to promise elections 
in 1985, but for what offices and under what conditions is far 
from clear. The recently passed law governing political 
parties offers the opportunity to ban any party insufficiently 
zealous in "defense of the revolution," which in Sandinista 
terminology would seem to mean defense of the FSLN regime. The 
Sandinistas' intentions became evident in a statement by 
Comandante Humberto ortega, member of the FSLN Directorate and 
Minister of Defense: "there will not be elections to decide 
who is in power, becuase the people hold power through their 
vanguard, the Frente Sandinista." In Eastern European style 
the FSLN has put together a "Revolutionary Patriotic Front" of 
satellite parties, apparently to give a pluralistic image to 
any electoral campaign it intends to run. This front includes 
the Marxist Nicaraguan Socialist Party and radicalized 
breakaway groups of Christian and Social Democrats, in addition 
to the FSLN. 
The Sandinista drive to monopolize power is supported by 
other institutions and practices characteristic of the regimes 
in Eastern Europe and Cuba. An elaborate and increasingly 
sophisticated internal security apparatus designed by East 
Germans and Cubans has been established in the form of the 
General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). It promotes and 
monitors the required "internal vigilance" of the neighborhood 
Sandinista Defense Committees. Humberto Ortega has reportedly 
called upon the people to draw up lists of "harmful or 
potentially counter-revolutionary elements." The independent 
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), itself the object 
of continuing harassment, characterizes the situation as one of 
the "institutionalization of human rights violations" through 
such measures as the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order 
and Security which gives the police sweeping powers to deal 
with alleged "counter-revolutionary activities." The CPDH 
reports 300 people missing in police custody, numerous cases of 
torture and mistreatment of prisoners and more than 90 persons 
allegedly detained last year by the security services who have 
yet to reappear. 
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In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the 
sandinista regime established special tribunals with summary 
powers to try former National Guardsmen and others linked to 
the Somoza dictatorship. About 3,000 of these remain in 
prison. Another 2-3,000 persons have been arrested for 
political offenses since the revolution. The regime last year 
reinstituted special courts under the title of "Popular 
anti-Somoza Tribunals," again with summary powers. There is no 
provision for appeal of their sentences. 
The most widespread human rights violations have been 
perpetrated on the Miskito, sumo and Rama Indians of the 
Atlantic Coast, who have all along refused to accept Sandinista 
rule. Entire settlements have been forcibly moved away from 
what the Sandinistas consider sensitive border areas. The 
security services have employed short-term arrest and intensive 
interrogations on a massive scale to intimidate these 
indigenous populations, as Amnesty International attests. (It 
should be noted that Amnesty states in a communication to the 
Commission that it has found no significant evidence to 
substantiate charges of torture and disappearances of persons 
in Sandinista Nicaragua. This communication does not 
specifically address the allegation of the Nicaraguan Human 
Rights Commission.) 
Among Nicaraguans who struggled for a democratic outcome in 
their country, and among many Central Americans, there is a 
fear that the FSLN will succeed in establishing an irreversible 
totalitarian order. The pattern of developments this report 
has just examined indicates that little now stands in the way 
of that objective. Though many observers believe that popular 
support for the FSLN has eroded, the Sandinistas can from all 
accounts still rely on a substantial hard core of supporters 
among the youth and the urban lower class. And there are 
clearly enough enthusiasts for the Sandinista style of 
revolution to man the leadership positions in the government 
ministries, armed forces and mass organizations. With that, 
the proven Cuban model of progressive militarization, mass 
mobilization and tight security controls is likely to function 
so as to permit the FSLN to achieve its objective. There is, 
we recognize, debate as to whether that objective is a 
totalitarian state in the Cuban mold. But all nine of the FSLN 
Directorate are declared Marxist-Leninists who in their 
"fraternal" message of condolence to the soviet Communist Party 
in November 1982 referred to Brezhnev as "companero" or 
comrade. Humberto Ortega is reported to have said at one point 
that "Sandinismo and Marxism-Leninism are inseparable." Our 
examination of the Nicaraguan situation would support that 
statement. 
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The Military Buildup and the Export of Revolution 
Immediately after marching into Managua, the Sandinistas 
converted their fighting forces into the Sandinista Popular 
Army (EPS) to replace the National Guard. They refused offers 
of training assistance from Panama and Venezuela, turning 
instead to the Soviet Union and Cuba. Military advisers 
arrived in substantial numbers from Eastern Europe and Cuba. 
The EPS has now become a regular military organization with 
Army, Air Force and Navy components. These forces are 
comprised of approximately 25,000 officers and enlisted 
personnel, supported by up to 25,000 reserves and 30,000 
militia. The new conscription law will at least in theory 
permit the formation of a militia force of 200,000. The size 
of this buildup can be put in perspective by recalling that 
Nicaragua's total population is only 2.7 million and that 
Somoza•s National Guard never exceeded 9,000. After 1977, 
during the civil war, its number was raised to approximately 
15,000. It is important to note that the EPS is a Sandinista, 
not a national armed force. Its formal allegiance is to the 
FSLN, not to the Nicaraguan nation, just as the National 
Guard's declared loyalty was always to Somoza, father and sons, 
not to the state. 
This dramatic buildup in manpower has been accompanied by 
an equally impressive buildup in weaponry, most of it from the 
soviet bloc. The EPS now deploys 45-50 Soviet T-54-55 tanks --
the heaviest in Central America -- 1,000 East German trucks and 
armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, assault 
helicopters, anti-aircraft weapons, mobile multiple rocket 
launchers, patrol boats, and amphibious vehicles. The first 
delivery of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear of a type seen 
previously in Cuba took place in December 1982, giving 
Nicaragua the ability to intercept signals from throughout 
Central America. The acquisition of these and other military 
goods accelerated during 1983, with 14 deliveries arriving from 
the Soviet Union between January and August, compared to 11 
such deliveries in all of 1982. It is estimated that as much 
as 15,000 tons of soviet bloc arms and equipment reached the 
EPS in 1983, approximating the annual level of supply to Cuba 
during that country's military buildup in the early 1970's--
and, given the relative size of the two countries, representing 
a far higher level on a per capita basis. Deliveries in the 
past year included additional MI-8 helicopters, BM-21 rocket 
launchers and other artillery, tanks and armored personnel 
carriers. 
Foreign military personnel have also arrived in 
considerable numbers in Nicaragua. The most significant 
presence is that of at least 2,000 Cuban officers and men, who, 
in addition to carrying out advisory functions, could serve as 
the nucleus of a larger Cuban force to be brought in should the 
Sandinistas appear in danger of overthrow. (The Sandinista 
government asserts that the real number of Cuban military 
advisers is only 200, but it concedes that there are some 4,000 
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other Cubans in the country, purportedly on various 
non-military missions.) Several hundred Soviet, East European, 
Libyan and PLO advisers are on hand, as are representatives of 
such terrorist movements as the Basque ETA and the Argentine 
Montoneros. The foreign advisers have helped the EPS establish 
36 new military bases. East German advisers have reorganized 
Nicaragua's internal security apparatus and intelligence system 
and set up a military communications network linking Managua 
with Havana and Moscow, while the soviets are supervising the 
reorganization and "Sovietization" of the Nicaraguan economy, 
and while Bulgaria establishes especially close trade and 
shipping relations with Nicaragua. 
The Castro regime has sent in Cuban road construction 
teams, a presence recalling the capability u.s. forces found on 
the island of Grenada. The Cubans have constructed a major 
strategic road between Puerto Cabezas on the northeastern coast 
and the interior, facilitating the movement of troops and 
supplies to suppress and remove indigenous Indian residents of 
the region. They are also building one of the largest 
airfields in Central America on the eastern (sparsely 
inhabited) coast of Lake Managua; and they have supervised the 
extension of the airfields at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on 
the Atlantic Coast and Montelimar on the Pacific Coast to 
accomodate advanced jet aircraft. Some 30 Nicaraguan pilots 
who were trained in Bulgaria are now in Cuba, where it is 
reported that about an equal number of MIG warplanes designated 
for Nicaragua are based for eventual transshipment. 
Nicaragua's extraordinary military buildup and the 
substantial Cuban-Soviet bloc presence there are of grave 
concern to neighboring countries. Nicaragua's armed forces are 
far larger and much more heavily armed than those of its 
neighbors. Democratic Costa Rica to the south has no army and 
no military forces at all, except for small constabulary and 
border-guard services. Honduras, the country that believes 
itself in the most imminent danger, has an armed force of only 
about 15,000, no significant reserves, no tanks and extremely 
limited transport and communications capabilities. Its aging 
Air Force does have the advantage, but one that would quickly 
disappear if the Sandinistas were to acquire high performance 
aircraft. The larger armies in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
fully engaged as they are in combatting insurgencies, lack the 
firepower, modern equipment and trained manpower to match the 
Nicaraguan force. 
We have found that Nicaragua's neighbors perceive this 
formidable military machnine as jeopardizing their security 
both in terms of a conventional military threat and as a means 
of intimidation to facilitate the export of revolution. (It 
is, of course, questionable that the Nicaraguans could as yet 
mount a conventional cross-border attack. But the buildup 
points in the direction of acquiring that capability.) That 
the Sandinistas are committed to the spread of Marxist-Leninist 
41. 
revolution has been apparent from the early days of the 
regime. The Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Committee 
of the u.s. House of Representatives stated in September of 
1982 that "there is -- persuasive evidence that the Sandinista 
government of Nicaragua is helping train (Salvadoran) 
insurgents and is transferring arms and support from and 
through Nicaragua to the insurgents with bases of operation in 
Nicaragua. Cuban involvement in providing arms is also 
evident." At this writing there are reports that the 
Sandinistas, concerned for the security of their own regime, 
may have cut back on such support, although the evidence is not 
clear on that point. But nothing we are aware of would 
indicate that their ultimate commitment to the cause of the 
Salvadoran guerrillas has diminished. Other Marxist-Leninist 
movements of the region have, until at least recently, found 
haven in Managua, establishing permanent headquarters and 
planning their operations from there. 
Foreign Ties 
In the immediate aftermath of the Nicaraguan Revolution, 
the Sandinista regime began to forge strong ties with Cuba and 
the Soviet Union. Members of the governing junta and the 
Sandinista Directorate journeyed to Havana a month after the 
victory to receive Castro's praise for what he would later 
describe as the creation of the "second country in Latin 
America free of imperialism." The influx of Cuban military and 
civilian personnel followed in increasing numbers. 
The establishment of formal ties with other Soviet bloc 
nations was another basic objective of Sandinista foreign 
policy. Begininig in early 1980, several members of the FSLN 
National Directorate traveled to the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Bloc countries, initialing a variety of economic, 
technical, and trade agreements. The Sandinista Front and the 
Soviet Communist Party also agreed on future party-to-party 
contacts, along the same lines pursued by the Soviets with 
Castro and the revolutionary regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. 
In addition to providing economic assistance, the Soviets began 
to assist in the transfer of arms to Nicaragua, usually through 
third parties. The strength of the Soviet connection was 
demonstrated in the initial Sandinista decision against 
establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
China. As Arturo Cruz, who served on Nicaragua's governing 
junta in 1980-81, has said, the FSLN from the outset identified 
itself with the international agenda of the Soviet Union, from 
the problems of Kampuchea to the stationing of missles in 
Europe. Cruz has also noted that Sandinista propaganda organs 
draw a parallel between the democratic trade unions in 
Nicaragua and Solidarity in Poland as fellow "agents of 
imperialism." 
Consistent with its "anti-imperialist" strategy, the 
Sandinista regime has established formal ties with the PLO and 
with Libya. The PLO has provided assistance, primarily in form 
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of pilots and mechanics to the Sandinista Air Force. Libya has 
granted both financial assistance, notably a $100 million loan 
in 1981, and arms assistance. The pattern of this assistance 
became clear when the inspection of several planeloads of 
"medical supplies" by Brazilian authorities in early 1983 
yielded an extensive list of military hardware. The 
Nicaraguans have sought and received assistance from North 
Korea, South Yemen, and Vietnam. That the Sandinistas are 
prepared to work with terrorist organizations became apparent 
with the arrest in Costa Rica in September 1983 of a Basque 
terrorist infiltrated from Nicaragua with the assigned task of 
assassinating Eden Pastora. 
The Armed Opposition 
After Somoza's fall, small groups of former National 
Guardsman appeared in Nicaragua's rugged northern region along 
the Honduran border to harass operations of the Sandinista 
army. Until March of 1982 these activities were of little 
consequence. Since then anti-Sandinista insurgency has taken 
on significant proportions. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force 
(FDN) operates primarily in northwestern Nicaragua, reportedly 
with about 7,000 troops. The FDN pursues standard guerrilla 
hit-and-run tactics, attacking military outposts, staging 
ambushes, engaging in occasional pitched battles and mounting 
sabotage attacks on strategic port and airfield facilities. 
The latter have been particularly damaging at the ports of 
Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the northwestern coast where most 
of Nicaragua's petroleum supplies enter the country. 
Sandinista special forces and infantry reserves, as well as 
poorly trained militia troops, oppose these guerillas in the 
field. The regime has so far not committed army regulars in 
any significant numbers. They remain the strategic reserve and 
backbone of the Sandinistas. 
As previously indicated, the indigenous populations of 
northeastern Nicaragua from the outset were suspicious of 
sandinista rule. That area, in which the English language is 
predominant, had through history developed its own culture, 
largely in isolation from the rest of Nicaragua. The intrusion 
of the Sandinistas with their measures of mobilization and 
control was bitterly resented. The Misura Revolutionary Front, 
with about 3,0000 guerrilla fighters under arms, has evolved 
from that opposition. The Misura has proved an effective 
guerrilla force but is limited to operating in the east coast 
areas populated by the Miskito, Sumo and Rama tribes. 
In southeastern Nicaragua the Revolutionary Democratic 
Alliance (ARDE) has fielded several thousand combatants. The 
military leader of this force is Eden Pastora, formerly a top 
Sandinista military commander, known as "commandante zero," 
hero of the revolution and Vice-Minister of Defense in the FSLN 
regime. Pastora defected when he became convinced that his 
comrades had betrayed the ideals of the revolution. The 
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Revolutionary Alliance's political leader, Alfonso Robelo, a 
member of the first junta of the Governmnet of National 
Reconstruction, followed the same path, going into exile when 
he concluded that the democratic pronouncements of the 
Sandinistas were no more than empty promises. Pastora's forces 
operate in the remote southeastern region of Nicaragua and as 
yet pose no significant threat to the regime in Nicaragua. But 
the presence in the armed opposition of Pastora and Robelo with 
their impeccable anti-Somoza credentials and possible appeal to 
Sandinista supporters has clearly concerned the FSLN 
Directorate. 
It is widely alleged that the United States Government 
provides significant support to the guerrillas of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the form of arms, 
training, supplies and finance, assistance that has purportedly 
been an important factor in the FDN buildup and the expansion 
of its activities in northeastern Nicaragua. According to 
press reports, the objective is to pressure the Sandinistas to 
end their involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency and 
negotiate a regional political settlement acceptable to 
Nicaragua's neighbors. 
During 1983 the insurgency gained momentum. Although none 
of the guerrilla forces has yet been able to break out into 
Nicaragua's populous southwestern plain, the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force (FDN) in particular has continued to grow and 
expand operations. The Sandinistas charge that its strength is 
the sole result of u.s. support -- that it is an artificial 
force created by the United States for the purpose of 
reimposing Somoza-like rule. But the fact that 10,000 
Nicaraguans have voluntarily chosen the hardship and danger of 
an arduous guerrilla campaign suggests otherwise. 
That some of the guerrilla military commanders in the north 
once served in the National Guard has been exploited by the 
Sandinistas to support the charge that the entire movement is 
"Somocista." Eden Pastora and his associates in the ARDE 
guerrillas also denounce the FDN as relying on some Somocista 
leaders. But the FDN's most prominent political leaders were 
jailed and tortured by the Somoza regime. The military leader 
of the FDN, Enrique Bermudez, enjoyed such wide respect within 
the National Guard and among the moderate opposition that 
Somoza exiled him abroad for the last five year of his reign. 
The FDN guerrillas themselves insist that their objective is 
the kind of democratic order to which the Sandinistas initially 
pledged themselves. The other guerrilla groups similarly hold 
out the goal of the revindication of the 1979 revolution. 
The FSLN's Relations With the West 
Somoza's fall and the victory of what promised to be a 
democratic revolution were widely hailed in Europe, Latin 
America and the United States. The FSLN already enjoyed the 
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active support of governments and political parties in many of 
the countries of the West. The Carter Administration, although 
concerned by the leadership's Cuban associations and 
ideological rigidity, undertook a patient and concerted effort 
to build a constructive relationship of mutual respect with the 
new regime. Three days after the GRN took office the first 
planeload of food from the United States arrived in Managua. 
In the months that followed the u.s. Government furnished $8.8 
million in emergency food assistance to help alleviate the 
hunger and misery caused by the war. Total u.s. aid from 1979 
to 1981 came to $117 million, including 100,000 tons of food 
more than five times the aid provided the Somoza regime from 
1974 to 1979. The u.s. actively supported disbursements to 
Nicaragua of $102 million from the World Bank and $189 million 
from the Inter-American Development Bank during this period. 
President Carter, in September of 1979, received Daniel Ortega 
at the White House for a meeting "to strengthen the basis for a 
cooperative relationship." A distinguished congressional 
delegation visited Managua two months later. One first-hand 
observer has described Lawrence Pezzullo, the u.s. Ambassador 
in Nicaragua at the time, "as the soul of patience and tact 
with the Sandinistas." u.s. policy, as stated repeatedly by 
Administration spokesmen, was to assist the new government in 
the task of reconstruction and to encourage it in every way 
possible to carry out its commitments to pluralism within the 
country and genuine non-alignment without. 
But ideology apparently did not permit a sandinista 
response in kind. The FSLN's anthem contains the line "we 
shall fight against the Yankee, enemy of humanity." This 
perspective on the world evidently made it impossible, as 
Lawrence Harrison, Director of the United States AID mission in 
Nicaragua from 1979-81, has said, for the Sandinistas to accept 
a positive image of the United States. Humberto Ortega, in 
announcing in August of 1980 the postponement of elections for 
five years, declared that when held they would be nothing like 
the "corrupt elections" of the United States. Barricada, the 
official Sandinista newspaper from virtually its first edition, 
launched a drumbeat campaign of propaganda against the United 
States. The direction in which the regime was moving became 
particularly evident when Nicaragua abstained in the United 
Nations vote to condemn the soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
More serious for u.s. policy than this ingrained hostility 
was the contempt the Sandinistas demonstrated for their earlier 
commitments. By late 1980 it had become clear that the FSLN, 
in partnership with the Cubans, was feeding the insurgency in 
El Salvador with arms, communications facilities and advisers. 
Nonalignment had become a dead letter. And the long deferral 
of elections suggested that pluralism had suffered the same 
fate. The regime in Nicaragua continues to argue that its 
relationship of "mutual respect" with the United States was 
"fundamentally modified" by the Reagan administration when it 
took office. Yet the Carter administration, despite its 
initial goodwill, had already decided by then to suspend the 
u.s. aid to Nicaragua. 
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The Sandinistas' democratic rhetoric and commitment to 
improving the lot of the poor attracted broad sympathy in 
Western Europe and Latin America. Mexico and Venezuela 
provided oil on concessionary terms, as they did to the rest of 
Central America. But Mexico initially did not ask for payment, 
creating what is now a de facto loan of over $300 million. 
(Venezuela, on the other-hand, stopped shipments when bills 
were not paid.) Assistance in development and humanitarian 
projects came from virtually every country in Western Europe 
from governments and private organizations alike. Between July 
19, 1979 and February 11, 1982 Nicaragua received about $1.5 
billion in bilateral and multilateral loans, donations, and 
lines of credit, a figure equivalent to almost 75 percent of 
gross domestic product in 1980. By now the country has 
received over $2 billion in foreign assistance, most of it from 
western countries. 
Despite this massive influx, real GNP per capita (measured 
in 1980 dollars) was $761 in 1982, which was still lower than 
1970's $1,020. As with the economies of the other countries of 
the region, the world recession had its effect in producing 
that poor record -- as did the enormous damage done by the 1972 
earthquake and the dislocations created by the 1979 
revolution. But Nicaragua's neighbors have received 
considerably less foreign assistance than that country. 
Sandinista mismanagement, harassment of the shrinking private 
sector and heavy military expenditures would thus appear to 
have contributed to Nicaragua's deepening poverty. 
The FSLN in 1980 was given observer status in the Socialist 
International (SI), reflecting the strong sympathy for the new 
Nicaraguan regime in the Social Democrat parties of Western 
Europe and Latin America. The Mitterand government was 
particularly supportive, even agreeing in 1982 to provide 
helicopters and other military equipment. Resolutions adopted 
by the SI during the period 1980-83 on Latin American issues 
generally offered support for the FSLN's public positions on 
Central American issues. But impatience with the Sandinistas' 
failure to carry out the revolution's initial commitments began 
to appear in the attitudes of the democratic socialists and 
Western European governments. In July 1983, Willy Brandt, 
President of the SI, Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain 
and Carlos Andres Perez, ex-President of Venezuela, dispatched 
a letter to the FSLN Directorate calling for the establishment 
of an open political climate and the holding of elections in 
1984 rather than 1985. We are unaware of what, if any, 
response the FSLN made. 
Conclusions 
The FSLN still enjoys considerable sympathy in this 
country, as well as generally in the western world, despite its 
broken promises and increasingly totalitarian image. Favorable 
attitudes arise from the conviction that anything is better 
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than Somoza, from the image of a government concerned for the 
poor, and from the emotions aroused by the specter of u.s. 
intervention in the region. Yet it was precisely during the 
1979-81 period of significant u.s. financial support and 
repeated u.s. efforts to establish a policy of constructive 
engagement that the Sandinistas began the massive buildup of 
their armed forces, established close military ties with Cuba 
and the Soviet Union, committed all-out support to the 
Salvadoran insurgents and put in place the instruments of 
internal repression. It appears to us that ideology and the 
inherent dynamics of an extremist revolutionary movement, 
rather than foreign hostility, wrote that record. 
some observers believe the Sandinista revolution may be on 
the way to greater maturity and moderation. It is pointed out 
that the rhetoric from Managua is less strident, more cautious 
in support of Central American revolution. Nicaragua's 
desperate economic condition is seen as tempering in time the 
fervent Marxism-Leninism of the nine comandantes. The fact 
that some semblance of opposition is allowed continuing 
existence within the country and that after four years perhaps 
40 percent of the economy remains in private hands is seen as 
hopeful. In this view, the regime may be moving for reasons of 
self-interest toward a disposition to deal more pragmatically 
with its neighbors -- and with the United States. 
The Sandinistas, under military pressure from the contras 
and diplomatic pressure from the international community, have 
attempted of late to reinforce some of these assumptions. In a 
six-point peace proposal issued last July 19, they declared 
that Nicaragua has "no expansionist ambition", and no intention 
of imposing its "socio-political system on other countries." 
The proposal also called for "non-interference in the internal 
affairs of each country" in the region. But the command center 
directing the guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador continued to 
operate near Managua and, at the very time the Sandinista 
proposal appeared, an attack into Honduras by Nicaraguan and 
Cuban-trained guerrillas was being launched from Nicaraguan 
soil. 
Subsequently, the regime announced measures apparently 
designed to reassure its critics. An amnesty has been offered 
to anti-Sandinista guerrillas -- excluding their leaders and 
former members of the National Guard. The same offer has been 
made to the Miskito Indian rebels -- again excluding leaders 
and about 300 of their number were released from jail. The 
Sandinistas also relaxed censorship of La Prensa somewhat, 
entered into talks with the Roman Catholic hierarchy and 
promised that the date and rules for the 1985 elections would 
be announced early this year. In addition, reports from 
Sandinista sources in Managua held out the prospect of a 
permanently reduced Cuban military presence and of diminished 
support to other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups in 
Central America. (At this writing we have no confirmation that 
either of these latter two developments has taken place or is 
likely to take place.) 
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The Sandinista regime has so far failed to address with any 
precision two questions that greatly preoccupy neighboring 
countries: the military buildup in Nicaragua and the nature of 
the political system being established there. As we have seen, 
the Sandinista military buildup, far and away the most rapid 
and extensive in Central American history, is regarded by the 
surrounding countries as a threat and a chronic source of 
instability and insecurity. With Cuban and East German 
assistance this force has been equipped with a highly 
scphisticated intelligence service employing modern electronic 
devices. Sandinista declarations of peaceful intent are 
insufficient to quiet regional fears in the light of that kind 
of military deployment. 
Expansion of Nicaragua's military capability is perceived 
in the region as closely related to the development of a 
particular and now familiar model for use in structuring and 
consolidating power. After four years the major elements of 
that model are identifiable: 
a vanguard political party which asserts on the basis 
of a triumphant revolution the right to monopolize 
power; 
an ideology centered on the goal of a radical 
transformation of society along Marxist lines; 
an unremitting propaganda war conducted against the 
United States as a means of converting nationalist 
sentiments into broad popular support for the regime; 
a foreign policy which, although described as 
non-aligned, supports revolutionary movements 
throughout the world and is ideologically linked with 
the soviet bloc; 
the creation of a network of sectoral organizations 
manipulated from the center for purposes of 
indoctrination and mass mobilization; 
the establishment of a massive internal security 
system reaching down to every neighborhood in the 
country; and 
the use of conscription to militarize and control 
society. 
The model gives every appearance of being Cuban. And 
Central Americans recall all too well that the Cuban model is 
"internationalist" in the Marxist sense -- dedicated to the 
exportation of that brand of revolution. It was Fidel Castro 
who said "the duty of the revolutionary is to make the 
revolution." It is this internationalist commitment that makes 
the regime in Managua so unique and threatening. Nicaragua'a 
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neighbors fear that while it may temporarily for tactical 
reasons draw back from the export of revolution, its 
evangelical ideology will sooner or later impel it once again 
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63 percent of total adult population 
$246 million 
Most of the region's problems are present on a magnified 
scale in El Salvador. A single commodity, coffee, accounts for 
more than 50 percent of exports and its fortunes on the world 
market determine to a considerable degree the state of the 
entire economy. Until the recent land reform, less than two 
percent of the population controlled 60 percent of the land --
and virtually all the good coffee and cotton land. At least 
two-thirds of the population live in extreme poverty. 
Illiteracy and malnutrition are widespread in the countryside. 
Although the popular legend that El Salvador is controlled 
by just 14 families is not correct -- one expert counts more 
than 200 families as making up the elite -- there are few 
countries where the disparity between the grinding poverty of 
the majority and the ostentatious wealth of a small economic 
elite has been more glaring. The military institutions have 
generally -- although not always -- supported the status quo 
and benefitted from it. Thus, the Salvadoran political 
tradition of authoritarian military government has tended to 
reinforce this inequitable social structure. 
El Salvador's problems are compounded by severe 
overpopulation. It is the smallest nation on the Western 
Hemisphere mainland (about the size of Massachusetts) and, with 
close to 5 million people, the most densely populated. The 
land-population ratio in the countryside comes out to less than 
one acre of arable land per inhabitant. The rate of population 
50. 
increase at 2.9 percent annually continues to be among the 
world's highest. One result has been emigration. The movement 
of Salvadorans into Honduras set off the so-called "soccer war" 
of 1969. And there could be as many as 500,000 Salvadorans in 
the United States, the majority of them illegally. 
RECENT HISTORY 
There was little dispute among the witnesses appearing 
before the Commission that, in the words of one of them, "El 
Salvador needed a revolution" -- a democratic revolution. In 
1979 this was apparent to many Salvadorans, and to a 
significant number of military officers, particularly the 
younger ones. Moderately reformist military regimes of the 
1960's had given way after 1972 to increasingly repressive, 
autocratic military governments. Their capacity to deal with 
the country's long-smoldering discontent steadily shrunk. El 
Salvador's president in 1979, retired General Carlos Humberto 
Romero, offered only a defense of the status quo and 
increasingly brutal repression. some in the military perceived 
that this policy ultimately threatened their own institution 
thut the rejection of reform strengthened the prospects for 
radical revolution. The triumph of the Sandinistas and the 
destruction of the National Guard in Nicaragua provided 
powerfully persuasive evidence in support of that conclusion. 
On October 15, 1979 a group of young officers overthrew 
Romero and replaced him with a five-man civilian military junta 
committed to reform. (One of the members was the Social 
Democrat Guillermo Ungo, now a leading spokesman in exile for 
the guerrilla movement.) The junta had as a major objective 
putting an end to political turmoil and violence by cleansing 
the army -- some 70 senior officers were dismissed -- and 
enlisting the cooperation of the left in a program of reform. 
The official Communist Party (PCS) did ostensibly cooperate, 
but the principal Marxist-Leninist groups in arms, the Popular 
Forces of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the 
People (ERP), along with Marxist front organizations, rejected 
the junta. Beginning in the mid-70's the Popular Revolutionary 
Block (BPR), the political arm of the FPL, and the United 
Popular Action Front (FAPO), made up of Marxist labor and 
peasant organizations, had undertaken a campaign of mass street 
demonstrations and occupations of public buildings, often 
leading to violence. Despite the accession of the new 
government these continued, as did terrorist acts by the armed 
organizations. 
Rather than abating, violence increased as the security 
forces responded with their own excesses. In early January of 
1980 the junta dissolved when the three civilian members 
resigned. This was a crucial development in the contemporary 
history of El Salvador and its causes have been the subject of 
much debate. On one side it is argued that the government of 
the "first junta" -- others were to follow -- failed because it 
51. 
was unable to control the security forces and to put an end to 
their brutal methods of repression. There is undoubtedly 
substance to that charge. But it also seems evident that the 
refusal of the so-called "popular organizations" of the left to 
lay aside their revolutionary tactics and to give the promises 
of reform a chance played into the hands of the extreme right 
and sabotaged the junta from the outset. This response from 
the radical left lends weight to the argument that power rather 
than reform was (and is) the real goal of the leaders of these 
movements. 
Following the fall of the first junta, the Christian 
Democrats (PDC), El Salvador's principal reformist political 
party, reached agreement with the military high command on a 
new government. This agreement essentially remained in force 
through various changes in the governing junta until the 
constituent assembly elections of March 28, 1982. Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, the leader of the PDC, was the dominant 
civilian figure and in time became president of the junta. 
Beginning in March 1980 the government launched an ambitious 
program of land reform, nationalized the banks and took control 
of the marketing of coffee and sugar. In concept El Salvador's 
agrarian reform is the most far-reaching in non-communist Latin 
America. It has already affected 20 percent of the arable 
land. The program claims more than 136,000 principal 
beneficiaries. When their families are included in the 
calculation the program has benefitted over 20 percent of the 
population. 
The period leading up to the 1982 elections was thus one of 
both reform and escalating political violence. The guerrillas, 
now organized for combat in the countryside and well equipped 
with Nicaraguan and Cuban supplies, launched their "final 
offensive" in January 1981. The expected popular rising did 
not occur and the offensive failed. But death squads of the 
extreme right, determined to wipe out reformists as well as 
revolutionaries, multiplied their activities. More than 90 
Christian Democrat mayors and other officials had been murdered 
by mid-1982. Elements of the security forces practiced 
indiscriminate violence as a means of asserting control, 
particularly in the countryside. Terrorists of the Marxist 
left built their war chests and spread intimidation through 
kidnappings and murders. We see here the continuing 
characteristic of the Salvadoran conflict: murderous violence 
from the exteme left and extreme right, with the victims in the 
political center and among the mass of ordinary, uninvolved 
Salvadorans-- violence that has created the country's 
overriding problems of the abuse of human rights and the threat 
to the nation's security from outside forces. 
The March 1982 elections revealed the aspirations of those 
ordinary Salvadorans. About 80 percent of the eligible voters 
participated, despite the threats and violence of the Marxist 
left. The guerrillas intensified their attacks all across the 
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country in an attempt to disrupt the elections. That large 
turnout under the most difficult conditions can only reasonably 
be explained as a demonstration of the desire for peace and a 
democratic order. But the results were less decisive. The 
Chri~tian Democrats led with about 40 percent of the vote, but 
the rest went to four smaller parties ranging from the extreme 
to the moderate right. These coalesced in the Constituent 
Assembly to form a majority. A political independent, Alvaro 
Magana, was chosen as president with the military's backing 
when it appeared that rightist parties in the new assembly 
would attempt to install as president Roberto D'Aubuisson, long 
associated with the violent right. The lineup of forces in the 
Constituent Assembly and President Magana's lack of a solid 
power base has made the government's task difficult. Economic 
deterioration has struck the emerging middle class particularly 
hard. Employment in the small Salvadoran industrial sector is 
down substantially, throwing many skilled workers out of their 
jobs. The shrinking economy has forced a number of small 
shopkeepers and wholesalers to close their business. 
Restricted national budgets have meant economic hardship for 
teachers and government workers. And they have led to a 
deterioration in social services -- in education, health and 
nutrition -- already severely inadequate, particularly in the 
rural areas. 
LAND REFORM 
Land reform in many respects is at the center of El 
salvador's internal conflicts. Its objective is to produce 
fundamental change in the country's social and political 
structures by breaking the grip of the landholding oligarchy on 
economic and political power, while giving a significant number 
of the rural poor a sufficient stake to resist the appeal of 
Marxist revolution. The first phase of the program is 
virtually complete, with almost all the large properties of the 
wealthy (those over 1,234 acres), now in the hands of 
cooperatives. Phase II, designed to distribute medium-sized 
holdings, has not yet been implemented. Phase III, called 
"land to the tiller," offers renters and share-croppers the 
right to claim the land they work up to a maximum of 17.3 
acres. It has moved forward: more than 53,000 small farmers 
have filed for their plots. 
The program has suffered from various political, 
institutional and economic problems -- and most especially from 
El Salvador's pervasive violence. The first chief of one of 
the two land-reform agencies was murdered, along with two u.s. 
advisers from the American Institute of Free Labor 
Development. Guerrillas have threatened and attacked peasant 
cooperatives set up under the Phase I program. Landlords, at 
times employing members of the government security services, 
have carried out acts of violence, including killings, in 
efforts to drive peasants off plots claimed under the Phase III 
program. In areas affected by the insurgency properties 
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formally conveyed to new owners have been abandoned. The 
Government of El Salvador lacks the financial resources in most 
cases to make prompt and effective payment to expropriated 
landowners. This may well be a factor contributing to the 
violence, and certianly accounts in part for the intense 
political opposition to the program. 
The cooperatives formed among the agricultural workers on 
the large estates do not have in a number of instances the 
timely credit, management and the technical skills necessary 
for the efficient operation of their properties. Cumbersome 
institutional arrangements, including separate agencies to 
administer the two phases now being carried out, have created 
an unwieldy land-reform bureaucracy. Beneficiaries under Phase 
III are prohibited from selling their plots for 30 years, a 
restriction seen as helping to prevent the development of a 
free market in agricultural land. In the Constituent Assembly 
attempts were made by the political right to gut the program 
and a provision in the new national constitution raises the 
upper limit on landholding to slightly over 600 acres, reducing 
the amount of land potentially available for distribution under 
Phase II to less than half of that originally programmed. 
Whatever the faults the program may have, it is a 
remarkable accomplishment. Land reform vvas hastily planned in 
response to the crisis of 1979-80. It has been implemented in 
the midst of a violent insurgency and against the opposition of 
strongly entrenched local interests by a weak, transitional 
government. Progress has been slow and painful, but progress 
has been made. 
Crop yields seem to have held up remarkably well and are 
reportedly now better in the reformed sector than in the 
traditional sector, except for cotton and rice. (Cotton 
cultivation in particular takes place in areas of high 
guerrilla activity.) It is, of course, too early to foresee the 
lasting economic effects of land reform. But the program does 
promise dramatic changes in the vvay Salvadoran society has 
functioned -- and, as we have seen, change has been badly 
needed. Adjustments in the program and its implementation will 
no doubt be needed, but its reversal at this point seems 
inconceivable. 
THE ECONOMY 
This political evolution is taking place against the 
backdrop of an economy in agony. Nowhere in Central America 
has the crisis cut so deeply as in El Salvador. Nowhere is the 
need to arrest economic decline and restore growth more 
urgent. 
The prolonged war waged by the guerrillas has had a 
shattering effect on the economy. The cumulative direct cost 
of the war to the economy has been estimated at more than $800 
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million, with indirect costs far higher. The insurgents 
themselves acknowledge that economic destruction is a key 
ingredient in their strategy to bring down the government. 
Their priority targets are hydroelectric dams -- of which El 
Salvador has quite an extensive network -- power stations and 
tranmission systems, and the buses and trucks on which 
transportation in the country depends. There have been more 
than 400 sabotage attacks against the electric grid systems, 
shutting down power for prolonged periods, particularly in the 
central and eastern sections of El Salvador. Up until July of 
1983 the guerrillas had destroyed 60 bridges, including in the 
fall of 1981 the key Puente de Oro span linking eastern and 
western El Salvador. Of late the guerrillas have, with 
disturbing success, turned their attention to attacks on the 
key agricultural sector which accounts for a quarter of gross 
domestic product, nearly half of employment and two-thirds of 
the country's exports. They assault farms, disrupt planting 
and harvesting, cut roads and destroy rural electricity and 
other power systems -- all at high cost in both human and 
national terms. Such is also the case with the large number of 
persons displaced from their homes by the war-- i.e., human 
suffering and economic cost. The number of these still within 
El Salvador is estimated to be several hundred thousand. 
Real per capita income in El Salvador has declined from 
$753 in 1980 to $604 in 1982. The country's real gross 
domestic product fell by about 35 percent from 1978 to 1983. 
El Salvador is now, with Honduras, one of the poorest countries 
in the region and in the hemisphere. Largely as a result of 
U.S. foreign assistance the decline in real income has slowed 
but will still fall between two and three percent in 1983, 
according to the Central Bank of El Salvador. (Because of the 
rate of population increase, the country's economy must grow by 
more than three percent annually to stay even.) Declining 
coffee prices and excess stocks of that key commodity have hit 
the country particularly hard. The amount of coffee needed to 
buy one barrel of oil went from five pounds in 1977 to about 26 
in 1982. Guerrilla attacks in the growing areas and the 
uncertainties created by agrarian reform have reduced the 
acreage devoted to cotton, El Salvador's second most important 
export crop, by more than 50 percent from the pre-war level. 
War, poor prices for export crops and general uncertainty 
about future government policies have dried up private 
investment and credit, foreign and domestic. The u.s. Embassy 
estimates the contraction of foreign private credit at about 
$250 million between 1978 and 1982. This has had a 
particularly depressing effect on imports of spare parts, 
machinery and raw materials. Capital flight has been heavy. 
No reliable figures exist, but estimates range up to more than 
one billion dollars. But the President and his colleagues have 
held the government together. They have struggled to prevent 
the collapse of the economy in the midst of a cruel civil war 
and the systematic destruction of the nation's infrastructure 
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by the guerrilla forces. And they have persisted in the 
program of land reform and in their intent to lead El Salvador 
to elections and a constitutional government. 
El Salvador is poor in natural resources, but not in human 
resources. Its people are industrious and talented, renowned 
throughout the region for their hard work and productive 
skills. Salvadoran entrepreneurs demonstrated impressive 
vision and adaptability in taking advantage of the 
import-substitution opportunities offered by the Central 
American Common Market. Manufacturing of light consumer goods 
developed rapidly during the 1960's and 70's. A dynamic and 
independent private sector began to take form. Salvadoran 
industrialists and their foreign partners moved in the decade 
of the 1970's into re-export assembly operations of the kind to 
be found in Mexico along the u.s. border. The foundation of 
this nascent industrialization and the key element in 
attracting foreign investment was the extraordinary 
productivity of the Salvadoran worker. Civil war and recession 
have reversed these advances; and in many other respects the 
outlook in El Salvador is grim. But this demonstration of 
capabilities in an area of promising economic growth should not 
be overlooked in assessing the country's prospects. 
THE VIOLENT LEFT 
Today's insurgency can be traced back to 1970 when Salvador 
Cayetano Carpio, a long-time communist leader, broke away from 
the Communist Party (PCS) to form the Popular Forces of 
Liberation (FPL). Contrary to orthodox communist doctrine in 
Latin America at the time, Carpio insisted that armed struggle 
was feasible and offered the only route to power for 
Marxism-Leninism. Other groups broke away from the PCS to form 
small bands of armed terrorists. Finally in 1979 the 
communists themselves, inspired by the Sandinista victory in El 
Salvador, launched an armed force of their own. There are now 
five guerrilla organizations in the field: the Popular Forces 
of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the People 
(ERP) we have previously mentioned, the Armed Forces of 
National Resistance (FARN), the communists' Armed Forces of 
Liberation (FAL) and the Revolutionary Party of Central 
American Workers (PRTC). The FPL and the ERP are the largest 
and most active. 
During the early and mid-1970's the emerging guerrilla 
groups began to build the structures of their movements by 
establishing parallel military and political organizations. 
The latter evolved into such mass movements as the FPL's 
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) and the FARN's United Popular 
Action Front (FAPU). Leadership for the most part came from 
the universities, unemployed professionals and other 
disaffected members of the middle class. Recruiting among the 
young, particularly the young unemployed, for what were 
ess~'ntially protest organizations with a somewhat disguised 
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ideology, was quite successful. (The fraudulent elections of 
1972 and 1977 provided an important recruiting incentive.) The 
leaders of these movements then turned to terrorism, staging a 
spectacular series of kidnappings, bank robberies and other 
acts in the late 70's. One authority estimates that the 
guerrillas collected a war chest of about $65 million from the 
ransom received for ten wealthy Salvadorans and several foreign 
busii,essmen. 
The transition to full-blown rural insurgency clearly 
called for coordination and at least a measure of unification 
among the five armed groups. The differences among them 
centered on tactical and theoretical issues, not on the 
ultimate goal of a Marxist-Leninist El Salvador to which the 
leadership of all five has consistently been committed. In 
particular, Carpio's FPL maintained that a prolonged war of 
attrition in the Mao style was the correct route to victory, 
while Joaquin Villalobos's ERP advanced the doctrine of the 
sudden victorious blow delivered by a mass uprising. (This 
argument paralleled that between the "prolonged popular war" 
and "proletarian" factions of Nicaragua's Sandinista 
movement.) In practical terms these differences have been 
reflected in recent times in quarrels over the tactical utility 
of negotiating with the government of El Salvador. 
The first priority of the Cuban supporters of armed revolt 
in El Salvador was to unify these five factions. Fidel Castro 
made such unity a formal prerequisite for his support and, as a 
result, representatives of the factions met in Havana in 
December of 1979 to reach a preliminary agreement. In May of 
1980, again in Havana, they formed the Unified Revolutionary 
Directorate (DRU) to oversee the military political alliance. 
The DRU in turn in November of 1980 created the Farabundo Harti 
National Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the executed 
communist leader of the 1932 peasant uprising in which 
thousands were killed. The FMLN is headed by a general command 
made up of the leaders of the five factions. This joint staff 
established itself in Managua, from where it exercised command 
and control over the guerrillas in the field. Starting in 
1980, logistic and training support for the FMLN was also 
buttressed from Nicaraguan soil by Cuban and other soviet bloc 
assistance. The five factions continued -- and continue to 
this day -- to maintain their separate identities under the 
FMLN umbrella and to operate separately in the field. 
But coordination and cooperation among them has steadily 
improved. The FMLN initially pursued a classic guerrilla 
strategy of hit and run from bases in El Salvador's remote 
mountainous regions. The guerrillas gradually expanded their 
areas of operations and now operate widely, particularly in the 
eastern part of the country. Estimates of the combined 
strength of the five groups in the FMLN range from 6,000 to 
12,000 full and part-time fighters. Many of these are 
youngsters in their early and mid-teens, recruited -- or in 
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some cases abducted -- from the fertile field offered by El 
salvador's army of unemployed young. 
The FMLN is competently led in military terms, increasingly 
well-trained with the help of the Sandinistas and the Cubans, 
and now adept at guerrilla warfare after four years of 
experience. Its forces have adequate supplies, obtained 
through clandestine shipments or within El salvador from 
sympathizers or by coercion or corruption. They enjoy 
sanctuary and command and control facilities in Nicaragua. The 
FMLN thus presents a formidable military threat in the terms of 
El Salvador's war. It is usually calculated that the defense 
requires a ten-to-one manpower ratio to counter successfully a 
guerrilla insurgency. The Salvadoran armed forces have 
increased their troop strength rapidly but have yet to reach 
half that margin. The guerrilla forces, nevertheless, have 
been unable so far to make a decisive breakthrough, as the 
failures of their successive offensives attest. To date they 
have neither worn down the resolve of the government's military 
forces nor attracted the substantial popular support necessary 
for such a breakthrough. But their recent successes in 
widespread engagements appear to have reinforced the FMLN's 
faith in ultimate victory. Meanwhile, the insurgents continue 
to damage the economy severely, while preventing the 
consolidation of the government's reform program and 
encouraging terror and counter-terror. 
The FMLN also campaigns on the international political 
front through the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a 
coalition of communist and non-communist political parties and 
other organizations. The leaders, including the Social 
Democrat Guillermo Ungo and the dissident Christian Democrat 
Ruben Zamora, are active in promoting the guerrilla cause in 
this country and Europe. They also participate with 
representatives of the FMLN in a joint political-diplomatic 
commission, apparently established principally to coordinate 
the various positions on negotiations. 
It is the alliance of elements of the non-communist left 
with the FMLN more perhaps than any other factor that makes the 
possibility of government negotiations with the guerrillas 
attractive to a variety of opinion groups in the u.s., Western 
Europe and Latin America. It is to be noted, however, that the 
non-Marxist political groups in the FDR have yet to demonstrate 
significant popular support. Except for a tiny group of 
professionals and technicians, the other organizations in the 
FDR are Marxist-Leninist fronts for the guerrilla factions. The 
latter clearly control the FDR -- as they control the vast 
majority of guerrilla combatants. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The most fundamental rights of many thousands of individual 
Salvadorans have been victimized in the climate of conflict and 
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death in that country. Since 1979 over 30,000 non-combatants 
have been killed. (That seems to be a generally accepted 
minimum figure. There is heated debate about numbers and 
trends in the controversy over the Salvadoran human rights 
situation. This report does not enter that debate, only noting 
that the lowest numbers are sufficiently appalling.) Several 
thousand more are reported as "disappeared." Torture, 
arbitrary arrest and kidnappings add to this grim picture. 
Both sides to the conflict engage in these practices. One of 
the principal guerrilla groups, the FPL, claims credit for 
several assassinations, including those of a member of the 
constituent assembly and the deputy commander of the United 
States Military Group. FMLN units in the field seek to 
intimidate and coerce local populations with shootings, 
abductions and other strong-arm tactics. In one attack on the 
small town Cinquera last May the guerrillas summarily executed 
ten captured soldiers and civilians. In addition, as we have 
seen, the key groups in the insurgent front have resorted to 
kidnappings as an important means of financing their operations. 
On the other side, the government•s security forces and the 
right-wing paramilitary groups associated with them bear 
responsibility for thousands of murders. These atrocities take 
two general forms: killing of specifically targeted 
individuals for political reasons -- as in the 1980 
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero -- and the 
indiscriminate shooting in the combat zones of peasants 
suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas. The Minister 
of Defense has now issued detailed orders designed to prevent 
these latter abuses and there are indications of improvement in 
that respect. Politically-motivated murders attributable to 
death squads continue, however, as in the recent assassination 
of four labor leaders. Targets include persons associated with 
reformist civic, political and religious movements, as well as 
those suspected of harboring sympathies for the insurgents. 
The precise relationship between the death squads of the 
extreme right and the security forces is a matter of some 
dispute. But it is scarcely conceivable that they could operate 
as they do with seeming impunity in the absence of protection 
from elements of those forces. Furthermore, there is 
considerable evidence that members of the security forces make 
up some of the death squads and participate with civilian 
mercenaries and right-wing fanatics in others. (Reportedly, 
wealthy Salvadorans living in this country finance these 
activities.) The problem of the death squads is complicated by 
blurred lines of authority among a proliferation of security 
forces -- Army, National Guard, National Police, Treasury 
Police and Customs Police -- and the lack of a firm chain of 
command to control them. Leadership of the armed services is 
characterized by a collegial style in which authority is 
diffused. The need to establish a clearly defined and 
centralized structure of command appears obvious. 
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A further complication arises from the virtual collapse of 
El salvador's system of criminal justice. Judges and 
prosecutors have been terrorized by the agents of the extreme 
left and extreme right. Corruption and cumbersome, virtually 
unworkable, rules of evidence further undermine the system. 
Currently only about 20 percent of those charged in criminal 
cases are convicted. The most glaring deficiencies are 
dramatically evident in t\vO highly-publicized cases involving 
the killing of u.s. citizens. Three years after the murder of 
four u.s. churchwomen the case is still in the courts, despite 
what is reported to be abundant and unambiguous evidence. The 
triggermen in the killing of two employees of the American 
Institute of Free Labor Development in early 1982 have 
confessed, but the officer they identified as having ordered 
the crime has yet to be indicted. Last June President Magana 
appointed a commission to make recommendations on the subject 
and has since announced a follow-up commission to revise 
criminal codes and procedures. No aspect of El Salvador's 
complex of problems merits higher priority. 
Reform of the legal system will, however, only prove 
effective to the degree that El Salvador's government and 
military authorities are determined -- and are able -- to curb 
the death squads and the brutal activities of the security 
services. These practices are both repudiated by the 
international community and gravely damaging to the war against 
Marxist insurgency. On the other hand, it is precisely that 
insurgency that contributes so materially to the climate of 
violence in which the death squads have flourished; and it is 
the insurgency, with the fear and passion it creates, that 
helps make the rule of law so difficult to impose. 
Reform of the country's election laws and procedures is 
also under way in preparation for the presidential election to 
be held March 25, 1984. A commission made up of 
representatives of the five political parties in the 
Constituent Assembly is developing a new system of voter 
registration which for the first time in the nation's history 
should result in real barriers to fraud. Completion of 
nationwide registry is promised by next February or March, 
although as this is written further delay in completing that 
complicated task appears possible. 
Also of importance to the preparations for elections have 
been the activities of the government's Peace Commission. This 
body, made up of a bishop of the Catholic Church and two 
respected laymen, is charged with formulating and recommending 
measures to encourage all sectors of Salvadoran society to 
participate in the democratic process. The Commission took a 
step forward last year by drafting an amnesty law and 
submitting it to the Constitutent Assembly, where it was passed 
unanimously. Before the expiration of the law in August of 
1983, 1,159 political prisoners, guerrilla combatants, and FMLN 
supporters had taken advantage of the amnesty offer and been 
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released from jail or otherwise allowed to return ~o a normal 
life. 
The Peace Commission has also met twice in Bogota, Colombia 
with representatives of the FMLN/FDR to discuss participation 
of the insurgent left in the 1984 election. This effort has so 
far produced no results, the guerrilla forces continuing to 
insist that negotiations over an interim coalition government 
must first take place. 
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE WAR 
The regular armed forces of El Salvador, now numbering 
about 37,500, including police and security services, have had 
to cope with difficult problems in meeting the FMLN challenge. 
The military tradition there has been one of preoccupation with 
the country's internal political affairs and concern for 
institutional privileges rather than national defense. Not 
surprisingly, given this background, the high command has not 
always provided effective leadership in the conduct of the 
war. Authority in the armed forces is exercised collegially 
rather than in the hierarchial fashion demanded by wartime 
conditions. Command relationships are less than clearly 
defined and the force structure has yet to be satisfactorily 
adapted to a guerrilla war. The Minister of Defense recently 
responded to these problems by replacing a number of the key 
commanders. 
These problems have been compounded by a 200 percent 
expansion of the army in four years. Despite significant u.s. 
training support, a shortage of commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers still hampers operations. Limited 
national budgets and uncertainty about levels of U.S. security 
assistance have complicated logistics and reinforced a tendency 
to husband ammunition and stay on the defensive. This in turn 
creates a vicious circle of guerrilla initiative, further 
damage to the economy and the reaction of brutal 
counter-terrorism. Unsatisfactory relations between the 
uniformed forces and the civilian population have also hampered 
the war effort. 
The government's forces have taken high casualties. In the 
12 months ending last June 30, 2,292 Salvadoran troops died in 
action, almost twice that number were wounded or missing. 
These figures represent about one-fifth of the total Salvadoran 
forces and are approximately double the count for the preceding 
12 months. They attest both to the combat efficiency of the 
guerrillas and the bravery of the Salvadoran soldier. 
As with most guerrilla wars, trends in the Salvadoran 
conflict in terms of increasing military advantage on one side 
or the other are difficult to perceive until well after they 
are over. It does appear that in recent months the forces of 
the FMLN have managed to seize the initiative. Clearly, the 
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guerrillas have the capacity and the determination to continue, 
but as yet not the power to prevail absent an internal collapse 
on the other side. For their part, the Salvadoran armed forces 
do not as yet have the leadership, trained manpower, firepower 
and mobility required to win conclusively on the battlefield. 
The aspect of the war that has attracted particular 
international attention is the issue of outside support to the 
guerrillas. That the Sandinistas and Cubans have assisted the 
FMLN with arms, training, communications equipment and other 
supplies is generally acknowledged. But the extent of that 
support and its importance to the FMLN's efforts is perhaps not 
so clear. In the background is the question of the nature of 
the Salvadoran insurgency. Is it an indigenous phenomenon 
sustained by local conditions, or is it a movement shaped and 
kept alive by outside forces? As we have seen, the groups 
making up the FMLN first appeared as a result of the internal 
evolution of El Salvador's radical left. Domestic political 
and economic grievances helped create the conditions necessary 
for insurgency. The evidence also indicates that, as in most 
guerrilla wars, the revolutionaries do obtain arms and supplies 
from their adversaries through corruption and in military 
operations. 
But it is also the case that Fidel Castro played a key role 
in the unification of the five guerrilla groups, that the 
Soviet Union facilitates arms procurement for them and that the 
Sandinistas provide them sanctuary and permanent 
command-and-control communications in Nicaragua. How important 
this outside support is to the combat effectiveness of the FMLN 
forces we find difficult to determine. But that it changes the 
nature of the insurgency in El Salvador is clear. A conflict 
with roots in the indigenous conditions of the country becomes 
internationalized with the intromission of the Soviet Union and 
its agents. A struggle for reform in a small, impoverished 
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The difficult topography of Honduras with its long 
stretches of mountainous terrain hindered the integration of 
the nation and the development of the agricultural export crops 
central to the economies of the region. Coffee cultivation, 
historically the primary source of capital accumulation in 
Central America, came late and on a relatively small scale. 
The banana industry, the country•s most important, was in large 
part established and until recent times controlled by U.S. 
companies. These conditions forestalled the development of a 
powerful landowning elite of the type associated with the 
histories of El Salvador and Guatemala. The social structure 
of Honduras has consequently tended to be more open and freer 
of conflict than those of its neighbors. 
The country•s leading economic and military classes have 
also proved more disposed to accept moderate reform. During 
the decade of the 1950 1 s, following the overthrow of the 
dictator Carias, a national labor movement began to emerge, 
progressive labor legislation was enacted and the government 
established several institutions to provide social services in 
such fields as housing and child care. The government of Ramon 
Villeda Morales, elected in 1957, expanded the area of reform 
with Honduras•s first agrarian reform law, the establishment of 
a social security institute, a national water service and other 
measures. After the military overthrow of that government in 
1963, progress on the social front slowed for a time but no 
serious attempt to turn back the clock occurred as in 
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Guatemala. In the early and mid-1970's a de facto government 
dominated by the military promoted agrarian reform. By 1980, 
approximately ten percent of all farm land, much of it 
previously owned by the state, had been redistributed to 
peasants. 
Military officers headed the regimes in power in Honduras 
for all but brief interludes between the coup of 1963 and the 
assumption of the current constitutional government in 1982. 
This period was characterized by joint military-civilian rule. 
Ultimate power resided with the military but civilians, often 
with ties to political parties, managed the economy, held key 
cabinet positions and predominated in the bureaucracy. 
Corruption at times was a serious problem but the use of 
violence for the purpose of political repression was relatively 
rare. The country's strong labor unions continued to exert 
influence. Support for a full return to constitutional 
democracy grew during these years, finally becoming predominant 
in the armed forces. Honduras thus entered the years of crisis 
with a legacy of accommodation and relative social peace, 
unlike its near neighbors. 
The return to constitutional government was an important 
contribution in this context. The elections of November 29, 
1981 were by all accounts entirely honest and the results 
unchallenged to any significant degree. The reformist Liberal 
Party returned to power for the first time since the overthrow 
of Villeda Morales in 1963. Roberto Suazo, a respected 
physician, became president and his party achieved a majority 
in the unicamaral congress. Honduras now displays good 
democratic credentials. The press is free, the courts are 
respected and the congress functions freely. The military 
retain an important voice in the nation's affairs, particularly 
with respect to security issues. General Gustavo Alvarez, 
Commander of the Armed Forces, has repeatedly affirmed his 
support for constitutional government. 
Several factors in addition to the political opening help 
to explain the absence in large part of violent political and 
social turmoil from the recent history of Honduras. The 
pressure on the land there is not as severe a problem, as in 
other Central American countries. Population density is 
relatively low, though increasing: about 69 inhabitants per 
square kilometer of arable land as contrasted with 334 in El 
Salvador. Substantial tracts of fertile land remain to be 
developed, although the population explosion will probably put 
an end to that opportunity before too long. An effective labor 
movement -- Central America's most deeply-rooted and committed 
to democratic values -- has helped to channel dissatisfaction 
and dissent constructively. Although Honduras is desperately 
poor, disparities in income are less extreme than in El 
Salvador or Guatemala. Two traditional parties -- the Liberal 
and National -- dominate the political scene and impede the 
growth of extremist movements. Finally, Honduras is the least 
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urbanized of the Central American countries and, as a 
consequence, less vulnerable to the radicalizing pressures 
Central America's crowded urban centers so clearly breed. 
But Honduras, blessed by a greater measure of internal 
peace than its neighbors, is also extremely poor. Per capita 
income is just over $600 and in the countryside is probably 
well under $200. According to the government's own figures, 57 
percent of Honduras's families live in extreme poverty, lacking 
sufficient income to cover the cost of the basic basket of 
food. Two-thirds of the population live in the countryside. 
About 50 percent of this rural population is illiterate; 54 
percent don't have access to safe water; and over 70 percent of 
the children under five years of age are believed to suffer 
from some degree of malnutrition. Life expectancy is under 60 
years, one of the lowest in the region. And social conditions 
are deteriorating further. Private per capita consumption 
actually declined in Honduras by more than 5 percent in 
1981-82. The housing shortage has tripled over the last 20 
years. 
Underlying these problems is an extraordinary growth in 
population, currently about 3.4 percent annually. Between 1960 
and 1982 the number of Hondurans rose from 1.9 million to 4 
million. It is now an extremely young population: about 48 
percent are below the age of 15. As in the other Central 
American countries, unemployment is difficult to measure. The 
government's figure of 20 percent includes only those who 
failed to work as much as one hour in a given week. Probably 
half the population of Honduras is unemployed or 
underemployed. This mixture of extreme poverty, high 
unemployment, steadily deteriorating social conditions and a 
young population clearly is potentially explosive. Honduras 
finds itself on the "edge of a precipice," as a spokesman for 
the government put it. · 
Economy 
Honduras, as the least developed of the five Central 
American states, registered the lowest economic growth during 
the area's three decades of expansion. Per capita gross 
domestic product grew 27 percent from 1950-1978, less than 
one-third of the average for all of Central America. With the 
weakest industrial base of the member states, Honduras profited 
least from the economic surge produced by the Central American 
Common Market. However, for a brief period during the mid- and 
late 1970's the economy spurted, in part because of substantial 
new sugar and coffee production and in part because of sharply 
increased government borrowing and spending. The overall 
economy grew on an annual basis of between 7 and 8 percent in 
those late years. 
Weakness in the international commodity markets, the higher 
cost of imported petroleum, regional instability leading to 
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capital flight and problems in marketing its principal exports 
carne together to put an end to economic growth. Real GDP fell 
by approximately 8 percent between 1979 and 1982. Balance of 
payments deficits grew, reaching almost $228 million on a 
current account basis in 1982. Servicing Honduras's public 
external debt of more than $1.5 billion became increasingly 
difficult. President Suazo pledged his government from the 
outset to a program of fiscal austerity, a reduction in public 
sector employment and in government participation in the 
economy. A stand-by agreement of $104 million was negotiated 
with the International Monetary Fund and has imposed strict 
conditions, require a ten percent reduction in government 
expenditures and tax and tariff increases. 
President Suazo has described the situation of Honduras's 
economy as the worst in the country's history. Although the 
decline in per capita income seems to have been checked last 
year, in part because of increased assistance from the United 
States, the restoration of growth will be difficult to 
accomplish. The economy is highly dependent on the export of 
agricultural commodities: bananas, coffee, sugar and meat. 
Quotas allocated to Honduras by the International Coffee 
Agreement and for sugar under current u.s. legislation are 
highly unfavorable. (Such quotas are calculated on the basis 
of historical data. They penalize Honduras because of the 
significant expansion of coffee and sugar production in very 
recent years. Thus, Honduras had the capacity to export 
121,000 tons of sugar to the United States, but was permitted 
to sell only about 28,000 tons here last year.) Coffee 
production, on which 50,000 families depend directly and many 
more indirectly, is down approximately 25 percent and continues 
to be plagued by the spread of coffee rust, particularly 
affecting the small producers. 
The process of development has been arduous for the 
Hondurans. During the era of economic growth between 1960 and 
1980 population increase largely offset the economy's expansion 
of about four percent annually. Thus, close to 80 percent of 
the population remained in poverty after 20 years of difficult 
effort. But there is a widespread commitment in Honduras to 
national development -- a determination to achieve economic and 
social progress. One obstacle -- the drain imposed by the high 
cost of imported oil -- is being attacked by the construction 
of the El Cajon hydroelectric plant. This project, financed by 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, will 
come on stream in two to three years and will take care of all 
the country's electricity requirements. Additional major 
projects in forestry and the opening of new agricultural lands 
are going ahead. 
The government has developed an ambitious plan of 
development for the period running to 1995. An urgent 
objective of the first stage is to improve the lot of the poor 
rural population by dramatically increasing the production of 
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food crops through the introduction of modern methods of 
cultivation, fertilizers, storage facilities, distribution and 
commercialization networks. The second stage of the plan would 
focus on the larger agricultural units, promoting 
diversification into new export crops, the establishment of 
agro-industries, industrial production for the agricultural 
sector and development of Honduras's extensive forest resources. 
This vision of the future extends to the beginning of the 
next century when broad industrialization would complete the 
transformation of a poverty-stricken nation. It is a vision of 
hope and daring. Two conditions would seem necessary to its 
fulfillment: a significant flow of outside assistance and a 
climate of peace and stability in the region. 
The Price of Security 
An exposed geographic position, with El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua on its borders, traps Honduras in what has 
appropriately been called an "arc of fire." From the beginning 
of the insurgency in El Salvador, guerrillas have used the 
border area between the two countries for sanctuary and 
basing. Nicaraguan insurgents -- first the Sandinistas 
fighting against the Somoza regime with Cuban support and then 
the so-called contras attacking the Sandinista regime with u.s. 
support -- have deployed from the rugged territory on that 
border, as did Augusto Sandino half a century ago. During the 
1960's much of the violent struggle in Guatemala took place in 
the Zacapa region close by the Honduran frontier. Today's 
conflicts in that country are farther away for the time being, 
but the threat of a spillover persists. 




decision to assist the guerrillas in El Salvador posed a 
fundamental challenge for Honduras. The Sandinistas with 
Cuban and Salvadoran allies set up clandestine routes for 
transshipment of arms and other supplies from Nicaragua. 
established undercover support groups in Tegucigalpa and 
elsewhere to further these activities. Honduran authorities 
began to detect the presence of foreigners infiltrated for the 
purpose. Raids on safehouses in November 1981 revealed the 
presence of a subversive group which included several 
Nicaraguans. Captured documents and statements by those 
detained revealed that the group had been formed in Nicaragua 
at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, that its 
chief of operations resided in Nicaragua, and that members of 
the group had received military training in Cuba. 
Honduran efforts to close down the clandestine supply 
routes beginning in late 1981, and intensifying during 1982 
after the inauguration of the new constitutional government, 
were met with terrorist bombings, kidnappings and armed 
assaults, for the most part in Tegucigalpa. The most 
devastating of these was the July 1982 bombing of that 
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capital's major electric plant, resulting in damage estimated 
at $10-20 million. The timing, targets and accompanying 
propaganda indicated that these attacks were orchestrated from 
outside for the purpose of intimidation. Furthermore, captured 
Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists admitted that explosives 
used in bombings in Tegucigalpa were obtained in Nicaragua. 
The Salvadoran insurgents and their Cuban and Nicaraguan allies 
seemed to be offering the government of Honduras a choice: 
stand aside while we use your territory in our war against the 
government of El Salvador or suffer the same violent subversion 
at work in that country. 
But the evidence suggests that no real choice was being 
offered. The ground had already been laid for an armed 
insurgency in Honduras by the creation with Cuban and 
Sandinista backing of the Morazanista Front for the Liberation 
of Honduras (FMLH) in the familiar pattern of the FSLN in 
Nicaragua. A founder of this new Honduran counterpart 
described it for a Honduran newspaper as a political 
military-organization formed as part "of the increasing 
regionalization of the Central American conflict." Statements 
from the insurgent leaders in El Salvador, the Sandinistas and 
from Havana emphasized the theme that the era of revolution had 
dawned not just for Nicaragua and El Salvador, but for the 
entire Central American region. Under the circumstances the 
conclusion reached in Tegucigalpa that Honduras \vas high on the 
target list does not seem unreasonable. 
In March 1983 the effort to destabilize Honduras took a new 
turn with the announcement from Havana that four extreme left 
groups had formed a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board 
along the same lines as those of the umbrella guerrilla fronts 
previously formed under Cuban aegis by the Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan insurgents. The April 21 issue of Barricada, the 
Sandinista organ, published the new group's declaration of 
"popular revolutionary war" which called on the Honduran people 
to rise up against the government and armed forces and against 
"U.S. imperialism." 
Subsequently, on July 19, about 100 Honduran guerrillas 
launched a raid from Nicaragua into Olancho Department. The 24 
guerrillas who deserted or were captured told a fairly 
consistent story of their recruitment and training. In almost 
all cases they were recruited by deception, having been told 
that they would receive some type of training in mechanics or 
agriculture. They were not told that they would be sent to 
Cuba. The training there took up to two years and included 
four to six months at the guerrilla training school in Pinar 
del Rio. There they received instruction in ideology, weapons, 
intelligence, and military tactics. At the same camp were 
guerrilla trainees from other countries, including El Salvador 
and Guatemala. Following their stay in Cuba, they were sent to 
Nicaragua for additional training before their entry into 
Honduras on July 19. 
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This guerrilla invasion was rapidly subdued by the Honduran 
Armed Forces. The leader, Jose Reyes Matta, a Honduran 
revolutionary long resident in Havana, was killed along with 
many of his followers. Other members of this ill-prepared 
insurgency deserted. Reyes Matta and his followers did not 
directly threaten the stability of the Honduran state. But 
theirs may well have been only the first attempt. Reports from 
Havana and Managua have indicated that the effort to mount 
rural insurgency in Honduras can be expected to continue. 
The Hondurans perceive across the border in Nicaragua a 
conventional military as well as a subversive threat. The 
Sandinistas are engaged in a rapid military buildup. Their 
regular army is now more than twice the size of that of 
Honduras and is supported by reserve infantry battalions and 
militia manned by more than 50,000 men. The flow of arms to 
the sandinistas from the Soviet bloc leaves the Hondurans far 
out-gunned. The Honduran armed forces consist of an 11,500-man 
Army, 300-man Navy, and 1,200 Air Force personnel. Most of the 
basic military equipment is 10-20 years old; there are also 
substantial weaknesses in communications and transport. 
Honduras has relied on its Air Force, the region's most 
professional and capable, as the major deterrent to outside 
attack. There are over 100 aircraft in its inventory, 
including 14 Super Mysteres (vintage 1952), the mainstay of the 
force. The deterrent capacity of the Air Force is increasingly 
in question in light of its aging inventory and Nicaragua's 
acquisition of Soviet-built anti-aircraft systems. 
Up until late 1982, as the Sandinistas pursued their 
efforts to exploit Honduran territory for the support of the 
Salvadoran insurgency, and as they attempted to introduce armed 
subversion into Honduras, anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity 
along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border was sporadic, of low 
intensity and posed no threat to the regime in Managua. 
Subsequently, there has been a substantial expansion of their 
activities, as described in the paper on Nicaragua. Numerous 
incidents along the border have occurred, including armed 
Sandinista incursions and threats from the Nicaraguan regime to 
retaliate across the frontier. A high degree of tension exists 
between the two countries. 
Honduras has sought to strengthen its security through a 
closer military relationship with the United states. Military 
assistance from this country increased and is now running at 
about $37 million, or approximately one-third of all u.s. aid. 
The u.s. and Honduras have conducted joint military exercises 
with the participation of up to 5,000 u.s. troops and the two 
countries have established a Regional Training Center in 
Honduras at which instruction is provided to Salvadorans, as 
well as to Hondurans. Fleet maneuvers by the u.s. Navy off 
both Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Central America have 
demonstrated u.s. concern for the security of Honduras. 
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The available evidence indicates that these maneuvers, the 
military exercises and the presence of u.s. troops in Honduras 
have had an effect in curbing to some degree the use by the 
Sandinistas of Honduran territory for the transshipment of arms 
to the Salvadoran insurgents, as well as exerting pressure on 
the regime in Managua to respond more positively to regional 
peace initiatives. The u.s. military presence in Honduras is 
also seen there as a tangible commitment to the nation's 
security, although only about 200 officers and men are in the 
country on a permanent basis. 
This relationship of security to an outside presence, 
particularly in the form of relatively large-scale military 
exercises, poses potential problems in terms of the possibility 
of excessive dependency and the impact on a small, agrarian 
society of foreign troops from another culture. But in the 
absence of a regional peace settlement, there would appear to 
be little choice for the Hondurans but to look to the United 
States for such support. We note that relations between the 
Honduran civilian population and the u.s. military are reported 
as largely free of tension and that the work of u.s. Army 
medical teams among the rural population has been particularly 
welcomed. 
The Honduran security situation is further complicated by 
border problems with El Salvador. Differences over demarcation 
of the boundary line go back to the colonial era and in 1969 
led to the so-called "soccer war." Although the OAS succeeded 
in putting an early end to that conflict, the underlying 
dispute has yet to be resolved. A 1980 agreement on joint 
demarcation has so far produced few results. As previously 
noted, Salvadoran guerrillas have long used the border for 
bases and supply, making particularly effective use of 
contested pockets in the line. It is alleged that they have 
also infiltrated Salvadoran refugee camps on the Honduran side 
for purposes of gathering intelligence and providing protection 
for some of their forces from regular Salvadoran troops 
operating in the area. 
The Initiative for Peace 
Honduras has sought above all to ensure its security by 
promoting the concept of a comprehensive regional peace. As 
the government of Honduras stated to the Commission, "the 
internal conflicts (in the region) have altered the basis of 
equilibrium in bilateral relations and have shattered the terms 
(on which) regional security previously existed." These 
conflicts "have spilled and spread over the other countries of 
the region-- creating a global crisis", requiring a global 
solution for the region. Thus, bilateral arrangements on a 
narrow range of state-to-state issues, as the Sandinistas 
insistently proposed in the past, would leave the essence of 
the crisis untouched and Honduran security still very much in 
jeopardy. 
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It is the Honduran thesis that the search for peace must 
comprehend the internal conflicts, bilateral problems and " 
multilateral, regional security. These three elements cannot 
in the Honduran view be separated. Honduras was the first 
nation to put forward a general plan of peace for the region. 
Foreign Minister Paz Barnica announced it in a speech to the 
Organization of American states on March 23, 1982 and later 
submitted it to the United Nations. The plan called for 
agreement on six basic points: 
an end to the arms race and significant reductions in 
existing armaments and numbers of military personnel; 
reduction in the numbers of foreign military and other 
advisers; 
an end to the clandestine traffic in arms; 
absolute respect for traditional national boundaries; 
provisions for verification of all such obligations through 
international inspection and supervision within and among 
the countries of the region; 
a permanent multilateral dialogue leading to political 
arrangements designed to ensure democracy, pluralism and 
human rights in the area. 
Two elements of this plan are of particularly critical 
importance to Honduras: airtight provisions for verification 
of the obligations undertaken and measures to ensure 
pluralistic political systems in the region. Verification of 
commitments on armaments and arms trafficking is seen as 
essential, given the long Sandinista record of covert 
introduction of arms into the region. In the Honduran view, a 
closed, totalitarian political system in Nicaragua with its 
underlying commitment to the export of revolution would pose a 
permanent threat to Honduras's own democracy. The conclusion 
there is that peace in Central America in the long run depends 
on the existence of generally compatible political systems in 
the five countries and that these systems should be essentially 
democratic. 
The Honduran plan was the forerunner of subsequent 
initiatives more elaborately developed but with the same 
general thrust. These include the various proposals of the 
so-called Contadora group, which for the most part cover the 
Honduran six points. For more than a year following the 
Honduran proposal, the Sandinistas continued to insist that 
such issues as border security and arms trafficking could only 
be addressed on a bilateral basis with Honduras. They 
ostensibly modified this position somewhat in July of last year 
in response to the 21-point proposal of the Contadora group. 
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The course President Suazo and his government have followed 
in pursuing national security through closer military ties with 
the United States, while rejecting bilateral negotiations with 
the Sandinistas in the absence of a regional framework, has not 
gone without challenge in Honduras -- or in this country for 
that matter. It is argued that Honduras is being "militarized" 
and has abandoned neutrality to take sides in a dangerous 
military and ideological struggle. That choice, according to 
this line of reasoning, puts the democratic experiment in 
Honduras at risk, threatening a return to military goverment, 
polarization within the society and, eventually, a situation of 
internal violence of the Salvadoran type -- if not open warfare 
with Nicaragua. In the ruling Liberal Party, as well as in the 
opposition and among the military, there have been those who 
questioned the wisdom of this policy. 
The debate has, as far as we can determine, for the most 
part died down this last year. As we have seen, the appearance 
of a putative Honduran guerrilla front, Cuban and Nicaraguan 
propaganda targeting of Honduras for "liberation," terrorist 
attacks in Tegucigalpa and the incursion of the Reyes Matta 
band from Nicaragua indicated that the purported choice was 
illusory. In addition, incidents along the border, including 
the gunning down of two u.s. journalists in June of 1983 by 
Nicaraguan troops, conveyed the clear impression of an 
aggressive Sandinista military posture. The announcement last 
year in Managua of Nicaraguan claims to Honduran territory in 
the remote Mosquitia region reinforced that impression. As we 
have noted, the Sandinistas refused for more than a year to 
respond seriously to the Honduran call for a comprehensive 
regional approach to the problem of establishing peace in the 
area. That too served to dampen down the debate in Honduras 
over the policies of the Suazo government. 
On the other side, the Sandinistas continue to insist that 
the alleged Honduran and u.s. support to what they call the 
contras and the purported use of Honduran territory by those 
forces constitute the primary threat to the peace of the 
region. As discussed in the paper on Nicaragua, the 
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan Democratic Force deploys about 
10,000 troops in the frontier area of northwestern Nicaragua. 
According to press reports, these guerrillas at times stage 
from Honduran territory where they are said to maintain base 
camps. It is worth reiterating that this guerrilla activity 
was of little consequence before March of 1982. By that time 
the Sandinistas had long since established routes and bases on 
Honduran territory for the transshipment of arms to the 
Salvadoran insurgents. 
Human Rights 
Understandably, there has been fear in Honduras that, with 
the appearance of terrorism and the threat of insurgency, the 
brutal counter-terror and repression seen elsewhere in the 
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region would follow. In its report covering 1982, Amnesty 
International reviews denunciations it received of a number of 
alleged arbitrary arrests, cases of torture, disappearances and 
extrajudicial executions. Amnesty International has submitted 
cases involving disappeared persons in Honduras to the United 
Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary 
Disappearances. Many of these involved foreign nationals 
purportedly suspected of entering Honduras to conduct 
subversive activities. Another concern of Amnesty and other 
human rights organizations has been reported harassment and 
abduction of Salvadoran refugees by the Salvadoran military, 
allegedly acting with the cooperation of the Honduran 
military. Friction between the Honduran authorities and 
personnel of the relief agencies over these and other charges 
of unsatisfactory conditions in the refugee camps has also been 
a problem. 
The spillover from the neighboring conflicts and the threat 
of terrorism and subversion introduced from Nicaragua create 
grave difficulties for Honduras. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are more than 
40,000 refugees in the country, including Salvadorans, 
Nicaraguans -- many of them Miskito and suma Indians -- and 
Guatemalans. This figure is probably understated. Refugee 
camps are located close by the Salvadoran border and, as we 
have noted, allegedly provide shelter for active supporters of 
the Salvadoran insurgency. (The Government of Honduras and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are currently 
discussing proposals to move the camps inland away from the 
border.) It does appear that the Honduran security forces may 
well have tried at times to deal with this difficult situation 
without due regard for the well-being and physical integrity of 
the refugees. It also may be that those services engaged in 
unacceptable practices in attempting to meet an outbreak of 
terrorism and subversion for which the country's relatively 
peaceful past ill prepared them. 
But Honduras's open political system and climate of freedom 
have permitted the opposition to publicize charges of human 
rights violations, thus inhibiting tendencies to use 
extra-legal methods. It is our understanding that the security 
forces have demonstrated a growing capability to locate and 
apprehend terrorists without using the illegal and inhuman 
methods of some of their counterparts in the region. Although 
problems continue to plague the refugee camps, relations 
between the relief agencies and the Honduran authorities are 
reportedly now more cooperative. There is thus hope that 
Honduras can escape the brutal struggle of terror and 
counter-terror afflicting its neighbors. But there must be 
fear that the exporters of revolution will raise the stakes by 
testing further the capacity of the undermanned and 
undertrained Honduran security services to respond within the 
law. As in so many other countries of the world, the purpose 
would be to provoke the repression on which radical 
revolutionaries hope to feed. 
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Outlook 
Honduras faces the difficult challenge of maintaining its 
new democracy, weathering its economic crisis and launching a 
renewed drive for development in the shadow of the perceived 
threat to its security from a militarized and radicalized 
Nicaragua. Historically, the dynamics of situations in which 
security considerations -- particularly internal security 
considerations -- become overriding have tended in Latin 
America to work against civilian political control and the free 
play of political competition, even where democracy has had 
deep roots. (Uruguay provides perhaps the most dramatic 
example.) Firm protection for human rights is bound to be 
difficult to sustain in an atmosphere of regional violence and 
in the context of the threat of subversion from abroad. But 
evident commitment to a democratic order on the part of the 
Honduran military high command is encouraging, as is the spirit 
of close cooperation which seems to animate the relationships 
between the armed forces and the civilian government. 
As with other countries in the region, Honduras will need a 
greater sense of security in order to devote its full energies 
and resources to the tough job of development. Honduras's own 
proposals for a regional settle~ent based on pluralistic 
political systems and verifiable measures to end violence, 
Cuban-Soviet intervention and export of revolution would seem 
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Guatemala, roughly the size of the state of Tennessee, is 
the most populous of the countries under study -- and is a land 
of great physical beauty and potential wealth. Its economy is 
the largest and the most diversified in Central America. Its 
long border with Mexico endows it with special strategic 
significance in the region. And the presence of a large and 
culturally unassimilated Indian population sets it apart from 
its neighbors. 
During much of Guatemala's history prior to 1944, national 
government was dominated by Liberal Party strongmen, including 
notably Manuel Cabrera Estrada (1898-1920) and General Jorge 
Ubico (1931-1944). The exercise of executive authority was 
both centralized and arbitrary. Government policy was designed 
to develop Guatemala economically through the promotion of 
agricultural exports. Labor costs were kept low, the work 
force kept under control, and the privileges of the landholding 
elite protected. Threats of revolution were easily contained 
because of relative international isolation, the limited 
interplay of ideologies and the personalistic nature of the 
government with its firm control of the police and the 
military. The Indian masses, pure-blooded descendants of the 
great Mayans, were regarded as wards of the Ladinos (Latin or 
white population); the Indians performed physical labor in 
return for a minimum of care and protection. 
Modern Guatemalan political developments are generally 
traced to the so-called "decade of revolution," the period from 
1944 to 1954. In the former year a coup d'etat, engineered 
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primarily by middle class intellectuals and junior army 
officers, brought down General Ubico. The successor junta, 
promising to modernize and democratize Guatemala, held 
elections and turned over power to the new president, Juan Jose 
Arevalo, a university professor who had spent years in exile. 
Arevalo proclaimed a program of "spiritual socialism" designed 
to encourage reforms in education, health, labor and 
agriculture. New freedoms were granted for organized political 
and labor activities. In 1947, a social security institute was 
created. An initial step toward agrarian reform was taken with 
the passage of a law requiring the rental of unused land. 
Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, Arevalo's successor, channeled "the 
revolution" in a more radical direction. In 1952, an agrarian 
reform law passed the Congress. It called for the 
expropriation and redistribution from large estates of 
uncultivated lands. The Guatemalan Labor Party, Guatemala's 
communist party, was granted legal status in the same year. 
The extent of communist influence in the Arbenz period remains 
a subject of debate. The communists did dominate the emerging 
labor movement, developing a lever to manipulate the political 
process. But they lacked influence in the armed forces and 
were only a vocal minority in the Congress and in the 
population at large. 
With arms from the United States embargoed, Arbenz turned 
to the Eastern Bloc, arranging for the purchase of 2,000 tons 
of Czech-made small arms -- an unprecedented acquisition by the 
Central American standards of the time. The regime also 
undertook plans to create an armed peasant militia, greatly 
alarming the armed forces. Concern over these developments led 
the Eisenhower Administration to provide arms, air support and 
other assistance to Colonel Castillo Armas, who at the head of 
other dissident Guatemalans, invaded the country from a base in 
Honduras. Without the support of the army and unable to 
galvanize popular resistance, Arbenz fell in June of 1954. 
These events have colored U.S.-Guatemalan relations ever 
since. The reactionary nature of the succeeding military 
regimes opened the United States to the charge of having 
frustrated reform. And the sense of humiliation over outside 
intervention remained strong within the Guatemalan army for 
many years. 
Under Castillo Armas and his immediate successors agrarian 
and other reform measures v~ere repealed, trade union activity 
curtailed and dissident political movements repressed. The 
military as an institution, rather than at the service of a 
single leader, began to play a primary role in politics. The 
officers forged alliances with powerful private-sector 
organizations, representing industrialists, coffee and cotton 
growers, and with rightist politicians. The system served to 
bring occasional periods of stability and fostered economic 
growth, if not social reform. However, divisions within the 
army continued to manifest themselves. In 1960 younger 
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officers staged an unsuccessful coup in an effort to oust their 
corrupt superiors. Pressures from within the military and from 
other quarters resulted in the drafting in 1965 of a liberal 
constitution and the election of a civilian president, Julio 
Mendez Montenegro. He was Guatemala's last civilian president 
to date. 
With the formation of the Central American Common Market 
and the advent of the Alliance for Progress, Guatemala 
developed important regional markets and registered high growth 
rates. In overall output, as measured by per capita GNP of 
over $1,000, Guatemala raised itself to a place within the 
middle ranks of the developing countries. Growth, however, was 
not reflected in an improved distribution of national income. 
Striking contrasts between the urban and rural sectors 
remained, the latter sector receiving only a limited share of 
the benefits of economic expansion. While the rural labor 
market became more complex, reliance on inexpensive and 
unorganized labor remained the cornerstone of commercial 
agriculture. 
In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution insurgency struck 
Guatemala. The Rebel Armed forces (FAR), founded by some of 
the officers who staged the aborted 1960 coup, appeared in the 
field, to be followed by the MR-16. The insurgents, many of 
whom at the time were non-Marxists, declared themselves the 
heirs to the "decade of revolution", commenced guerrilla 
activity in the countryside and mounted terrorist attacks in 
the urban centers. Some were financed and supplied by the 
Cubans and established links with the underground Guatemalan 
Labor Party. From 1966 to 1968 the violence escalated. A u.s. 
Ambassador and two senior u.s. military advisers were murdered 
in Guatemala City. The guerrilla threat began to diminish 
when, as we have seen, Fidel Castro withdrew his support, and 
as the Guatemalan Army's counter-insurgency campaign in the 
Zacapa region along the Honduran border Jnade headway. By 1970 
the insurgent threat had largely been contained, although at a 
high cost in terms of human rights violations. 
This struggle had a profound impact on political 
developments and attitudes during the ensuing years. The army 
acquired experience and confidence in its counter-insurgency 
capacity. But the dominant groups in the military and among 
their civilian allies increasingly perceived dissent in 
virtually any form as subversion. The conviction that brutal 
repression was necessary to meet the threat of Marxist 
revolution took hold. The use of violence for political ends, 
always present in Guatemala, became endemic. The political 
system became progressively more closed and oppressive. 
During the 1970's, the army played an even greater role in 
the management of the state. Between 1970 and 1982, a series 
of military officers became president, each of whom had served 
his predecessor as Minister of Defense. Intricate political 
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maneuvers and arrangements with various political parties 
guaranteed "continuismo", or political continuity. Unlike the 
case in El Salvador, there was no single party associated with 
the military. Instead, a multiplicity of party organizations 
existed, conducting separate negotiations with the army. 
Access to political participation by opposition groups was 
often limited by the denial of legal status (personeria 
juridica) to a party, or by intimidation. Regular elections 
were held, but in conditions that effectively guaranteed 
results satisfactory to the military high command. The 
government's control of the vote count in 1974 forestalled an 
apparent electoral victory for the coalition led by the 
Christian Democratic candidate, General Efrain Rios Montt. In 
each succeeding election, voter apathy increased as the range 
of electoral alternatives diminished. In short, the system 
preserved the political status quo but did little to address 
underlying discontent. 
A second generation of Marxist insurgents, once more with 
Cuban support, emerged in 1972. Beginning with a nucleus of 12 
men, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor initiated operations in the 
remote northwest region of Ixcan. The new insurgents declared 
that the struggle would be waged through a "prolonged popular 
war." Bases were established and a political infrastructure 
developed in the countryside. During the previous period of 
guerrilla activity, the insurgents had largely ignored the 
Indians. The Guerrilla Army of the Poor switched tactics and 
exhorted the Indian population to join the armed revolutionary 
struggle, promising land and freedom. An additional element of 
the new strategy was the attention devoted to the 
"international front" through the use of propaganda and 
solidarity organizations aimed at developing external support 
for the guerrillas. 
The government responded by intensifying its 
counter-insurgency actions, employing force, and often terror, 
against both insurgents and political moderates. The leaders 
of a number of independent or opposition organizations who 
could not be co-opted or frightened into exile were murdered. 
The integrity of the judicial system was impaired as judges, 
witnesses, and defense lawyers were either intimidated or 
murdered. Under the presidency of General Lucas Garcia 
(1978-1982), the number of deaths from politically related 
violence climbed dramatically. Government security forces and 
leftist guerrillas murdered their enemies -- real or perceived 
-- with impunity. caught in this war of attrition were 
politicians, union and campesino leaders, students and 
professors, and some members of the catholic clergy, many of 
whom fell victim to the violence. 
By 1982, the situation in Guatemala appeared to have 
reached crisis proportions. The number of 
politically-motivated killings rose from a monthly rate of 
between 70 and 100 in 1981, to what u.s. Government sources 
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estimated to be 250 to 300 a month in 1982. The guerrillas 
also intensified their activities, employing a more 
sophisticated array of weapons obtained from their Cuban 
sponsors. The possibility that the armed left could prevail 
began to be taken seriously in Guatemala. 
The March 1982 presidential elections took place in a tense 
atmosphere. Although General Anibal Guevara was proclaimed the 
victor as expected, amidst charges of massive fraud, junior 
army officers, in particular, were alarmed at the prospect of a 
continuation of the unsuccessful policies of the Lucas regime. 
On March 23 a group of young army officers staged a coup 
d'etat. (Again, as in El Salvador, the fate of Nicaragua's 
National Guard undoubtedly impressed these officers with the 
need for change.) General Efrain Rios Montt was asked to lead 
a new governing junta. The 1965 constitution, previously 
observed only in the breach in any case, was suspended. Rios 
Montt's government set out to build popular support and restore 
stability. 
Its first priority was the campaign against the 
insurgents. The new government declared that it would give 
priority to ending human rights abuses, preparing for a return 
to constitutional government and eliminating government 
corruption. Employing the tactic of "beans and bullets," the 
army attempted to reduce support for the insurgents by 
distributing supplies of food, medicine, and building materials 
in rural areas. Civic action, which had worked well in the 
counter-insurgency of the 1960's, was again a part of the 
government's strategy. The national development program was 
redirected from large-scale projects to smaller undertakings to 
strengthen economic and social infrastructures in the 
impoverished highlands. On the security front, the military 
began arming civil defense units. Government amnesty programs 
were also instituted to draw support away from the guerrillas. 
In April 1982, Rios Montt, presenting his "Fourteen Points 
of Government," called for national reconciliation, judicial 
reform, and an improvement in the standards of living. A 
return to constitutional government was promised, although no 
specific timetable was developed. A most significant step was 
the creation of the Council of State as a policy advisory body, 
with ten representatives of the Indian population among the 30 
members. This was the first time since 1954 that the 
indigenous peoples had had an opportunity to participate in the 
making of nation~l Guatemalan policy. The Rios Montt 
government also proclaimed campaigns against government 
corruption and the extra legal use of violence by the security 
forces. 
Under Rios Montt there was a significant decline in open 
violence in Guatemala City. But human rights organizations 
charged that the security forces continued to kill large 
numbers of non-combatants in rural areas for suspected 
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involvement with the guerrillas or simply for reasons of 
intimidation. Secret tribunals were set up in Guatemala City 
and death penalties were meted out. Hhatever the shortcomings 
of the Rios Montt regime, however, it did show a greater 
awareness than predecessor regimes to the serious problems 
confronting Guatemala. 
The Rios Montt experiment ended on August 8, 1982. In a 
new coup, Brigadier General Oscar Mejia Victores, Army Chief of 
Staff, assumed the position of chief of state. This action, 
the government maintains, forestalled other more 
politically-based coup plots and protected the unity of the 
armed forces. General Mejia has stated that his government's 
objective is to conduct the transition to a constitutional 
order. The first step, elections for a Constituent Assembly, 
is now scheduled to take place on July 1, 1984. Roughly 36 
putative political parties are preparing to register and 
participate in the Constituent Assembly elections. Potentially 
of greatest importance is the public commitment of the armed 
forces to a policy of strict non-intervention in the 
elections. However, the reported resurgence of urban death 
squads darkens the political climate. 
Social Problems 
In terms of meeting human needs, the Guatemalan record is 
not encouraging. In rural areas -- where almost two-thirds of 
the population are to be found -- living conditions remain 
primitive. Life expectancy in 1980 was only 59 years, little 
better than that in Honduras, the poorest country in the 
region. Adequate sanitation, potable water and proper shelter 
barely exist outside the cities. More than 50 percent of the 
adults remain illiterate, a poor educational record for a 
country with a per capita income of over $1,000. 
overshadowing all social issues in Guatemala is the 
presence of a large, unassimilated, mostly illiterate, and 
culturally distinct mass of peasantry composed of Indian 
campesinos who represent between 45 and 60 per cent of the 
population. Historically, the isolation of the Indians has 
been in part voluntary; their cultural traditions, language and 
way of life seemed to render them impervious to Hestern 
influences. National authorities thus tended to assume that 
what they took to be the fatalistic, introspective nature of 
the Indians made them impenetrable to radical subversion. In 
the past, political and social conflict seemed to be confined 
to the ladino (mestizo) population. 
This situation has changed. In recent decades, increasing 
population pressures have weakened the traditional agricultural 
economy of the Indian, making it more difficult for families to 
eke out even a subsistence living. At the same time, growing 
exposure to modern culture -- through missionaries, relief 
workers, the transistor radio and other influences -- has 
undermined traditional Indian attitudes and behavioral 
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patterns, provoking a strong desire, especially among young 
Indians, to enjoy the benefits of participation in the cash 
economy. Discontent and change can be measured in the 
willingness of the Indians to accept evangelical Protestanism 
and to break away from the syncretist blend of Roman 
Catholicism, traditional Mayan religious beliefs and communal 
organizations which characterized their lives for centuries. 
New more independent and modernistic attitudes have begun to 
take hold. The simple appurtenances of modern society have 
become powerful instruments of change. 
An annual population growth of over 3 percent is at the 
root of much of the Indian problem. Although Guatemala is not 
overpopulated in absolute terms, the high concentration of 
population in the western highlands has generated severe land 
pressures. More people has meant progressive sub~division of 
plots on mountain sides which were barely adequate in the first 
place for family subsistence. For example, the microfinca 
(farms of less than 3.5 acres) accounted for 21 percent of all 
farm units in 1950, but 41 percent in 1979. The search for 
more land to till has brought the progressive destruction of 
Guatemala's extensive forest cover. And, as the population 
expansion continues, underemployment grows in both rural and 
urban areas. swelling migration to the cities has been the 
inevitable result. Others seek to supplement incomes through 
seasonal and migratory agricultural labor. Overall low ~vorld 
prices and weak demand for export crops have limited 
opportunities for Indians to participate in the cash economy. 
For the most part, government social policy has been 
passive with respect to the problems of the indigenous 
population. No legal barriers to cultural change or social 
mobility have been erected, but programs to promote 
modernization and qualitative improvements in living conditions 
are limited and depend greatly on external assistance, as has 
particularly been the case in the teaching of the Spanish 
language. One government action with a significant potential 
for benefitting poor rural laborers was the tripling of the 
minimum wage in 1980 following an almost unprecedented strike 
among cotton and sugar workers. But declining employment 
opportunities due to the current recession have largely offset 
that gain in terms of the poorer segment of the population as a 
whole. (In addition, studies have been published indicating a 
stagnation or even decline in real urban wages since the early 
1970's.) 
This complex of interacting problems in recent years has 
evidently increased the sense of discontent and alienation 
among the Indian population, offering a significant opportunity 
to the Marxist-Leninist insurgents. As we have seen, they have 
for the first time mounted a campaign of active proselytizing 
in the Indian commmunities of the highlands. The Rios-Montt 
counter-insurgency program succeeded in blunting this 
campaign. But the contest for the allegiance of these 
long-isolated people will continue. 
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Human Rights 
As we have indicated, Guatemala has been the scene for a 
number of years of gross violations of human rights. Amnesty 
International estimates that 12,000 civilian non-combatants 
were killed by the security services between 1978 and 1982. 
Death squads, reportedly made up of members of those services, 
murdered labor leaders, religious personnel, political leaders 
and journalists and others identified with dissident points of 
view. A recent outrage was the apparent murder of four 
contract employees of the u.s. Agency for International 
Development. On the other side, Guatemala's insurgent groups 
have long practiced urban terrorism to a greater extent than 
their counterparts elsewhere in the region. Kidnappings and 
assassinations continue to be their stock in trade. 
During recent years, the bulk of the killings in Guatemala 
have occurred in the rural areas in the context of a violent 
insurgency. Government forces have been charged with massacres 
of entire Indian villages. Guerrillas are reported to execute 
non-combatants suspected of collaborating with the army. These 
atrocities on both sides take place in remote areas where 
independent access and verification is often impossible. 
Documentation in support of such charges is necessarily 
sketchy. There are no well-organized human rights groups in 
Guatemala. But, at the government's invitation, both the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Chairman of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission visited Guatemala during 
the last year. 
The dimensions and realities of that war in the backlands 
are only dimly perceived from the outside. But its impact can 
be seen in the tragedy of the displaced person and the 
refugee. There are perhaps one million persons within the 
country who have been driven from their homes by war and 
economic hardship. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 40,000 Guatemalan Indians are lodged 
in refugee camps just across the border in Mexico, and there 
may be many more outside the camps. 
The Government of Guatemala professes a determination to 
curb violations of human rights. And, according to u.s. 
Embassy figures, there has been a steady decline in civilian 
deaths attributed to the violence: 493 a month in 1981 on the 
average; 365 in 1982; and 140 in 1983. The Government has 
lifted a state of emergency (known as a "state of alarm"), 
abolished the secret tribunals set up under Rios Montt and 
promulgated a 90-day amnesty program in August of last year. 
But several recent disappearances of students and faculty 
members of San Carlos University and the murders of the AID 
contract employees referred to earlier raise doubts as to how 
much permanent progress has been made. Clearly, firmer 
government action will be required to establish confidence in 
its intentions. 
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The Loss of Economic Growth 
As the largest country of the region with a strong export 
base in coffee, bananas, sugar and meat, and with an aggressive 
entrepreneurial class, Guatemala was well positioned to take 
advantage of the dynamic development of the Central American 
Common Market. Industrialization for export within the market 
was the most extensive in the region. Gross Domestic Product 
grew during the 1960's at a rate of 5.5 percent and between 
1970 and 1977 at around 5.4 percent equaling the highest rate 
in Central America. Government policies, particularly low tax 
rates and prudent fiscal management, encouraged economic 
expansion, led by the private sector. 
But coffee exports remained the key economic factor. 
Historically they have accounted for about 70 percent of the 
country's foreign exchange earnings. Hith the decline in real 
prices for that commodity and over-production around the world, 
Guatemala's economy began to suffer. Difficulties in marketing 
the country's other commodity exports-- bananas and sugar in 
particular -- contributed to the decline. The troubles of the 
Central American Common Market also had a significant impact. 
Over 80 percent of Guatemala's manufactured goods are normally 
sold in the Common Market and are not competitive outside it. 
The insurgency has also had its effect. Property damage from 
the fighting for the 1981-82 period has been estimated at $22 
million. But losses in terms of production and investment have 
undoubtedly been much greater. Both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors have been hard hit by capital flight and the 
drying up of external credit to Central America. Along with 
the other countries of the region (except for Nicaragua), 
Guatemala has turned to the International Monetary Fund for 
stabilization assistance, but is having great difficulties in 
carrying out the program. 
The u.s. Embassy estimates a four percent decline in 
Guatemala's overall production in 1987. Unemployment according 
to Guatemalan government figures is now 20 percent; including 
underemployment would probably double that figure. Population 
growth of over three percent a year makes the restoration of 
economic growth an especially urgent requirement. In current 
international conditions, Guatemala cannot look for rapid 
expansion of world markets for its traditional cash crops. 
Revival of the Central American Commmon Market and 
intra-regional trade would obviously be of great benefit. An 
end to insurgency and urban violence could restore a tourist 
industry that showed great promise in the early and mid-1970's. 
But, as World Bank studies show, Guatemala must develop new 
products and markets. Potential does exist in such 
non-traditional exports as rubber, sesame and other oil-bearing 
crops, as well as in agro-industrial production. Projections 
of petroleum production of perhaps 30,000 barrels a day by 1986 
add a note of optimism. The greatest opportunities would seem 
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to exist in more efficient use of the land. As much as one-
hall of Guatemala 1 s usable land is uncultivated and could be 
developed for food crops or pasture. Substantial investment 
will, however, be required. The drastic shortage of capital 
within the country means that foreign sources of financing will 
be needed if satisfactory growth is to be restored. 
u.s. foreign assistance programs in Guatemala declined 
appreciably over recent years. Anticipated increases for the 
current fiscal year may not materialize given restrictive 
legislation passed in the Congress and directed at the 
country 1 s poor human rights situations. Support for Guatemalan 
development from the United States has long concentrated on the 
rural poor whose needs are now greater than ever. The prospect 
of elections and the establishment of a democratic order in 
Guatemala hold out promise that the substantial u.s. aid so 
greatly needed may yet be possible. 
The Search for a Democratic Alternative 
In no country of the region has the three-sided contest 
among a rigidly traditional social order, the movement for 
democratic reform, and Marxist-Leninist insurgency developed 
over a longer period. From 1944 to 1982 Guatemala 1 s history 
was one of the rise and repression of moderate reform, of 
cycles of intense political violence and Marxist-Leninist 
insurgency, and of the growing brutality of military 
government. The Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua induced, as in 
El Salvador, the overthrow of a particularly oppressive group 
of ~ilitary leaders associated with the regime of President 
Lucas Garcia. Those who replaced them have promised a return 
to constitutional and civilian rule and the way may now be open 
for another effort at democratization. 
The central problem has been ~- and will continue to be --
the need to create a stable government with popular legitimacy 
and capable of adapting to changing economic and social 
realities. For the past 30 years Guatemala 1 s successive 
governments have for the most part been narrowly based and 
under the domination of the military. The challenge now is to 
open the political process and lay the foundation for 
government widely perceived as legitimate and representative. 
That will require the active support of the military 
institution. As we have seen, the officer corps has not over 
these three decades always been either monolithic or an 
unchanging defender of the status quo. Military men have at 
times been at the cutting edge of political change. The young 
officers who organized the coup in ~1arch of 1982 sought a 
government free of administrative corruption and capable of 
developing a counter-insurgency strategy that did not rely on 
the force of arms alone. 
The armed forces have pledged themselves to 
non-interference in the electoral process. But they can be 
expected to continue to regard their institution as the 
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ultimate guarantor of the integrity and security of the nation, 
above and apart from the normal structure of government. This 
deeply ingrained attitude can lead to interference and 
domination in the process of government. 
Guatemala's strong private sector has been able to exert 
considerable political influence in recent times, particuarly 
over the framing of economic policy. As with the military, its 
commitment to democratization will be important. The turbulent 
politics of Guatemala, its violence and susceptibility to 
extremist formulas, have to all appearances made the country's 
leading economic groups wary with respect to the transition to 
a freely competitive political environment. The Council of 
Growers, Businessmen, Industrialists and Financiers (CACIF), an 
umbrella organization of the private sector, has been 
particularly concerned to maintain the contemporary Guatemalan 
tradition of a small public sector, low taxes-- the lowest in 
Latin America -- and resistance to schemes for land reform. 
The private sector's views will be well represented by several 
conservative political parties in the forthcoming campaign. 
Guatemala's labor movement is relatively weak. Only 10-15 
percent of the work force has been unionized. After 
substantial growth in the "decade of the revolution" (1944-54), 
organized labor met strong government resistance and, in the 
1970's, brutal government repression. In the last years of 
that decade a number of strikes for collective bargaining 
rights and wage increases won some concession, but also led to 
the perpetration of even more systematic violence against union 
leaders and organizers. In the past year there has been a 
resurgence of activity in the labor sector. Two new democratic 
federations appeared: the National Campesino Coordinating 
Board in representation of rural vvorkers and the Syndicated 
Unity Confederation of Guatemala. The latter achieved legal 
status last year, an encouraging development in an 
administrative system that has often managed to block such 
recognition. Labor can have a significant role to play in a 
freer political climate. 
Political parties in Guatemala have had difficulty in 
sinking deep roots. The National Liberation Movement, a 
right-wing party, the centrist Christian Democrats and the 
Revolutionary Party do, however, have relatively long records 
of participation in government in cooperation with the 
military. Other parties, generally of a social-democratic 
tendency, made little headway in past decades, in good part 
because of violence directed at their potential leaders by the 
security services. As previously noted, there are now more 
than 30 putative political parties vying for attention. A 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal has been established to plan and 
supervise the projected elections. But the principal obstacles 
to democratization are not organizational or administrative. 
They are to be found, rather, in the violence created by the 
insurgency and terrorism of the left and the counter-violence 
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of the security forces. Progress on both fronts will be 
important to the realization of a democratic future in 
Guatemala. 
The Insurgency 
Guatemala has now undergone more than 20 years of prolonged 
Marxist insurgency, rural and urban. There have been cycles of 
both growth and decline, coinciding to an important degree, as 
we have noted, with the relative level of Cuban interest and 
support. Thus, the resurgence of rural insurgency between 1979 
and 1982, reaching in the latter year a peak of over 3,000 men 
in the field, was related partly to worsening economic 
conditions, partly to a reaction to government repression in 
rural areas, and partly to new opportunities Castro saw in 
Central America with the emergence of a victorious Sandinista 
movement in Nicaragua. As in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran 
cases, it was Cuban pressure that brought rival guerrillas 
together in an umbrella political-military front organization. 
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) was 
established in Managua in 1982. 
The components of the UNRG include the Rebel Armed Forces 
(FAR), the oldest of the insurgent organizations, dating from 
1962; the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the largest of 
these groups; the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms 
(OPRA); and two armed labor parties. The various groups 
operate on a number of fronts in the western highlands, the 
south-central regions of the country and the northern Petan. 
The EGP, for example, claims six fronts -- named for "Che" 
Guevara, Augusto Sandino, and Ho Chi Minh, among others. 
Operational guidance, logistical supply, and training for each 
of the organizations comes from the outside, notably from Cuba 
and Nicaragua. About 300 Guatemalan immigrants were trained in 
Cuba in 1982; and Cuban-supplied arms reached these groups 
through Belize and Mexico, and indirectly from Nicaragua. 
As with other Central American guerrilla organizations, 
there are differences of views on tactics and strategy among 
the groups of the UNRG. The EGP emphasizes the strategy of a 
prolonged popular war of the Mao-style, gradually rising in 
stages to a final armed confrontation. Its propaganda is 
directed at grievances among the Indian population and at urban 
workers. The FAR advocates classical Marxist-Leninist 
strategies of combining political organizations with armed 
action. OPRA, on the other hand, makes less of its Marxist 
ties and seeks to build an efficient fighting force with Indian 
combatants. For all groups, however, the ultimate goal remains 
a process of mass mobilization and armed confrontation aimed at 
the conquest of political power and the establishment of a 
Marxist-Leninist political order. There is still some question 
as to the ability of the UNRG national command to coordinate 
the activities of these diverse groups in the field. 
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The Guatemalan Army has developed confidence through 20 
long years of experience in its capacity to mount effective 
counter-insurgency operations. As has been seen, the campaign 
mounted in 1982 by the Rios Montt government combined military 
force with civic action-- the "beans and bullets program." 
The theme was sounded by Rios Montt himself who said "to fight 
against subversion does not consist in killing a guerrilla; it 
consists in killing the hunger of the peasant." Civil defense 
forces were recruited from rural communities and provided with 
a few arms. The campaign, fought brutally, succeeded in 
blunting what looked to be a dangerous insurgent offensive. 
The Guatemalan forces have demonstrated the ability to 
contain the insurgency in that country. But it appears 
unlikely that they can eliminate it in the forseeable future, 
unless important changes are introduced in the political, 
economic and military fields. The groups of the Guatemalan 
Revolutionary Union still have significant numbers of 
well-trained cadres, as well as experienced leadership and 
important foreign allies in the cubans and Nicaraguans. For 
the army, resources are short, adequate logistics are 
increasingly difficult to maintain, equipment is old and in 
short supply and mobility has been curtailed by difficulties in 
replacing and servicing helicopters. Until the recent 
authorization of a cash sale of helicopter parts, the United 
States Government had provided no military assistance or 
permitted any military sales to Guatemala since 1977. 
Guatemala and the United States 
Guatemala's relations with the United States have in recent 
years been considerably more distant than those of El Salvador, 
Honduras or Costa Rica. Attitudes in the politically powerful 
officer corps have been characterized by strong nationalism and 
resentment over perceived u.s. interventionism in the country's 
internal affairs, ranging from the Arbenz episode and the use 
in the early 1960's of Guatemala as a base for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion to our human rights policies of recent years. The 
cutoff of u.s. military assistance and sales deepened those 
feelings of resentment. The Guatemalan government and military 
pride themselves on their toughness, independence and 
self-sufficiency in the face of tvvo decades of armed subversion. 
On the other side, United States policy objectives in the 
relationship with Guatemala produce dilemmas. It is very much 
in the interest of the United States to support resistance to 
Marxist-Leninist insurgency in Guatemala, as elsewhere in 
Central America. Tl1is country must also, however, be deeply 
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A long and stable democratic tradition sets Costa Rica 
apart from the other nations of Central America; and the fact 
that it has no army makes Costa Rica unique in Latin America. 
The country's democratic system is deeply rooted. Only 
twice since 1899, and then for only brief periods, has the 
democratic order been interrupted. There have been nine 
successive presidential elections since 1949, all as called for 
by the constitution and all by every account available to us 
conducted freely and honestly. 
The Formation of Democracy 
Costa Rica's national character was largely determined 
during the colonial period -- more so even than was the case 
with the rest of the isthmus. Its history is remarkably 
parallel to the American frontier experience -- a comparison 
known to many Costa Ricans, whose sympathetic feelings for the 
U.S. are grounded in the common historical concept of 
Jefferson's small-farmer agrarian democracy. 
What is now Costa Rica was in the 16th century the most 
distant and backward of backwaters. The Spanish "conquerors" 
of Costa Rica were seeking opportunities removed from the 
centers of viceregal power. They found on their arrival not an 
advanced Indian civilization -- ironically, the easiest to 
manipulate and then enslave -- but a less organized, more 
primitive, uncooperative population. The Indians were killed 
or driven off the better lands, leaving the settlers to 
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cultivate only what they could farm by themselves without 
forced labor. 
In contrast to the Spanish-American experience elsewhere, 
where small colonial aristocracies owning and managing 
large-scale holdings exploited indentured native labor, the 
family farm became the model in Costa Rica. Whereas other 
Spanish colonial societies became highly stratified with 
economic and political control in the hands of a few families, 
the Costa Rican society from the beginning was more 
egalitarian. On the marches of colonial rule, but 
comparatively unthreatened by either organized Indian hostility 
or English depredations, the Costa Rican settlers saw little 
need for a standing army that had to be supported by taxes sent 
to distant Guatemala. The raising of local militia reflected 
their reliance on mutual cooperation and gave it further 
impetus. Other Spanish-American societies were characterized 
by the struggle for power and wealth, but early Costa Ricans 
displayed an overriding preference for compromise to bloody 
confrontations. Finally, the weaker class barriers of Costa 
Rican society inspired visions of personal advancement. 
Opportunities for education were looked upon by the poorer 
elements in society as the key to a better life and not as a 
privilege of the wealthy. Progress in providing such 
opportunities was slow, but this attitude underlies Costa 
Rica's impressive educational accomplishments in modern times. 
Costa Rica obtained its formal independence in 1821. 
Subsequent economic development, however, was the source of the 
most profound changes in the country. The so-called "coffee 
miracle" of the mid- and late 19th century transformed Costa 
Rica from one of the poorest states in Central America to one 
of its richest and most progressive. 
This transformation conformed to a considerable degree to 
the country's traditional pattern of small land holdings. Even 
today there are 70,000 individual coffee plantations. But the 
coffee boom and the development of railroads and a banana 
industry around the same time did tend to concentrate the land 
in fewer hands, at the expense of the ideal of agrarian 
democracy. In 1889, Costa Rica held elections -- the first 
free and honest ones in the nation's history-- and began a 
trend maintained with only a few lapses since then. 
The most important formative period of modern Costa Rica --
especially in terms of social welfare and electoral reform --
occurred during the 1940's. Under President Rafael Calderon 
the creation of a modern welfare system began. In 1941, the 
Office of Social Security was established. This was followed a 
year later by proposals to provide legal guarantees of social 
rights for all Costa Ricans, including accident, sickness, 
disability and unemployment compensation, in addition to the 
8-hour day, a minimum wage, and the right to organize. Many of 
these protections were embodied in the comprehensive labor code 
of 1943. 
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While Calderon's social program met with wide approval, he 
came under increasing attack for his efforts to perpetuate his 
hold on power and for his alliance with the communists. 
Following attempts in 1948 by his governing party to perpetuate 
fraud in the presidential election, Jose Figueres, a coffee 
grower, founded an amateur army and rose in rebellion. In a 
brief civil war Figueres and his forces defeated the regular 
armed forces and armed bands of banana workers assembled by the 
Communist Party. A junta headed by Figueres took over, 
promising to stay in power no more than 18 months. The promise 
was kept, the government turned over to the legitimate winner 
of the 1948 election and Costa Rica's democratic order solidly 
established. Figueres's National Liberation Party has since 
played a pivotal role in Costa Rican politics, alternating in 
power with opposition coalitions. 
The reforms introduced by the Calderon government were 
maintained after 1948 and broadened through a series of 
institutional measures designed to build a more egalitarian 
society. These included bank nationalization and sharply 
increased property and income taxes. At the same time, 
safeguards against communist penetration of unions were 
adopted. Most significantly, Figueres, in the wake of his 
successful revolution, abolished the armed forces, which by 
then had become both politicized and discredited. To all 
appearances, a national consensus against the reestablishment 
of a professional army persists to this day. 
Since 1949 Costa Rica has followed the course laid down by 
the 1948 revolution. Alternating coalitions elected to power 
have promoted the welfare state, expanded education and health 
care and preserved democratic rights. The electorate has 
remained anti-communist but left-of-center. The two major 
candidates in the 1982 elections ~~ere both active heirs of the 
tradition of social reform: Luis Alberto Monge of Figueres's 
National Liberation Party and Rafael Angel Calderon, the son of 
the reforming president of 1940-44. 
By any statistical measure it is clear that Costa Rica's 
citizens have benefited from a tradition of stable democracy 
and reform. Costa Rica's standard of living is superior to its 
four Central American brethren in every category: literacy, 
(90 percent in Costa Rica versus 65 percent in the other 
Central American countries); medical care, (one doctor per 
1,470 persons compared to one per 2,762); life expectancy, (70 
years versus 59.6); and per capita income ($1,430 in 1981 
versus $812). One of the most telling yardsticks is the 
composite of major social indicators compiled by the overseas 
Development Council as an index of tl1e physical quality of 
life. Costa Rica is rated 89 on a scale of 100. The North 
American (U.S.-Canadian) average is 96. Other Central American 
states are rated in the GO's. 
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As the Commission learned on its visit to San Jose, most 
Costa Ricans are understandably proud of a system of government 
unique in Central America. They are committed to the continued 
development of a western democracy in their own country and, 
while sometimes skeptical about political development in the 
rest of Central America, are naturally sympathetic to 
democratic movements elsewhere. 
If criticism is to be directed at Costa Rica, it is that 
the country's economic achievements are still rather modest 
when taken out of the Central American context. And it may be 
that the welfare state has expanded beyond the capacity of the 
Costa Rican economy to support it under current economic 
conditions -- a difficulty a number of more advanced nations 
have recently encountered. Some observers find the government 
bureaucracy to be excessive; and, as elsewhere in Latin 
America, some semi-autonomous government institutions at times 
appear to be operating beyond the effective fiscal control of 
the central government. Reports of corruption have also become 
more frequent in recent years. The need to establish consensus 
in a society with such broad political participation tends on 
occasion to force delays in important national decisions. 
These, however, are clearly problems of a far different 
magnitude and nature than those one encounters elsewhere in 
Central America. 
An Economy Under Siege 
During the period 1960-1979, Costa Rica enjoyed a period of 
sustained growth with a relatively low and stable rate of 
inflation and with limited unemployment. The Central American 
Common Market with its opportunities for import substitution 
and intra-regional trade produced much of this growth. Average 
annual real per capita gross domestic product increased on the 
order of 3.1 percent annually. The poverty rate was brought 
down to 25 percent of the population (compared to 67 percent 
for the rest of Central America). The government financed a 
generous expansion of medical care, social security, housing 
subsidies and community development projects for the middle and 
lower classes during this period. Educational opportunities 
were broadened significantly. Income for the 30 percent of the 
population below the median grew during these years at double 
the rate of that for the 10 percent in the most affluent 
stratum. 
In the late 1970's, however, Costa Rica's economic 
situation began to deteriorate due to global, regional, and 
internal problems. The first round of oil price increases and 
higher prices for imports brought on an inflationary spiral and 
the beginning of stagnation in economic expansion. In 1978-79 
the price of coffee dropped while the country was forced to 
absorb additional increases in the price of imported oil. The 
terms of trade between 1978-1982 deteriorated by a crushing 34 
percent. Although decreased agricultural production and a drop 
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in tourism and intra-Central American trade because of 
deteriorating regional political and economic conditions also 
affected Costa Rica, stable terms of trade alone during this 
period would have assured it an average 2 percent annual 
increase in GDP. Instead, the deterioration in the balance of 
payments, which caused the value of the Costa Rica colon to 
decline against the dollar by 370 percent, was accompanied by a 
general weakening of the economy. Economic growth averaged 6 
percent annually during the 1970's, but declined by 20 percent 
during the 1980-82 period. And per capita income decreased.by 
over 30 percent within the three-year period. Uncontrolled 
foreign borrowing by the autonomous agencies ran up 75 percent 
of Costa Rica's foreign debt without legislative sanction. 
Since taking office in May 1982, President Monge has 
implemented a politically painful austerity program to reduce 
public sector spending. He has increased public utility and 
fuel prices, raised taxes, and sought to impose government 
hiring freezes. These measures led to a standby agreement with 
the IMF in December 1982. While commited to these austerity 
programs, the Monge Administration appears determined in so far 
as possible to preserve the social programs that have made 
Costa Rica a unique example for the region. 
Despite recent improvements, Costa Rica's economic problems 
remain severe. Financial difficulties are exacerbated by the 
burden of the large-scale external borrowing in the late 1970's 
and early 1980's-- borrowing directed at maintaining the 
country's standard of living and welfare programs in the face 
of sharply deteriorating terms of external trade. Costa Rica's 
total debt to international multilateral and commercial lenders 
(principally u.s., European, and Japanese banks) is now over $3 
billion, extremely high in per capita terms. The government 
has been forced intermittently since July 1981 to suspend debt 
service payments and at this writing is about $1.1 billion in 
arrears. Debt service payments, that is interest alone, came 
to about $500 million in 1983, or 58 percent of expected export 
receipts. 
The government recognizes the need to address the country's 
economic shortcomings over the next few years. In order to 
reduce vulnerability to unstable commodity prices and energy 
costs, programs are to be developed for the longer run to 
promote alternative exports, find new markets and produce more 
nontraditional exports. Ventures in this field are under way 
in such diverse areas as macadamia nuts, quail eggs, cut 
flowers, fresh fruit and vegetables, fisheries, and oil 
exploration. Costa Rica also needs to attract foreign risk 
capital for investment, a task which may be facilitated by the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. But general regional as well as 
domestic economic and political conditions will continue to 
affect investment decisions and the turbulence elsewhere in 
Central America remains a negative factor. 
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Both foreign and domestic capital investors are also wary 
of what they sometimes see as an overemphasis on the public 
sector in Costa Rica. The growth of the public sector is 
reflected in the fact that its share of total employment 
increased from 5 percent in 1950, to 15 percent in 1970, to 20 
percent in 1980. Total expenditures of the non-financial 
public sector as set forth in the 1982 budget amount to 41 
percent of GDP, a high figure by most standards. Public sector 
growth in Costa Rica as elsewhere has had an impact on the 
economy through both regulation and sharpened competition for 
available resources. The public sector has increased its share 
of total credit in the country from 18 percent in 1970 to 47 
percent in 1981, severely squeezing the private sector's access 
to lending. Corrective efforts by the Monge Administration to 
reform the exchange rate system, to cut bureaucratic 
expenditures and bring the finances of the autonomous agencies 
under the control of the central government are under way. One 
important consequence of these measures was an end to capital 
flight in 1983. 
In order to achieve a return to pre-1979 prosperity, Costa 
Rica seeks over the next few years both to increase investment 
in productive enterprises and to show significant export 
growth. In view of fiscal austerity in the public sector and 
uncertainty in the private sector, the first goal will be 
difficult to reach. And even if the balance of trade is 
corrected, the debt service problem is such that in order to 
achieve investment goals, Costa Rica will require gross 
external financing of approximately $600 million by 1986. 
Because of the external debt situation, private foreign 
investment may lag, and new inflows would probably have to come 
from bilateral and Inultilateral sources. 
The Threat to Democr~tic Stability 
Tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua are not new. 
What is new and what deeply concerns Costa Ricans is the 
conjunction of economic recession and the coming to power of a 
radical Marxist regime on its northern border. The anxiety of 
the Costa Ricans about the future of their democracy under 
these circumstances is understandable. 
When Costa Rica abolished its regular army in 1949, it was 
realized that Somoza's Nicaragua could constitute a threat to 
the country's security. But the decision was taken to rely on 
international mechanisms, particularly the inter-American 
security system, to counter any such threat. This was a bold 
decision. Somoza had conspired in 1948 with the deposed 
President Calderon to launch an invasion from Nicaraguan soil 
and relations between the two countries were tense at the time 
of Costa Rica's armed forces were dissolved. Another type of 
tension came in 1955 when a border dispute escalated into an 
open Nicaraguan attack. Reliance on collective security worked 
in practice as the OAS, backed strongly by the U.S., restrained 
Nicaragua. 
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In turn, Costa Rica served as a base for numerous dissident 
groups aimed at toppling the Somozas. Figueres gave direct 
assistance in 1959 to a failed guerrilla invasion of Nicaragua 
led by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Somoza's implacable foe. During 
the 1978-79 civil war in Nicaragua the Carazo government 
permitted Costa Rica territory to be used in the transshipment 
of supplies to the Sandinistas while providing sanctuary and 
other assistance to the anti-Sandinista forces. 
The emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua in 
1979 has posed an entirely new order of problems. First, 
Nicaragua is seen as presenting a much more serious threat in 
terms of military and intelligence capabilities than ever 
before. Against an increasingly heavily-armed standing 
Nicaraguan army of more than 25,000 with its massive militia 
reserves, Costa Rica has a Civil Guard of 4,000 men and a 
3,000-strong Rural Defense Force. These are non-military 
constabulary entities which neither offer any threat to 
Nicaragua nor are in a position to deter armed aggression. In 
an effort to obscure this enormous imbalance, Radio Sandino and 
Radio Havana have made much of the existence in Costa Rica of 
several hundred men enrolled in the ranks of self-styled and 
self-armed militia, usually attached to political parties. 
This propaganda campaign features the accusation that Costa 
Rica (and the United States) is harboring "secret armies." In 
truth, Costa Rica's Marxist parties support similar groups, and 
these are predictably better armed and trained than those of 
the non-communists. 
Costa Rican leaders have not wavered in their trust in 
international security mechanisms as the country's principal 
line of defense. Their responses to what are considered in San 
Jose as Nicaraguan provocations have been calm and measured. 
But by all accounts, public concern with respect to the 
country's security situation remains strong. An issue of 
particular sensitivity in terms of public perceptions in Costa 
Rica has been the Sandinista challenge to Costa Rican 
navigation rights on the San Juan river. The disputes between 
the two countries over the border along that river go far back 
in history. The navigation issue was, however, seemingly 
settled by an 1888 arbitration award. But Nicaraguan forces 
reacting to anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity in the area 
began detaining Costa Rican tourist craft on the river. The 
issue has for the time being died down, but has left an 
impression of Sandinista arrogance and contempt for Costa Rican 
sovereignty. Such was also the case in an incident last year 
in which Nicaraguan troops patrolling near the border against 
insurgents shot up a Costa Rican customs post, apparently with 
deliberate and vindictive forethought. 
The northern part of Guanacaste province on the 
Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border poses a special problem for Costa 
Rica. It was once part of Nicaragua and an area in which 
Nicaraguan governments have regularly registered political and 
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economic interest. Many of the inhabitants long settled in the 
area are of Nicaraguan ancestry and to these have been added 
thousands of recent Nicaraguan refugees. The area has become a 
natural target for Sandinista proselytization, infiltration, 
and training for subversion. There is also a Salvadoran 
refugee camp in Guanacaste which has been suspected as a source 
of arms transshipments to the FMLN in El Salvador and as a 
Salvadoran guerrilla rest and recuperation sanctuary. The 
Costa Rican Government has recently sought international 
assistance to promote Costa Rican colonization in the province 
and to establish a transport and communications infrastructure 
there. 
Anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity in the border region is 
a principal issue in the relations between the two countries. 
As detailed in the paper on Nicaragua, several thousand men 
under the command of the former Sandinista leader Eden Pastora 
operate against targets in southern Nicaragua, allegedly at 
times staging from Costa Rican territory. Pastora's 
unquestioned anti-Somoza and democratic credentials have 
elicited a good deal of sympathy for his cause among Costa 
Ricans. At the same time, the government in San Jose simply 
does not have the security forces or other resources necessary 
to police the border region. 
The Sandinistas with the assistance of their Soviet and 
Cuban patrons have responded in part to this situation by 
organizing an international propaganda campaign designed to 
blacken Costa Rica's good name. Costa Ricans, accustomed to 
the respect their country enjoys abroad, have been shocked to 
find their government and their institutions vilified in 
Mexican and West European publications. Crude threats have 
been added to the propaganda. A member of the Sandinista 
Directorate told a third-country statesman in 1982 -- and 
before Pastora's guerrillas had appeared in the field-- that 
if provoked by Costa Rica, the Nicaraguans would stop only when 
they reached the Panamanian border. 
But the deepest concern of the Costa Rican leadership is 
not the specter of armed invasion but the longer-range threat 
posed by the ideological persistence and aggressiveness of a 
Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua bent on propagating its creed. Hany 
Costa Ricans initially sympathetic to the Sandinista revolution 
have been appalled by the Leninist system they perceive 
consolidating across the border. They fear that the 
Sandinistas consider their revolution to be inevitably 
exportable through political pressures, the support of an armed 
Costa Rican insurgency, or through a fifth column in the years 
ahead. This long-range concern is heightened by Nicaragua's 
ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union and its bloc. While a friendly 
United States was the sole world power to exert influence on 
the isthmus, Costa Rica could afford to take a reasonably 
detached view of the aggressive posturing of Somoza's 
Nicaragua. But now that Nicaragua has forged such strong ties 
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to the Soviet Union and its allies, Costa Rica finds itself on 
the front line of the East-West struggle. The problem is no 
longer one of periodic Nicaraguan muscle-flexing, but of 
becoming the target of Soviet-Cuban geopolitical strategy, and 
of being exposed to the possibility of externally supported 
subversion backed by a huge military and intelligence 
apparatus. There is increased anxiety that this predicament 
could well persist for a long time to come. 
Indications have appeared to support Costa Rican fears of 
being targeted for subversion. During the 1978-79 Sandinista 
campaign a number of third world revolutionary groups sent 
representatives to Costa Rica to aid in the fight against 
Somoza. These included the Montoneros of Argentina, the 
Tupamaros of Uruguay, and the M-19 of Colombia. Following the 
overthrow of Somoza, some revolutionaries stayed on to train 
Costa Ricans in subversive techniques, as evidenced by the 
documented Montonero connection with the Costa Rican terrorist 
group that blew up a u.s. Embassy van in 1981. (Individuals 
with Montonero and Tupamaro connections operated a shortwave 
radio station near San Jose for a time, broadcasting programs 
with a high content of revolutionary rhetoric and intelligence 
information for insurgent groups. The station was closed in 
1981 and its equipment removed to Nicaragua where it is now 
suspected of being utilized for Radio Venceremos, the 
mouthpiece of the Salvadoran insurgents.) 
The refugee influx of about 20,000 Salvadorans and up to 
200,000 Nicaraguans has offered opportunities for infiltration, 
terrorism and espionage. Since 1980 Nicaraguan and Salvadoran 
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary operatives have made use 
of Costa Rican territory to harass one another, on occasion 
staging terrorist acts. In mid-1983 members of the Basque 
terrorist group ETA were apprehended by Costa Rican security 
and accused of attempting to assassinate anti-Sandinista 
elements in Costa Rica. Accompanying the terrorism has been 
increased agitation by communist-dominated labor unions. The 
banana workers staged the longest strike in their turbulent 
history during 1982. Observing that the strike had no 
plausible economic purpose, the government accused the union of 
attempting to destabilize the country. 
The Nicaraguan challenge and the threat that the vicious 
conflicts elsewhere on the isthmus will increasingly embroil 
Costa Rica pose difficult policy choices for the country's 
leadership. But President Monge and his administration have 
held fast to the country's traditional approach to security 
problems. On November 10, 1983 President Monge issued a solemn 
proclamation of absolute Costa Rican neutrality with respect to 
Central America's armed conflicts. And the government has 
flatly rejected any suggestion that it might reverse the policy 
of 35 years and reestablish professional armed forces. In this 
the Monge government has the strong support of the people, 
although the need to strengthen and improve the existing 
constabulary forces is widely recognized. 
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Neutrality, however, does not mean in the Costa Rican 
scheme of things indifference to the struggle for freedom in 
Central America. President Monge has explained that while his 
country remains militarily neutral, it will continue to be a 
political belligerent on the side of democracy. Certainly in 
this context Costa Rican democracy with its dedication to the 
dignity and liberty of the individual stands as a rebuke to the 
Sandinista doctrine of the incompatibility of the practices of 
democracy with the establishment of social justice. 
The Future 
Costa Rica's democratic system is deeply rooted and retains 
the faithful allegiance of the vast majority of the nation's 
citizens. But the months and years ahead are likely to test 
the strength of that system. Reconciling economic recession, 
financial crisis and resulting austerity with the requirements 
of a welfare state is already proving most difficult, as it has 
in recent times for so many countries. The Monge 
administration is prepared to accept greater austerity and to 
promote a larger role for a dynamic private sector. But 
understandably it will not abandon what Costa Ricans regard as 
essential social services. The result is and will continue to 
be severe strains on the system until economic growth is 
restored -- and that will require substantial external 
assistance. 
The threat of subversion and of further Nicaraguan assaults 
on the country's sovereignty and dignity produce equally severe 
strains. Preserving the national consensus necessary to 
safeguard democracy in the face of such challenges is not 
likely to be a simple task. Thus the importance to Costa Rica 
of a regional security arrangement based on internal pluralism 
in all countries, verifiable commitments to non-intervention, 
an end to the arms race and to soviet-Cuban intromission. 
Costa Rica will work for such an outcome and will look to its 
friends for support. Its citizens believe that the 
preservation of its democratic institutions is a cause meriting 
the interest and assistance of democratic states everywhere --
a proposition those who uphold freedom around the world should 
find difficult to dispute. 
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Tm'VARD A LONG TERl'~ U.S. POLICY IN CEI'1 TPAL AHEP.ICA 
William C. Doherty Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of AFL-CIO/ AIFLO Central American Activities 
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The involvement of the U.S. labor movement in Latin America dates from the 
turn of the century. As far back as 1916, Samuel Gompers, the architect of the 
modern American labof movement, was instrumental in establishing the Pan-American 
Confederation of tabor, which sought to defend the dignity of the Mexican Revolution 
and served as the first important platform to protest the actions of despotic regimes 
(as well as exploitative corporations) south of the U.S. border. 
Both institutional and informal relationships were maintained with Latin 
American trade union movements and progressive political leaders over the years. 
American labor has consistently given moral and material support to the democratic 
victims of dictatorships, often when U.S. foreign policy was supportive of these 
regimes. For example, while the U.S. government enjoyed a comfortable relationship 
with the notorious dictatorship of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in the 1950's, it was the 
AFL-CIO which intervened to support the visa application of Romulo Betancourt to 
live in exile in the United States. Betancourt, of course, later returned to Venezuela 
and became the elected President of his country. 
In the early 1960's, the AFL-CIO formed the American Institute for Free tabor 
Development (AIFLD) to intensify the solidarity and friendship with the workers and 
campesinos of Latin America, which had been initiated more than a half century 
earlier. Specifically, the AIFLD was founded to support and encourage the 
participation of free and democratic unions of this hemisphere in the political, 
ecqnomic, and social development of their countries. For over 20 years, the AIFLD 
has supported the development of Latin America and Caribbean union movements with 
programs of education and social development. 
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AIFLD Activities in Central America 
In Central America (including Panama), more than 93,000 trade unionists have 
received instruction in AIFLD in-country courses. AIFLD graduates hold a large 
percentage (at least 70%) of the executive board positions of Central American free 
trade unions. They thus constitute a strong force for democratic change in the region. 
A Department of Social Projects has been active in the development of workers' 
housing, cooperative development, and union-sponsored community projects designed 
to provide services to union members and to the general public. In housing, slightly 
more than 18,000 units have been constructed at a cost of $77,000,00. Of these 
amounts, 1,313 houses valued at $4,288,000 were built in Central America with AIFLD 
technical assistance; 128 units in Costa Rica ($320,000) and 1,185 units in Honduras 
( $3, 968,000). 
Smaller social projects, such as school repairs, support of union-operated 
medical facilities, and construction of community centers, have been supported by two 
funds: the AFL-CIO financed Impact Project Fund for projects costing less than 
$5,000 and the AID-funded Regional Revolving Loan Fund (RRLF) for projects valued 
up to $50,000. Impact Projects can be either grants or interest-free loans, depending 
on type of the project. The RRLF provides loans (not grants) that carry a minimum 
interest charge of two percent. The highest interest charged to date is six percent. 
For Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, there have been a total of 588 
Impact Projects totaling $1.25 million financed from multiple AFL-CIO donations 
totaling $880,000. The projects were roughly two-third grants, one-third loans. The 
RRLF has financed 82 projects valued at $7.9 millionl/ through loans totaling $2.3 
million. Projects financed by either fund require substantial local self-help 
contributions. All such grass roots projects have been designed to improve the popular 
image of the trade union movement as a positive social instrument for progressive 
change. 
!/ Please see Attachment Ill for breakdown of RRLF Projects. 
Central American projects bear an asterisk. 
Rural Pr~grams 21 
The AIFLD has developed a special Agrarian Union office within the Social 
Projects Department for the purpose of working with campesino unions throughout the 
hemisphere. Thus far, support for campesino organizations has resulted in projects 
involving Operating Program Grants (OPG's) from AID ($1 ,500,000) in fields such as 
agricultural credit and marketing services, and large-scale organizing campaigns in the 
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras and Ecuador. Of special interest is the 
crucial role being played by the AIFLD in El Salvador in support of the land reform 
programs. 
El Salvador Land Reform·Y 
Since early 1980, in El Salvador, the AIFLD has provided key technical 
assistance to several campesino organizations which have spearheaded the 
development of the land reform programs. This was possible only because of more 
than a decade of AIFLD training and support for these organizations, without which 
there would have been no base for the reforms. Thus far, 64-,874 applications 
representing 306,534- family members have been submitted under the land-to-the-tiller 
phase of the program. There are an additional 32,000 beneficiary families on the 
larger cooperatives. Altogether, this represents nearly 500,000 people, (including 
family members of beneficiaries) who have benefited from the program. Despite these 
successes, the land reform program is currently less than one-half completed and is 
under attack from both left and right wing forces. 
~I Please see Attachment 112 for more detailed discussion of Central America's 
agrarian situation. Paper entitled Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Central 
America. 
~./ A more detailed review of the status of the El Salvador land reform program is to 
be presented orally to the Commission. 
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RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S QUESTIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA 
The Commission, in preparation for this session, has circulated a list of 20 
inter-related questions on the social, political and economic problems of the area. 
Many of the questions dealt with the same problems addressed in the recent Survey of 
Views of Democratic Labor Leaders in Central America, which is as an attachment to 
this presentation. 
Economic Development Needs and Programs 
The tiunger, malnutrition, and illiteracy of Central America are well-
documented realities. Programs of USAID can, and have, been instrumental in helping 
countries of Central America to combat these serious problems, but there is still a 
long way to go. To do so is in our long-term national interest because these are part 
of the so-called "root problems." The creation of employment possibilities is, 
however, more important to the solution of these problems than are the short-term 
palliatives of providing food. 
No single approach to economic development, and consequently our aid effort, 
can solve all the social problems of the area. The solutions call for measures as 
drastic as are the problems. They will require a massive and lengthy and diversified 
approach to development which includes everything from infrastructure development 
to baby-feeding programs. Certainly we must support and encourage those worker 
organizations such as rural cooperatives and credit facilities. Only by expanding the 
economic opportunity of the masses of the people of Central America will they be able 
to solve their social problems. Nothing less than the future peace of the area depends 
on our support of these grass-roots organizations which together form the democratic 
center and which will eventually break the stranglehold on the economy by the 
oligarchy. These very same organizations are the primary targets of the communist 
revolutionary groups which would typically use them en route to power and abuse them 
thereafter. 
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Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of labor movements in country 
development, as well as in improving the social and economic well-being of working 
men and women. A primary objective of U.S. assistance programs should be to assure 
that economic benefits of development are shared equitably, and this requires 
development strategies which are employment-oriented and support for trade unions 
through which workers are able to protect their legitimate rights. We need to enlist 
free urban and rural labor movements as partners in our assistance programs. 
However, we cannot hope to gain the wholehearted support of workers in the 
difficult and burdensome task of national development if they are without .rights, 
without freedom, without justice, without bread. In providing assistance, a major 
consideration should be the adherence of recipient governments to the conventions of 
the International Labor Organization, especially those relating to freedom of 
association, discrimination and forced labor. 
Role of the International Monetary Fund 
The role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is controversial, not only to 
political leaders, but also the region's trade union leaders. In cases of economic 
emergency, organized labor in Central America, as in the United States, stands ready 
to do its part to solve the problem. However, when "belt-tightening" policies are 
required by the IMF, further restrictions on wages and harsher working conditions 
usually result, particularly if the interpreters or implementers of these policies are the 
economic elites in Central America. Under these circumstances, the trade union 
movements, not unexpectedly, reject the notion that their members should suffer 
further for conditions created by the oligarchy. Capital flight provides one example: 
it is not the workers of El Salvador who have taken their money to the safe haven of 
Miami. 
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Soviet Influeoce in Central America 
Central America, in our opinion, should be considered an area of vital interest 
to the United States. Therefore, we should not give away any policy option, including 
direct military action, even though such drastic measures should be used only as a last 
resort- one that, we would hope, never has to be exercised. We believe that the heavy 
hand of the Soviet Union is significant, through their surrogate stateS of Cuba and 
Nicaragua, in the insurgencies in Guatemala and El Salvador. We believe that their 
goal is to ultimately create more "Cubas" close to the United States. The Soviet 
Union certainly stands to benefit if our attentions are drawn away from Europe to the 
problems of our own security occasioned by hostile countries affording the possibility 
of threatening military bases in Central America. 
There are those who contend that a strategy for containing Soviet exploitation 
is to eliminate its breeding ground, namely political, social, and economic oppression. 
We, however, contend that poverty, social injustice, and closed political systcns are 
realities which must be dealt with in any case, and we should hope, primarily for 
reasons of human rights rather than only as a "strategy" for containing Soviet 
influence. In any case, whether the roots of the problem lie in social injustice or 
Soviet interference is an idle argument. If economic development programs. to deal 
with poverty and social injustice are to succeed, we must concurrently with our 
economic assistance efforts also be prepared to cooperate with democratic 
governments regarding the threat they face from guerrilla movements influenced and 
supported by Moscow. The post-World War II period clearly indicates that the Soviet 
Union will use its influence to prevent the correcting of social injustice by reforms, 
elections and economic assistance, since these solutions would stand in the way of its 
objective of one-party communist rule. 
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Economic Interests and National Security 
Our vital interest in Central America, therefore, has a great deal more to do 
with our national security than it does with economic interests. Central America 
produces little or nothing that we absolutely need economically. But we do need 
neighboring states that share and benefit from our democratic principles and beliefs. 
The development of democracy and open societies in Central America are our best 
security defense. Without participatory democracy, responsive to the needs of their 
citizens, the countries of Central America constitute a potential danger to us. 
U.S .. Role in Developing Free Non-Governmental Institutions 
By strengthening free trade unions, the AFL-CIO/AIFLD has long been involved 
in the development of "free and democratic non-governmental institutions". There is 
no reason that more social and political organizations in the United States could not 
play a similar role in the support of counterpart organizations in Central America. We 
would encourage such participation and believe that the U.S. government should 
support their activities as it does ours. Our programs are a matter of public record 
and we offer to share our experience of the problems of "institution building" with any 
other private organization which chooses to provide assistance in Central America. 
We applaud the concept of the Democracy Foundation which we view as an important 
ingredient in the solution of the political problems of Central America. 
Role of Other Groups and Organizations to Achieve Peace 
The U.S. government should use any and all available channels to promote peace 
currently in the region. The Contadora Group and the Organization of American 
States come immediately to mind, and the mediation efforts of individual democratic 
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countries such as Costa Rica are useful. In the long-run, however, the political 
solutions required must be found through free and honest elections. International 
organizations such as the OAS might usefully oversee electoral processes in an effort 
to guarantee their honesty to the satisfaction of the citizens of the Central American 
countries. 
Military Aid to El Salvador 
Specific reference must be made regarding El Salvador and the U.S. provision of 
military aid. The AFL-CIO position is that such aid should be suspended until there is 
progress in the case of the murders, directed by Army officers, of Michael Hammer 
and Mark Pearlman, former AIFLD employees, and of Rodolfo Viera, a Salvadoran 
trade union lea.der, and until the Salvadoran judicial system is reformed and 
restructured so that it protects the rights of all Salvadoran citizens. This policy 
position was not hastily arrived at and, in a very direct way, is illustrative of the 
dilemmas faced by policy makers in the U.S. government on a variety of issues. The 
AFL-CIO obviously would not like to see a guerrilla victory nor would the democratic 
trade union movement of El Salvador. However, neither we nor our Salvadoran 
brothers (more than 30,000 of whom have been killed in the last three years) can 
accept the corruptness of the judicial system and the Army which considers itself 
above the law. We believe that, in this case, military aid should be used (or not used) 
to assure that absolutely necessary changes in both the judiciary and the military 
forces take place. A democracy cannot function under these conditions of corruption 
and violations of human rights. The restriction of military aid would force 
fundamental changes which, in turn, would foster a more just, humane, and democratic 
system. 
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~::~ossibility of Building a U.S. Public Consensus 
We cannot ask the American public to understand and accept a policy of support 
for the status quo in El Salvador and elsewhere on the assumption that the only other 
alternative is a Marxist-leninist guerrilla victory. Only by taking firm stands against 
the oligarchy and their traditional military allies; by thus standing up for the poor and 
oppressed in Central America, can we hope to build a U.S. public consensus which 
supports U.S. policy. We must choose whom we will support in each country of the 
area, and if it is the wealthy and corrupt elite, the American people won't buy it! We 
cannot make the mistake of identifying the status quo with stability. 
Importance of Supporting the Democratic Cmtu 
The AFL-CIO/ AIFLD is convinced that the free trade union movements of 
Central America represent one of the most cohesive force for democracy in the area. 
They represent the voice of the working people. Unless this voice is heard, economic 
development alone will not staunch the advance of radical authoritarian solutions, or 
the totalitarian solutions of the Marxist-Leninist left, to the social problems created 
by the current political structure. To change the structure without resorting to 
revolutionary violence requires that the d ernocratic center, including trade unions, be 
effectively supported and encouraged so as to significantly change the society within 
each country. To do less is to leave the field open to the political extremists. The 
AFL-CIO/ AIFLD believes that support of a pluralistic center and the development of 
open societies is both our moral right and duty and in our long-term security interest. 
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OPINIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE UNION LEADERS 
The AFL-CIO/ AIFLD has intimate and sympathetic knowledge of the trade 
union and political life of Central America. Daily contact allows us the privilege of 
understanding how Central American workers and campesinos view the political, 
social, and economic issues which confront them, and we are pleased to be able to 
reflect their opinions to this distinguished Commission. In fact, during the week of 
August 22, 1983, a team from the AIFLD conducted a survey of leadership opinion to 
insure the accuracy of our comments.Y The current perceptions of trade union and 
campesino organizations· of their own political, social and economic structures are 
revealing. 
PANAMA 
In Panama, the leaders of the democratic trade union movements, the 
Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama, indicated a basic faith in the 
social systems of that country and are prepared to participate actively in the 
forthcoming presidential and congressional elections by supporting candidates 
perceived to be friends to labor's goals. The union leaders also view the military as a 
positive force in the Panamanian society, a force which has greatly improved the 
social, economic and political opportunities of the workers and campesinos by 
implementing reforms and creating a climate for the development of trade unions and 
other popular sectors. The CTRP will actively participate in this year's next 
presidential campaign seeking representation in elected bodies and in the autonomous 
administrative institutions. They believe that while reform and modernization of the 
social systems are necessary, they can be achieved by working within the structures. 
'!f Attachment 113 is the result of the leadership survey. Questions and responses are 
broken down by country. 
Chief economic factors affecting workers in Panama are unemployment, lack of 
competitive manufacturing capabilities, and low agricultural production. The CTR P 
welcomes foreign investment and international aid programs, but under the conditions 
that transnationals respect the right of the workers to form unions and bargain 
collectively and that development projects reach the popular social groups and that 
they be planned and executed in conjunction with representatives of those sectors. 
In conclusion, the CTRP feels that the last years of Torrijos' government have 
strengthened the labor movement and contributed an opportunity for the majority of 
the workers and campesinos to begin to play a more significant role in the 
development of th~ir own society. 
COSTA RICA 
The leaders of the democratic labor movement in Costa Rica while also 
expressing trust in the basic state social services and political structures of the 
country were less optimistic about future political participation. The experience of 
various democratic elections, which has resulted in little opening for trade unionists in 
the political parties, make Costa Rican leaders more cautious despite the fact that in 
the last election one "labor deputy" was elected and the president of the country is an 
ex-labor leader. 
As in Panama, Costa Rican leaders view income distribution as unfair and state 
service systems antiquated, but believe the problems can be remedied peacefully by 
working within the system. They do not believe that corruption is generalized, but 
attribute waste to inefficiency. 
Unemployment is seen as the most serious problem coupled with the lack of 
agricultural credit which hampers production. 
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The only major criticism of international investment is that local managers 
with traditional concepts of trade unions make the organizing of workers of 
international firms difficult. 
Past aid programs were generally said to have benefited Costa Rica, but the 
lack of participation in the planning was seen as retarding the impact of these projects 
in the social sectors. 
Costa Rican labor leaders would like aid programs channeled more through 
popular organizations in order to stimulate the growth of worker-owned industries and 
cooperatives. 
HONDURAS 
The leaders of the Confederation of Workers of Honduras are not optimistic 
over labor participation in the electoral process, despite having just returned to a 
constitutional government via democratic elections. They feel that they have 
traditionally been locked out of the decision making processes which are monopolized 
by an alliance of oligarchy and corrupt military commanders which has always 
dominated the Honduran political structure. While acknowledging some social gains 
made by organized labor over the past 30 years through pressure on the government or 
through collective bargaining process, they maintain that the workers and campesinos 
are largely on the outside of the system which has to be radically altered in order to 
let the majority participate. 
Economic problems most affecting the workers are unemployment and a rising 
cost of living. A lack of foreign reserves, which restricts the importation of raw 
materials for manufacture, is forcing small factories to close. A lack of agricultural 
credit and a concentration of land in large commercial estates which are estimated 
40% unproductive is forcing rural workers to abandon their farms and join their 
unemployed urban brothers on the streets of Tegucigalpa. 
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The CTH sees foreign investment as necessary for development; however, 
because of bitter past experiences with U.S. fruit companies, is fervently convinced 
that all transnationals should subscribe to a "code of conduct" which would require 
strict adherence to labor laws and inhibit corrupting influence by these companies on 
Honduran government officials. 
As well CTH leaders feel that an effective land reform based primarily on 
expropriation on non-productive private land is a fundamental part of developing and 
democratizing the Honduran society and economy. The current land reform, according 
to a leader of ANACH (largest campesino organization in Honduras) is effectively 
breaking up national campesino organizations by forcing beneficiary coops to obtain 
individual legal status which results in their separation from the national parent 
bodies. 
They also maintain that any future international aid programs, if they are to 
directly improve the human rights and economic status of the majority of Honduran 
citizens, should concentrate on rural areas which currently contain 78% of the 
country's population. Aid programs should promote basic changes in all government 
structures and should be planned in consultation with the popular sectors. Honduran 
labor leaders feel that international pressure can be particularly effective in 
influencing change. 
EL SALVADOR 
Despite the ongoing guerrilla war and the gross violations of human and trade 
union rights in El Salvador, trade union leaders, both rural and urban, are enthusiastic 
over upcoming elections and their role in them. They quickly say that their judicial 
system is almost inoperative, is often used to obstruct rather than dispense justice, 
that the military has always been in blatant collusion with the power elite, stopping at 
no measure, no matter how grotesque, to intimidate worker and campesino 
organizations. They maintain that structures must be radically altered before the 
majority of the population has any direct participation in the development of a truly 
democratic society. 
Nonetheless, possibly because of past recent successes at occasionally 
influencing policy makers and politicians or possibly because of the success of the 1979 
reforms, the trade union and campesino leaders are actively planning to participate in 
the next year's elections which obviously indicate that they feel the process will be 
relatively honest and that their participation will be significant. 
Economic factors affecting the workers are listed as unemployment caused by 
economic sabotage and world recession. Reviving the economy and ending the war are 
given as obvious solutions. Foreign investment is rated as necessary, but again 
conditioned on respect for trade unions. The Acajutla Free Port is given as an 
example of transnational abuse. Military security forces have consistently inhibited 
organization at Acajutla. The San Bartolome Free Port was the scene of bitter labor 
strife in 1977 and 1978. Capital flight is listed as another factor depressing the 
economy as are deliberate guerrilla destruction of economic targets. 
Land is considered as still too concentrated in the hands of a few, and true 
reform will not be accomplished until Phase 2 is complete. 
As in Honduras, the Salvadoran leaders consider that radical changes must 
occur in the entire structure of the government and the military. They believe that 
such changes can be accomplished peacefully, particularly if aid programs are 
conditioned "up front" on guaranteeing trade union and human rights and are designed 
to directly benefit the workers and campesinos. Programs must not be left to the 
government alone to plan and execute. Some leaders suggested a tripartite 
(government, labor and business) commission to oversee all projects. Others distrusted 
private sector participation as simply fortifying the government-oligarchy alliance 




The leadership of the Trade Union Confederation of Unity of Guatemala (CUSG) 
were the least positive over the possibility of change or political participation. They 
viewed the Rios Montt government, which stopped right wing violence in the cities and 
briefly allowed relative trade union freedom, as a positive change. They are very 
uncertain about the policies of the new government. They expressed little enthusiasm 
for becoming involved in elections, if they are held. The rural leaders said that their 
membership doesn't believe any candidates any more, and points to the abstentionism 
in the last elections as an example of apathy caused by repeated disillusionment. 
Labor leaders a(e convinced that traditional political parties remain closed to 
the labor movement and offer no real alternative to the electorate. 
Uniformly aU condemned the courts as being non-functional or as instruments 
of repression. Official corruption is viewed as being pervasive throughout the 
government system and any government project as simply another scheme by those in 
power to further enrich themselves. 
According to Guatemalan urban and campesino leaders, the military officer 
corps is trained to view them as communists or potential guerrillas. The military is 
seen as an institution designed to protect the privileges of the few while ready to 
ruthlessly stamp out any threat to the traditional social order. 
The main economic factors affecting the workers are unemployment and lack of 
purchasing power. Agricultural credits are lacking or inefficiently provided. There is 
a lack of infrastructure to facilitate marketing. CUSG leaders maintain that 70% of 
Guatemalans are living outside of the economy. 
Controlled foreign investment is needed, but past transnational corruptive 
practices must be eliminated. 
The leaders feel that theirs is a closed society and few or no state education or 
health facilities are available to the mass of workers. The perception of past aid 
programs is that they have only enriched the ruling elite. 
Regarding land tenancy, campesino leaders believe too few have too much, and 
that 25-50% of fertile lanci in private hands isn't producing, and recommended that the 
large estates be expropriated. INT A, the government land reform agency, typically 
takes six or seven years to process a claim. 
Guatemalan labor leaders say that the majority of international aid programs 
must go directly to popular organizations, and that urban and rural labor movements 
are the only organizations in Guatemala capable of combating abuses. 
NICARAGUA 
Interviews with the leadership of the Trade Union Unity Confederation (CUS) in 
Nicaragua were not possible since the Sandinista government refuses to allow visas to 
representatives of the AIFLD or the AFL-CIO. However, a good idea of how these 
trade union leaders perceive the current structure can be understood by reviewing 
their latest protest to Commander Bayardo Arce Castano, Coordinator of the Political 
Committee of the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) in 1982. 
The CUS letter requests: (1) that CUS organizers not be threatened or 
imprisoned by the police or army; (2) that workers not be laid off simply because they 
belong to the CUS; (3) that workers be permitted to negotiate collectively and not 
have to accept contracts dictated by the FSLN Ministry of Labor; (4-) that the CUS be 
allowed to receive support from international labor organizations; (5) that CUS 
organizers be allowed to travel freely within the country, and (6) that the CUS be 
permitted to exercise its right to act as a free labor organization without being 
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labeled by the FSLN-controlled press as "counter revolutionary," "destabilizing" and 
"conspiratory." 
Since this letter was written, CUS officers and those of the other independent 
workers' confederation, CTN, continue to be the victims of official harassment, 
beatings and jailings. In 1983, seven port workers from Corfnto were jailed for 
attempting to lead their union out of the official Sandinista workers' central. Forty-
seven CTN union leaders are currently under arrest. 
CUS leaders would most likely view their current social systems as being 
unfunctional, repressive .and in need of radical change, an opinion shared by other 
trade unionists in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. 
BELIZE 
Traditionally, Belize, because of its language and cultural differences and 
because of its lack of independent status, has been isolated from Central America. 
Nevertheless, Belize is a physical part of the Central American isthmus, and its long 
range economic interest will be related more and more to its geographic neighbors. 
The same political and social upheavals confronting the rest of Central America could 
also one day affect Belize. 
The workers of Belize are organized in various confederations, of which the 
Trades Union Congress of Belize is the most important. The TUC is the voice of 
democratic worker concern for the developmfflt of a just and stable society. 
Any international aid plan for the economic and social development of Central 
America should include Belize. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy 
Economic development and democratic political stability are related, but not 
necessarily interdependent goals that must drive U.S. foreign policy in Central 
America. Economic growth, which averaged a very respectable 5 percent per annum 
for a recent 20-year period did not result in political stability. Nor is political 
stability a guarantee of economic progress. 
The formation of U.S. foreign policy must be based on the changing realities in 
the region and exhibit the necessary flexibility to adj.ust for future changes in a way 
that reflects our national interests. The key, therefore, is to identify what our national 
interest is in Central America. There are forces in the United States which may argue 
that the "national" interest is to create conditions conducive to free enterprise or to 
guarantee the security of our borders and/or the sea lanes from attack by a foreign 
power. The AFL-CIO does not disagree that these are elements of our interest in 
Central America, but would argue that it is more important in our long term interest 
to have prosperous democratic societies as our neighbors in this hemisphere and 
especially, because of the geographic proximity of the area, in Central America. This 
Commission, it seems to us, must listen attentively to all views that portend to define 
our national interest (which must consequently be bi-Qartisan if the interest is indee£ 
national) and present a well-defined foreign policy to the Administration, the 
Congress, and to the American people. Without the support of the American people, a 
foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, is doomed to failure. 
It is tempting, but erroneous, to claim that we have no foreign policy toward 
the region or that the approaches have been absolutely partisan. Changing 
circumstances have elicited different responses from this Administration and its 
predecessor in meeting the challenges of Central America, but threads of a policy 
have remained constant. Generally, we as a nation have supported the development of 
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democracy and democratic institutions, an adherence to human rights, and an 
elimination of social injustice to the extent that we have the power to effect change. 
Often, our actions have not measured up to the principles of our policy. Rhetoric, 
changes in emphasis, and rapidly changing situations account, in large measure, for the 
perception that we have no cohesive policy in Central America. Having said this, 
however, the United States must strive to put in place better aid delivery systems and 
foresighted diplomatic initiatives which will allow us to obtain our overall foreign 
policy objectives. 
Qual R egiooal and Bi-lateral Policy Needed 
We must understand more profoundly the exact nature of the problems of 
Central America. They vary from one country to another to such an extent that 
primary emphasis should be placed on a bi-lateral aid and diplomatic approaches. 
Since, however, some serious problems are regional, rather than national in nature, a 
related effort should be maintained on a regional level. Examples of regionalization 
are the current activities of a roving Ambassador, and the revitalization of· the 
Central American Common Market. This dual approach of bi-lateralism and 
regionalization, on both aid and diplomatic levels, will serve to give maximum 
flexibility to our foreign policy. 
The Need to Change Social and Political Structures 
Even given the fact that many differences exist between the countries of Central 
America, some generalizations are in order. Rigid social structures, ruling elites 
unwilling to share political power with the masses of the population, and the military 
establishments of the region have combined to block the democratic aspirations of 
Central Americans. U.S. foreign policy should be designed to change this situation. 
Indeed, if one word is used to describe what our policy in Central America should be, 
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that word is "change." Our policy, as previously stated, is all-too-often thought of as 
defending the status-quo and thus opposed to the interests of millions of Central 
Americans striving for their share of economic opportunity and political power. 
The effectiveness of our efforts to require change depends, in large measure, on 
the amount of aid resources which we are willing to put into Central America, and 
agreement with the host government on the use of these resources. We believe that, 
for example, for the cost of one nuclear aircraft carrier, during the next few years, 
significant economic, social. and political developm ~-r c:1.n take place in the region .. 
The· current government-to-government approach should be conditioned significantly 
Flnd a major role should be given to direct support for indigenous popular democratic 
organizations. The "trickle-down" theory of ·improving the quality of life (much less of 
effecting necessary and desirable political change) simply has not worked. 
It should be noted that the required political, economic and social changes 
imply a long term commitment from the United States. What is being suggested here 
is nothing short of a peaceful long-term democratic revolution - the changing of 
political systems and overcoming social injustice that have plagued the masses of 
Central America for centuries. It cannot, and should not be expected to, occur 
overnight. But the time has come to take the first aggressive policy steps in that 
direction and, in so doing, to change a common ill-informed perception of the United 
States as a defender of the status guo. We must openly declare our dedication to 
democracy and social justice in the Americas. The current governing elites are not 
going to easily give up their power, wealth, and prestige. Our point is that U.S. policy 
should actively support those democratic forces within each Central American society 
who are striving for a voice in their own political future. 
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Marxist-Leninist Influence and Military Governments 
The AFL-CIO is profoundly aware of the dangers from Marxist-Leninist led 
insurgencies in the area. We are also aware that these insurgencies are aided and 
abetted by forces from outside the region and, indeed, from outside the hemisphere. 
We support the provision of a military "shield" against the potential takeover of 
countrie..s by these totalitarian fore es. But we do not endorse, carte blanche, the 
continuation of military regimes who, consistently disregarding the rights of their own 
citizens, use the so-called "national security" argument to maintain themselves in 
power. Rather, we see such regimes as a contributing factor to the violent 
insurrections in the area. Military dictatorships must not be made to feel that they 
are comfortable allies of the United States. The provision of a military shield does not 
preclude the Army being subordinate to a democratically elected civilian government. 
Every U.S. action and policy statement should be designed to encourage civilian 
control and the Armies' return to the barracks. 
Changes in Structure of Aid Mechanisms Required 
The AFL-CIO has noted over the years the relative ineffectiveness of our aid 
programs, i.e., trickle-down development, in changing the well being of the average 
citizen of Central America. We therefore suggest that the structure for the 
transmittal of resources be changed in a way which will broaden the basis for 
determining how the aid can be most effective. While the details of this approach 
remain to be developed, and while we feel that existing development agencies such as 
USAID, IDB, and other Central American regional organizations are adequate to plan 
and program this additional social development package, we would also propose that 
this commission recommend the creation of a Watchdog Committee as a regulatory 
body that would oversee all of the planning and programming of social and economic 
development projects. (We applaud the efforts of the IDB meeting scheduled in 
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Brussels next week, but we are not convinced that these traditional approaches to 
economic development will have any significant impact on the popular sectors). The 
committee would be composed, much as is this National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, of leading representatives of government, religious, labor, business, 
and academia. Further, to guarantee that the popular sectors of Central America 
have an adequate and influential voice in their own development programs, we would 
also propose that counterpart watchdog commissions be formed in each of the 
recipient countries, to agree on and approve the areas where aid programs can be most 
beneficially utilized for the welfare of their entire societies. 
The U.S., and other donor countries must also have a strong voice, obviously, in 
the aid granting process. The volume of bi-lateral aid, or the curtailment of aid, 
should be conditioned on the degree of freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of the host 
country. Priorities should be given to democratic countries. Violations of 
internationally accepted standards of human rights, of freedoms of expression, of the 
freedom of the media, of the right of assembly and of trade union rights would incur 
aid restrictions or curtailment. We must rem ember that unqualified aid to non-
democratic countries simply reinforces their illicit use of power. 
Priority R ecommendatioos 
We would propose in this regard a U.S. bilateral assistance program to the 
countries of Central America in the range of $7.5 billion over a five year period. Of 
course, the effectiveness of an aid program of this magnitude depends greatly on the 
structure through which the aid is dispensed. This fund would be used for grants and 
concessionary loans at 2% over forty years to improve educational and judicial 
systems, urban and rural infrastructure, construction of low cost housing, apprentice 
and vocat.ional training, agrarian reform and agricultural production, and where 
appropriate, private sector development. These essentially economic programs must 
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serve to strengthen popular institutions s'uch as civic organizations, cooperatives, 
credit unions, and trade unions, which are seeking to obtain social change. 
We would propose that the local currency repayments of the loans generated by 
this fund be deposited into an account to be known as the U.S./Central American 
Social Economic Development Revolving Fund which, by continuing to finance future 
programs, would serve as a demonstration of our· long term interest in the development 
of Central America. 
The AFL-ClO continues to feel that greater attention should be paid to the role 
of labor movements in Central America in their countries' development. ·They have 
long been in the front lines of the struggle for the types of economic, social, and 
political changes that should be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. They have 
opposed dictatorships of both the right and left. They have organized for social and 
economic change in the rural areas and negotiated with business and government in the 
interests of their urban members. Most importantly, perhaps, they are the leaders in 
the fight for political participation and social justice in their countries. They are 
especially deserving of our support. 
AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT 
REc;JONAL REVOLVING LOAN FUND {AI07LA-T-IIU?} 
FINANCIAL STATUS Of PROJECTS 
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED 06730]83 
REPAYMENTS AMOUNT OUT- LAST 
R~LF DATE TOTAl LOCAl AMOUNT AMOUNT TO nus IN STANDING PYMT. 
~ DESCRIPT £!!!X APPRVD COSTS CONTRIB Of lOAN DISBURSED DATE PERIOD AHREARS BALANCE DATE 
2 Land Urban Ecu 06/2)/69 $ 18,200.00 $ 2,200.00 $ 16,000.00 $ 16,000.00 $ n, )69.08 .• S 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 N/A 
"It Supmkt Cons Hond 10/18/68 72,500.00 22,)00.00 )0,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
5 Comm Cer~ter Braz 01/1 5/69 110,000.00 86,636.97 23,163.03 23,363.03 16,96'i.05" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
7 Social Assist Arg Olt/16/69 n,ooo.oo 5,000.00 30,000.00 30,000.00 17 • 758. 'j3. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
10 Prod Coop Peru 03/03/70 300,000.00 250,000.00 )0,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
II Credit Union Col 12/29/69 38,000.00 28,500.00 9,500.00 9, 500.00 7,687.77. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
13 Housing Proj Hond 01/21/70 ltlt,l66.00 4,166.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
D Credit facil D.R. 01/16/70 6'i,OOO.OO D,OOO.OO 50,000.00 50,000.00 28,592.00" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
16 Print Equip 1\rg 03/ll/70 16,)71.00 1,656.00 14,9D.OO 14·, 9U.OO 4,550.0)" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
17 Gym Cons Braz 06/29/70 58,000.00 17,209.00 ti0,791.00 40,791.00 30,167 .02. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
Ill Credit Coop Arg 04/28/70 118,429.00 92,179.00 26,2'j0.00 26,250.00 7,251.63. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
19 Tech School Arg 05/22/70 18,429.00 8,429.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 4 ,688. 39. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
20 Constr loan 1\rg 05/11/70 46,750.00 9,250.00 17,500.00 37' 500.00 I ,671. 21 • 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
21 Mut Aid Fnd Arg 06/09/70 84,000.00 46,812.)0 37' 187. 'j0 37' 187.50 17.205.06. 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
24 Social Center Guat 02/19/71 ~9,663.00 29,063.00 10,600.00 10,600.00 10,600.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A .· 
H Sp Auto Parts Ecu 09/06/70 166,000.00 116,000.00 )0,000.00 )0,000.00 111,002.82 la6. 57 8, 997.18 8,997.18 O'J/04/<jl 
27 Social Cer~ter Bol 03/23/71 11,000.00 1,000.00 12,000.00 12,000.00 9, 519.48" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
28 Comm Center Antig 06/25/71 90,000.00 75,000.00 D,OOO.OO 15,000.00 12.393.0-5 276.63 2,606.95 2,606.9) 06/17/83 
29 Cooperative Col 09/29/71 100,000.00 50,000.00 )0,000.00 50,000.00 24, 580.49" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
30 Cornm Cer~ter liond 09/29/72 58,000.00 8,000.00 )0,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
31 Photo Equip Braz 09/16/72 ~(),()()0,00 40,047.44 9,9g.)6 9,952. 5~ 6,809.48" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
> 











*32 Credit Union Col 06/01/72 $ 50,000.00 $ 
H Supermarket Urug 06/2 3/72 80,000.00 
34 Dental Clinic Braz 06/12/72 41 , 5 58.24 
35 land Purchase Bol 06/28/73 
36 Hasp Bldg Braz 03/28/74 
37 labour Col Barb 05/18/73 
38 Vacation Ctr Braz 06/24/74 
39 Hocar Bldg Col 02/04/74 
40 Island Coop Berm 03/22/74 
>f42 Credit Coop Hand 10/09/74 
43 HomeCnstr Barb 03/10/75 
45 Housing Proj Bol 08/13/7') 
46 Tel Coop Braz 02/13/76 
47 flee & Plumb Braz 02/13/76 
41! Hotel Wkrs Braz 09/08/76 
49 Educ Center Col 11/01/76 
*50 Constr Mat Guat 03/10/76 
*H Constr Mat Guat 03/10/76 
*52 Constr Mat Guat 03/10/76 
*53 Disaster Rei Guat 04/15/76 
















































































































































































































RRlf DATE TOTAl 
NO. DESCRIPT CTRY APPRVD COSTS 
56 Credit Coop D.R. 09/08/76 $ 116,000.00 
58 Sugr Mill Wkrs Ecu 02/14/77 12,513.26 
59 Credit Coop Trin I 2/01/76 65,981.15 
60 Bus Coop D.R. 02/01/77 440,087.00 
61 Housing Proj Col 03/21/77 28,121.47 
62 Sm Proj (new) Braz 06/23/77 39,131.14 
62B Sm Proj (oid) Braz 06/15/77 41,928.51 
63 Rural Wkrs Braz 05/26/77 27' 568. '52 
64 Credit Coop Col 09/07/77 50,402.00 
65 Educ Center Col 09/07/77 26,022.4! 
66 Credit Coop Ecu 01/04/78 22,780.00 
67 Health Center Braz 04/17/78 7,341.40 
i168 Cr IJn fed Pan 06/14/78 250,000.00 
69 Market Coop O.R. 08/02/78 69,200.00 
71 School Conslr Col 11/21/78 129,000.00 
72 Med Equip Braz 01/03/79 26,891. H 
lf7} Print Press C.R. 01/25/79 23,000.00 
74 Seed Capital Urug 02/08/79 95,000.00 
75 Mut Aid fnd Chile 02/08/79 95,000.00 
76 Transp Center Boi 09/29/79 39,993.70 
77 Educ Center Barb 09/14/79 250,000.00 
SUBTOTALS ~§,291,329.08 
R~l_F QIJ}\IHERLY REPORT (CONTINUED) 
PAGE NO.3 
R EPA YMElNTS 
lOCAL AMOUNT AMOUNT TO THIS 
CONTRIB OF lOAN DISBURSED DATE PERIOD 
s 96,000.00 $ 20,000.00 $ 20,000.00 $ 20,000.00 $ 0.00 
965.00 11,548.26 11,548.26 8,799.82" 316.43 
41,828.26 24' 152.89 24,152.89 24,002. 38" 0.00 
392. 087.0.0 48,000.00 48,000.00 14,441. 52" 0.00 
0.00 28,121.47 28,121.47 24,204. 97'~ 0.00 
0.00 39,131.14 39,131.14 I 5,139.82 106.71 
0.00 41,928.51 41,928.51 28,992.39" 0.00 
14,000.00 13,568.52 13,568.52 8, I 57.56 • 0.00 
42,182.00 8,220.00 8,220.00 7,605.68" 0.00 
7,693.00 18,329.41 18,329.41 13,259.38. 0.00 
2,780.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 15,934.13 5 0.00 
I ,713.94 5,627.46 5,627.46 2,912.46" 0.00 
200,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 11,844.86 I ,718.76 
19,200.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 11,223.88 0.00 
82,287.79 46,712.21 46,712.21 28,158.07 1,087.76 
21,116.75 5,774.78 5,774.78 2,589.79* 0.00 
17,004.68 5' 99 5. 32 5,995.32 1,347.36* 0.00 
45,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 36,835.01 3,703.85 
65,000.00 30,000.00 30,000.00 27 ,830.79* 0.00 
14,993.70 25,000.00 25 '000. 00 0.00 0.00 
200,000.0() 5(),000.()() ~0,0()().()() ~2,!74.37 ~' 7()2. ~! 





















































RRlf QiJI\RTERlY REPORT (CONTINUED) 
PAGE NO.4 
REPAYMENTS AMOUNT OUT- LAST 
RRlF DATE TOTAL LOCAl AMOUNT AMOUNT TO THIS IN STANDING PYMT. 
NO. DESCRIPT CTRY APPRVD COSTS CONTR!B OF lOAN DISBURSED DATE PERIOD ARREARS BALANCE DATE -
78 Health Center Braz 10/12/79 $ 50,217.00 $ 25,523.23 $ 24,6'H.77 $ 24,693.77 $ 6,612.86 $ 223.43 $ 0.00 $ 18,080.91 06/27/83 
79 Bealth Center Chile 06/14/79 105,088.00 55,088.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 8,787.29 0.00 13,600.00 41,212.71 !0/05/81 
80 Health Center Col 11/19/79 157,986.79 114,046.00 43,940.79 43,940.79 0.00 0.00 12,727.24 43,940.79 None 
81 tieaith Center Braz 09/10/79 !31 '108.00 113,978.85 17,129.15 17' 129.15 8,970.83" 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
*83 Agri Dev C.R. 08/06/80 8,712.05 l ,000.00 7,712.05 7,712.05 37.03 0.00 5,119.00 7,675.02 09/23/82 
84 Credit Coop Col 08/06/80 30,605.00 10,163.46 20,441.54 20,441.54 10,101.41 368.92 4,344.00 10,340.13 06/13/83 
85 Health Center Peru 12/18/80 60,000.00 10,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 I, 292.84 553.70 0.00 48,707.16 06/06/83 
86 Motorcycle D.R. 0)/02/81 5,179.00 1,000.00 4,179.00 4,179.00 4,179.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
87 Credit IJnion Guy 03/02/81 35,000.00 6,618.73 28' 381.27 28,381.27 857.65 286.36 0.00 27,523.62 04/07/83 
88 Credit Union Ecu 06/08/81 200,000.00 170,000.00 30,000.00 30,000.00 5,091.19 767.58 0.00 24,908.8! 06/09/83 
89 Health Center Braz 05/22/81 58,275.00 40,793.00 17,482.00 17,482.00 5,928.03 921.68 0.00 11,553.97 06/24/83 
90 liealth Center Braz 01/06/82 20,458.44 8,155.23 12,303.21 12,303.21 1,957.49 613.73 0.00 10,345.72 06/24/83 
91 Credit Union Urug 04/01/82 70,000.00 40,000.00 30,000.00 30,000.00 2,934.00 0.00 6,168.00 27,066.00 03/28/83 
92 Educ Research T rin 04/01/82 158,000.00 108,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 0.00 0.00 4,740.00 50,000.00 N/A 
93 Credit Union Ecu 05/19/82 204,854.43 174,854.43 30,000.00 30,000.00 2,263.09 I ,031.03 0.00 27,736.91 06/21/83 
94 Health Center Braz 04/01/82 44,741.00 23,141.00 21,600.00 21,600.00 I, 817.17 404.57 500.00 19,782.83 04/29/83 
95 Credit Union Ecu 10/07/82 148,000.00 118,000.00 30,000.00 30,000.00 340.11 340.11 0.00 29,659.89 06/21/83 
96 Health Center Braz 06/08/82 78,655.39 54,790.39 23,439.34 23,439.34 1,320.04 1,320.04 0.00 22' 119. 30 06/27/83 
97 Arch. Bldg. Col 01/06/83 69,286.00 55,000.00 14,286.00 14,286.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14,286.00 N/A 
9& llealth Center Braz 06/22/83 16,557.28 2,905.40 13,651.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
TOTALS $7,944,052.46 $5,631,700.83 $2,3jl ,925.97 $2,298,274.09 $1,22.5,212.29 $19,937.17 $193,503.26 $718' 8 30. 58 







AGRICUL TIJRE AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Population and Economic Growth 
In 1982, five of the six Spanish speaking nations in Central America had over 
forty (40) percent of their labor force engaged in agriculture. Costa Rica, the one 
exception, had 36 percent of its labor force in agriculture. The prevailing vocation in 
Central America clearly remains rural and agrarian in character. 
Second, population growth rates continue to be excessive: in 1982, excepting 
Panama, all Central American countries were growing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent 
or more. (Population "doubling time" for a country growing at 2.5 percent per annum is 
twenty-eight (28) years.) These population growth rates are one of the central factors 
explaining the severe land pressures which exist in Central America today. 
Third, growth rates in the national economies of Central America from roughly 
the end of World War II to the later years of the last decade were quite impressive ·-
averaging about 5.3 percent in GNP growth per annum. However, the incremental 
wealth generated by this growth generally has not been well-distributed. Development 
strategies which favored import substitution and low labor absorptive industrialization 
inordinately benefited the small commercial monied classes; and within the rural 
sector, government taxation, investment, monetary and fiscal policies markedly 
favored the interests of cash crop, export-oriented commercial agriculture. With few 
exceptions, the bulk of small primary producers involved mainly in the production of 
basic grains, far-and-away the largest segment of the agricultural sector, benefited 
much less from this extended period of economic growth. 
The Role of Commercial Agricul.ture 
With the increases in energy costs and continued low international market 
prices for products such as cotton, sugar and coffee, commercial agriculture in the 
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countries of Central America generally has been depressed for the past four or five 
years. However, it is the centuries-old development, expansion and diversification of 
this large scale commercial agriculture which is another major factor in explaining 
contemporary land-man conditions in Central America, particularly the plight of the 
growing legion of landless and near landless. The fact is that commercial agriculture 
has gradually absorbed most of the better land over the past 150 years, displacing and 
fragmenting the other agrarian production system in the countries of Central America 
of small parcel, largely subsistence agriculture which. as yet has not _gone through a 
sustained process of modernization. This characterization of the competing production 
systems and the long struggle between them is particularly apt with respect to El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras. 
Closed Political Systems 
A third major factor defining the character of the land problems in Central 
America are the more or less dosed political systems dominated by traditional elites 
and their military allies, which resist and inhibit social and economic change. 
Effective political outiets for campesinos to express land grievances and seek redress 
have generally been conspicuous by their absence. This has been especially true of 
Guatemala and E1 Salvador. 
The landless and Ner landless 
When excessive population growth rates, the expansion of land extensive 
commercial agriculture, and political institutions unresponsive to the problems being 
generated are put togethe-, a causal pattern of the present !and-man conditions in 
Central America begins to emerge. These conditions concern primarily the landless -
tenant farmers, sharecroppers, agricultural laborers - and near landless - those 
small farmers who own or use a plot of land too small in size or too meager in 
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resources to support their households. The number of landless campesinos has 
increased virtually across the board in Central America over roughly the last two 
decades. In El Salvador, in 1980 before the present land reform programs took effect, 
there were roughly 480,000 rural six-person households, of which 300,000 were 
landless. In Guatemala, the estimated number of economically active landless 
agricultural workers in 1980 was 309,000. In Costa Rica, the bulk of the peasantry is 
now also landl.ess. A rural proletariat of growing size, faced with land scarcity and 
dim-to-hopeless employment prospects in other sectors, is indeed an omnipresent and 
depressing reality in much of Central America today. 
From the vantage point of the near-landless, the problems appear to be equally 
severe. For example, 88 percent of all Guatemala's farms in 1979 were of sub-family 
size (i.e. too small to provide for the needs of a family). Indeed, land use patterns 
suffer from distributional inequities of major dimension. A common pattern in 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras and pre-reform El Salvador has been land 
concentration in the hands of the few large landowners at the upper end of the size of 
holdings, and increasing fragmentation at the lower end for the mass of small 
farmers. To use the Guatemalan example again - where we have reasonably current 
and reliable figures -- 78 percent of all farms are under 3.5 hectares (1 hectare = 2.5 
acres), while occupying but 10 percent of the land in farms. On the other end, land 
concentration is e<:jUaUy dramatic with farms of 450 hectares and larger constituting 
less than one (1) percent of the farms, but containing 34 percent of the lands in farms. 
This pattern of land concentration in Guatemala, as well as in other Central American 
countries, is further intensified by the fact that the farms which have the high quality 
lands under cultivation generally are found where land concentration is the greatest. 
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Land Reform Efforts in Central America 
With the exception of El Salvador, the agrarian reform efforts of the non-
communist countries in Central America·* over the last thirty (30) years have been 
inadequate in addressing the scope and complexity of the land issues involved. In 
Honduras, until recently, in Guatemala and in Costa Rica, primary reliance has been 
placed on piecemeal and expensive land colonization programs in considerable part on 
marginal or undeveloped lands. These programs have been insufficient in size, 
administratively troubled from the beginning and generally have fallen far short of 
expectations. Meanwhile, land invasions and squatting by the landless have become 
almost a way of life, with the land reform agencies having to spend an exorbitant 
amount of time adjudicating land conflicts. 
Only in El Salvador has there been a major effort to address wholesale the 
structural problems of land distribution, specifically with the two new programs which 
the government began in 1980: the Phase I cooperative program which expropriated all 
land holdings above 500 hectares, and distributed them to newly formed cooperatives 
composed mostly of the agricultural laborers already working on the large estates; and 
the Phase III program, commonly called the land-to-the-tiller program, which allows 
tenant farmers and share croppers to file title for the small parcels (up to seven 
hectares) which they work. Owner-operated land cannot be claimed. (We shall discuss 
both of these programs in more detail in our oral presentation) 
* We will discuss the Sandinista land reform program in Nicaragua in our oral 
presentation. We would only note here that the program does not approach in 
scope or comprehensiveness the agrarian reform programs in El Salvador. The 
former essentially nationalized Somoza lands which are now being administered 
collectively as State Farms. Primary emphasis has been placed on food 
production, while production in the private small farm sector, which as yet has 
not been collectivized, is being encouraged by government subsidized credit and 
fixed prices. 
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In Honduras, there is a hopeful new and ambitious program of land titling of 
small producers largely on public lands. Fully 7 5 percent of all farms in Honduras are 
occupied and cultivated by small farmers whose tenure is insecure. The goal of the 
program is to issue an estimated 100,000 new land titles over a four-year period. Given 
the apparent political will of the Suazo government to carry out this program and its 
recognition of the fact that falling agricultural productivity is inextricably linked to a 
land tenure system in disarray, there is reason for optimism that constructive social 
changes in man-land relations are ln the offing in Honduras. 
The Complenmtarity _2f Political an~ Economic Effects 
The need for agrarian reform programs fitted to the varying circumstances of 
the different countries of the region is indeed manifest, as is the requirement for 
cooperation and financial and technical support by the U.S. Government. Both the 
programs in El Salvador and Honduras are now fully supported by the Agency for 
International Development (AID), but this support must involve a long range 
commitment beyond the initial stages of land redistribution and stabilizing tenure 
rights. For example, agrarian reform programs must involve not only land 
redistribution to the actual tillers and fair compensation to the ex-landowners, but 
also the long-term expansion and modernization of vital agricultural services to the 
new owner-operators, e.g. credit and production inputs. The key factor in 
comprehending the significance of these programs is the complementarity of the 
political and economic effects of the reform. Agrarian reform, appropriately designed 
to local conditions, can have the mutually reinforcing effects of politically stabilizing 
and democratizing the countryside while increasing agricultural productivity, or more 
broadly, establishing the base of agricultural modernization. The post World War II 
experience with agrarian reform programs in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea certainly 
bears out this conclusion. 
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Last, the broad model or type of agrarian reform which best reflects Western 
values and which also has proven to be the most successful in developing countries in 
the post-colonial period, devolves ownership and production into a system of private, 
owner-operated farms - in the case of food crops, usually small, family-operated 
units. The alternative of collectivization, in numerous cases the handmaiden of 
totalitarian government, certainly has been less efficient and less competitive with 
other more open systems. 
U.S. 5u_£port of Land Reform 
The conversion of landless peasants into small owner-operators is 
unquestionably a powerful incentive and a dynamic force in the evolution of 
subsistence farmers into modern food producers. In Central American countries where 
the development of the rural sector is lagging and most of the people are landless, 
poverty-ridden, largely subsistence producers, land redistribution options should be in 
the forefront of development choices. External donors such as the U.S. should not 
relegate land distribution options to the background as they are apt to do in favor of 
technical approaches to what are essentially non-technical problems. 
We would add that the United States has tended to embrace agrarian reform 
programs only very late in a typically unstable and violent process of social change, 
almost as a last resort in the face of threats inimical to U.S. interests, e.g., South 
Vietnam and El Salvador. AIFLD would hope that this time perspective will change. 
The United States needs to encourage and support democratic and fair redistributive 
agrarian reform programs before the threshold of large scale social violence and 
disruption. There is of course a prior requirement of political will by host governments 
before external support and collaboration become meaningful. But the availability of 
external financial and technical assistance can lessen the risks in what is usually a 
difficult political undertaking~ especially in its early stages. 
SURVEY OF VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
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Attachment 113 
From August 23 to August 30, 1983, an AIFLD senior staff member surveyed the 
views and perceptions of a representative sample of top-level democratic trade •1nion and 
campesino organization officials in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and El 
Salvador on major questions pertinent to the scope of inquiry of the Kissinger Commission 
on Central America. The information noted below represents a composite summary by 
country of the views expressed by these labor leaders. 
Question One: How does the electoral process and labor's role in that process function in 
your country? 
Panama It functions reasonably well and we intend to participate in the next 
elections; we think we will be able to play a meaningful role. We 
want to make sure that next year's election does not return power to 
the oligarchy. 
Costa Rica The system works. Labor has begun to play a role and hopes to 
Honduras 
expand it. However, this will depend on the preference of future 
presidential candidates. The recent election of a labor deputy was 
due solely to the intervention of Luis Alberto Monge. 
The electoral process does not function particularly well, though 
there was improvement in the 1980 elections. There is little 
participation by popular organizations. The traditional parties are 
too closed. 
El Salvador The election system does not work as it should. There is very little 
organized popular participation, though the democratic trade union 
movement plans to try to play a more significant role in the national 
elections next year. 
Guatemala The electoral process has never functioned well or fairly - e.g., past 
electoral frauds; worker participation is limited, and campesinos have 
lost faith in the process. Absenteeism is a sign of this loss of faith. 
Perhaps if the electoral system is reformed, democratic labor 
organizations would decide to actively participate. 
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Question Two: Does the jll..tdicial system fairly protect civil, human and trade union 
rights? 
Panama The system reasonably protects rights, but it is inefficient and needs 
modernization. The system should also be more independent. 
Costa Rica The system functions equitably, but it is slow and inP.fficient. 
Honduras No -- The judicial system helps only those in power. Courts have 
blocked land reform. 
El Salvador No .... If it functions at all, it protects those in power. The new draft 
constitutional reforms are no help. If they are approved, they would 
make the situation worse. As long as assassins are free, there is no 
justice. 
Guatemala No - The judicial system is slow, bad, and protects the privileged; no 
one has confidence in the system. It will only change when the 
government is democratic and has the will to effect reforms. 
Question Three In the view of organized labor, does the military play a proper role 
within your society? 
Panama Yes - Populist forces in the military have protected the popular 
sector in recent history (Torrijos). However, the military has too 
much power now, and should be restrained in the present political 
d emocra tiza tion process. 
Costa Rica The military is not a major factor. 
Honduras The military protects itself as an institution as well as protecting the 
powerful. However, it has played a role in effecting some positive 
changes in our society. Some of its members have taken advantage 
of their position to enrich themselves and to accumulate large tracts 
of land. We are not optimistic about improvements, but organized 
violent repression is seldom used. 
El Salvador The military has been a repressive instrument of the power elite, 
though there are some progressive younger officers. Military officers 
are in charge of civilian programs which they are not capable of 
managing. 
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Guatemala The armed forces do not play a proper role. The army has been 
historically trained to protect the interests of the wealthy and to 
combat the democratic trade union movement. The military is now 
attempting to militarize the society by putting more military officers 
in the government. Gross human rights violations have been 
perpetrated in the rural areas, and conditions will get worse with the 
creation of civil defense patrols. The campesinos do not depend on 
the military for protection. 
Question Four: Does official corruption exist, and, if so, does it hamper the development 
of a democratic and equitable economic process? 
Panama Corruption is sporadic but not generalized throughout society. 
Costa Rica There is some official corruption, but the problem is more a matter 
of poor management. 
Honduras Yes - It exists at all levels of government and the military, and it 
has hurt the process of economic and political development in our 
country. 
El Salvador Official corruption is general. Examples are manipulation of prices, 
bribes, military graft, and abuses of power for money and to serve 
the power elite. 
Guatemala Yes - Generalized corruption and abuse of power, both civil and 
military, has a long history in Guatemala. "It will never change". It 
would not necessarily hinder the democratization process, at least 
not as much as elections with the traditional parties offering 
traditional non-popular programs. 
Question Five What are the most important economic factors that affect the workers 
and campesinos for. the better or worse? 
Panama The need for economic development through investment, higher 
agricultural production, and the development of external markets. 
Unemployment must be eased and community enterprises stimulated. 
Unemployment is at 13%, and 20% of the population lives in abject 
poverty. 
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Costa Rica Economic development, better government policy, lower interest 
rates and more production. 
Honduras Unemployment, the need for investment in agricultural production, 
and the development of large tracts of land that are not producing. 
The high cost of living is more important than the problem with 
Nicaragua. The distribution of what the country produces and the 
economic assistance it receives both favor the government 
bureaucracy and business and commercial interests. 
El Salvador Congealed salaries, lack of purchasing power, lack of agricultural 
credit, inflation, war, recession, war damages (600,000,000 colones), 
and capital flight ($200 million). 
Guatemala 70% of Guatemalans live on a subsistence basis outside the economy. 
There is high unemployment. There is need to reactivate the 
economy, obtain more international aid, provide more infrastructure 
in rural areas to facilitate marketing, and carry out basic changes in 
economic policies to provide better access to international markets. 
Question Six: How do you view foreign investments and transnationals as they affect the 
workers and campesinos? 
Panama We need and want investment for modern production; however, 
foreign investment should be under national controls and directed 
toward improving our country. Free zones hamper union 
organization. 
Costa Rica Yes, we need investment but it should be controlled. Workers of 
transnationals are hard to organize because of reactionary local 
managers. There should be a transnational code. 
Honduras Past abuses make the labor movement cautious about transnationals. 
A code of conduct is needed to control their activities. 
El Salvador Transnational companies are hard to organize because they pay 
salaries above local rates, and contract people only one year at a 
time. Transnationals control price of agricultural machinery and, 
therefore, make exorbitant profits. They bleed the working class. 
Guatemala They are needed but should be controlled. Labor laws should be 
respected. Past history of bribes and corruption must be avoided. 
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Question Seven: Is there a class system which hampers upward mobility, educational 
opportunities or health facilities? Is the situation improving .. 
Panama Workers have the opportunity to move up. They have health and 
educational services. The quality is poor, but they are available. 
Workers and workers' children are in the Universities. The syster. 
works, but must be modernized. We need more vocational training. 
For example, one-half of the welders on pipelines are foreigners 
because of the lack of domestic skilled labor. 
Costa Rica The society is open, and workers have "pretty good" opportunities. 
Honduras 
There is no class polarization, but support systems should be 
improved 
Opportunities are limited. The geographic dispersion of the rural 
population limits the education and health services which are 
provided by the Government. There has been little improvement, and 
Honduras is still largely a closed society controlled by traditional 
elites. For example, of each 200 students who finish primary school, 
only 10 go on to secondary school, and only one goes to the 
university. 
El Salvador "Yes. Only the social mobility is downward." Higher education is 
only available for the poor at the state university, which is closed. 
The power e1lte actively represses upward movement by discouraging 
cooperatives, unions and small business competition. Some rural 
workers may have more opportunity now with the agrarian reform 
programs than the urban workers. 
Guatemala Yes, there is a class system. The majority have little access to 
benefits or opportunities. The social structure is stagnant. Rural 
services are poor. "For a campesino to try to better himself, he has 
to go the city." 
Question Eight: What is yow:- vie"W" of past international economic assistance programs? 
Panama Generally well thought out. Should be more diversification ... more 
direct aid to social groups. 
Costa Rica Well done. Generally worked well. Roads, schools, health, 
particularly infrastructure in rural areas, have made contributions. 
Honduras 
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Only criticism is in social sectors where workers and campesinos have 
not participated, for example, in housing. 
Should give first priority to rural dwellers who represent 78% of the 
population; therP should be worker representation in planning and 
implementation of proj e::ts. Results of aid programs have been both 
good and bad. 
El Salvador Good intentions, but badly administered. "Trickle down" doesn't 
work. As long as the aid programs go through the government, and do 
not arrive directly to the poorer classes, they will never work 
decently. 
Guatemala Aid programs only aid the "power class". They are always channeled 
through the government. Average worker knows little about them. 
More should go directly to social and popular organizations. Military 
and economic assistance should be conditioned on the "opening up" and 
the development of our society. 
Question Nine: What are the patterns of ownership of productive land? What are the 
inequities built into them? 
Panama Agrarian reform is not an acute problem. There are landless peasants 
but there are still public lands to be distributed. The present 
agrarian reform program is adequate, though it needs to be further 
developed and its efficiency improved. Credit and extension services 
are getting better. 
Costa Rica Land is too concentrated in large holdings. Major part of the land is 
in private hands but its unjust distribution results in land invasions. 
Honduras Land is too concentrated in large holdings. There are 600 large 
estates, some as big as 20,000 hectares, which are not producing. 
The large banana plantations of Standard and United are about 75% 
productive. Present law erroneously classifies land as "producing" if 
it is growing forage. 
El Salvador Land is still too concentrated in too few hands. The Phase II program 
is needed (the redistribution of lands between 500 and 100 hectares). 
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Guatemala Land is tied up in too few hands. At least 25% of the lands on the 
large estates are idle. 
Question Ten: Are the campesinos guaranteed the right to organize? 
Panama The right is guaranteed by law. 
Costa Rica The right is guaranteed by law. 
Honduras Yes, but the right is less than effective. 
El Salvador Yes, but in fact there are dangers of physical and economic 
repression. 
Guatemala On paper the right exists, but in reality it is difficult and dangerous. 
We must use the word "league" because we can't use the word 
"union". There is no campesino representation in agrarian agencies. 
The campesinos are politically marginated. 
Question Eleven: How can the labor movements of our two countries use the availability 
of larger sums of U.S. aid as a lever to effect basic changes in social structure or to 
guarantee human and trade union rights? 
Panama Form a Workers Bank, stimulate cooperatives enterprises, find 
foreign (U.S.) markets, modernize production, restructure ~he 
educational system, more vocational training; tripartite agreement 
(business-labor-government) on aid planning and projects. "Lack of 
development more due to lack of resources than an unjust system". 
Costa Rica Not structural changes, but reforms of legislation and administration. 
Honduras 
Projects should be aimed at improving production. Union 
participation in planning is needed. Channel aid through popular 
organizations. Mixed planning commissions should be established. 
Create worker-owned industries or cooperatives. Form popular 
foundations to administer programs. Less expensive mortgage money 
should be made available. Rotating funds for social projects should 
be established. 
Basic. changes should be sought in the land tenancy, military, judicial 
and political systems through conditioned aid programs and constant 
consultation with the popular sectors. More training of agronomists, 
extension agents and rural education is badly needed. Participation 
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of the popular sector is required not only to insure that the aid 
programs benefit everyone, but also to avoid corruption. 
El Salvador Basic changes are required. Systems don't function for benefit of the 
majority. A.I.D. programs have to be conditioned on worker 
participation. Tripartite, yes, no; government and business are 
natural allies and would overpower worker participation. Workers 
must be represented "like Kirkland on the Kissinger Commission." 
Guatemala A.I.D. programs should go directly to popular groups. Strengthen 
labor unions to combat abuses. Put in provisions that guarantee union 
freedoms. 
OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ISSUES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
EDWARD MARASCIULO 
Historical Perspective 
The level of Central American social development today, with partial 
exceptions in Costa Rica and Panama, is poor. The low quality of life 
among major population groups across the isthmus has been a significant 
factor contributing to the environment of political instability over the 
past 30 years despite more than $12 billion in bilateral, multilateral and 
private external support. 
To truly comprehend the problems of social development in Central 
America one must have a sense of history of the seven small colonies - the 
size of ID1ode Island and Massachusetts - that received their independence 
from Spain in 1821 as a Union of Central American States, very much the 
same way as our thirteen colonies fought and received their independence 
from England in 1776. On the east, the Union was almost totally flanked 
along the Caribbean by the British until their departure in 1903 from all 
but British Honduras (now Belize). 
The Union of Central American States fell apart in 1839, one part 
seceding to Colombia (now Panama), another joining Mexico, and the rest 
splitting into five feudal states made up largely of Indians with 
relatively few European overlords. There were many inter-state conflicts, 
some civil wars, but no Emancipation Proclamation, even though some 
observers consider that a form of slavery still exists in Central America. 
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Conflicts following the breakup were severe - greatest in Nicaragua. 
In 1851 a God-fearing American Free Boater named William Walker brought 
mercenaries from the United States to quell the conflicts ensuing from 
Nicaraguan independence. He was Chief of State for almost five years, shot 
before succeeding in efforts to annex other Central American countries. 
Walker looms large in Nicaraguan history as the symbol of US imperialism 
even though his actions had no US government sanction. Ironically, he is 
buried not more than a half mile from the camp where US military are today 
training soldiers from El Salvador on Honduras' north coast. Insurrection, 
revolution, border conflicts and general public upheavel have existed in 
Central America over the 160 years of independence. 
Following efforts by a US Commission for Latin America in the 1950s, 
promoted by Dag Hammerskjold, there has been a real attempt and some 
success in steps to reunify the Central American countries. Uneven 
progress is continuing in the integration process and the Central American 
governments give lip service to integration even though understandably 
reluctant to turn power over to a regional authority. Central American 
watchers who can get themselves in a positive mood will in philosophical 
moments declare economic, social and political integration of the countries 
to be the only real hope for Central America's democratic future. 
In 1950, amid widespread poverty in Central America, a small middle 
class was developing in an essentially feudal-mercantilist economy 
dependent on agricultural exports to the United States and Europe for 
foreign exchange to purchase manufactured goods. Since then, the economic 
base of the area has broadened; rural-to-urban migration has accelerated; 
capital formation, manufacturing and service industries have been launched; 
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and physical and institutional infrastructure to sustain developm~nt 
initiated. Most of this development occurred during the 1960s during the 
early golden and progressive years of the Central American Common Market 
when the Alliance for Progress was in full bloom. 
However, deep and difficult problems remain. There have not been, nor 
are there now easy solutions. Enormous difficulties face those involved in 
trying to improve the situation - an enormous challenge to the Commission. 
Population as the Major Issue 
The dominating social factor of Central America today is the popula-
tion explosion which has overwhelmed the capacity of public and private 
entities to improve material living standards for the 60% or more who have 
suddenly been thrust into a modern age. Central America including Panama 
had 8 million people in 1950, has 23 million today (admittedly very 
unevenly distributed), and will reach 39 million by the year 2000. It will 
double again by 2025. 
Wars have been blamed on population pressures. For example, the 1969 
border war between Honduras and El Salvador has been described as the first 
of the population wars. It highlighted the problem of 4.7 million El 
Salvadoreans (580 per square mile) trying to expand into Honduras which had 
only 3.8 million people (88 per square mile). 
In human terms, the results of the population situation were analyzed 
in a 1982 report by the Economic Commission for Latin America, "The Degree 
of Satisfaction of Basic Human Needs in Central America". The report 
classified 63% of the 23 million inhabitants of the area as "poor", or 14 
million people barely surviving, measured not merely in per capita income 
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but also by access to health care, sound nutrition, schooling and-other 
essential community services. In contrast, over 7 million (almost the size 
of the entire population of the area in 1950) had achieved higher standards 
of living. The ECLA study identified 40% of the population (9 million) as 
critically poor living on the barest level of survival, and 23% (5 million) 
unable to satisfy even basic human needs. We must conclude that the 
monumental development efforts of 30 years had in fact been largely negated 
by the cumulative effect of population increases. 
Education programs are hindered by the fact that 52% standards of the 
children in the region (primarily El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) are 
classified by reliable nutritionists as malnourished. This means that the 
learning abilities of at least 50% are seriously impaired by inadequate 
nourishment during their developing years. While the Central American 
Nutrition Institute (INCAP), founded by the UN and the OAS in the 1950s and 
now administered by Central American experts, has an important role to play 
in improving the nutrition situation, significant additional assistance 
could perhaps turn this devastating situation around in 5 years or so. We 
will hear more about nutrition and INCAP later this afternoon. 
Overloaded public services are not all due to population pressures, 
intractable socio-economic problems, or current political turmoil. Several 
countries have been victims of natural disasters which aggravated already 
difficult housing and public service problems. Belize, Honduras, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua all had hurricanes or major earthquakes during the 1970s 
damaging urban infrastructure and many dwellings. The danger of recurring 
disasters in the future has both a pyschological and a real financial cost. 
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The long range implications of a society much of whose pop~lation has 
little economic opportunity, is undernourished and subject to debilitating 
diseas, and cannot read and write is likely to be high susceptibility to 
emotional appeals rather than reason. This does not bode well for 
earlyachievement of a stable Central American social infrastructure. 
Prospects for Social Development 
Implications of the difficult social situation and prospects for the 
next two decades as the population continues to double every 20 to 25 years 
are deeply disquieting to demographers, development planners and political 
observers. Resources available to the Central American countries for 
reducing the 63% poverty level are limited -- and experience has 
demonstrated that only sustained programs over substantial periods of time, 
with special attention to income and employment generation, will have any 
significant impact on reducing the level of poverty. 
Major Problems to be Addressed 
Even with good expectations for the CBI and support by other donors, 
scarcity of resources raises concern as to whether poverty and unemployment 
can in fact be addressed simultaneously. Because the scale of problems is 
of manageable size (at least compared to those of some larger nations of 
the Hemisphere and other continents), some improvement could likely be 
achieved within the next five years on the basis of coordinated and 
consistent efforts, requiring, however, new and unique approaches even to 
maintain even a primitive level of services. The recently funded Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI) will certainly have some impact on job creation in 
the next few years. However, at this time it does not appear that all 
Central American countries can be certain to benefit from the CBI if they 
fail to meet political and other qualificatons imposed by the Congress. 
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A second major concern is whether the governments have the.will, 
abroptive, or administrative capacities to take on the tremendous task 
involved? Indeed, this Commission must wrestle ways of establishing 
priorities to respond to so many conflicting interests. 
A third important concern, perhaps the most disquieting, is the need 
to relate the call for major investments in social infrastructure, health, 
education, nutrition, and the generation of labor intensive industries, 
together with promotion of democratic processes like development of labor 
unions and peasant cooperatives, to the environment of heavy military 
expenditure, serious political unrest, and major capital flight accelerated 
by a wary private sector. 
Fourthly, concern also arises from the common perception of Central 
America as a homogeneous region, whereas it is not. Geographic variations 
among the countries are very great, and some self-appointed pontificates 
erroneously ascribe to the region characteristics observable only in one or 
two countries. For example, Costa Rica and Panama have far better social 
indicators than do El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize. Nicaragua 
is set apart from all others. 
Guatemala and El Salvador stand out as the most difficult in terms of 
both political conflict and inadequate social development. We must ask 
"why?" Costa Rica and Panama are set apart also, but with lesser problems 
of social and political conflict. Again, "Why?" Even more importantly, why 
are Honduras and Belize set apart from the other two groups of countries 
despite their statistical association with the poorest of the poor? 
Sharp Differences Among Central American Countries 
Analysis of these social and political disparities perhaps provide our 
best key to political solutions and social development policies in the 
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region: 
Today only in El Salvador and Guatemala are there gross disparities 
between the landed gentry and the landless poor. Attempts in the last 30 
years at labor union organization, agrarian reform, and rural leadership 
have met with violent opposition. 
Honduras and Belize on the other hand have no great disparities 
between the wealthy and the poor. Perhaps this is because they have more 
land area per capita, fewer elite, and a greater tradition of democracy. 
Their governments have a strong degree of will for social change and 
perhaps less to lose. Efforts to tackle agrarian reform have been openly 
debated. The labor union structure of Honduras' northern coast is by far 
the most significant force of democracy in Central America. An enlightened 
and progressive private sector also contributes to north coast society. 
The poorest countries in the region therefore, Honduras and Belize, appear 
to be the most fertile environments for genuine social development. 
Significant development investments in both countries promise quick results 
which can be good examples for their neighbors to emulate. 
The Nicaraguan Case 
Something must be said about Nicaragua's recent steps towards social 
reform and humanitarian development. Like Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia, 
Nicaragua is turning society around in a revolutionary fashion but with 
only a few of the requisites of social change. While agrarian reform is at 
the core of its revolution, labor unions prohibited under Somoza have not 
developed as entities free of government control under the Sandinistas. 
Sandanista successes, aided by the Cubans, in literacy, education and 
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health delivery systems are controversial. Not yet tested over fime, these 
social service activities are perceived as contributing to development and 
the quality of life, and as evidence that the government cares. 
You will hear from other witnesses about the Nicaraguan private sector 
which is still functioning and also provides important social services --
giving some real hope for pluralism in Nicaragua. 
Important in the Nicaraguan case, whether true or not, is that there 
is an upwelling of anti-Somozismo at the same time as left wing factions of 
the Sandanistas are convincing many Nicaraguans that to be poor is to be 
patri.otic, and that the government exists to help them. Anti-government 
criticism, even hostility, serves as a force to unite the people and create 
a nationalistic fervor which does not exist elsewhere in the region. This 
is a lesson that the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala have not 
learned from the Sandinistas is how to communicate with their people who do 
not have the same feeling that the government is there to be helpful. 
Addressing Basic Needs in Other Central American Countries 
In this context, it may be worthwhile investigating whether the Cuban 
and Nicaraguan literacy and health programs are worth replicating in El 
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize where these problems are acute. 
The greatest advantage might be the same creation of patriotism reflecting 
the perception that the government cares about well-being of the citizens. 
To nurture such patriotism, US and the developed world certainly can 
produce a better model than the Cuban model being used by Nicaragua. 
Hispanic Peace Corp Volunteers, for example, providing paramedic and 
literacy training, could have an impact at least as great as the Cubans 
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and in countries to which Cuba is unlikely to be invited even more. 
However, a decision as to whether to assign Peace Corps Volunteers on an 
adequate scale may prove difficult. Unfortunately, it sometimes appears 
that US development planners have difficulty in thinking in sweeping 
political terms, and perhaps our political people have difficulties in 
recognizing development assistance priority as part of the total picture. 
Many development practitioners who know Central America will agree 
that programs directed to merely sustain current levels of employment and 
incomes, literacy, health care, housing and other social services will 
require large amounts of external support from a variety of sources over an 
extended number of years. Indeed, they blame the on-again off-again nature 
of external support including US policies over the past 15 years, 
reflecting fluctuations from high to low profile from one US administration 
to another, for contributing to the current social malaise in the region. 
Whatever is to be done must be part of a commitment over a longer period --
at least five years with options beyond that. 
The Diaspora 
It is perhaps no great revelation that there are dramatic movements of 
population, both within Central America and from Central America to the 
United States and Mexico. Even though accurate and reliable figures about 
the Central American diaspora are hard to come by, newspapers report that 
over 200,000 Central Americans (mainly Nicaraguans) now live in Costa Rica, 
significant numbers of Guatemalans in southern Mexico, 20,000 Salvadorians 
in Belize, and a half million Salvadorians in the United States. Even more 
dramatic, newly independent, English-speaking Belize, two years old this 
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month, with a land area larger than El Salvador and only 145,008 
inhabitants compared to El Salvador's 4.5 million, has, in just 4 years, 
acquired a new refugee population of 10-15% of its current population. 
These new Spanish-speaking Belizeans are made up mainly of El Salvadorians 
and Guatemalans. 
Resettlement and related legal and social problems in Central America 
are so serious to the nations involved that the Secretary General of the 
Organization of American States has ordered a demographic study of each 
country affected to determine the number of foreigners visiting each. 
Is Existing Assistance Adequate? 
During the long 40 years of US bilateral assistance to Central 
America, a great deal of sophisticated expertise has been gathered. 
However, changing donor perceptions and capacities have meant that uneven, 
interrupted, and even contradictory development has been undertaken. 
One unfulfilled strategy has been a proper consultative arrangement 
among donor insitutions. That impasse may be finally broken by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which will host a special meeting to 
be held in Brussels next week on the Program for Economic Development of 
the Central American isthmus, to which are invited all donors and the 
Central American governments. 
Another critical issue long left undiscussed within the development 
community is avoidance by the larger financial institutions of the more 
controversial social development issues. Their unwillingness and inability 
leaves the more thorny problems mainly to the US bilateral program which 
some consider today as becoming more like a banking institution and less 
field sensitive or people-to-people oriented than it had been in the early 
days of the Alliance for Progress. 
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In a review of IDB materials presented for its consultative meeting, 
it is interesting to note that the IDB, like Central American governments, 
appears to relegate social issues to a lower order of priority. Indeed, a 
closer look at the Bank's lending strategies indicates that it has directed 
its investment portfolio mostly to economic development and only a 
relatively small amount of funds and staff focus to long range social 
issues. This is even true for the IDB's Small Projects operation which 
approved 81 projects since its beginning seven years ago. In 1982, of 22 
small-scale projects financed for all of Latin American totaling almost $10 
million, only 7 went to Central America. Furthermore, their value 
represents only about half the Bank's administrative costs to manage them. 
These small social projects are a good beginning but a bad performance for 
an institution that has a multi-billion dollar portfolio if it wishes to 
make a significant and durable contribution to resolution of social 
problems in the region. IDB's program priorities and assistance delivery 
are areas that the Commission might consider. 
US bilateral aid also needs scrutiny by this Commission. US political 
assessment that the conflictive situation in Central America would improve 
by 1984 led to a decrease in all categories of bilateral aid for 1984 and 
1985 to Central America in the AID program budget submitted to Congress 
last year. The "squeaky wheel" philosophy evidently had not been applied 
in assessing the situation. 
Central America's private sector has also played an ambivalent role. 
Its financing of industry has not truly reflected philanthropic concepts. 
No doubt this attitude has been fostered by the "easy out" available to 
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businessmen to move to Miami or New Orleans instead of committipg 
themselves to long range investments at home. 
Recommendations of this body implying a higher price tag should be 
made in knowledge of this. Hopefully your reaction will be to recommend a 
longer range commitment to helping solve these basic social problems which 
have plagued Central America continually in its 160 years of independence. 
Social Reform Is The Real War 
Design and management of social development and humanitarian programs 
is risky business. Wars and major conflicts continue to be fought over 
social reform issues among liberals and the conservatives in the Isthmus. 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua never really settled their philosophic differences 
while Somoza was in power. Agrarian reform arguments put forth by the 
communist government of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s must not be 
forgotten, nor the furor created by the award winning Pulitzer Prize book, 
"The Shark and the Sardines", in which Guatemala's Juan Jose Arevelo argued 
for reform for Central America as a whole. Agrarian reform will be 
discussed in greater detail by Bill Doherty of the American Institute for 
Free Labor Development, three of whose advisors were recently murdered in 
El Salvador. 
Much of the concern about human rights abuse in Central America arises 
from violent responses to social reform efforts. We have also a long list 
of Americans, Central Americans and Europeans who were threatened and 
murdered in the last 15 years (mainly in El Salvador and Guatemala) because 
of their association with social change. In 1968-9 the US Ambassador John 
Gordon Mien and his colleague the Ambassador from West Germany were both 
murdered in cold blood in Guatemala -- followed soon by the Guatemala's 
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Foreign Minister Fuentes Mohr who was the leading expert on the ~ommon 
Market and, along with Guatemalan socialist philosopher Colom Argeta, one 
of the most outspoken proponents for social change. US and other foreign 
clergy, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, who were actively involved in 
social change, were fingered as Communists, murdered, ailed, or if lucky 
they got out. We heard of the recent dastardly murder of El Salvador's 
Archbishop Romero and a group of US nuns. These are only the tip of the 
iceberg. We must not be blind to the high likelihood of continued violent 
reaction to social development programs by entrenched interests. You will 
hear about the fate of an education reformer later today from Dr. Davis. 
The story of Father Toomey, Jesuit from Loyola University, perhaps 
best describes the true risk of agents of social change. Twenty years ago, 
AID funded his training of Central American rural leaders. Students were 
first trained at Tulane Center in New Orleans, later at an AID-sponsored 
center at the Jesuit Landivar University in Guatemala. His goal was to 
stimulate change by providing "T-group" training sessions" to equip mostly 
illiterate Indians, Ladinos and compesinos to become agents of change. 
They became so successful in trying to improve conditions of the rural poor 
in Guatemala that most have since been denounced as communists, and many 
were murdered or are refugees in Mexico or in the United States. 
Are the Governments Up To Social Change? 
Speakers this afternoon will maintain that social and humanitarian 
development in Central America is not only a matter of dollars and cents 
but also a matter of will by governments and local leaders -- both good 
will and bad. If governments do not want it to happen, it won't, AID or no 
AID. Without a cadre of local leaders and grass root organizations, social 
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development is like the parable of the mustard seed falling on faJlow 
ground. 
We cannot take for granted Central American political support for 
human development. The poor frequently are politically weak. They are 
often too sick and uneducated to be politically active. 
Influential elites, particularly large landowners, may oppose human 
development if they feel it might undermine their power and status. The 
elite in Central America cutomarily maintains deplorable serf-like 
employment conditions on haciendas and plantations. A maid in her early 
teens with 1-2 illegitimate children sometimes is kept in the household 
working from sunrise to late evening. 
Without public and private sector support for real change (as distinct 
from a facade), results will be minor and not worth either the effort or 
taxpayers' money. This is the most critical issue which must be addressed. 
We Must Question Our Assistance Delivery System 
It has been recommended to me by development practitioners who served 
or are serving in Latin America that it is urgent reintroduce to Central 
America a system created by Nelson Rockefeller in the mid-1940s and in 
effect until the 1950s. AID's predecessor agency "The Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs", replaced by the Alliance for Progress in the early 
1960s, introduced a "Servicio System" as an apolitical organization through 
which external donors together with country nationals managed development 
organizations in health, education and housing (and in some cases access 
roads). Contributions made to a Servicio central fund were managed jointly 
by donor and host country nationals -- a system which reduced opportunities 
for corruption and also contributed significantly to training a cadre of 
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local development administrators. Exmination of the backgrounds ~f Latin 
Americans in technical and management ranks of the Inter-American Bank and 
the World Bank reveals that most began their careers in this early Servicio 
System. A brief background paper on the Servicio System is attached for 
your review. 
For today's conditions, the Servicio structure might well be adapted 
resemble the more collaborative model of the OECD in Europe. It should 
continue to be run by both those who contribute and those who carry out the 
activities (as distinct from governments). It should assure an orientation 
to the Central American Common Market. However structured, delivery 
systems for social and humanitarian assistance to the region should be 
designed so that most will be used for its intended purpose. 
Optimal social development assistance delivery requires clear analysis 
of the current system of government-to-government assistance currently 
carried out by the major aid-giving insitutions, and of whether there is an 
alternative. Some options are regional in scope; some must out of 
necessity be carried out on a country-by-country basis. It is perhaps best 
that recommendations be deferred until all of the invited experts have 
shared their views with you. 
Before any new programs are recommended, the Commission should assure 
itself that we can bring assistance programs directly down to the people. 
Cold analytical loan programs often provide lip-service that they are 
destined for the end-user, but the reality is that many pass through heavy 
filters of governments where long delays and leakages occur. 
There are bound to be other ideas and they should be welcomed. The 
message here is that the current system is not working well. 
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* * * 
Other Witnesses 
Let me briefly introduce our speakers this afternoon. You have had a 
good deal of briefing material from government sources. We find that 
comments from private sector experts on social and humanitarian development 
give another perspective. I should add that all of these experts are 
serving on a voluntary basis at no cost to the Commission or the US 
government. 
Dr. Loy Bilderdack, a demographer well-known for his work on Central 
America, is Professor at the School of Social Science at California State 
University at Fresno. He will provide us with some insights into Central 
America's major issues. 
Dr. Nevin Skrimshaw is a respected international expert in nutrition 
and currently on the MIT faculty. He will draw on a wealth of Central 
American experience, having spent many years in the creation, research and 
management of the Central American Nutrition Institute (INCAP). 
Dr. Russell Davis has also come down from Boston today where he is a 
professor of education and development, a research scholar, and a Senior 
Faculty Representative to the Harvard University Institute in International 
Development. Dr. Davis is an internationally known and respected author, 
lecturer and advisor in education with a great deal of Central American 
experience. He knows most if not all of the actors involved. He also 
played a role i.n the creation of the Central American Council of Unversity 
Rectors in the early days of Economic Integration in the Central America. 
Shifting to the role that the private sector has played and can play 
in social and economic development, presentations will be made by two 
witnesses: 
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We will hear from Mr. L. Ronald Scheman, Assistant Secretary for 
Management of the Organization of American States, who twenty years ago had 
the vision to create the National Development Foundations concept and 
launch a program for their creation across Latin America. He will have 
interesting things to say on these foundations' work in mobilizing private 
sector support for development and in helping small producers in the 
private sectors of Central America, also drawing on his recent trip to 
Nicaragua, Honduras and Belize. 
Mr. Leveo Sanchez, Chairman of Development Associates, Inc., has had 
long personal, professional, and Peace Corps association with Central 
America. His consulting firm is currently very active in the region, also 
elsewhere in the US and the world. His perspective too is somewhat unique. 
Tomorrow, two sessions will deal with agrarian reform and labor union 
development, both presented by Bill Doherty, Director of the Latin American 
Institute for Free Labor Development. Mr. Doherty is perhaps one of the 
most astute observers of the international labor scene in Latin America, 
bringing some rather unique social insights. 
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THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS ANB PROPOSALS 
ALAN STOGA 
I. Introduction 
Extremely weak economic conditions prevail throughout central America today, 
reflecting the difficult international economic environment of the past 
several years, the effects of political instability ana the consequences at 
poor domestic economic management. Economic and political stability are 
intertwinea: without a reduction in the levels of violence, economic recovery 
is almost impossible; without economic growth, the social and political 
pressures underlying the tensions in the region will inevitably increase. 
The United States has an essential interest in helping the central Pmericans 
solve this dilemma. Current conditions are unstable: they must either 
improve or deteriorate. Further deterioration would inevitably spread the 
political ana economic turmoil which engulfs Nicaragua ana El Sal vaaor to the 
rest of the region, including Panama. 
This paper seeks to describe current economic conditions, highlighting the key 
causes of the economic crisis. The conclusion is that, without a large-scale 
program of foreign financial assistance in support of a sustained effort by 
the cental Pmerican countries to restructure their economies, the vicious 
circle of economic and political crisis will continue. 
Breaking out of the circle will require a multilateral, multiyear program to 
reconstruct the economies of Central America. The program assumes that such 
an effort would have to address social and political problems simultaneously 
to have any real prospects for success. As a result, the program of expanaea 
financial assistance for the region proposed in this paper, to be funded by 
the United States in conjunction with other creaitor countries ana 
international financial institutions, is designed to achieve broad goals of 
economic stabilization, economic reform and political, social and economic 
development. 
The price tag will be high. The region as a whole woula require some $24 
billion in new money to finance an economic reconstruction program aesignea to 
recreate the conditions for sustainable growth. Such a program would aim at 
achieving the same level of per capita real income in 1990 as existed at the 
beginning of the decade. The United States would have to provioe up to halt' 
of this, a significant increase in the already high level of assistance whicn 
is now being made available. 
However, in the long run, the cost of the alternative woulo be even higher. 
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II. Economic Conditions* 
Central America has been badly affected by the international economic and 
financial crisis of the past several years. Adverse external conditions, 
compounded by poor management and structural economic weaknesses, have 
produced high inflation, economic stagnation, and debt service problems 
throughout the region. Although individual country experiences have differed, 
the same general pattern has prevailed: since 1979 the economies of the 
Central America have tended to stagnate or contract (Table 1). 
Table 1. Changes in Real GOP 
(Percent) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
Costa Rica 4.9 0.8 -4.6 -8.8 
El Salvador -1.7 -9.0 -9.5 -5.4 
Guatemala 4.7 3.7 0.9 -3.5 
Honduras 6.2 2.9 0.2 -1.2 
Nicaragua -26.4 10.0 8.5 -1.4 
Panama 4.5 6.0 4.3 4.1 
Changes in economic growth per capita have been even weaker in recent years 
(Table 2). However, during the years between 1960 and 1975, per capita growth 
was quite strong, reflecting the dynamism of the world economy and the 
positive effects of sharply increased regional trade under the auspices of the 
Central American Common Market (CACM). (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua formed a trade and payments union in 1960.) The most 
dymanic sector was generally manufacturing, propelled by the expanded market 
and industrial development policies created as part of the economic 
integration process. Economic activity declined sharply in Nicaragua 
(reflecting the effects of the massive earthquake and the struggle to 
overthrow President Somoza) and El Salvador after 1975. During 1980-82, 
economic activity in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras declined 
in per capita terms. Only Panama was able to maintain its economic growth 
momentum, at least through 1982; however, in 1983 real economic activity is 
reportedly declining in Panama as well. The result of the decline in activity 
has been dramatic: in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras the absolute levels 
of real per capita income in 1982 barely equalled that of 1976. In El 
Salvador and Nicaragua real per capita income had fallen to the levels of the 
early 1960s. 
* Data in this paper are drawn from International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, U.S. Government, the Bank for 
International Settlements, Economic Commission for Latin America, and 
national sources. These data often conflict and are partially estimated; 
the data which have been used are judged to be the most accurate 
information available. 
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Table 2. Changes in Per Capita Real GOP 
(Annual average percent) 































The population of the Central American isthmus nearly doubled from 1960 to 
1981, from 12 to 23 million (Table 3). Close to one-third of the region's 
population lives in Guatemala and none of the other countries has more than 5 
million people. Between the 1960s and 1970s, population growth rates slowed 
significantly only in Costa Rica and Panama. Overall, the regional growth 
rate remained around 3%, among the highest in the world, reflecting dramatic 
acceleration in population growth in Nicaragua and Honduras. The primary 
factor in the rapid population growth has been a sharp drop in mortality (life 
expectancy in the region rose from 50 years to 62 years between 1960 and 
1981), while birth rates have declined only modestly. 
Table 3. Population 
Population 
at Mid-year Population Growth Rates 
(millions) (percent) 
l96oa 1981 1960-1970 1970-1981 1980-20000 
Costa Rica 1.2 2.3 3.4 2.8 2.1 
El Salvador 2.6 4.7 2.9 2.9 2.8 
Guatemala 4.0 7.5 3.0 3.1 2.6 
Honduras 1.9 3.8 3.1. 3.4 3.1 
Nicaragua 1.4 2.8 2.6 3.9 2.9 
Panama 1.1 1.9 2.9 2.3 2.1 
Total or Average 12.3 22.8 3.0 3.0 2.7 
a Extrapolations based on the growth rate trends reported in this table. 
b Projected. 
The region's population will continue to increase dramatically for years 
because of the large numbers of young mothers already born, even if fertility 
rates begin to come down rapidly. Current projections are for a regional 
population of 30 million in the year 2000, with population growth averaging 
2.7% per year. At that rate, the population would double in 26 years. 
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The rapidly growing populations have resulted in age structures heavily 
weighted toward dependent age groups (particularly persons under 15 years at 
age), placing considerable pressure on governments to increase spenaing for 
education, health, and other social services. Where population density is 
high, there are also pressures on the land which result in environmental 
deterioration, rural landlessness and near lanalessness, and rural-to-urban 
migration. Population density is especially hign in El Salvaaor: 224 persons 
per square kilometer (580 per square mile), more than three times the figure 
for any other country in the region. In part, this renects consiaerable 
migration of Salvadorans across the 1-bnduran boraer which was a major factor 
in the Honduran-Salvadoran war of 1960. Population aensity is also nigh in 
the Guatemalan highlands, though this is masked by a national figure which 
includes large stretches of sparsely populated (ana not very fertile) lana. 
Another tendency shared by all of these countries has been the steady growth 
of the external sector in both absolute ana relative terms. Exports increased 
more than eleven times between 1960 and 1980 when total export value peaked, 
while the share of exports in the region's total output rose from 19 percent 
in 1960 to 31 percent in 1980. At the same time, intra-Central American trade 
grew rapidly, eventually accounting for about 25 percent of total trade. 
Despite the increase in manufacturing output in all of the countries, they 
have remained predominantly exporters of primary agricultural products 
especially to countries outside the region. About all of the value of El 
Salvador's extra-regional exports in 1980 were primary products; among the 
five member countries of the CAQv1, the share is lowest for Guatemala, at 75 
percent. Excluaing re-exports, Panama's exports are roughly 70 percent 
primary products. 
Thus, the pattern of export-lea growth which cnaracteriz.ea economic 
development in the 1960s ana 1970s resulted in economies that are oath 
interdependent--an economic shock in one country affects all--ana nighly 
sensitive to developments in the world economy. Moreover, tnis pattern of 
economic aevelopment, which reliea heavily on proauct1on ana export of primary 
commodities, has tended to reinforce traditional political and social 
organizational structures, although a miaale class began to develop in several 
countries. 
The differences among the Central American econom1es are almost as important 
as the similarities. Per capita GNP ranges between $600 in Honduras to $1900 
in Panama. Population growth varies from arouna 2. 3% in Panama to 3. 9% in 
Nicaragua; El Salvador, whose population of almost five million is increasing 
2. 9% annually, faces the most serious population pressures on its land and 
resource base. Income within these countries is typically unequally 
distributed, although the patterns of distribution differ signit'icantly among 
countries. The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) has estimated 
that at the end of the 1970s the 20 percent of indiviauals with tne highest 
incomes captured between 49 percent (Costa Rica) and 66 percent (E1 Salvador) 
of total income, while the bottom 50 percent of individuals received between 
21 percent (Costa Rica) and 12 percent (El Salvador). Moreover, the available 
evidence indicates that the gaps between the richest and poorest nave tended 
to widen over time. In Guatemala and Costa Rica, the real per capita income 
of the poorest 20% of the population actually fell between 1970 ana 1980. At 
the same time, the share of income going to the emerging miadle class has 
tended to increase in most of the countries of the region. 
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ECLA has estimated that of the more than 20 million people living in Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1980, some 13.2 
million were impoverished in the sense that their incomes did not cover basic 
human needs. More than 8. 5 million lacked sufficient income to purchase a 
nutritionally adequate diet. This extreme poverty is worse in rural areas 
than urban areas and differs between countries. For example, in costa Rica 
one-quarter of the population was estimated to be impoverished, compared to 
almost three-quarters in Guatemala. In general, poverty is more widespread in 
rural than urban areas: urban areas, accounting for 40}6 of the population, 
contained 28% of the poor. 
Table 4. Central America: Estimated Incidence of Poverty* 
(millions) 
Total Urban Rural 
Impoverished 13.2 3.7 9.4 
Extreme poverty 8.7 2.1 6.5 
Basic Needs not satisfied 4.5 1.6 2.9 
Not impoverished 7.5 4.6 2.9 
Total 20.7 8.3 12.4 
*Data compiled in late 1970s by ECLA, Central American Basic Neeas Project. 
This urban/rural split reflects the economic structure of the region: 
agriculture remains the largest single sector in each country except Panama. 
Agriculture accounts for between 20% (Nicaragua) and 32% (Honduras) of 
national output in the CACM countries, but only 10% in Panama which has a much 
larger service sector. Moreover, agriculture accounts for an even larger 
share of the labor force: the share is unaer 50% only in Costa Rica (29%) ana 
Panama (27%). Labor productivity in agriculture is low and many farmers are 
engaged in subsistence production except during the harvesting of cash crops. 
The result is low farm incomes and high levels of poverty. 
Rural underemployment is pervasive, reaching 50% in some countries. One cause 
is the skewed distribution of land holdings; between 40% and 80% of farms in 
the various Central American countries have less than 12.5 acres of productive 
land and many have less. Such small farms produce much less than full-time 
employment. In addition, limited access to agricultural land is another cause 
of rural poverty. In the region as a whole, an estimated 3(]}6 of the rural 
labor force depend entirely on employment, typically on a seasonal oasis. 
Finally, agricultural production has grown slowly over the past decade, 
limiting the development of new employment opportunities. 
The inevitable consequences of widespread poverty are poor health, nutrition, 
and social conditions. Mortality rates for infants ana chilaren are higher in 
Central America than in the rest of the remisphere, although significant 
improvements have been realizea over the past two decaaes. Communicable 
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diseases are the major cause of death and disability in the region, reflecting 
the relative lack of access to adequate health care. At the same time, 
malnutrition continues to be a serious problem. In Guatemala, Honauras, and 
El Salvador, between 30l6 and 65% of all households consume fewer tnan the 
minimum daily caloric requirements; in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama 
nutritional deprivaton is less serious. The quality and availability of 
education also differ significantly across the region. Panama, Costa Rica ana 
Nicaragua have high relatively levels of adult literacy. Literacy averages 
under 60Yo for the other three countries with sharp differences between urban 
and rural literacy rates. 
Economic contraction over the past several years has almost certainly leo to 
higher levels of unemployment and under-employment, ana increased poverty. 
Accurate measures of unemployment are unavailable. However, unemployment must 
have increased by at least the annual growth in the labor force over the past 
three years; the regional labor force grows by at least 3. 4% amually, some 
240,000 workers. In addition, the decline in economic activity has led to the 
loss of existing jobs. As a result, as much as one-quarter of the labor 
force, or around 1. 75 million people, might be unemployed today. under-
employment is undoubtedly even higher. 
Increased inflation has also been a common regional characteristic in recent 
years. The impact of higher world oil prices, accelerating inflation in the 
United States, and overly expansionary domestic economic policies proauced 
higher inflation in all countries in the 1970s. In 1980-82, inflation sharply 







Table 5. Inflation: GOP Deflator 






















In short, although the Central American countries experienced rapid economic 
growth between 1960 and the ena of the 1970s, the pattern of export-lea 
development, the unequal distribution of income, rapid population growth, low 
productivity and slow growth of production in agriculture, increasing 
inflation and high unemployment and underemployment lea to a worsening of 
living conditions for many Central Americans. By 1982, most people in the 
region were probably worse off in economic terms than they were ten or fifteen 
years earlier. 
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III. causes of the Current Crisis 
The economic crisis thoughout the region can be tracea to several factors: 
1. High oil prices, prolonged world recession, and weak demand/prices far 
commodity exports. 
All of the countries in the region were badly affectea by the sharp rise in 
oil prices during the 1970s. Oil imports in 1981, after the second rouna 
of price rises and before the collapse of Central America's exports, were 
equal to more than one-fifth of export revenues. 
Moreover, slack world demand for Central America's key export products 
(coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat) coupled with inflation-driven 
increases in prices of their imports led to a drastic deterioration of the 
region's terms of trade (the relationship between their export and import 
prices). Between 1977 and 1982 the terms of trade fell 41%. This means 
that the countries would have to sell 41% more in volume terms in order to 
maintain the level of export earnings. However, at the same time oemana 
for central America's exports was also falling. As a result, exports fell 
dramatically during 1980-1982; for the region as a whole, exports aropped 
2(m. 
Table 6. Trade Performance, 1960-1982 
(Average annual percent) 
1960-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1982 
Casta Rica 
Exports 10.3 16.4 15.2 -6.5 
Imports 11.2 16.9 17.0 -25.0 
El Salvador 
Exports 8.7 17.7 12.7 -19.3 
Imports 4.7 23.1 10.5 -4.2 
Guatemala 
Exports 9.9 16.6 18.9 -11.1 
Imports 7.9 20.3 17.0 -6.8 
Honduras 
Exports 10.9 11.7 21.9 -10.8 
Imports 12.2 12.9 20.7 -15.7 
~· 
Nicaragua 
Exports 10.8 15.9 3.7 -4.0 
Imports 12.3 21.9 10.7 -5.3 
Panama 
Exports 12.8 20.5 2.5 -7.6 
Imports 11.7 20.0 10.3 5.3 
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Since each of these countries has a relatively open economy in which 
exports of goods and nonfactor services account for 25 to 40 percent of 
GOP, the shortfall in export earnings reduced the ability to import raw 
materials, spare parts, and other capital and consumer goods, contributing 
to the economic slowdown (Table 6). ECLA has estimated that, if the 
region's 1977 export purchasing power hao been maintained, economic 
activity would have been approximately 2% higher in 1982. 
2. Intra-regional tensions and political unrest. 
The conflict between El Salvador and 1-bnouras in 1969 adversely affecteo 
cooperation among the CACM countries ana began a process which gradually 
undermined the dynamics of the common market. Nevertheless, intra-regional 
trade, largely in manufactured goods, continuea to grow until 1980. Since 
1980 political unrest in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala and the 
financial problems of all the CACM countries leo to a sharp oecline in 
intra-regional traoe: the value of such trade fell by almost one-thiro 
between 1980 and 1982. This collapse of intra-CACM trade--in part because 
of the accumulation of serious trade imbalances between Costa Rica and 
Guatemala with surplusses on tne one hana, and Nicaragua, El Salvaoor, and 
Honduras with deficits on the other--contributed to the region-wide 
economic contraction. 
Another economic consequence of political conflict, besioes the oestruction 
of economic infrastructure, has been commercial bank and investor 
retrenchment. Private sector confioence, both in and outside Central 
America, has been shaken; domestic and foreign investment has declined and 
capital flight has been substantial. Although accurate measurements of 
capital flight are unavailable, balance of payments data imply that some 
$2.5 to $3.0 billion in private capital flowea out of the six countries 
between 1979 and 1982. Investment has fallen in all of the countries. 
This reduction, refecting a sharp drop in savings because of both political 
and economic turmoil, has seriously undermined the prospects for future 
growth. 
3. Weak economic management. 
The Central American countries hao traaitionally been characterized by 
relatively sound economic management. However, these countries shifteo 
policies after the second oil shock, the sharp increase in interest rates 
and the onset of recession in the United States. Eacn of the countries 
increased public sector spenoing in an attempt to sustain domestic economic 
activity, and failed to raise taxes. Fiscal revenues as a share of gross 
domestic product amounted to 9.3% in 1960, 9.7% in 1970 and 11.4% in 1980 
for the regional as a whole. These levels are low compared to other 
countries of similar economic and social structure; in combination witn the 
unequal distribution of income, they suggest that the small groups in each 
country which controlled large concentrations of income and wealth were 
able to prevent their governments from imposing higher taxes. 
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By contrast, public sector spending began r1s1ng rapidly in the late 
1970s. The percentage of central government expenditures in national 
product rose from 11.2% in 1960 to 11.6% in 1970 ana to 19.3% in 1980. The 
results were larger public sector deficits which lea to higher innation 
(especially in Costa Rica where consumer prices rose on average 90% per 
year in 1980-82) and increaseo foreign aebt (especially in Costa Rica ana 
Panama). In 1980-82 consumer price inflation in the region averaged 23%, 
despite the contraction in economic activity, and between 1975 ana 1982, 
the external debt of the region increased 2401o. 
4. Commercial bank retrenchment. 
With the beginning of the international financial crisis in 1982, the 
Central American countries lost their limited access to the international 
commercial banking market. Trade finance lines were cut and public and 
private sector borrowers were unable to raise new funds. To some extent, 
this reinforced the drop in imports and the decline in economic activity, 
even though increased official assistance more than offset the decline in 
commercial bank credits. 
The legacy of these developments has been economic stagnation--with attendant 
widespread unemployment and declining real incomes--ana a significant 
accumulation of external debt. The size of the aebt ana the buraen of 
servicing this debt, relative to foreign exchange earnings, are highest in 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, ana Panama (Table 7). 
Total disbursed debt of the five CACM countries was estimated at $11.0 billion 
at the end of last year; including Panama, the aebt total for the region was 
$14 billion. (These figures probably underestimate short term and private 
sector indebtedness as well as interest arrears.) About 40% of this aebt has 
been borrowed from commercial banks. 
Table 7. External Debt 
Total Debt Debt/GJP Debt 
(end 1982) (%) Service Ratio* 
Costa Rica $3. 6 billion 142 57 
El Salvador 1.2 33 8 
Guatemala 2.0 22 9 
Honduras 1.7 59 21 
Nicaragua 2.5 96 37 
Panama 3.1** 74 31 
Latin America 300.0 27 54 
* Scheduled interest and amortization as % of merchandise exports ana 
non-factor service earnings. 
** Public debt only. 
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Although debt service burdens are less than those of other countries in the 
Western Hemisphere, all of the countries in Central America are having 
difficulty maintaining timely debt service payments. Costa Rica, and Panama 
are currently restructuring their external debt. Nicaragua is presently in 
arrears on debt which was restructured in 1980 and 1981. Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador are also having difficulty meeting debt payments. 
Faced with these conditions, all of the Central American countries--except 
Nicaragua--have adopted IMF sanctioned stabilization programs. The programs 
aim at reducing public sector deficits and slowing rapid money supply growth 
in order to reduce inflation, while at the same time stabilizing the balance 
of payments. There have already been some successes: inflation nas fallen 
sharply in all of the countries; in Costa Rica, where inflation was 9070 last 
year, prices rose at an annual rate of 2G'o in the first half of· 1983. 
IV. The Economic Outlook 
In the near term, the outlook is for continuea economic decline at least 
through 1984. Until the international economic and financial environment 
improves, the regional economies cannot recover; similarly, unless political 
conditions in the region are stabilizea, there will be no halt to the economic 
decline. 
Despite the industrialization of the past two decades, which was largely aimed 
at the regional market, the health of the Central American economy basically 
depends on international commodity prices ana demand. Around 7070 of the 
extra-regional exports of the six Central American countries are accounted for 
by six commodities: coffee, bananas, cotton, meat, shrimp, and sugar. Prices 
of these commodities have not performed well; in particular, coffee and sugar 
seem to be in structural oversupply. Thus, the terms of trade and, 
ultimately, the earnings of the region have not yet benefitted from economic 
recovery in the United States. As a result, imports and economic activity are 
constrained by the limited availability of foreign finance and the need to 
devote foreign exchange to debt service. 
More generally, the region's external performance--and, hence, domestic 
economic activity--will be largely aeterminea by the aevelopments in three key 
variables: dollar interest rates, oil prices and commodity prices. The 
sensitivity of the balance of payments to these variables can be easily 
summarized. Because of the large share of generally fixed interest rate ana 
lower cost official finance in the region's total foreign aebt, a one 
percentage point rise in average interest rates costs Central American 
countries about $60 million per year. A 1070 rise in oil prices costs some 
$100 million. However, a lO'k rise in the prices of the region's commoaity 
exports would produce aoaed annual revenues of at least $350 to $400 million 
for the six countries as a group. 
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The importance of these key variables should not be underestimated; in both 
the short ana medium run, their performance wlll largely aetermine the 
external financial needs of the countries. A heal thy world economy 
characterized by moderately increasing prices for the region's main commodity 
exports, stable or lower interest rates, and stagnant or aeclining oil prices 
would considerably ease the balance of payments problem ana exert a positive 
influence on economic activity. 
Nevertheless, over the next several years economic activity will remain 
depressed unless there is a sharp increase in foreign financial inflows. 
These countries need capital inflows to finance new investments, to rebuild 
their productive capacity, to replace damaged infrastructure and to maintain 
debt service, which is essential to restoring international financial 
credibility. In the short and medium run, the bulk of new financing will come 
from official sources, since private investors ana foreign banks are generally 
unwilling to increase their investments or loans. For example, last year new 
loans from commercial banks covereo only about 13% of the region's net 
financing requirement (the sum of the current account deficit, reserve usage 
and estimated capital flight), comparea to about 31% in 1980. In aaaition, 
banks and other creditors proviaed involuntary financing to the extent that 
borrowers in Central America aia not pay schedulea interest (incluaea in the 
chart as "arrears"). 
Table 8: Central American Net Financing Requirement, 1982 
($ billion) 
Direct Investment ($0.2) 
Arrears ($0.6) 
Commercial Banks ($0.4) 
IMF ($0.1) 
Other ($0.2) 
U.S. Government ($0.4) 
Other Official Sources ($0.9) 
Net Requirement = $2.8 Billion 
More than half of the borrowing requirement was met by lenaing or grants from 
official sources, including the IMF, the u.s. government, ana otner official 
institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development BanK. 
Although aata are not strictly comparable, U.S. non-military financial 
assistance (including development assistance, Economic Support Funas, PL480 
ana CCC guarantees) of some $370 million accounted for about l3:to of the 
region's financial needs last year. Combined Venezuelan ana Mexican 
assistance, through a program of concessional loans ana grants to finance oil 
imports (included in the chart as part of "other official sources") totallea 
around $200 million. 
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If official capital flows remain at current levels in real terms through the 
rest of the decade, if private capital flows remain aepressed for several 
years before increasing modestly, if the international economic environment 
gradually improves, if prudent economic policies are consistently implemented, 
and if political stability returns, the economies of Central Pmerica will 
gradually recover. Economic activity might begin to increase after 1984. 
However, the decline has been so dramatic over the past several years and the 
underlying social problems are so great that, unoer the assumptions outlined 
above, economic activity (measured in terms of real GOP per capita) would 
probably reach only three-quarters of the 1980 level by 1990. This would be 
insufficient to prevent a further increase in unemployment or to reouce 
poverty unless the patterns of income distribution are radically changea. 
Reactivation of the regional economy under the conditions which exist tooay 
will have to be export-leo. Government spenoing is being reaucea ana private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, is likely to remain weak for political, 
financial, ana economic reasons. Thus, exports will lead; in the near-term 
that principally means increased traditional agricultural exports--which 
largely depend on improved commodity prices and oemano--ana development of 
non-traditional exports based on agricultural processirg. At the same time, 
improved intra-regional traae coula proviae some qu1ck growth benefits as long 
as all countries are able to sustain their regional commitments. 
Over the medium term, even to reach the moaest level of economic activity 
described above, Central American countries will have to aevote scarce 
resources to developing new export-oriented industries aimed at the 
extra-regional market. The incentives available under Caribbean Basin 
Initiative should encourage increased domestic and foreign investment, but 
unless there is a sharp increase in the availability of net foreign resources, 
higher levels of investment will require higher levels of domestic savings. 
In an environment where consumption has already been under severe pressure, 
and where efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of income are 
necessary for social stability, increased savings will be difficult to 
generate. 
V. A Financial Assistance Program 
The United States has profound interests in stimulating economic recovery, 
social progress, and political reform in Central Pmerica. The countries of 
the region lack the resources to halt the rapid aeter1oration which threatens 
to engulf all the countries of the region. Without a concentratea, 
large-scale effort to stabilize economic conaitions, the mutually reinforcing 
circle of economic and political crisis will accelerate. At the same time, 
political and social change are necessary pre-conaitions for a successful 
economic program--and are integral to long-run u.S. interests. Moreover, a 
successful program must be multilateral, flexible, ana ambitious enough to 
engage the public and private sector in a sustained effort, which is essential 
to helping the Central Pmericans solve their problems. 
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Principles 
An expanded program of economic assistance should be designed to achieve 
broad goals of economic stabilization, economic reform, and political, 
social, and economic development. 
The program should be available to all countries on the Central American 
isthmus. However, credible economic and political development goals and 
policies should be an essential requirement for access to financial 
assistance. 
The program should distinguish between the short and medium run. In the 
very short run, the goal should be to prevent economic collapse of the 
region; in the medium run, renewed economic growth is possible. Most 
importantly, the program should lay the groundwork for a return to rates 
of per capita growth which are sufficient to raise people's standards of 
living; this means that a key element will be to improve the distribution 
of income throughout the region. 
The program should be multilateral, involving other creditor countries as 
much as possible. 
The program should be supportive of Central American originated 
initiatives and, at least in the short run, should aim at reinvigorating 
the Central American Common Market. 
The program should encourage foreign private sector participation, but 
not be dependent upon it. 
The program should facilitate structural adjustment efforts in 
conjunction with the programs of the international financial institutions. 
The program should recognize that the region 1 s needs for extraordinary 
assistance will continue for many years, even though the principal 
economic objective will be to help the Central Americans achieve a 
sustainable growth dynamic by the end of the decade. 
Structure 
Extraordinary financial assistance linked to the achievement of economic, 
social and political goals should be channeled through a new multilateral 
structure to be established jointly with the Central Americans. The Central 
American Development Organization (CADO) would initially include the six 
countries of the Central American isthmus, the United States and any other 
country in the Hemisphere capable of making a significant political or 
economic contribution (e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Canada and Colombia). 
Nicaragua would be encouraged to participate as part of an effort to engage 
that country in a broad based policy dialogue; Nicaragua 1 s--or any other 
countries'--access to funds would be conditioned on mutually agreed and 
monitored political, social and economic progress. 
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Economic growth which is not accompanied by greater social equity ana enhancea 
political participation will not produce peaceful change in Central America. 
Goals for progress in health care, education, housing, and the fulfillment of 
basic human needs would be essential elements of the program for all the 
countries. Each of the participating countries would also make a firm 
commitment to political pluralism, freedom of expression, respect for human 
rights, and the right of their people to choose their destiny free from 
repression or coercion. Progress towards these goals would be an essential 
condition for future economic assistance through CADO. 
Such an organization would promote continuing high level attention to the 
problems of the region and encourage cooperative (and, hopefully, well funded) 
efforts to address them. The essential functions of CADO would be to mobilize 
external financial assistance; to assist the Central American countries in 
defining and attaining social, political and economic development goals; to 
regularize (and, to an extent, routinize) contacts among key U.S. ano regional 
leaders; and, ultimately, to provide a framework within which regional 
political and development problems can be aadressea cooperatively. The 
organization would not preclude or downgrade bilateral contacts, but would ada 
a multilateral dimension to U.S.-Central American relations. 
The key policy making boay would be a Political council that meets 
semi-annually with representation at the Foreign ana Finance i'<linister levels 
of each member country. The COuncil's chairmanship--ana perhaps its 
venue--would rotate among member countries. Its principal auties would be: 
0 To provide a regular forum for discussion of regional political, 
economic, traae and social issues; 
0 To determine the parameters of action for the Economic 
Consultative Group (ECG) and the Development Council (DC or Wise 
Men's Group); 
0 To review issues referred by these groups or member states; 
0 To oversee the CADO budget; and 
0 To appoint an Executive Secretary who would be responsible for 
day-to-day management of the organization. 
The Executive Secretary would be a Central American of considerable stature, 
with broad experierce in regional organizations as well 1n his own 
government. f-le would be a principal focal point of the activities of CADO, 
especially in the initial years, and would be an ex-officio member of both the 
Wise Men's Group and the Economic Consultative Group. However, by aesign, his 
Secretariat would be very small with almost no professional staff; its purpose 
would be to organize meetings, communicate policy decisions, and attend to 
administrative issues. 
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The two other main substantive boaies would be the Economic Consultative Group 
and the Development Council or Wise Men's Group. The ECG would be modeled on 
existing World Bank led consultative group mechanisms. Chaired by the World 
Bank, with participation by the IMF, IBD, the six Central American countries 
and all potential donors, the ECG woulo be the basic vehicle for assessing 
national economic (and investment) programs. Working papers would be prepared 
by the international agencies--there woula be no group of in-house economists 
--who would be responsible for preparing an annual analysis of each country's 
economic performance and policies, as well as its overall foreign exchange 
needs. National development plans for the short and medium term would be 
prepared by the countries themselves, in consultation with the donor countries 
and international agencies. A key role of the ECG would be to develop a 
regional development program ana to assure consistency of national development 
plans; in this capacity the ECG would work closely with the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration ana other CACM institutions. 
The ECG would annually review each country's development program. These 
plans, and their evaluation oy the economists of the IBRD, IMF ana IBD, woula 
form the basis for aid pleaging sessions, attenaed by appropriate donor 
countries. A regional meeting woula also be hela annually, at the completion 
of the bilateral pledging cycle. (For convenience, all of these meetings 
could be held at the same time as recently occurrea in Brussels for Central 
America and regularly occurs for the Caribbean countries.) 
The work of the ECG would have to be carefully coordinated with that of the 
Wise Men's Group. The Wise Men would be responsible for defining political 
and social development goals for each Central American country and for 
reviewing progress toward specified goals. The quality of its membership 
would be crucial to the success of the whole CADO initiative; without highly 
respected members of considerable integrity and stature, CADO would fail. 
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Each of the six central Pmerican countries ana the U.S. would be eligible to 
nominate one member of the Development Council; two aaai tional memoers woula 
be appointed by other member countries on a rotating basis. There woula be no 
requirement that countries nominate their own nationals, although tnat woula 
undoubtedly be the tendency. 
Like the ECG, this group woula review each country's performance annually and 
judge its progress vis-a-vis defined political and social targets. f-bwever, 
since there is no international agency capable or willing to evaluate social 
and political conditions, the Wise Men would receive evaluations from ad hoc 
working groups of experts nominated by the member countries themselves. Each 
of these working groups would be made up of representatives from the u.s., 
three of the six Central American countries, and one of the other member 
countries. These five man teams, consisting of representatives of the public 
or private sectors, would prepare their reports after brief country visits, if 
necessary, and with reference to any testimony prepared by member states or 
other interested parties. 
The Wise Men would not be obligated to accept the finaings of the experts, 
since they are ultimately responsible for the aetermination of country's 
political ana social progress. If, on balance, they concluaea that a country 
was fundamentally out of compliance with its political ana social program, 
donor countries woula be expectea to moaify tneir aid programs accoraingly. 
In the case of U.S. financial assistance, Congressional and popular reaction 
to the decisions of the Wise Men woula /probably assure tneir potency. 
However, since the deliberations of neither the Wise Men nor the ECG would be 
binding, creditors would retain a substantial aegree of freeoom to aetermine 
the pace of their own aid disbursements. 
More generally, although economic assistance woula oe channelea tnrougn U1e 
ECG, creditors would retain ultimate control over the size, composition ana 
distribution of their assistance programs. Nevertheless, there woula be an 
expectation that bilateral creditors, especially the u.s., would work in 
concert with the multilateral group. In aaoition, bilateral creditors woula 
be asked to define the amount of assistance they expect to make available over 
a five year period. If the U.S. were unable to make such a multi-year 
budgetary commitment, the Congress could pass a joint resolution, at the 
initiative of the President, indicating the magnitude of expected aia 
disbursements over five years. (Ideally, this commitment would be regularly 
renewed to add additional years.) 
A crucial element of the CADO structure should be an active advisory role for 
the private sector. This is especially important on the economic side since 
the ECG would be an entirely official booy. (Wise Men coulo--and probably 
would--be drawn from the private as well as the public sectors.) Thus, an 
Aavisory Council including Central American and foreign business ana labor 
representation should be established parallel to the Consultative Group. Its 
basic purpose woula be to aavise regional ana national author1ties on country 
development programs and to engage the private sector in the effort to 
reactivate the regional economy. The Executive Secretary woula be responsiole 
for appointing two or three co-chairmen (perhaps one labor representative, one 
foreign businessman ana one local businessman) who woula serve staggerea 
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terms. They would define the membership and, to a great extent, the goals of 
the Advisory Council. Two important additional functions would be to promote 
dialogue among business and labor leaders from member countries and to 
encourage the development of a continuous interchange on economic policy 
issues between the public and private sectors. 
In addition, each Central American country could be encouraged to establish 
parallel councils. The Investment Council of Panama, which advises the 
government on its investment program but has no authority over the 
disbursement of funds, might be an appropriate model. 
This proposal explicitly excludes security issues, although the Political 
Council could be expanded to incluae Defense Ministers ana its manaate 
enlarged to incorporate the development of a regional security pact. However, 
this could undermine the effectiveness of the organization in aaaressing 
longer term economic, social and political issues in part by making membership 
more difficult for countries outside the region. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Although the establishment of a new institutional structure along these lines 
would require considerable effort, such an initiative is probably essential to 
generate adequate political ana economic resources. A piece-meal, bilateral 
approach would inevitably fail to sustain support for what must be a long-term 
program; moreover, excessive reliance on bilateral mechanisms would complicate 
u.s. political relationships throughout the region and the 1-emisphere. An 
institution like the Central American Development Organization could provide 
the framework to help Central Americans begin to solve their deep rooted 
problems over the next decade. 
cost 
The overall cost of an emergency assistance program for Central America 
depends on a number of factors, including the international economic and 
financial environment, the political climate in the region, the posture of 
economic policy throughout the region, and the ability of national and 
regional institutions to use increasea assistance proauctively. The estlmatea 
cost of the program also depends on the goal: the higher the real growth 
target, the greater the cost. However, the relationship is not symmetrical: 
more money may not produce increased economic activity, but increased economic 
activity almost certainly requires more money. 
The ultimate goal of an expanded financial assistance program should be to 
help the Central American countries recreate the conoitions for sustainable 
economic growth. In practical terms, the program should focus on helping 
these countries to re-achieve 1980 levels of per capita income by the end of 
the decade. Because of the depth and duration of the economic decline 
throughout Central America--for the five CACM countries per capita GOP has 
declined 15% since 1977 and 10% since 1980--getting back to 1980 will be 
difficult and attainable with only an enormous, sustained effort. 
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Macroeconomic projections have been prepared for the five CACM countries ana 
for Panama through 1990. These projections are built on assumptions about the 
international and regional economic environment ana about the policy responses 
on the part of the Central American countries. They assume that the countries 
of the region consistently pursue economic policies which encourage investment 
(especially in labor intensive, export oriented indust.ries), promote price 
stability, increase labor productivity, and enhance economic efficiency. In 
other words, the projections necessarily assume that efforts to restructure 
the economies of the region, which are now being implemented in most of the 
countries, are sustained and effective. 
In aggregate, the goal of re-achieving 1980 income levels by the end of the 
decade for the six countries would produce a cumulative net financing 
requirement of around $24 billion. Excluding Nicaragua--which at least today 
would almost certainly not qualify for financial assistance on the sort of 
economic or pali tical conditions envisioned as aid criteria--the total woula 
be $21 billion. 
External Financint Requirements, 1984-1990* 
( billion) 
Costa Rica $5.1 








* Projected aggregate net financing requirements associated with 
achieving 1980 per capita GDP levels in 1990. For Panama the 
goal is to maintain 1982 per capita GNP, since through last year 
the economy continued to expana. 
These projections probably underestimate the region's financing needs by 
assuming that capital flight is eliminated after 1983, commercial ana 
financial arrears are fully capitalized, maturing public ana private dents are 
refinanced, and, most importantly, the bulk of new financial resources go to 
investment rather than consumption. None of these assumptions are likely to 
be fully realized; the overall net borrowing requirement would inevitably be 
greater. In adaition, the gross financing requirement would be larger by the 
amount of scheduled amortization, $3.2 billion for the five members of CACM 
and another $1.7 billion for Panama. These aeots wlll have to be 
restructured, which is a burden on the creditors, but aoes not represent a new 
transfer of financial resources. 
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This enormous financing requirement reflects the extremely aaverse economic 
development of the past years, the structural weakness of the Central American 
economies, the need to rebuild infrastructure in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
and the likelihood that even steady progress to develop export capacity 
through appropriate incentives ana accelerated investment will only gradually 
have a significant impact on export revenues. At the same time, these funds 
would not stimulate the projected economic recovery unless there is a sharp 
reduction in the level of violence in the region and unless the Central 
American countries themselves make a determined et'fort to restructure their 
economies. 
Most of the projected financing neea would have to be met by official 
creditors. Over the next several years commercial banks are likely to be 
reluctant to increase their exposure in Central America. However, some $4 
billion in interest payments to banks are due auring 1984 to 1990. Based on 
the refinancing proposals which are being discussed or are in place, it seems 
reasonable to assume that at least half of these amounts will be reloaneo. 
This fraction coula rise as economic performance improves. In aaaition, 
several of the countries are likely to attract some private investment flows, 
especially in the context of an improving political ana economic environment. 
Thus, official sources would probably have to provide around $18 billion. 
For the U.S. this would mean at least $10 to $12 billion over the seven years, 
assuming that World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico and 
Venezuela continue their assistance programs at roughly current levels. A 
successful effort to increase assistance from these organizations or to 
encourage European and Japanese participation would reduce the u.s. share. 
Although a significant increase in assistance is needed in the near term to 
prevent economic collapse, the bulk of the projected aid funds could be 
disbursed in later years of the program. 
One adverse consequence of such an ambitious recovery program woulo be a sharp 
increase in debt levels in all the Central American countries. Unless the 
terms on which this assistance is extendeo are highly concessional, the 
increased debt burden would permanently mortgage Central America's future, 
almost regardless of efforts to enhance export (ano, hence, debt service) 
capacity. 
Mechanisms 
Specit'ic mechanisms to fund stabilization ana development programs should be 
designed to aadress the region's particular problems; especially in the 
initial stages, incremental assistance shoula be in program rather than 
project form and should be quick disbursing. 
-- Short-term stabilization . The immediate neeo is for increased balance of 
payments assistance. AID has already programmed a significant increase 
in such assistance; however, with the unwillingness of commercial banks 
to make available short-term traae finance or to provide other credits, 
additional monies will be needed if economic activity is to be 
reinvigorated. More balance of payments assistance will allow countries 
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to begin the recovery process, but such funas should be disbursed in 
conjunction with IMF and World Bank economic stabilization efforts. For 
example, increased aid coula be used as counterpart funding for existing 
project loans where local budgetary retrenchment has undercut ongoing 
projects. 
-- Commodity earnings stabilization. Economic assistance aesignea to reauce 
the volatility of export earnings waula oe useful to ease the impact of 
cyclical downturns on the regional economy. In aaaitian, such a facility 
would be politically attractive because, like the IMF's Compensatory 
Finance Facility, it would have almost no policy conditionality. Such a 
fund could be self-liquidating aver the cycle; credits could be repaid 
during periods of rising prices to increase the availability of' monies 
for periods of price weakness. 
-- Export recovery. In the short-run, revenues from extra-regional traae 
will improve only with the recovery of commodity prices and export 
volumes, although specific u.s. ana European Community restrictions, 
especially on the impartation of sugar and textiles could be easea with 
immediate benefit. Intra-regional traae coula be improved if the 
existing debts of the countries within CACM were funded out and if 
liquidity were provided to the regional financial institutions an an 
ongoing basis (ana if improved economic policies--or administrative 
restrictions--prevented the imbalances from recurring). In aaaition, a 
trade finance facility could be established either with government funas 
or guarantees. Alternatively, a mechanism coula oe set up which woula 
purchase existing loans from commercial banks in return for the 
establishment of new traoe lines. (Banks would in effect trade ala paper 
for new paper, improving the quality of their assets, but not reducing 
their exposure. The countries waula gain much neeaea liquiaity.) 
Over the medium tenn, export expansion requires the development of 
manufactured goods exports to countries outsiae Central America. The 
Caribbean Basin Initiative incentives will help in this regara, but 
important reciprocal action is necessary on the part of the Central 
Americans. A major liberalization of tariff policies as well as a 
focused effort to reduce the impeaiments to foreign (ana for that matter, 
domestic) investment shoula be undertaken. In addition, appropriate 
economic incentives have to be maintainea ana the full ranye of export 
promotion programs and policies developed to support increased exports. 
--Regional integration. The u.s. should support efforts to revitalize the 
CACM institutions as part of its short-run assistance program. However, 
over the long-term the kind of import substitution strategy which CACM 
pursued with considerable success between 1960 ana 1975 seems unlikely to 
hold much further promise; in particular, tariff liberalization will be 
essential to developing extra-regional non-traditional exports. 
Nevertheless, there are considerable benefits in promoting regional 
financial, energy, agriculture and other sectoral initiatives; to be 
effective, these require strong regional institutions. 
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--Debt relief. Among the five CACM countries, only Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua have debt problems in the sense that debt service imposes a 
significant constraint on economic activity; Panama has a similar 
problem. The easiest way to adaress the debt issue in all the countries 
would be to provide concessional terms for public sector reschedulings, 
to convert official loans to grants, or to establish an interest subsidy 
fund. However, all of these--especially the last--woula have 
implications for non-Central American countries that would probably 
outweigh their benefits. 
-- Public/private tradeoff. A massive inflow of ot'ficial financial 
assistance will inevitably strengthen the public sector in the recipient 
countries relative to the private sector. To minimize this eft'ect, 
targetted efforts should be undertaken to encourage local businessmen, 
including: 
0 Establishment of a reconstruction fund for local businesses and banks 
which would provioe working capital as well as longer term finance on 
concessional terms. These funds woula also be available for the 
establishnent of new companies, especially in potential export sectors. 
0 Development of a small loan facility within the Export-Import BanK 
aimed specifically at providing small denominated loans or guarantees 
to finance imports from the U.S. 
0 Enlargement of existing OPIC risk guarantee programs, incluaing the 
development of a facility with u.s. participation for non-u.s. 
investment insurance. 
Investment. Investment has fallen in all of the countries ana, over the 
medium term, neeas to be restored if sustainable economic growth is to be 
realized. A key function of the Economic Consultative Group woula be to 
help develop investment programs tailored to each country . In general, 
the priorities of these programs should be: 
0 High return, export-oriented development projects; 
0 Energy projects; 
0 Human development projects, including investments in education, health 
care, water, and housing. 
These investments will have to be funaed both with increased foreign 
assistance and with higher levels of domestic savings. Increased savings 
will require approriate financial policies and incentives, which are 
crucial to sustained recovery. 
VI. Conclusion 
Ultimately, the Central American countries will have to aefine their own 
solutions to the economic, political, and social problems which threaten to 
destroy them. The role of the Unitea States and other creaitors can only be 
to provide some of the political and economic resources which these countries 
need to grow. Without outsiae assistance, the people of the region t·ace a 
grim future; with adequate support the Central Americans may gradually create 
conditions under which future generations will have better opportunities to 
benefit from balanced and sustained development. 
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SECURITY ISSUES IG U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA 
GREGORY F. TREVERTON 
This memorandum seeks to pose the critical questions, with some of 
the arguments about each. It is broken into three clusters: interests, 
threats, and issues about the role of military force or the threat of 
force. 
I. What are critical United States security interests in Central America? 
The answer is hardly obvious; different views, more often implicit than 
explicit and seldom examined, lie at the root of much of the debate. The 
tendencies ( impute grand u.s. security interests in the region, on the one 
hand, o:c to conjure "worst case" scenarios on the other, bedevils assessment 
of positive u.s. objectives and realistic dangers. Here are examples of the 
arguments: 
• u.s. security interests in Central America are broad and deep. The 
political coloration of particular regimes in the region matters to our sec-
urity. 
The region is, figuratively at least, the United States backyard. 
Hence even if specific u.s. interests are not strong, the global image of 
the United States requires it to have a considerable measure of control over 
the region. 
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-- Especially in our "neighborhood," it is important to promote democracy 
and human rights. In a region whose past is distinguished by neither (Costa 
Rica excepted), a high degree of u.s. influence is required. 
-- The Panama Canal and associated sea lines of communication are crucial 
to the United States. In the years before the ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties, some 70 per cent of cargoes passing through the Canal were en route 
to or from the United States. On the other hand, that represented only one-
sixth of total u.s. ocean trade. More important, no active-duty American 
aircraft carriers can now traverse the canal, and even with expanded naval 
comm~tments in Southwest Asia and elsewhere, movement of fleets among oceans 
is rare. 
-- Central America itself is relatively unimportant to u.s. security, but 
developments there eventually could pose a threat to interests that are 
strategic -- especially Mexico. This, frequently asserted in one form or 
another, is the central argument in support of an expanded conception of u.s. 
security interests in Central America. It is hard to evaluate. 
Pro: Mexico obviously is important enough to the United States to count 
as a ~urity interest, and venezuela is also important even if not in the same 
category as Mexico. With renewed economic growth here, Mexico could be sup-
plying a third of u.s. oil requirements by the end of the decade. Though 
current divisions among the Central American nations are sharp, ideas and 
people traditionally have moved among them. Moreover, given the precarious 
domestic situations and slender armed forces of most of the nations, they 
are extremely vulnerable to actions from outside their borders. 
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Con: The counter argument rests on two observations. (1) Most telling, 
the "dominoes" we care most about do not perceive such a "domino effect" 
threatening them, quite the contrary. }1exico remains sharply critical of 
current u.s. policy, even discounting much of Mexican rhetoric as designed 
for internal audiences. Mexicans regard their revolution as real, whatever 
its current inequities, and they welcome, probably genuinely, the prospect 
of real social and economic change in Central America. In any case, they 
believe they can cope with the consequences of change in the region, even if 
it is revolutionary and even if it brings to power regimes that label them-
selves Marxist. 
(2) Paradoxically, the effort to exert u.s. control in Central America 
is counterproductive, making it harder to achieve that control. That may be 
especially true in Central America, given the history of u.s. intervention 
and given that nationalism, long delayed, is breaking to the strrface. The 
attempt to exert u.s. control only makes the United States the obvious target 
of nationalism, and it discredits those governments the control is intended 
to assist. 
(3) A subsidiary point is that some of the specific scenarios for Mex-
ico that are painted seem relatively independent of what occurs in neighbors. 
Mexican oilfields, for example, are vulnerable to terrorist attack in any 
case. What is happening in neighboring countries makes, in most cases, only 
a marginal difference. 
• u.s. security interests are weak in Central America, more important 
in the Caribbean. 
Most obviously, there is the role of Cuba and its relation to the 
Soviet Union. Cuba has become an enormous Soviet military and intelligence 
base; in the event of a war in Europe, for the first time the United States 
would have to divert military resources to deal with a military threat in 
the Caribbean. In peacetime a substantial portion of the world's seaborne 
commerce passes through the Caribbean. 
-- Because of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the United States is 
itself a Caribbean country. u.s. facilities in the region for tracking and 
anti-submarine warfare are important though not vital. More important over 
the long term is the flow of people. Between 1970 and 1978, 17.5 per cent 
of legal immigrants to the United States came from the caribbean, as did a 
substantial portion of the illegal immigrants. By contrast, immigration from 
Central America (that is, excluding Mexico) has been small, though it can be 
expected to grow with the fighting there. 
-- Economically, the Caribbean is more important to the United States 
than Central America, though neither is very important. About half of u.s. 
oil imports from the Middle East and Africa are refined in the Caribbean, 
and about half of u.s. requirements for bauxite and alumina come from the 
region. 
• u.s. security interests in Central America and the Caribbean are 
crucial but narrow. This view, my own, draws a distinction between objec-
tive and subjective interests -- between what u.s. security requires and 
what we as a people prefer. 
What is vital is to contain Cuban and Soviet military forces, bases 
and facilities with clear military purposes. Those pose a threat to our --
and the region's -- security. By contrast, whether particular regimes in 
the region move to the "left" or "right" is a concern but a less immediately 
pressing one. 
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-- A corollary to the imperative of containing Cuban and soviet military 
power is the need to do so in ways consistent with norms of behavior we share 
with the region (like non-intervention) and which distinguish us from our ad-
versaries. Otherwise we risk needlessly embittering relations with our allies 
throughout the region, thus damaging important long-term interests. 
-- The Panama Canal is of significant but declining security interest. 
It is more important to the Latin American states themselves than to us. 
Moreover, the Canal treaties underscore that the Canal is more secure when 
responsibility for it is shared by the Latin Americans. 
_...;. "Domino effects" are unlikely. Indeed, states of the region 
especially Mexico -- fear just the opposite: that hard, military responses 
to revolution in particular countries of the region will destabilize, rather 
than stabilize, their neishbors. 
-- Growing Soviet, Cuban and East European cultural and economic cont,:<ct"' 
with tlH.> regj on Eire worrisome, but in the rrodern V.'C.'rld t.he United States can 
hardly prevent them. And whatever we think, the Latin Americans generally 
regard such contacts as a sensible diversification of their external inter-
course. The need is to distinguish those forms of Soviet and Cuban presence 
that do pose a threat in security terms. Without doubt, there are hard cases: 
witness the Grenada airport. 
2. What is the threat to u.s. security interests? 
Here, the debate too often is stylized: either the problem is all the 
Soviets and Cubans or only internal forces in particular countries. Views 
of the threat derive from conceptions of u.s. interests. 
• For those who take an expanded view of u.s. interests, almost everything 
is a threat. 
-- Even apparently benign forms of Cuban or Soviet economic presence 
are threatening because they may have an intelligence function or, more im-
portant, may be the basis for a still more threatening future presence. 
-- Leftist regimes are threatening even if they have no close Cuban con-
nection: (a) because of the possible "domino" effect on the stability of 
neighbors; or (b) because they might be receptive in the future to threat-
ening forms of Cuban or Soviet presence; or (c) because even if neither were 
the case, still the fact of left-wing or Marxist regimes will be regarded as 
a "loss" for the United States in global prestige and competition with the 
Soviet Union, especially in the "backyard." 
$ By contrast, a narrower conception of u.s. security interests leads 
to distinctions among threats. 
-- The primary security threat is Soviet and Cuban military forces, 
bases and facilities. To be sure, Marxist regimes, especially ones that 
are serious violators of human rights, are not to be desired, but they are 
of less immediate concern provided primary security interests are safe-
guarded. 
This distinction reflects three recognitions. (a) Central America 
has not in the past been distinguished by its democratic and freedom-loving 
regimes (Costa Rica again excepted); it is foolhardy to think that condition 
will change easily or quickly. (b) The United States ability to determine 
the course of internal change is limited, even in Central America. u.s. 
citizens will, as the saying has it, do anything about the region except 
pay sustained attention to it. (c) Most u.s. attempts to exert a high 
degree of control would in any case be counterproductive. They would run 
the risk of discrediting the United States and those it sought to aid. That 
is especially true given the legacy of the past u.s. association with tawdry 
regimes in the region. 
In this context the Soviet-American understandings over Cuba of 
1962, 1970 and 1979 are valuable and have merit as suggestions for the 
future. In effect, the United States agreed not to try to overturn the 
Castro regime in exchange for Soviet pledges not to introduce, first, 
nuclear weapons and, later, certain forms of conventional forces in Cuba. 
Those understandings might be extended to the entire region and to 
cover Cuban military activities as well as Soviet. In return for Cuban and 
Soviet pledges not to install particular types of military facilities or 
forces in the region, the United States might agree, formally or tacitly, 
not to intervene, directly or indirectly, against existing regimes in the 
region. Those understandings might also be extended to mutual restraint in 
providing weaponry. States and revolutionary movements in the region might 
associate themselves with the understandings, agreeing not to accept parti-
cular kinds of outside forces, facilities or weaponry. In all cases, the 
pledges would be conditional: they could be revoked if the other parties 
violated their commitments. 
$ In all of this, there are hard questions about the nature of the Cuban 
and Soviet threat in the region. 
-- Most observers agree that in the late 1970s the Cuban and Soviet at-
titudes toward revolutionary movements converged, with Moscow moving toward 
the Cuban view that: such movements should be supported, not disdained. 
-- At the same time there is little evidence that the Soviet Union is 
prepared to pay much, or run much risk in support of revolutionary movements. 
That is plain to Nicaragua. 
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3. What is the role of u.s. force, or threats of force? These issues do 
not outrank economic or political questions in thinking about u.s. security 
interests in the region. But whatever other measures are considered, issues 
of force will be important, emotional and divisive. 
• What is the purpose of u.s. military assistance to particular govern-
ments, notably El Salvador{ Notice that no u.s. arms were sent to El Sal-
vador between 1977 and 1981. Thus, the government defeated the guerrilla. 
offensive of January 1981 without significant u.s. assistance. (By the 
same token, State Department documents make clear that the guerrilla re-
ceived little weaponry from external so1rrces before September 1980 and 
only some before November 1980. Thus, the civil war raged well before 
the guerrillas received much help from the Cubans and Soviets.) 
• What does the limited assistance now provided El Salvador accomplish? 
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Is it the right kind of military assistance? Notice that because u.s. assist-
ance goes to purchase (expensive) u.s. weaponry, it buys El Salvador much 
less than if the money were deposited in a. Swiss bank account to purchase 
used weapons from the bazaar in Tangiers. More important, there are questions 
about whether the kind of weaponry, training and advice El Salvador receives 
is the right kind. 
• What would be the form and purpose of stepped-up u.s. involvement, 
were it deemed appropriate and possible? Whatever the image in the public 
mind, Central America. is no Vietnam. Twenty thousand American combat 
troops could be decisive in purely military terms. The questions are: 
decisive for what, and at what cost? 
(Notice, however, than any analogy with the apparently successful 
u.s. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is fatally flawed: 
Pentagon analyses make clear that armed rebels in the Dominican Republic 
numbered in the tens, not thousands, so the 23,000 American troops mostly 
patrolled the streets of Santo Domingo. Moreover, there were two obvious 
candidates for president, and the elections between them left no signifi-
cant group feeling unrepresented.) 
• What is the purpose of demonstrative displays of force, such as the 
maneuvers of this summer and fall? 
-- Surprisingly perhaps, the maneuvers seem to have had some effect. 
Rather than denouncing them as "gunboat diplomacy," Cuba., Nicaragua and 
the Salvadorean guerrillas made some vague conciliatory gestures. Paradox-
ically, since u.s. military forces have intervened in the region so often 
in the past, displays of force may be more threatening to parties in the 
region that we would anticipate. Some paranoia on their part is understand-
able. 
However, the history of the u.s.-soviet understandings over Cuba 
suggests the value of a. combination of carrots and sticks -- of displays 
of force combined with a. readiness to talk about security arrangements 
that may be acceptable both to the United States and to other parties. 
e Should the United States abrogate the Soviet-American understandings 
over Cuba? Reagan Administration officials often have hinted that they 
regard the understandings as of little value. But what would be the 
purpose of the threat implied in abrogating them? What would the implied 
threat be? How credible? Notice that recent events have tightened the 
Cuban-soviet military link. Arms deliveries from the Soviet Union to Cuba 
in the first eighteen months of the Reagan Administration sharply increased, 
perhaps nearly doubled, Cuban military capabilities. 
e What is the purpose of assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, covert 
or open? 
-- Does the threat implied by that aid frighten Nicaragua into cutting 
off aid to the Salvadorean guerrillas? Or does it drive Managua closer to 
Cuba and the Soviet Union? Or does it have little effect? 
-- Notice the practical impossibility, given the chaos in the region, 
of helping opposition groups like the Contras for our purposes but not 
theirs. If our support is designed to achieve our purpose -- interdicting 
aid to El Salvador, for example -- we still buy~nd are seen in the region 
to buy, their purposes as well. 
e What is the balance of short-term gains and long-term costs entailed 
in particular u.s. military activities in the region? 
-- Displays of force, for example, may achieve their purpose in the 
short run. Yet they also entail costs, long-term and hard to measure, by 
enhancing the image of the United States as interventionist. At least that 
suggests the need to be clear that their short-run purpose is important. 
-- In political systems as weak as those in Central America, assisting 
local militaries to defeat subversion almost inevitably runs the risk of 
making them more central political forces as well. There may be little 
choice in the short run, and again the costs are hard to assess. But the 
costs surely are present no matter how hard we try to minimize them. 
e Finally, in military terms, what level of commitment in Central 
America makes sense in light of crucial u.s. security interests elsewhere? 
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PROMOTING U.S SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
DR. MARGARET DALY HAYES 
[The ideas presented in this paper are the author•s own and are not 
intended to represent the positions or opinions of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate] 
It is the United States national interest that there exist in 
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Central America and the Caribbean stable, friendly, prosperous nation-
states that permit the free movement of goods and services in and 
through the region. This interest is being challenged today by 
political instability stemming from the region's own development 
trauma; by economic insecurity resulting from the region's 
backwardness and exacerbated by international economic trends; and by 
insurgency generated internally and encouraged and supported 
opportunistically by international Communism. 
The critical questions to be answered in reviewing u.s. security 
interests in Central America are not whether the U. S. has security 
interests in that region -- or more broadly in the Caribbean Basin of 
which it is a part -- but rather, how to promote those interests most 
effectively. 
This disucssion paper will review first, the dimensions of u.s. 
national interests in Central America, then discuss the challenges to 
those interest and finally suggest options for u.s. policy for coping 
with the challenges and enhancing the security of the region. 
u.s. security in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly in the 
contiguous zone of the Caribbean Basin and Central America is defined 
by different considerations than is security taken in the context of 
u.s. relations with the Soviet Union or with our principal allies in 
Western Europe and Asia. In the context of our major political-
military alliances, United States security is defined in 
terms of a global balance of political, military and economic 
power. u.s. allies contribute significantly to the balance of 
power in favor of the United States, and because the relationship 
is mutually beneficial it enjoys a certain stability and predic-
tability over time that has contributed importantly to development 
of relations over the long-term. Central American nations do not 
contribute significantly to the balance of power in favor of the 
United States. Nevertheless, they are important constituents in 
the u.s. sphere of influence, and their possible defection from 
that sphere weighs heavily against the u.s. balance. The principal 
u.s. goal in preserving security interests in the Central American 
region is to minimize challenges to u.s. access and influence in 
the region. 
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In considering the relative balance between the United States 
and its principal rival, the Soviet Union, emphasis is given almost 
exclusively to the military balance between the two powers. The 
Soviet military threat is seen as the principal threat to u.s. 
national security. Soviet intentions to limit u.s. access to 
resources or to weaken international support for the United States 
is given relatively less attention. In particular, long-term 
policies designed to limit Soviet opportunities have received 
inadequate attention and application. However outside the arena of 
strategic force balance, U.S.-Soviet competition for the Third 
World is likely to be far more important in determining the global 
political balance and structure of emerging alliances than is the 
military balance. 
In the traditional focus of u.s. security concerns -- that of 
u.s.-soviet military balance and the NATO-Warsaw political-military 
balance -- the Western Hemisphere countries (excluding Canada, a 
NATO member), have traditionally had little or no role. However, 
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in spite of the relatively low profile Latin America has enjoyed in 
u.s. national security planning, the United States' most constant 
allies in the Third World have been the Latin American countries, 
and the United States has a profound interest in maintaining, at 
relatively low cost, a strong and supportive inter-American system. 
As the United States' immediate sphere of influence, that system 
has been a cornerstone of u.s. projection of the world scene. With 
the support of Latin American allies the United States for a long 
time was able to muster votes within the United Nations and was 
able to project a positive image for itself among the developing 
world. Moreover, the Latin Americans' announced (if not practiced) 
commitment to democratic values has supported this country's firm 
belief that democracies can provide the best opportunities for 
political, social and economic development in Third World countries. 
Relations within the Inter-American system have been changing 
dramatically over the past 10 to 20 years as Latin American countries 
have acquired greater economic and political power and have begun 
to assert their independent voices in world affairs. The Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) survives as a 
remnant of post World War II policy with which the United States 
sought to make the Western Hemisphere "safe" from communism so that 
it could concentrate on other higher priority areas. Hemisphere 
circumstances have changed dramatically since 1947. The Latin 
American countries have grown economically and politically. Latin 
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American nationalism is strong. In the aftermath of the Falklands-
Malvinas crisis of 1982, it is unlikely that the Rio Treaty ever 
can serve again as the focus on which to mobilize hemisphere-wide 
political and military cooperation. 
The challenge to the United States in responding to changes 
in the hemisphere political balance is to assure that independent 
Latin American voices are consistent with U.S. policies in areas 
that are vitally important to us. To do so will require from the 
United States adroit diplomacy, accommodation to some Latin American 
interests, and active engagement in long-term policies that contri-
bute to the emergence of stable, prosperous, friendly states that 
support the United States and do not threaten to throw their politi-
cal weight behind u.s. principal antagonist in the global balance. 
In pursuing policies that enhance u.s. security position in 
the Caribbean and Central American region it is necessary to: 
(1) recognize the degree and dimensions of U.S. security 
interest in the region; 
(2) recognize the nature of the present challenges to those 
interests; 
(3) agree on goals for the region; 
(4) establish a consensus on how to deal with the challenges 
to those interests; and, 
(5) establish a realistic level of investment of political, 
economic and military resources in the pursuit of u.s. 
goals in the region. 
Degrees and dimensions of u.s. security interests in Central America 
In spite of its relative underdevelopment, the Caribbean Basin 
represents an area of important economic activity to the United 
187. 
States. It is the principal source of u.s. raw material imports 
from the Western Hemisphere. Mexico is the United States' second 
most important supplier of critical raw materials after Canada, and 
the principal supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, 
bismuth, selenium, barium, rhenium and lead. Mexico could supply 
up to 30 percent of U.S. petroleum import requirements or up to two 
billion cubic feet of natural gas per day. In 1980, Venezuela 
provided a quarter of u.s. iron ore imports, 23 percent of its 
petroleum products and eighty percent of its crude petroleum. A 
majority of u.s. petroleum imports transit the Caribbean Basin from 
producers in the Middle East, Africa, South America and, more 
recently, from U.S. Alaskan fields. Lightering operations at 
Caribbean refineries will be critical to u.s. crude petroleum 
supplies until Gulf ports are able to handle super-tankers. Refin-
eries in the Antilles supply over 50 percent of U.S. petroleum 
products derived from Middle Eastern and African crude. 
Jamaica has been an important supplier of bauxite and alumina 
to the United States. Suriname and Guyana have joined it in that 
activity. A continuing high volume of inter-oceanic and hemispheric 
trade moves through the Caribbean on north-south trade routes and to 
and from the Panama Canal. The entire region is today the focus of 
development efforts sponsored by regional development banks, the 
World Bank and bilateral aid programs. Over time this export-oriented 
development planning will increase the volume of trade that transits 
the Caribbean Basis to and from the United States. 
The Caribbean is also militarily important to the United 
States, providing critical links in the network of u.s. listening 
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posts monitoring ship and submarine activities in the Atlantic 
Ocean and approaches to the Caribbean Sea itself. A variety of 
military training activities takes place in Panama, Puerto Rico and 
Cuba (Guantanamo) that would be costly to move, and in some cases 
would be irreplaceable. Communications, tracking and navigation 
facilities are located throughout the region and particularly in 
the Eastern Islands. The Navy's Atlantic Underseas Test and Evalua-
tion Center in the Bahamas has been critical in the development of 
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The Panama Canal continues to 
be a key facility on major east-west trade routes. 
The Caribbean region's importance to the United States on 
these dimensions should not be exaggerated. The United States has 
important military installations at Panama, The Bahamas, Puerto 
Rico, Guantanamo and elsewhere. Only recently, however, has the 
United States had any military facilities in Central America. 
The United States enjoys convenient access to certain raw 
materials from the Caribbean Basin countries, including petroleum, 
petroleum by-products, bauxite, alumina, and other materials that 
constitute the list of critical imported raw materials. However, 
no critical raw materials come from Central America, which exports 
sugar, cotton and some coffee to the United States. Only about 3.7 
percent of the U.S. world trade takes place with the Caribbean 
Basin countries. The same countries account for 11 percent of u.s. 
trade with Latin America. In contrast, the United States supplies 
the majority of imports to Caribbean Basin countries and is the 
principal market for Caribbean Basin country exports. The United 
States is economically important in the Caribbean Basin. The 
Caribbean Basin is not particularly important economically to 
the United States. 
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About 18 percent of u.s. overseas direct private investment is 
committed to Latin America. Of this, above half is invested in the 
Caribbean Basin, most of this (up to one-third) in offshore banking 
facilities in The Bahamas, Bermuda and in Panama. U.S. firms have 
never been heavily invested in the island economies (the Dominican 
Republic is an exception) mainly because of the islands' ties to 
former European colonial powers. In contrast to the widely held 
belief that U.S. corporations "run" the economies of Central America, 
major firms divested their interests in the "banama republics" in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Other firms left the region in the 1970s 
because of the endemic political instability. One of the most 
questioned aspects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative has been the 
assumption that u.s. firms would invest capital in the region. 
Many if not most economists believe that the lack of economic 
infrastructure, the low level of skills, foreign investment policies 
designed to protect domestic producers from competition, would 
discourage even the most altruistic corporation. 
The Panama Canal continues to be important to u.s. East-West 
trade though its importance has waned since the 1950s and 1960s 
when European and Japanese economic recovery and growth fostered 
unprecedented expansion in East-West maritime shipping. By 1969-
70, Canal growth had stabilized such that even the most optimistic 
growth forecasts could not justify expansion or investment in a new 
canal. Only the temporary (and recently ended) use of the Canal 
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for transshipment of Alaskan petroleum to U.S. East Coast refineries 
has sustained Canal use at its highest level over the past decade. 
In spite of its diminished economic importance, the Panama 
Canal does continue to be a valuable commercial and military asset 
access to which must be defended. It is nevertheless a vulnerable 
asset whose utility would be limited in major global conflict. The 
u.s. stake in the Canal today is as much a question of principle as 
of vital interest. 
If the United States has relatively low vested interests in 
the economic potential or even in the military installations in 
Central America, the region is the u.s. sphere of influence and 
political stability and harmony enhances u.s. security. Throughout 
the history of u.s. relations with the Caribbean Basin countries, 
political compatibility with U.S. determined values has been the 
key factor directing U.S. attention to the region and determining 
u.s. relations with emerging governments in the area. During the 
19th century, U.S. efforts were concentrated on progressively 
excluding other powers from the region in an effort to reduce 
potential threats to u.s. security. In the early 20th century, 
u.s. interventions in the affairs of countries of the region were 
frequent and largly intended to promote the interests of expanding 
u.s. corporations. In the aftermath of World War II, u.s. interests 
in Latin America in general, and in Central America in particular, 
declined. Friendly dictators occupied most governments and were 
supportive, on demand, of U.S. interests and policies. u.s. corpor-
ations were active in the region. 
u.s. policy attention turned to Central America only when 
trouble emerged -- in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba in 1959, in the 
Dominican Republic in 1964 and more recently in Jamaica in the 
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1970s and in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979. In each of these cases 
u.s. attention focussed on a political crisis that threatened to 
bring to power a government thought to be potentially hostile to 
the United States. In most cases such governments were known to be 
or suspected of being Marxist. The same concerns have drawn atten-
tion to the present on-going crisis in Central America. Insufficient 
thought has been given to underlying causes of domestic instability 
and policy response required to deal with that phenomena. 
Present Challenges to u.s. Interests in Central America 
The United States has enjoyed security in the Caribbean Basin 
and Central American at relatively low cost for a prolonged period 
of time. The region has been largely free of external influences. 
In the period after World War II, no other world powers had the 
desire or capability to maintain a major military presence in the 
region. Over time the European colonial powers withdrew from the 
Eastern Caribbean, confident that the United States would defend 
their remaining interests. Until the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union 
did not have the ability to maintain a sizeable force in the region, 
nor did it provide Cuba with such a force. 
Under these circumstances, the United States became overconfident 
of the security of its interests in the Central American region. We 
relied heavily on predictable dictators and failed to note the 
changes taking place in the regional societies and economies that 
would eventually give rise to domestic unrest. As aid and military 
assistance budgets diminished, we had fewer and fewer people in the 
region to report back through channels on local developments. 
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Given the low priority the region enjoyed during the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, even the best reporting might not have aroused 
sufficient attention to the emerging political crisis in the region. 
The present challenge to u.s. security interests in Central 
America stems first and foremost from political instability that has 
resulted from the deep-rooted social, economic and political back-
wardness of the region. Backwardness and inequalities have encouraged 
the emergence of radical and nationalist political forces within 
the region. The Soviet Union, Cuba and other pro-Soviet elements 
have began to take advantage of the targets of opportunity that 
such political instability presents. 
Few scholars or members of the intelligence community believe 
that the Soviets have a master plan for undermining u.s. interests 
in the Latin American region. However, the Soviets have become 
much more aggressive in pursuing opportunities for building their 
own influence and for undermining the United States influence in 
the Third World. 
The Soviet Union has long recognized the special importance of 
Latin American solidarity with the United States and is increasingly 
willing to take advantage of opportunities to exploit cracks in the 
inter-American system. At the same time, the Soviets understand 
that their ability to operate in the United States' immediate 
sphere of influence is limited. As a result, they generally have 
taken a conservative attitude toward revolution in the Western 
Hemisphere. In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, the Soviet 
Union gave Fidel Castro rein to explore revolutionary potential in 
the region. After the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 
however, it is generally agreed that the Russians instructed Cuba 
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to cease its revolutionary activities in the hemisphere. Through 
most of the 1970s, Cuban support to Marxist movements in the region 
consisted of providing refuge to Marxist exiles and training Marxist 
political leaders in Cuba itself. Cuba did not become directly 
involved in Central American's turmoil until the Sandinista victory 
in Nicaragua was nearly assured. Then, believing that conditions 
might be "ripe for revolution" elsewhere in the region, Cuba became 
active in organizing disparate revolutionary factions, in training 
guerrilla cadres, and in developing mechanisms for logistic support 
to revolutionary movements. The Cubans did not have to initiate 
revolutionary or terrorist activities in the Central American 
countries. Such eevolutionary movements had long been active in El 
Salvador and in Guatemala. 
Because of its proximity to the United States and because of a 
long history of u.s. domination of Cuban politics and economy, as 
well as because of u.s. efforts to overthrow the Castro regime, the 
present Cuban government feel it has considerable motive to to 
sponsor anti-American sentiment in the hemisphere. However, even 
Cuba seems to recognize limits to its challenge to u.s. interests. 
The Cubans do not want to provoke direct u.s. military involvement 
in the region, perhaps because they would themselves be required to 
become involved on behalf of their clients. There is strong reason 
to believe that the Soviet Union has made it clear to the Cuban 
leadership that no Soviet support would be forthcoming if a direct 
confrontation should occur. 
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In the current policy debate on u.s. interests in Central 
America, there has been too little recognition that both the Soviet 
Union and Cuba have goals of exploiting weaknesses in the political, 
economic and social fabric of Central America for purposes of 
embarrassing the United States and displaying weaknesses of u.s. 
support within the Third World. Neither the Soviet Union nor the 
Cubans are willing to take great risks to bring revolutionary 
leaders to power or to maintain them once there, but they are 
clearly motivated to pursue the lesser task of promoting instability 
in the region and by doing so, undermining u.s. security. 
Neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba has incentive to cease its 
activities in the hemisphere. Indeed expressions of heightened 
U.S. concern for the Marxist threat in the region have the double 
impact of signaling caution and raising interest in the ultimate 
success of the challenge to u.s. interests. Cautionary signals 
from the United States may bring about temporary retreats from the 
policy of challenge, but there is little to suggest that such 
retreats will be permanent. Only a long-term policy that is designed 
to deny the Cubans or Soviets of their appeal within the region is 
likely to assure u.s. security interests. 
A second and different aspect of the problem confronting the 
United States in its sphere of influence stems from internal political 
and economic developments in the countries in the region. The 
Central American polities are undergoing dramatic political change. 
Economic, social and political forces have converged to bring about 
the collapse of the traditional, narrow, elite-dominated political 
order that has prevailed in the region for decades. Yet, to date 
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the processes of change have failed to produce a substitute order, 
and there is little consensus as to the nature of successor regimes. 
Moreover, the near total lack of tradition of compromise and accommo-
dation in the political patterns of the region make compromise 
exceedingly difficult. Democratic traditions are weak despite 
historical claims of support for democratic principles. Political 
and judicial institutions have been weak and corrupted, servicing 
the interests of a narrow elite. In contrast to recent patterns in 
a more politically developed South America, there is little tradi-
tion of benevolent authoritarianism in Central America, either. 
Recent military authoritarian governments have worked to exploit 
the system for the benefit of a small group, have engaged in repres-
sive tactics against a broad spectrum of political opposition, 
alienating large elements of the center of the political spectrum, 
and in general have failed to engage in meaningful efforts to 
respond to the economic needs of the population. On the scale of 
political development, the Central American countries are far behind 
their South American neighbors or their American and European 
democratic models. The .foremost task confronting them in the 
present crisis is to generate political institutions capable of 
coping with change. 
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The Central American countries are experiencing a crisis of 
political leadership. The military remains the single most coherent 
political institution in the region and military leaders have pro-
vided the foundation of u.s. support there for many decades. The 
unique role of the Central American military institution presents a 
serious problem to the United States in developing a policy for 
coping with regional political instability. Central American 
militaries have been conservative guardians of the old order. In 
many countries -- El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala -- they were 
(and are) corrupt. Institutional commitment to pluralist, competi-
tive democratic political processes is severely limited. Defensive 
institutional considerations have been the prime motivators of 
political involvement during the recent period of political insta-
bility. At the same time, the military institutions were the first 
political actors to recognize that the fall of Somoza signalled the 
need for dramatic changes within the region. In each of the Central 
American countries military leaders -- often junior officers 
reacted in a unique way to the Sandinista victory. In Guatemala, 
the military government intensified efforts to eliminate domestic 
political opposition. In Honduras, the beginning of an ultimately 
successful effort to transfer authority from the military to a 
civilian government were initiated. In El Salvador, young officers 
overthrew the military government of General Romero and sought to 
establish a reforming civil-military coalition. Similarly each 
military institution has reacted in its unique way to continuing 
domestic insurgency. 
The key political role of the Central American militaries has 
complicated the emergence of independent civilian political insti-
tutions. Political leaders are confronted with the task not only 
of building consensus amoung self-interested political actors, but 
also of countering the political wishes of the only institution 
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that has traditionally exercised veto power over the entire domestic 
political process. Democratic political institutions are unlikely 
to be successful in Central America until the future role of the 
military in Central American societies is decided. 
Complicating the domestic uncertanties in Central America, the 
region is increasingly permeated by competing international political 
actors, including both revolutionary and non-revolutionary Marxists, 
also Social Democrats and Christian Democrats from Europe and Latin 
America, religious groups of all persuasions, union organizers and 
others. All of these groups seek to influence emerging political 
leaderships for institutional purposes often irrelevant to the 
political needs and realities of Central American politics. Their 
activities challenge u.s. abilities to channel national political 
energies in directions that complement u.s. interests in the region. 
In summary, instability and insurgency in Central America pre-
sent a direct challenge to u.s. interest and security. The Central 
American and Caribbean countries constitute the United States 
immediate sphere of influence. They are more dependent on the 
United States and over time have been more influenced by this 
country than have other nations in the hemisphere. Any change in 
this traditional line-up of Central American countries with the 
United States represents a failure on the part of this country to 
maintain support within its own sphere of influence. While the 
comparison is uncomfortable, the loss of a supportive government in 
Nicaragua can be compared to a loss of the Polish or Czechoslovak 
regime from the Soviet sphere of influence. 
The United States has an understandably limited tolerance for 
Marxist governments in its immediate sphere of interest. In spite 
198. 
of periodic tests of will, such as the missile crisis of the Cienfuego 
submarine base incident, the United States has learned to live, 
reluctantly, with the Marxist government in Cuba. Additional 
pro-Soviet, aggressively anti-American governments like Cuba's in 
the United States' primary sphere of influence cannot be entertained 
for a number of reasons. 
First, the long and revered tradition of U.S.-Latin American 
relations is one of general regional harmony. An aggressively 
hostile anti-American foreign policy on the part of one or more 
members of the inter-American foreign community represents a break-
down of the community that has long been a cornerstone of u.s. 
political power projection onto the world scene. It is important 
in the global balance of political power that the United States be 
able to demonstrate its alliance with the countries of the Western 
Hemisphere. 
Second, as the Cuba experience has demonstrated, Marxist 
revolutionary governments are committed to promoting their ideology 
abroad. Given the politically weak regimes of Central American and 
the Caribbean countries, it is difficult if not impossible to limit 
the activities of committed and coordinated revolutionaries. 
Many domestic revolutionaries are nationalists first, then 
Marxists. International and u.s. domestic opinions are generally 
sympathetic to the nationalists. However if the leadership cadres 
of revolutionary movements remain committed Marxist-Leninists, it 
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is unlikely that the less politically organized and prepared nation-
alists can prevail in determining the political direction of their 
movements. The recent Nicaraguan experience has demonstrated this 
difficulty. Moreover, in the geographically-linked region of 
Central America, it is impossible to isolate one revolutionary 
movement from another, or one subversive effort from another. 
Borders cannot be controlled and longstanding personal contacts 
cannot be eliminated. Real risks to regional stability are presented 
when revolutionary movements associated with and supported by 
international communism come to powers. 
Finally u.s. opinion leaders and more importantly, the u.s. 
public, are profoundly divided on the question of the potential 
benign nature of Communist regimes and of u.s. ability to deal with 
such regimes and moderate their revolutionary and anti-American 
tendencies. The weight of opinion falls heavily against conceding 
ground to such movements, however. The domestic political risks of 
"being soft on Communism" severely constrain policy changes. As a 
consequence there is little room for the unpredictable alignment 
such as might result from independent socialist or non-aligned 
governments. There is little tolerance in the present u.s. 
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political system for the uncertainties that a Marxist, but not 
Soviet-oriented regime, might present to U.S. interests in the 
region. While many argue for greater accommodation with revolu-
tionary leaders, few political leaders are willing to assume the 
greater political costs that such "absence of political guarantees" 
might entail. This has been a major stumbling block to achieving 
consensus on current Central American policy. 
Foreign Policy Objectives in Support of National Security 
u.s. vital interests in the Caribbean Basin can be maintained 
by military force but only at very high cost. Moreover, to rely on 
superior military might to defend U.S. security in that region, and 
especially in Central America, has negative consequences for u.s. 
relations with friendly nations in the region, and almost certainly 
escalates the stakes in the Soviet or Cuban game of challenging the 
United States. The more military might that is committed to the 
region, the greater the need to demonstrate resolve to use that 
might and the greater the excuse offered to hostile governments 
like Nicaragua, Cuba or Grenada for failing to respond to political 
initiatives. 
Moreover the more u.s. military might committed or committable 
to Central American or the Caribbean Basin to defend against inter-
mittent low level challenges to u.s. security, the less likely the 
policy will enjoy full support of domestic public opinion. In 
spite of negative attitudes about co-existing Communist states, 
there is no consensus to support the ouster of an installed, agres-
sively anti-American, communist government like Cuba's. There is 
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less support for using military might to forestall the coming to 
power of additional such governments. A better approach to promoting 
u.s. security interests in the region is required. 
The first questions that must be asked in establishing policy 
for the Caribbean and Central American regions are: "What political 
outcomes do we want in the region?" and "What are we willing to 
expend to achieve these outcomes?" 
At the beginning of this paper I asserted the answer to the 
first question. The United States wants to see stable, friendly, 
properous states and freedom of movement of goods and services 
within and through the region. The United States wants no hostile 
powers in its sphere of influence, thus expanded Cuban or Soviet 
presence in the region, or additional Soviet client states are not 
to be tolerated. Realistically, the United States is not likely to 
invest large amounts of political or economic capital in the region 
other areas present more immediate demands on limited resources. 
In short, u.s. objectives in the Central American region are to 
achieve the stable, predictable, supportive and low cost environment 
that characterized u.s. relations with the region, but which, in 
the present and future will accomodate the rather dramatic changes 
that Central America is experiencing in its current political 
development crisis. Such conditions might best promote key u.s. 
security interests in the region -- continued unchallenged access 
for u.s. economic and military activities, support for u.s. foreign 
policy objectives and denial of political support to the United States 
principal world rivals. In addressing such desired outcomes, it is 
important to recognize that in the 1980s the United States cannot 
impose or will the preferred states of affairs in the region. 
Rather it must contribute actively to their evolution. 
Policies for Dealing with Political Instability and Insurgency 
Three broad political areas of consensus need to be established in 
order to elaborate a low cost security supporting policy for the 
Central American region. First, u.s. political leadership needs to 
develop a greater consensus and more visible expression of U.S. 
goals for the Central American region. Second, there must be a 
visible commitment of u.s. resources to the promoting of political 
and economic development within the region. Finally the United 
States must develop a consensus on how to deal politically and 
militarily with Marxist insurgencies within the region. In each 
case, policies should be elaborated with a sober view toward the 
resources available for implementing them. The tradition of u.s. 
relations with Latin America has been to promise much and deliver 
little. There is little patience left in the region for cynical 
approaches to present instability. 
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Within broad u.s. public opinion there is little objection to 
stating u.s. policy goals for the Central American region as the 
promotion of stable and prosperous nations, as long as prosperity 
is shared and stability is understood to entail managing and coping 
with change and not just insistence on a convenient status quo. 
However, there is great debate within the u.s. body politic on 
the necessity of having supportive governments within the region. 
This has been the crux of the debate over u.s. relations with 
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Nicaragua or over the merits of negotiation with the Salvadoran 
revolutionary Front. Before a coherent u.s. policy toward Central 
America can be adopted, this debate must be resolved and a consensus 
must be forged on the costs and benefits of a non-aligned U.S. 
Southern flank. 
It is clearly more desirable from a national security perspec-
tive that regional governments be friendly and supportive rather 
than aloof or hostile. It is in the United States interest that 
its neighbors not be torn politically between support for Western 
or Soviet bloc interests in global political debates. To date, 
non-alignment has not become sufficiently neutral to provide an 
appealing alternative to more formal commitment to one or another. 
u.s. diplomatic efforts must strive to make adherence to the 
Western bloc more appealing than membership in a Soviet camp. 
The weak link in the political equations of nearly all Central 
American countries are the political instititions and political 
practices. The United States policy must seek to promote the 
development of strong political institutions in the region. To 
date this country has tended to be too easily satisfied with 
appearance and has overlooked practice in its assessement of politi-
cal performance in Central America. The human rights controversy 
provides an exemplary strong case in point. The public image is 
one of u.s. government laxness in asserting human rights priorities. 
u.s. efforts in El Salvador to evoke elicit responsibile political 
behavior from an entrenched corrupt system underscore the need for 
more concerted efforts at promoting political institutional develop-
ment in the region. The best minds must be called to the task of 
devising policy for accomplishing the goal. The u.s. past recorn 
of transferring democratic values and practices to new regions and 
cultures has not been good. 
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The United States must make a strong commitment to the economic 
development of the region in order to stimulate hope of future 
prosperity. The present zero-sum economic environment in Central 
America must end. Economic constraints severely limit even the 
best political leaders' abilities to generate support for their 
policies. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a step in the right 
direction, but the development effort must be more visible. The 
carrot of economic benefits to be derived from association with the 
United States is one of the strongest incentives for regional 
leaders to associate themselves with u.s. interests and policies. 
At the same time, economic development programs must be elaborated 
with a clear and sober view of the human and material resources 
available in the region and of the absorptive capabilities of 
individual countries. 
Finally, the United States must engage in a consensus-building 
debate that will generate a coherent understanding of the challenge 
posed by Soviet-backed Marxist activities in the Western Hemisphere. 
At least until the internal political questions are resolved in 
Central America, Marxist insurgencies of greater and lesser political 
strength will continue to pose a threat to regional political 
stability and to u.s. security interests in the region. At the 
same time, until insurgent threats to emerging political coalitions 
end, political solutions will be difficlut to impose. Neither 
political nor economic development can take place in a climate of 
war. All sides must agree on this point. 
A number of themes should be considered in the u.s. policy 
debate. They include the following items. 
(1) The United States must devote a much more serious 
intelligence gathering effort to the Central American 
region. Terrorist, insurgent and radical opposition 
movements (of left and right) must be better understood. 
Throughout much of the current crisis in Central America 
the United States has been operating in the dark. 
(2) The United States must deal directly with military 
setablishments in Central America. They must be prepared 
to carry the burden of counter-insurgency alone. Central 
American militaries need training and equipment, but they 
should not be spoiled by providing equipment, training or 
political attention that far exceeds their requirements 
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in a more stable environment or under a democratic govern-
ment. 
(3) Given the central position that militaries have occupied 
in regional politics, caution should be exercised so as 
not to further military veto authority over politically 
weaker civilian leaders. 
(4) Contingent policies for dealing with Marxist or Marxist-
leaning governments must be elaborated. Such governments 
must be rejected by countries of the region, and not just 
by the United States. Therefore, a regional consensus on 
the acceptable foreign policy behaviors must be generated. 
Criteria for judging such behaviors might include: 
(a) the extent to which such regimes would follow foreign 
policy lines truly independent of the Soviet Union; 
and, 
(b) the extent to which they contribute to regional 
political stability and order. 
The criteria should apply to Cuba as well as to newer 
leftist governments. On both of these counts, the present 
Nicaraguan leadership would fail. However, the radical 
revolutionary leadership of El Salvador claims that its 
program of government would satisfy u.s. concerns on both 
of the dimensions. That assertion needs to be tested. 
(5) A greater burden of regional problem solving must be born 
by Latin American countries. Like Central American 
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political leaders, our Latin American allies have tended 
to rely on the United States to take controversial 
initiatives in the region. They have relished the 
opportunity to criticize the United States for its actions 
while enjoying the results of that policy. Latin American 
countries cannot afford large scale economic assistance 
to Central America at present. They must begin to share 
greater political responsibility for their region neverthe-
less. 
Any u.s. policy for Central America is likely to have mixed 
success and mixed support. Solutions being posed today to Central 
American problems are not new. In the past however, there has been 
insufficient follow-through with policies to realize success. The 
Central American problem is deeply rooted in the political, social 
and economic fabric of the region. The region is experiencing 
turmoil because its institutions are not adequate to deal with the 
demands that confront them. Soviet or Cuban supported insurgent 
activities exacerbate difficulties, but did not cause them. 
Resolving Central America's political problems will require a long 
time. Military responses can provide superficial and short-term 
relief. More difficult political responses are required for long-
term relief. Moreover, the effort to find political solutions will 
have to come from within each individual country. The United States 
can help but not accomplish the task itself. 
UNITED STATES POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: 
TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
HOWARD J. WIARDA 
[The views expressed are the author 1 s and not necessarily of the 
agencies with which he is affiliated.] 
The United States has in the past accorded little attention to 
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Central America. Not only do we not understand that area very well, 
but we have seldom tried to understand it. 04r notions about 
Central America are shrouded in myths and stereotypes. Attitudes in 
the United States toward the region tend to be patronizing, 
condescending, and lacking in empathy. We refer to the nations of 
the area as "banana republics" and we doubt if they are worthy of 
serious attention, culturally, historically, politically, 
sociologically. We turn our attention to the area only in times of 
crisis, and then our inclination is look for an easy formula, pat 
solutions. As James Reston of the New York 'l'imes wrote twenty years 
ago as we became absorbed by the area in reaction to an earlier 
Cuban revolution: "The United States will do anything for Latin 
America except read about it." 1 
This statement attempts to provide some of the understanding 
often lacking in our discussions of Central America, to assess the 
difficulties of development there, to provide an overview of the new 
realities of the area and of the constraints on U.S. policy as it 
attempts to grapple with the area, and to assess policy options and 
'b '1' t. 2 po s s 1 1 1 1 e s • = 
Four points need to be addressed initially: (1} Though our 
assignment is to focus on the mid- (3-5 years) to longer- (10-2p 
years) term, it needs to be recognized that in practice these time 
frames cannot be easily separated. O~r instructions are to deal 
not with current events but to present models and frames of 
reference for longer-term policy -- but one recognizes the 
artificiality of these divisions. For one thing Central 
America today remains strongly a prisoner of its historic 
past; for another, it is impossible to conceive that Central 
America three, five, ten, or twenty years hence will not be 
affected by what is occurring there presently; for a third, and 
looking back over past history, one doubts that in the near-
or even longer-term Central America will be altered fundamentally 
by whatever we choose here to do. The heavy hand of history is 
too powerfully present there for these time frames to serve more 
than analytical purposes, or for much to be altered quickly 
despite all our efforts. We can marginally affect change in that 
area but we cannot reverse the course of history. However, as 
former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chief of Staff Pat Holt 
has remarked, "even a change of direction of 3-4 percent would 
have been enough to save the Titanic." 3 
(2) A second point has to do with the presumption on which 
the work of this Commission is based. It is widely believed that 
since past policies have "failed," there is now need for a new 
approach. That, after all, is why this Commission was created. 
But I think we would be remiss in branding all past U. S. policies 
in Central America a "failure" and therefore opting for some 
wholesale -- and hence probably unrealistic -- revamping of 
policy. In this paper I suggest a new formula and some new 
approaches but these build upon earlier efforts, reflecting the 
"new realities" of the area, rather than any wholesale abandonment 
of past strategies. Such abrupt departures as may seem tempting 
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may well not work, and I am not entirely convinced past policies 
were the unmitigated disaster they are often pictured. 
(3) Related is the possibility that the Corronission may be 
overly tempted by some pat and easy formula. Among the candidates 
are the "Project Democracy" and new "Marshall Plan" ideas. These 
are useful ideas deserving of support, but there is reason to be 
skeptical of formulas that promise all-encompassing solutions to 
Central America's problems and thus raise exaggerated expectations. 4 
(4) Allow me also to enter a plea for a careful, serious, 
bipartisan strategy, as distinct from an unbalanced and intensely 
partisan one. There are many axes -- partisan, personal, academic, 
political, institutional -- that are being ground over the Central 
America issue, most of which generate heat but little light. 
Particularly in the midst of an election campaign the temptations 
to partisanship, or to the private and personal ambitions that 
Harvard's Edward Bansfield called "private-regardingness" (as 
5 distinct from "public regardingness"), are powerful. In this 
charged context, it is especially important to suggest recommenda-
tions that are balanced and prudent, that have realistic possibili-
ties of generating support and of achieving success, rather than 
extreme, partisan, unrealistic and impractical ones. The 
presentation of such a reasonable, balanced, non-partisan, and 
prudent policy is what I have attempted here. 
Political Institutions and Institutionalization 
in Central America 
The literature on political institutions and institution-
alization in developing countries is rich and diverse, but little 
of it has been applied to Central America. The seminal book on 
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the subject is Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing 
S . t' 6 oc1e 1es. This book is rich in general and conceptual ideas but 
has almost nothing to say about Central America. Indeed one would 
be hard pressed to think of any general volume in that body of 
literature called "Political Development" that contains anything 
more than passing reference to the area. 
The problem for Central America -- and for United States 
policy there -- is an almost complete lack of institutions of any 
sort. Central America was characterized by colonial neglect 
during Spain's 300 year long rule which means that, in contrast 
to Mexico for example, the Central American nations never developed 
strong centralized political authority, a strong and centralized 
military, an efficient and rationalized bureaucracy, a strong 
Church, even a strong oligarchy that might have held these countries 
together after independence. 7 Nor did the instituions of a liberal 
polity -- political parties, electoral machinery, republican and 
representative institutions -- develop in nineteenth century Central 
. 8 Amer1ca. 
The result was -- and is -- a set of countries in Central 
America, Costa Rica being the foremost exception, with the 
institutional infrastructures neither of a traditional nor of a 
liberal-democratic polity. Central America was undefined 
institutionally, unformed -- and it remains so. Indeed at the 
heart of the problem in Central America -- and at the root of its 
instability, violence, and lack of viability -- is an almost 
complete lack of institutionalization of any kind. The absence 
of institutions, particularly of a democratic sort, makes it 
terribly difficult for the United States to assist these countries, 
to grasp on to the levers and to turn them to positive develop-
mental goals. For the levers prove slippery and difficult to 
grasp, or else they simply break off in our hands. 
To make up for these institutional deficiencies -- what 
"' the Central Americans often refer to as a "falta de civilizacion" 
a variety of other agencies have been created over time. These 
seldom conform to United States or "Western" notions of good and 
proper governance, but historically they have not functioned 
entirely badly in the Central American context. These include 
extended family networks, clan and patronage networks, mixed 
civil-military regimes that defy the rigid classificatory schemes 
we often employ to define a government as either the one or the 
other, personalistic and populist regimes such as that of former 
President Torrijos in ~anama. Such regimes are seldorn fully 
democratic by our lights but they are seldom fully totalitarian 
either. Given the small, personalistic, city-state nature of 
the Central American polities, one could argue such "mixed" 
regimes are not entirely inappropriate in the Central American 
context. And given the absence of any other institutional 
arrangements in these countries, one must warn against those U. S. 
assistance programs that, sometimes purposely and sometimes 
inadvertently, helped undermine or discredit existing institutions 
in Central America before any new ones had been created. While 
often launched with the best of democratic and developmentalist 
intentions, some of these programs had the practical effect of 
destabilizing Central America still further and of leaving ·the 
area with a vacuum of institutions of any kind. 
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Left largely to its own devices, approaches, and sometimes 
crazy-quilt pattern of institional arrangements, Central America 
developed rapidly in the 1950s, 1960s, even on into the 1970s. 
Economic growth was in the range of 5-7 percent per year, social 
programs were greatly expanded with U. S. assistance, one could 
even argue that representative institutions were growing -- though 
not necessarily in conformity with U. s.-preferred democratic 
9 
precepts. Then two main forces, one political and the other 
economic, came together to undermine this not altogether unattrac-
tive picture and to precipitate the crisis in which we now find 
ourselves. 
The political trends involved cloture, sclerosis, and a 
failure to adjust to new realities. In Nicaragua the authoritarian 
but not entirely unpopular or unenlightened reign of the father 
Anastasio Somoza and then his son Luis gave way in the 1970s to 
the greedy, increasingly corrupt and repressive regime of Anastasio 
Jr. (Tachito), which finally succeeded in antagonizing all groups 
in society including the business community and the American 
embassy. In El Salvador the nationalistic and quasi-progressive 
combined civil-military system that dominated from 1958 to 1972 
was replaced by a brutal and reactionary civil-military faction 
that sought to turn the clock back with predictably disastrous 
consequences. In Guatemala, similarly, the more-or-less centrist 
regimes that had dominated in the 1960s and early 1970s were 
replaced by a brutally repressive and corrupt regime that laid 
the basis for renewed guerrilla resurgence later on. The patterns 
in these three countries are remarkably similar; they are also the 
three countries with the largest current difficulties and with 
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which u. S. policy recently has been mainly concerned. 10 
It bears repeating that none of these regimes replaced 
by more brutal, corrupt, and repressive factions were models of 
liberalism and democracy by our lights. But they were tolerably 
efficient, not entirely based on blood and guns, more-or-less 
nationalistic and progressive. Moreover -- and because of this 
they kept the guerrilla challenges perpetually present in Central 
America since the early 1960s from getting entirely out of hand. 
Although it is getting ahead of the story, it may be submitted 
that is about as much as we can reasonably expect or hope for 
in Central America. 
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The second major precipitating factor was economic: the 
downturn of the Central American economies in the 1970s. The 
downturn was precipitated by, among other factors, the two oil 
shocks of 1973 and 1979, declining or wildly fluctuating markets 
for Central American products, and the world-wide economic 
depression of 1979 and thereafter. The subject has been extensively 
treated by others and its details cannot detain us here. 11 
What requires emphasis, however, is what the economic crisis 
did to the whole model of Central American change and development. 
That model and process, albeit not exclusively democratic, had 
generally in the 1950s and 1960s been peaceful and accommodative. 
New groups -- the business community, the middle class, some labor 
groups -- had been gradually absorbed into "the system'' of Central 
America in an evolutionary process that was not entirely undemocratic 
and with little bloodshed. Accommodative politics is of course 
relatively easy in a context of an expanding economic pie, since 
there are always more pieces to hand out to the newer groups 
without the older and established ones having to be deprived. 
But in the context of a stagnant or even contracting economic 
pie as prevailed in Central America by the late 1970s, there 
are no new pieces to hand out and competition for the existing 
shares tended to become more intense and violent. The responses 
from existing governments was often greater repression. 
These indigeneous political and economic causes of the 
Central American crisis were then exacerbated and made worse by 
the intervention of outside forces -- principally the Cubans, the 
Soviets, eventually the Nicaraguans -- into the regional cauldron 
and by their efforts to take advantage of the instability present. 
Thus seen, the Soviets and Cubans are not the prime causes of the 
rebellion in Central America, but it is their presence there that 
. b . 1 f u . d s f . 1' 12 1s o v1ous y o most concern to n1te tates ore1gn po 1cy. 
It bears reemphasis that the problems in Central America 
13 are systemic problems. They are long-term, deep-rooted, and 
therefore not .amenable to quick or easy solutions. They have to 
do with fundamental political, sociologic, and economic trends 
stretching back over twenty years and more. They are not ephemeral 
or rapidly resolvable. No one single cause provides an adequate 
explanation for them. Because they are basic, systemic, complex, 
and long-term, they will require long-term, sustained policies and 
solutions on the part of the United States. I believe it is 
important for the Commission to stress this to the American people. 
At the same time I am not certain the forces at work and the 
realistic possibilities open are well understood by the American 
public or, oft times, by policy-makers. The struggle in Central 
America is not some dichotomous, either-or struggle between 
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dictatorship and democracy but rather lies in that murkier 
series of halfway houses that exist in between these two poles. 14 
How to reach not some ideal and therefore unrealistic solution 
but one that shows promise of working and a measure of viability, 
however we might disagree over precise emphases, would seem to me 
to be a proper concern for the Commission. Similarly, we need to 
sort out the indigenous from the external causes of the crisis, 
emphasizing the indigenous causes but showing how and why it is 
the Cuban and Soviet presences that cause most concern for U. s. 
policy. Hence I think the Commission needs, among other things, 
to perform an educational function, educating the public and 
policy makers both to the realities of Central American domestic 
politics and sociology and more precisely concerning what is 
important and not so important to the United States in that part 
of the world. 
Past United States Policies 
Prior to 1959 Latin America was viewed as an area that was 
''safe" for United States interests. True, there had been the 
Guatemalan affair of 1954 but that was looked on by policy makers 
as a temporary aberration that had successfully been reversed. 
The notion of Stalinist legions expanding into Latin America was, 
at the time, viewed as preposterous. Hence, with the exception 
of some limited Point Four and other programs, Latin America could 
f 1 b . d 15 sa e y e lgnore . 
Benign neglect is not an entirely inappropriate policy in 
easy and peaceful times. However in Latin America that stance 
was maintained too long, serving to obscure the smouldering 
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problems of the region and therefore to catch us unawares and 
ill-prepared when they eventually exploded. The Cuban revolution, 
among other things, meant Latin America could no longer be 
ignored. 
In response to the Cuban revolution, and reflecting also 
the new idealism and dedication to democratic development of the 
Kennedy Administration, the United States launched the Peace Corps 
and the Alliance for Progress. 
A review and evaluation of both these programs would require more 
space than is possible here. The Alliance requires some attention 
because its assumptions are still alive and well in the United 
States government; those same assumptions are current in the 
debate presently over U. S. policy and the proposal for a Central 
American Marshall Plan. Hence the assumptions of the Alliance and 
its accomplishments require attention. 
The Alliance was posited on the major assumption that economic 
growth would also produce social and political development that 
would lead to happy, liberal, pluralist, democratic, middle class 
. t' . t l'k 16 Th 1 t . t d t' soc1e 1es JUS 1 e our own. e goa s were no JUS emocra lC 
and developmentalist in an updated Wilsonian sense, however, but 
also had a major strategic component. That is, they assumed that 
in such a happy and economically modernized society, middle class 
stability would be assured, extreme ideologies would lose their 
appeal, the trade unions would become oriented to collective 
bargaining rather than radical political action, the military would 
put aside praetorianism in favor of professionalism and an a-
political stance, business elites would develop a greater sense 
of noblesse oblige, etc., etc. 
No one should deny the significant economic accomplishments 
of the Alliance. Those 5-7 percent growth rates mentioned earlier 
were in considerable measure due to Alliance pump-priming. The 
social modernization was also major. Anyone going to Latin America 
over the last twenty years cannot but be struck by the improvements 
in housing, health care, roads, education, sanitation, water 
supplies, communications, and a number of other areas -- all under-
taken with Alliance support. 
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But it is important to emphasize, particularly as we consider 
proposed new campaigns for democratic development, that the 
political presumptions of the Alliance have not worked out. Nowhere 
in Latin America do we see the growth of happily middle class 
societies like those of North America or Western Europe -- and 
with them the moderation and stability in politics on which the 
Alliance economic assistance was based. Those countries that are 
most middle class -- Argentina, Chile, Uruguay -- could hardly be 
described as happily, moderately, democratic. Nowhere -- certainly 
not in Central America -- have extremist ideologies lost their 
appeal. Nowhere have the trade unions come to accept their "proper" 
place in society, as docile and apolitical. Nowhere han military 
professionalization led to an apolitical military; indeed, as 
Alfred Stepan's work has shown, 17 professionalization of the 
military may lead to greater armed forces intervention in politics, 
not less. 
The list of assumptions that have not worked out goes on. 
Social modernization has led not to greater stability but less, 
as old institutions are destroyed before viable new ones are 
created. 18 The country-- the Dominican Republic-- that received 
the most per capita aid in ·the early 1960s and was viewed as a 
model of the Alliance exploded in left-wing revolution in 1965 
calling forth a massive U. S. military intervention that 
presaged the Vietnam imbroglio. The country -~ Chile -- that 
received the greatest per capita aid in ·the late 1960s nevertheless 
elected a Marxist president in 1970 and then produced one of the 
most repressive regimes ever seen in Latin America when he was 
overthrown in 1973. 
These comments and examples are not meant to deny the 
importance of U. S. social and economic assistance to Latin America. 
Indeed such assistance is put forward later in this statement as 
part of the recommended policy package for Central illnerica. But 
it is to caution against excess enthusiasm for such aid as a cure-
all, and against the widespread assumption that all such good 
things as economic development, social modernization, and democracy 
go happily together. Not only is that not necessarily the case but 
the evidence is strong in the more recent development literature 
that economic and social modernization may actually be disruptive 
of political development. 19 
By the late 1960s, corresponding with the height of Viet Nam 
War protests, the early development literature -- that of Rostow 
and others, whose writings had undergirded the Alliance for 
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Progress -- was strongly under attack. The Alliance continued to 
limp along for a time, but with neither the funds nor the enthusiasm 
of its early heady days. Samuel P. Huntington and others had weighed 
in with influential critiques of the development literature. But 
Huntington's own prescriptions -- an emphasis not on social 
modernization but on such agencies as political parties, bureaucracy, 
and the armed forces as the only institutions capable of holding 
divisive, fragmented Third World countries together -- did not 
seem to work well in Viet Nam and came under a considerable cloud. 
New approaches -- for example, meeting basic human needs -- were 
being discussed in the aid agencies, but there was as yet no 
consensus on them. Indeed it was precisely this lack of consensus, 
coupled with growing critiques of the familiar and exisiting aid 
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and development approaches, the fact that fewer funds were available, 
preoccupation with Vietnam and other concerns, that led to a 
lessened attention in policy circles to the spiraling problems of 
Central America. 
This new period of not-so-benign neglect produced consequences 
similar to those that the same strategy had produced in the 1950s. 
The problems began to build up; yet because of Watergate and other 
preoccupations little attention was devoted to them. This was 
precisely the time, however, when the more repressive elements 
were seizing power and consolidating their hold in El Salvador 
and Guatemala, and when Tachito's greed was getting the best of 
him in Nicaragua. Most scholars and policy analysts look on this 
period as an opportunity lost in Central America. Had we been 
more strenuous then in supporting moderate elements, we would not 
likely face the same degree of magnitude of problems in the area 
that we face now. 
Benign neglect was replaced in 1976 by Jimmy Carter's 
emphasis on human rights. That strategy, which had earlier 
echoes in the Kennedy administration and in Woodrow Wilson's 
naive if well-intentioned efforts to make the world safe for 
democracy, produced some notable successes. There is no doubt 
that as a result of the human rights emphasis numerous political 
prisoners were released from jail, torture was diminished, other 
abuses were prevented, and the United States received considerable 
moral credit. But critics charged the human rights strategy was 
not even-handed, that it favored some groups and regimes on 
partisan grounds while ostracizing others, that it was inconsis-
tently applied, that it was inefficiently and heavy-handedly run, 
that it ignored cultural and societal differences, that it was 
elevated to such a place that other U. s. interests -- economic, 
strategic -- were ignored, and that, in the end, it was not very 
effective. 20 
While Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights, he no more 
entirely abandoned American security doctrine than Ronald Reagan 
abandoned human rights. In fact most analysts, while seeing new 
emphases, have stressed the degree of continuity between the Carter 
d d .. t t" 21 an Reagan a m1n1s ra 1ons. President Carter and his administra-
tion began on the left side of the political spectrum and gravitated 
toward the center; President Reagan began on the right side and also 
gravitated toward the center. President Reagan has more strongly 
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emphasized the East-West struggle in formulating his Central American 
policy and has considerably increased the U. S. military presence 
and pressure. Critics charge that a military solution is not likely 
to solve anything and may produce the opposite consequences of those 
intended. And, they argue, his approach to Central America has done 
little to resolve the basic, underlying problems that cause 
revolutionary sentiment to flourish. 
The idea is widespread in the land that none of the approaches 
tried by the United States in Latin America in over thirty years have 
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worked. Certainly the litany of policies outlined here must 
give pause to those who believe in ever-onward and upward. 
These range from coexistence with all forms of regimes to 
blatant military interventionism, from strong activisim to 
benign neglect. It is widely argued in the development field 
that none of the doctrines of the past really fit Central 
. 22 d h 1' h . . h Amer1ca, an t at U. S. po 1cy, of w atever or1entat1on, as 
been similarly deficient. Hence the idea for a commission to 
come up with new approaches. 
Many scholars are not convinced the experiences of the 
past have been such a dismal failure, however. They are not 
ready to throw out the baby with the bathwater. That is, they 
recognize the flaws in some aspects of policy but feel the overall 
thrust and record have been not entirely unsound. Mistakes and 
judgemental errors have been made in some countries but they feel 
in general and region-wide notable successes have also been 
registered. They see the need, hence, not for some wholesale 
revamping of policy but for adjustment and updating. They would 
argue that the basic tenets of policy are not so much flawed in 
their essentials but that these have been implemented haphazardly 
and inconsistently by successive administrations. Hence these 
analysts argue not for some grand but untried new departures 
but for a pragmatic eclecticism, choosing and balancing among 
the tried and true policies of the past but accommodating to 
nuance and new realities and, above all, without the wild 
fluctuations from administration to administration that they 
see as the heart of the problem. Let us see what these "new 
realities" are to which policy must be adjusted. 
New Realities in Latin America 
and in U. s.-Latin American Relations 
Policy of course is not formulated in a vacuum. The 
facts are that Latin America is quite different than it was 
two decades back, and the context of U. S.-Latin American 
relations has changed correspondingly. These "new realities" 
need to be factored into any assessment and recommendations for 
policy. They are here presented in summary form, recognizing that 
more detailed analysis and qualification are necessary. 
1. The United States is presently in a generally weaker posi-
tion vis-~-vis Latin America than was the case 15-20 years 
23 ago. Then, United States hegemony -- military, political, 
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economic, cultural -- was overwhelming; today that is no longer 
the case. Our foreign assistance is down and hence our leverage 
is diminished; our aid, military, and other missions have been 
greatly reduced; the American business community is no longer 
dominant throughout the area; our presence overall is consi-
derably less than it once was; and hence our capacity -- or 
even willingness -- to influence events is considerably lessened. 
We now have fewer levers to manipulate, fewer resources to 
manipulate them with, and our stomach is not really with it. 
The United States is of course the dominant power in the 
region and our recent buildup in Central America has 
partially reversed the earlier trends; but this involvement 
is widely viewed as an abberation, unlikely to be sustained 
over the long haul, a temporary "blip" in a downward-tending 
graph line. Our heavy involvement currently in Central America 
is viewed as temporary, there is impatience to withraw, 
and the assurnptibh is widespread that the trends toward 
16 
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a decreased presence in the area will be resumed shortly 
once the problem-of-the-moment is resolved. 
2. The U. S. as a political and economic model has been 
considerably tarnished in recent years. Our economy has 
not worked so well, our political system shows warts and 
flaws, sociologically we are seen to have become somewhat 
unraveled, and our leadership position and stature in the 
world have been questioned and challenged. Abroad, there 
is widespread skepticism of the American notion that "we 
know best .. for other peoples, in Central America or 
elsewhere. Latin America in general no longer wishes 
necessarily or so eagerly to emulate the United States or 
to adopt its political institutions; nor does it wish 
necessarily to follow our foreign policy lead. These 
changes also imply a more circumspect role for the United 
States throughout the area. 
3. There is unlikely to be any major new foreign aid 
program for Central America. Neither the Congress nor 
the American people are willing to support bold new 
f . . t . . t. t. 24 ore1gn ass1s ance 1n1 1a 1ves. It is unlikely that 
there could be another Alliance for Progress even if that 
were desirable; Americans do not want it and we cannot 
afford it. Indeed the trends seem to point in the opposite 
direction: protectionist walls are being thrown up, 
isolationism is rising, and the one major foreign assistance 
program we have, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, has been 
so heavily gutted in its crucial trade provisions that one 
cannot be optimistic about some new, proposed "Marshall 
Plan" for the area. 
4. There is considerable apprehension, even given the 
best efforts of this Commission, whether in the present 
circumstances the United States can carry out a coherent, 
sustained, bi-partisan, long-term foreign policy. The 
intense and divisive debate over Central America policy, 
the uncertain fate of the CBI, the irresolution of and 
schizophrenia in American public opinion lend credence 
to this view. Many seasoned Washington observers, looking 
at the drumbeat in the popular media over El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, the strength and independence of some U.S. 
domestic interest groups who all but carry out their own 
separate foreign policies, the murky bureaucratic politics 
of policy in the foreign affairs area, the overriding 
desire for reelection and hence dramatic headlines on the 
part of all office holders, the "divided government•• 25 
betv.reen president and Congress, and the bitter and partisan 
nature of the debate, wonder aloud if we can conduct a 
serious foreign policy. We are so deeply divided that 
we have reached a stage of near irnmobilisme, and the 
notion that the main ingredients of a sound policy could 
be sustained from administration to administration is 
difficult to contemplate.
26 
It is arguable whether these constraints on policy 
are as severe as I have pictured them, and as to the 
degree to which they may be or have been reversed. 
Certainly in Latin America, even in the Caribbean and 
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Central America, the notion of the Uni·ted States as a 
floundering, indecisive, and declining superpower are 
widespread. These perceptions in the area may be at 
least as important as any objective assessments to the 
contrary that we may reach. 
5. While the United States would seem to be a diminished 
or declining presence in Latin America, the Latin American 
nations themselves have become increasingly assertive and 
independent. This includes even the smaller nations of 
Central America, and is especially the case in Mexico. 
Various efforts are being made by all countries of the 
area to modify their ties of dependence to the United States, 
or to redefine or renegotiate the terms of their dependence. 
This effort at "breaking away'' from the United States is 
characteristic of right wing and centrist regimes as it is 
of leftist ones, united in this cause by their rising and 
intense nationalism. There has always been in this region 
a "love-hate" relationship with the United States, and that 
mixed sentiment is by no means confined to one side of the 
political spectrum. This effort to loosen the bonds with 
the United States is of course related to Latin America's 
perception of United States power; and to the degree the 
Latin American nations perceive the United States to be a 
declining power or a diminished presence, it is thought of 
as prudent on their part to diversify their trade patterns, 
h d . . 1 11 . 
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6. At the same time, and to a degree that has not as yet 
been publicly recognized, we have become more and more 
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dependent on Latin America and our interests there have 
become greater than ever. As our own natural resources 
have been depleted, we have become increasingly dependent 
on Latin America for primary goods and raw materials. We need 
access to the area's markets and we are increasingly 
importing both foodstuffs and manufactured goods. It is 
a little known fact that U. S. trade with the Third World 
is now greater than that with Japan and Western Europe 
combined, with Latin America overwhelmingly the most 
important to us among Third World areas. We are now 
almost as much dependent on Latin America in various ways 
as it is upon us. Our complex interdependence with Latin 
America is best illustrated by the case of Mexico, where 
energy policy, immigration policy, trade policy, diplomatic 
relations, drug traffic, migrant workers policy, and 
political and strategic considerations are intertwined in 
. f 1 28 a var1ety o comp ex ways. 
7. Other outside actors have meanwhile come to be 
significant influences in Central America. These include 
West Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Spain, the Soviet Union, 
the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, some Eastern Euro-
pean countries, Saudi Arabia, and various transnational 
agencies (churches, unions, the Socialist International, 
foundations) • On numerous fronts these other nations and 
agencies are competing successfully for trade, contracts, 
business, and political influence. At the same time a 
number of new regional powers -- Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Argentina, Brazil -- have begun to play a 
stronger role, one that is generally more independent 
of the United States. The United States is no longer 
the only hegemonic power in the hemisphere, and our 
relations with the area have recently been made much 
more complex and difficult by the presence of these other 
29 actors. 
8. Central America is itself changing rapidly. The 
old beliefs and structures are crumbling, new ones are 
rising up, the winds of revolution are sweeping the 
area. All the nations are considerably more affluent, 
developed, self-assured, and independent than they 
were at the time John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance 
for Progress. Some have taken up l,eadership positions 
in the Third World and have put themselves forward as 
bridges or intermediaries between North and South. 
Nationalism is powerful, new ideologies have come to 
the fore not necessarily in accord with the older bases 
of legitimacy, change and modernization are everywhere 
in the air. These features, too, affect how the Latin 
American nations behave and their attitudes toward the 
United States. 30 
9. Central America is presently going through both a 
crisis and a period of experimentation. There is a 
widespread sense that the United States economic and 
political model may not be appropriate for them, yet 
there is almost no admiration for the Soviet Union 
either. Many Central American thinkers and political 
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leaders are searching for a new political formula, based 
on indigenous or national traditions or perhaps combining 
these with useful and workable imported institutions. The 
approach will be eclectic; no one set of institutions will 
be adopted en toto. While this experimentation goes on we 
can expect considerable instability; Central Americans also 
plead for some understanding on the part of the United 
31 States as they search for that new formula. 
10. New issues have come to the fore in inter-American 
relations. First, it is clear that economic issues are 
more important than previously, particularly from a Latin 
American perspective. While we talk of political and 
security concerns, their interests are in economic 
development. We speak of the East-West struggle while the 
Latin Americans, with some prominent exceptions, are more 
interested in commercial matters and access to U. S. markets, 
investments, technology and capital. We speak of aid but 
they are interested more in trade. This disjuncture in the 
agenda of issues that we and Latin America think of as most 
important is a major barrier to better relations. Further, 
even in terms of more traditional bi-lateral relations, the 
issues now are often different. These include such newer 
but vitally important issues as migration, employment, the 
drug traffic, human rights, undocumen·ted workers, oil, the 
debt situation. These issues are fundamentally distinct 
from the large political and strategic designs of the 
1960s and they call for a different, more pragmatic 
U. S. response. 32 
228. 
Policy Options 
Several policy options have been set forth for Central 
America, ranging from complete hands-off to a virtual American 
takeover of the area. While all these options will be duly 
considered here, it must also be said that they do not all 
conform equally to the history and new realities of the area, 
as outlined above. In addition, a number of these options have 
been tried, with varying degrees of success, in the past. Let 
us therefore review these options keeping in mind the implications 
and realistic possibilities of each. 
1. Complete Hands-Off. An influential body of academic 
opinion suggests that since the United States has so much 
capacity to do evil in the world and so little to do good, 
we and the rest of the world would be best off if we did 
nothing at all. This position goes beyond non-interventionism 
to suggest a complete hands-off policy, allowing Central 
America to develop on its own without outside interference. 33 
The troubles with this position are several. First, 
Central America is as much affected by what we in the 
United States don't do as by what we do; and cutting ourselves 
off from trade or contact with Central America will be 
devastating for that area. Second, while there is an 
argument for allowing Central America to develop autonomously 
and on its own, it is unlikely the other outside powers now 
operating in the region would permit Central America to do so 
even if the United States were to withdraw. Third, it is 
inconceivable that the American public or the American 
governinent would simply pull up all stakes in Central America 
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and go home. This option is not only undesirable from 
both a United States and a Central American point of view 
but it is also entirely unrealistic. 
2. Benign neglect, interspersed with occasional 
involvement. 
This policy has been attempted in the past, but it 
is no longer a useful basis for policy. It may have been 
appropriate in the 1950s when there were no or few perceived 
threats to U. S. interests in the area, but conditions have 
changed drastically since then. Benign neglect allows 
problems to fester until they explode rather than providing 
for treatment of them in their early stages. It tends to 
lead to dramatic interventionism (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba 
in 1961, Chile in 1973) rather than the patient resolution 
of problems over a longer term. Benign neglect also ignores 
the new reality of our complex interrelations with Latin 
America on a host of issues, meaning we can no longer ignore 
the area even if we choose to do so. 34 
3. Active Engagement and Democratic Developmentalism. 
This is probably the most attractive option, especially 
given the other alternatives. Most scholars and experts 
on the area, and the general public, would likely support 
such an option. But there are major problems here as well. 
These will be discussed below in greater detail. But here 
let is be said that such active engagement as we practiced 
in the region in the 1960s may no longer be feasible, the 
limits on what we can accomplish are greater, the funds and 
enthusiasm may not be available, the Central Americans may 
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no longer want such heavy U. s. involvement. Additionally, 
our ability to promote democratic developmentalism, while 
laudable in theory, runs the danger of being overblown, 
oversold, exaggerated, unworkable, and therefore productive 
only of unfulfilled expectations. Some additional cautionary 
notes follow. 
4. Proconsularism. This approach would have the United 
States, in effect, take over and run Central America. 
If the Central Americans cannot resolve their problems, 
the argument goes, then we should do it for them. 
But this approach cannot be effective in the long 
term. Such a heavy-handed U. S. presence breeds 
resentment from all sectors in the countries so treated. 
Moreover if the long range goal is the development of 
indigenous institutions in Central America capable of 
functioning effectively on their own, then pro~consularism 
will not help create or develop such institutions. It 
serves in fact to undermine local institutions rather than 
strengthen them. Except in genuinely emergency situations, 
pro-consularism would seem to leave more problems in its 
wake than it resolves immediately. 
5. Gunboat Diplomacy. Except in rare and very special 
circumstances, the era of gunboat diplomacy in Latin 
America may well be about over. Such military interventionism 
unites all Latin Americans against us. Domestically, we seem 
no longer to have the stomach for such action, and public 
opinion is strongly against the commitment of American forces 
in on-the-ground fighting. Americans tire quickly of 
indecisive military standoffs, and a policy of military 
commitment abroad cannot be sustained indefinitely. 
Gunboat diplomacy tends to respond to the symptoms and 
not the causes of upheaval and to leave more problems 
unresolved than solved. It may be an appropriate short-
term strategy under exceptional conditions but it is not 
a basis for policy on a longer term. 
Toward a Prudence Model of United States• Latin America Policy35 
Most professional students of Latin America would likely 
favor option #3 as a long-term basis for United States policy: 
active engagement by the United States in Central America and a 
policy of democratic developmentalism. But such a policy needs 
to be reconciled to the "new realities" listed above and to i:he 
historical and institutional considerations also discussed. 
There is widespread acceptance in the literature of the 
fact that Central America is going through a profound systemic 
crisis. That crisis is also long-term and will not be solved 
overnight or by easy panaceas. It requires a major and sustained 
commitment on our part, and to be effective that commitment must 
necessarily be realistic, consistent, prudent, and bipartisan. 
Second, such a policy must be based on the "nevr realities" 
outlined earlier -- new realities in the United States, in Latin 
America, and in u. s.-Latin American relations. If the "new 
realities" listed above have a sound basis in fact -- as most 
students of the area have concluded -- then certain policy 
prescriptions and guidelines tend to flow from them. It is on the 
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basis of these new realities, I believe, that the Commission's 
recommendations ought to be grounded. What follows therefore 
represents an effort to reconcile the new hemispheric realities 
with some broad guidelines for a sound, prudent, and realistic 
United States foreign policy toward the area. 
1. The diminished United States presence overall throughout 
the area, the seeming absence of realistic possibilities for 
some grand new design such as the Alliance for Progress, and 
the corresponding new assertiveness and independence of Latin 
America all imply some greater prudence and restraint on the 
part of United States policy toward the area. We can no 
longer work our will there easily, unilaterally, or auto-
matically; the era of deep United States involvement in the 
internal affairs of these countries has not produced the 
desired results and may be about over. We have neither the 
inclination nor the means for such heavy commitments, they 
seem unlikely to serve the purposes intended, and the 
expanding presence of other outside actors also implies 
greater restraint on our part. 
The same restraints that now limit unilateral U. S. 
military action in the Hemisphere also impose limits on 
U. s. political and diplomatic initiatives. A U. S. 
ambassador, for example, can seldom serve efficaciously 
any longer in a proconsular capacity as, de facto, the 
third, second, or maybe most important person in the 
country; nor is it useful to have U. S. mission chiefs 
running roughshod over local sensibilities by effectively 
controlling and manipulating those areas of the local 
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national life that fall under their responsibilities. 
Such blatant interventionism in the internal affairs of 
other nations almost always produces unforeseen consequences, 
leads to profound resentment on the part of all sectors in 
the country affected, and is certain in the long-run to be 
self-defeating. 
There are qualifications to these prescriptions: 
the formulation above does not take account adequately of 
how and when the Congress, public opinion, or legislative 
requirements such as the certification process may force 
an American ambassador into a proconsular role; nor does 
it take account of the degree to which those in the smaller, 
weaker countries, as distinct from the larger ones, expect 
us to play a powerful leadership role. But these qualifica-
tions do not invalidate the main point: the need over the 
longer-term to forge a policy based on caution, restraint, 
and balance and to reject heavy-handed interventionism 
either military or political. 
2. United States policy must be based on a far greater 
sense of empathy and understanding of these countries than 
we have heretofore recognized or practiced. The great 
developmental models and panaceas of the 1960s, largely of 
U. s. making, have been discredited or proved not to work 
as intended. The fact is, we do not "know best" for 
Central America; and efforts to export our institutions to 
a cul·ture area where the mores and traditions are different 
have not been notably successful. Central America must be 
234. 
allowed to fashion its own developmental formulas with 
some timely and appropriate assistance from the United 
States, not through the replacements of its own institutions 
by those imposed from the outside. It is prudent and wise 
for us to desist from exporting our institutions and models 
to societies where they do not fit, may not be wanted, or 
may not be deemed appropriate in precisely our form. Not 
only have such efforts in the past been unsuccessful but 
in the present context we no longer have the resources or 
commitment to carry out such programs in any case. 36 
But a considerably greater degree of empathy and 
understanding of Central America on its own terms and in 
its own institutional framework does not necessarily imply 
the acceptance of a Latin American-style Amin or Hitler. 
We do have values and we can express them. There are regimes 
the Latin Americans find unacceptable as well as we. 
would do well to follow their lead in these matters. An 
argument for a greater degree of empathy and cultural 
relativism in understanding Latin America does not mean we 
need carry the argument to ridiculous extremes. 
3. Similarly with the argument for restraint. Such 
restraint does not imply we do little or nothing. The 
key is to find a balanced involvement that falls between 
benign neglect and heavy-handed interventionism. We not 
only have values at stake but also increasingly more 
important interests to protect. The Central American 
nations, while no longer accepting U. S. hegemony and 
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dominance, do expect us to lead, particularly in the 
economic field, and to serve as a catalyst and locomotive 
for their own economic recovery. 
For example, we should stand for human rights but 
in a less noisy, more restrained, and therefore more 
effective and less often self-defeating manner than in 
h C t d . . . 37 1 b 't' t e ar er a m1n1strat1on; we can a so e more sens1 1ve 
to the impact our statements regarding the priority of 
human rights concerns have on Latin America, which was not 
always the case in the early weeks of the Reagan administration. 
The United States can no longer be the "caudillo of Latin 
America" with all the strong-arm methods that implies, but 
it can be a prudent bus driver. That imagery implies that we 
drive carefully and well with due concern for the needs of our 
passengers, neither so slowly that they become impatient and 
leave the bus nor so rapidly and far in front that we take the 
bus in directions the passengers do not wish to go, forcing 
them to bail out in confusion. Above all what is called for 
is consultations with the Central Americans themselves, to 
ascertain their wants and needs, and to adjust U. S. policy 
accordingly. 
4. The key would seem to be active involvement restrained 
by greater understanding, empathy, prudence, maybe even an 
unaccustomed deference to their wishes and aspirations than 
in the past. The United States cannot be a mere "moral 
force" which sometimes seemed to be the popular perception 
of President Carter. That led to a vacuum of hemispheric 
leadership and produced some unfortunate consequences. 
Our refusal to sell arms to some regimes deemed morally 
repulsive, for instance, simply prompted them to buy 
elsewhere, resulting in an even greater loss of control 
on our part over their actions and helping precipitate 
a dangerous arms race throughout the hemisphere whose 
sour fruits we are now reaping in the form of spiraling 
conflict within and between the various Latin American 
states. 
Nor can we elevate the notion of a "global" strategy 
and "no special relationship" v1ith Latin America to the 
level of revered truth which the previous administration 
at times also seemed to be doing. That flies in the face 
of the "special relationship" that has always existed and 
still exists in some areas between the United States and 
Latin America, and the requirement of balancing a bilateral 
and global strategy with a regional one. 
But heavy-handed interventionism and Cold War rhetoric 
are not an appropriate basis for long-term strategy either. 
Instead the United States must be seen as a catalyst, a 
fair arbiter, a presence (but not an interventionist one), 
a leader (but a judi9ious and temperate one) . live are 
inclined and expected to play a leading role in Central 
America, but that orientation must be tempered by the 
changing realities outlined earlier. We must acknowledge 
and build upon the special relationship that both we and 
the Latin Americans recognize we have in this hemisphere, 
but we must also be cognizant of how this relationship is 
now changing. 
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5. Finally, United States Latin American policy must be 
based on realities, not wishful thinking, myths, and 
romance. Neither the United States nor Latin America 
understand each other very well. Our relations are too 
often governed by moralistic, pietistic, and ideological 
posturing often devoid of realism or mutual comprehension. 
It is time for the relationship to grow up, to be put on 
a firm and stable basis rather like that with Western 
Europe, to eschew condescension and theatrics. 
We must not only promote cultural exchanges that 
flow in both directions but we must also begin to focus 
on the real issues in hemispheric relations, not phantom 
ones. In the long run these are not likely (except in a 
few especially troubled countries) to be the Cold War 
issues that receive so much media attention nor the 
grandiose political designs of twenty years ago, which now 
won't wash and are, additionally, impractical. Rather they 
involve a whole set of new issues outlined above -- and 
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above all trade, markets, access to capital and technologies. 
Our agenda often focuses on the older political and ideological --- . 
issues when in fact it is economic issues that form Latin 
America's chief long-term area of concern and which, as shown, 
lie behind and are the chief cause of the region's political 
upheavals. Unless we recognize and come to grips with these 
factors soon, our initiatives and policies and those of 
Latin America are likely to diverge even further. 
Given these general parameters for policy, what more 
specific recommendations can be suggested? What can we do 
and what are the means to get there? What should u. S. 
policy be to enhance U. S. interests in the longer term? 
The proposals that follow remain broad and require even 
more detailed fleshing out, but they do reflect the new 
realities in the area we are now facing and they are in 
accord with the general guidelines suggested previously 
that reflect an emerging consensus among scholarly experts. 
They are also meant not to offer a single simple answer but 
a broad matrix of answers that address the complexities of 
Central America. 
Political. A strategy based on democratic develop-
mentalistm but more restrained and less heavy-handed 
than in the past. Avoidance of some of the overdrawn 
expectations of Project Democracy and of a single-
minded campaign to implement these in favor of the 
more modest goals set forth in the actual legislation. 
Bloated rhetoric and unrealistic promises should 
be avoided. We will not succeed in transplanting our 
institutions into Central America or creating bastions 
of democracy there, but we may appropriately provide 
some modest nudges in the right directions and to assist 




We should favor a strong, visible human 
On the other hand that should be balanced 
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against a concern for other preeminent U. S. interests, a 
sensitivity to foreign cultures whose givens are different 
from our own, a sensitivity to interventionism 
in other nations' internal affairs, the requirement 
of even-handedness, and a subtle and discriminating 
approach rather than a heavy-handed one. 
Military. u.s. military assistance should be continued, 
may even be stepped up in some countries; but we should 
have no illusions that we can create a modern pro-
fessionalized (by our criteria) military there that 
will eschew involvement in civilian politics. That is 
unrealistic and will not happen, but we should neverthe-
less continue our training programs and efforts to get 
the El Salvadoran military, for example, to see the 
"bigger picture." 38 
Social. Vastly stepped up social programs are called 
for in the areas of housing, health care, education, 
etc. Moreover we need to get our people "on the ground, .. 
in the villages the way the Cubans do, so that our 
assistance is both effective and visible. We need to 
use our human resources far more effectively, and to 
plug into local institutions (neighborhood groups, 
women's groups, family groups) for more than we do at 
present. We need to send teachers, doctors, agronomists 
and others to operate at grass roots levels, with the 
empathy and understanding previously called for. 
Economic. A major new economic assistance program is 
required, which may be called a Marshall Plan for 
Central America. The program must recognize the 
differences of aid to already developed countries 
temporarily devastated like thos.e in Europe after 
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World War II, and aid to non-institutionalized 
countries like those in Central America. Appropriate 
modesty should accompany these proposals so as not to 
raise exaggerated hopes, either from the point of view 
of how much aid can be expected from a reluctant public 
and Congress and how much that aid can accomplish. 
However the main emphasis should be on trade. 
That is most advantageous to us and to the Central 
Americans. The trade package should include provisions 
for stable prices for Central America's export products 
(essential for these single-crop economies), guaranteed 
access to U. s. markets (enabling them to plan and to 
be assured of a stable market over a longer term) , 
access to credits, capital and technology. These 
provisions can be carried out in ways that are not 
prejudicial to U. S. industries. Continuous 
consultations with the nations affected are again 
required. 
Cultural. The United States needs greatly to expand 
its programs of scholarships, training, and travel to 
the United States for emerging Central American leaders. 
The Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations are 
beginning to overwhelm our own efforts in this area. 
We risk losing an entire generation of young Central 
American leaders. The provisions of Project Democracy 
that provide for greater cultural interchange deserve 
strong support. Some more imaginative new programs 
are also called for. 39 
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Strategic: U. S. security interests should be 
defined in broad terms that include developmental as 
well as military assistance. The United States should 
be prepared to accept a considerable degree of ideologial 
pluralism in Central America, but it should make clear 
that it will not accept (1) intervention by one state 
in the affairs of another, and (2) an alliance with the 
Soviet Union that leads to Soviet military bases in the 
40 area. 
These suggestions are intended as broad guidelines and 
directions for policy. They provide a framework and matrix in 
which more specific recommendations may be fitted. These more 
specific suggestions can be appended or they can be provided by 
the particular government agencies involved. We believed it was 
important for the Commission to develop a broad framework first, 
and that specific program recommendations could be formulated 
subsequently. 
Conclusion 
The spiraling crisis in Central America demonstrates, 
among other things, that the United States can no longer afford 
to ignore the area -- or to pay attention to it only in crisis 
times when our capacity to shape the outcome is already severely 
limited. Our difficulties of coping with the problems of that 
area also illustrates the limited knowledge and understanding we 
have about Central America, as well as our tendency to treat it 
not on its own terms but through the mirror of our own 
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domestic political beliefs and preferences or as an extension 
of our own election campaigns. Neither moral preconceptions, 
wishful thinking, nor exaggerated rhetorical flourishes have 
or will prove sufficient to achieve the kind of measured, 
balanced policy that is required, or to enable us to understand 
the dynamics of socio-political change in the area in terms of 
its own practices and institutions rather than through our own 
rose-colored lenses. 
The reorientation of policy suggested here, toward greater 
prudence, some modesty, greater empathy, and restraint in our 
attitudes and actions toward the area, coupled with the more 
specific policy prescriptions that followed, would seem to be 
both practical and wise. The United States both by its own 
preferences and power and by the expectations of the Central 
Americans themselves can be a leader -- and not just a moral 
one -- in the area; but such power and leadership also imply 
great restraint and forbearance in their use. The United States 
can serve as a bastion of freedom and human rights; but policies 
in these areas need to be practical, kept in perspective, and 
attuned to the distinct meanings and understandings such key 
terms may convey in the two quite different civilizations in the 
two parts of the Americas. 
We can and must adjust to the new realities of Latin America 
without presuming either ourselves to lead the change process or 
to stand irrevocably and hostilely against Latin America's own, 
quite natural processes of change. We can similarly continue to 
be a strong military as well as a strong political and economic 
influence in the area, while also exercising great moderation in 
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the use of such influence. We may even be able to use some tough 
rhetoric and action sometimes for a domestic political audience, 
as long as it is made clear to the nations of the area that other 
kinds of discussions and negotiations can go on behind the curtain. 
There are, similarly, ways to balance domestic economic concerns 
while also making provision for Latin American access to our 
markets -- access that the Central American countries desperately 
require, without which the political conflicts of the area are 
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bound to worsen, and hence which rests at the top of Latin America's 
agenda if not yet our own. 
Such a strategy of greater prudence, empathy, and restraint is 
not only wise for us in the long term but it is also, most importantly, 
strongly grounded in the new realities of Latin America and our 
relations with it. It responds to the somewhat diminished presence 
and influence of the United States in that part of the world in a way 
that enables us to continue to play a strong and positive role. 
It allows and encourages us to play a catalytic and "locomotive" 
role while also taking realistic cognizance of the circumscribed 
limits on what the United States can and cannot effectively do in 
that area. It reflects the growth and influence of other outside 
powers besides ourselves in the area and enables us to adjust 
realistically to the complexities of policy that the presence of 
these other actors necessitates. It reflects also the growing 
assertiveness and independence of the Latin American nations, their 
desire to diversify their trade and international connections, and 
the need for us realistically to accommodate to these newer currents. 
Finally, such a strategy enables us to continue to play a leadership 
role in the regional, in both the politico-strategic and the economic 
spheres, in ways that both we and the Central Americans desire; 
but to do so with considerably greater wisdom, empathy, and 
enlightenment than in the past. 
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BACKGROUND PAPER 
Regiona1 Diplomatic Options 
Prepared by Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise 
Institute and Lead Consultant 
Executive Summary 
This paper is designed for the hearings of September 30-0ctober 
1, and explores the regional diplomatic options for a Central American 
settlement. It is divided as follows: 
I. An Introduction that sets forth the basic presumptions of the 
paper writer; 
II. A review of existing instruments for diplomatic solution, 
with particular attention to the mechanisms of the Inter-American System; 
III. A survey of peaceplans presently on the table, followed 
by a brief analysis of their content; 
IV-V. An extended analysis of the most important of these, known 
as the Contadora initiative, including 
(a-b) An analysis of the players and their goals; 
{c) An analysis of outsiders crucial to the success of the 
initiative; 
(d) A brief evaluation of the Contadora process thus far; 
VI. Three models of diplomatic solutions based on Contadora 
guidelines, with attention to 
(1) Which countries could be expected to support each, oppose 
each, and which might be persuaded to shift in one 
direction or the other, and, 
252. 
(2) What the costs and benefits of each are bound to be; 
(3) What likelihood each has of bringing events to a successful 
conclusion, and, finally 
VII. What are the alternatives if the Contadora process fails? 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no element in the national debate over Central America has 
given rise to so much confusion as the false dichotomy between military 
and diplomatic solutions. The harsh truth is that no diplomatic 
solution will last long enough for its ink to dry if it is not based 
on certain hard realities on the ground--be they the disposition of 
forces or the will of contending parties to continue the battle. 
Further, it is impossible to understand both the possibilities 
and obstacles to a negotiated s6lution without understanding the 
motives and objectives of the players. This paper thus spends 
considerable space outlining how different elements in the Central 
American drama conceptualize 11 Success 11 • 
The central presumption of this paper is that any diplomatic 
solution must satisfy three criteria. It must be workable, and 
for more than a few weeks. It must be acceptable to the countries 
whose fates are therein decided. And it must accord with our own 
national values of pluralism, democracy, and self-determination. 
II. WHAT ARE THE EXISTING REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION? 
[1] The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This 
document, signed and subsequently ratified by all members of the Pan 
American Union at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, establishes a mechanism for 
considering and responding to cases of armed aggression, and, more 
generally, threats to the peace of the Americas. Its heart is Article 
3, wherein t~e signatories promise to regard an attack against one 
as an attack against all, and accept an obligation to take concrete 
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measures to assist the aggrieved party 11 Without delay 11 • 
Of more interest in the present context is Article 6, which binds 
the signatories to collective action in the case of less conventional 
forms of aggression ( 11 any other fact or situation that might endanger 
the peace and security of America11 ·). The current Cuban technique 
of financing and training subversives cou·ld be so considered, and 
in fact has been in the past. For example, in 1964 the Organ of 
Consultation voted a full range of sanctions against that country 
in response to its activities in Venezuela. 
The Rio Treaty has been invoked sixteen times since its ratification, 
almost entirely in connection with events in Central America or the 
Greater Caribbean, including Venezuela. The Organ of Consultation 
has been convened to discuss the situation of Cuba five times, relations 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua four times, relations between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti twice, and once, in 1969, conflicting 
territorial claims between Honduras and El Salvador. Actually the 
issue of 11 international Communism11 has been on the agenda only 
twice--once in connection with Guatemala, once in connection with 
Cuba. Article 7, provides a mechanism for resolving conventional 
conflict (typically, border disputes) between two or more American 
states, and in fact that is the use to which the document has been put 
most often and most usefully. 
To successfully invoke the Rio Treaty, a two-thirds vote of the 
Organ of Consultation must be obtained. On minor issues this has 
not been a serious problem, but on what might be called the larger 
political questions (indirect aggression and multilateral action to 
meet it) the consensus has been steadily eroding. In 1974 Colombia, 
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Costa Rica, and Venezuela reversed their earlier position and launched an 
unsuccessful attempt to challenge the sanctions levied against Cuba 
ten years before. The following year the United States was compelled 
to agree to a compromise resolution which in effect left each country 
to define the kind of relations it wished to maintain with the Castro 
regime. Presumably the treaty could still be invoked in the future 
under extremely compelling circumstances, but if the signatories cannot 
agree on a coJTJllon policy toward Cuba, it is unlikely--to say the very 
1 east--that they wi 11 be willing to use the existing treaty machinery 
to deal effectively with Castroite activity in the region. 
[2] The Charter of the Organization of American States. This 
document also provides for defensive measures whenever two-thirds of 
the membership can agree that a threat to peace and security exists. 
However, in contrast to the Rio Treaty, the deliberations of the OAS 
Council are not binding upon signatories, and in any event the increasing 
size and diversity of its membership* make it more difficult to obtain 
a decisive vote on security~related issues. The most recent attempt 
by the United States in 1979 (to obtain stationing of an Inter-American 
Peace Force in Nicaragua at the end of its civil war) was an unmitigated 
disaster. In general, Latin American diplomatic opinion over the 
last decade and a half has tended to move away from the Treaty and 
in the direction of the Charter--even beyond it. A foretaste of 
things to come might be found in a series of proposed amendments to 
the Rio Treaty itself on the table since 1975. The impact of these--
if ever actually incorporated into that document--would be to dismantle 
much of its existing machinery. One article would divide decisions of 
*At present all American states are members, including many who are 
English-speaking. The exceptions are Canada and Guyana, who maintain 
observers, and of course, Cuba (since 1962). 
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the Organ of Consultation into 11 binding 11 and 11 non-binding 1• resolutions; 
another, while retaining the provision for a two-thirds vote on obligatory 
resolutions, would reduce to a simple majority the number needed to 
rescind same. A new protocol would strengthen the language of non-
intervention, and insist upon 11 the rights of all states to choose 
freely their political, economic, and social organizations ... Most 
importantly, a new Article 6 would prohibit the Organ of Consultation 
from providing assistance to a state wi-thout its consent. 
The recent activities of Cuba and Nicaragua in Central America 
and the Caribbean have caused something of a shift back toward a more 
rigorous approach, perhaps eventually to· the extent of cooperating 
with the United States in providing a multilateral umbrella for its 
actions. But the OAS Charter offers little guidance on how this 
might come about. Article 59 merely makes provision for a Meeting 
of Consultation at the ministerial level, but unlike the Rio Treaty, 
offers no indication of the measures such a meeting might take. 
[3] The Central American Security Treaty (1963). This instrument 
can basically be regarded as a Central American miniature of the Rio 
Treaty, inasmuch as it builds upon the principle of reciprocity, obligates 
the signatories to respond in case of attack, and defines aggression 
broadly to encompass 11 any other fact or situation that might endanger 
the peace of the Central American isthmus ... Signatories include 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with Panama and Costa 
Rica as observers. (The United States also maintains an observer 
at the Treaty secretariat in Guatemala City.) 
The treaty also establishes a Central American Defense Council 
(CONDECA) composed of ministers of defense or officials of appropriate 
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rank who meet annually or at the request of any of the member states. A 
Permanent Defense Committee, comprised of officers drawn from the armed 
forces of signatory states, aGts as a general staff and performs 
administrative duties. Since 1963, when the organization was created, 
the member states have held joint maneuvers, some with the participation 
of U. S. forces. 
Changing political contexts and the inability to cope with regional 
conflict have seriously undermined the credibility of the CONDECA. 
In 1963 the Cuban threat was sufficient to unite all signatories; today 
Panama pursues a two-track policy toward Havana, and, of course, 
Nicaragua is virtually an ally of the Castro regime. Moreover, in 
the one case of conventional conflict (the war between El Salvador and 
Honduras in 1969), the organization was powerless to act, although 
given the small number of militarily active members, it was probably 
inevitable that the issue be transferred to the Organization of 
American States. 
The real achievement of CONDECA has been to temper and moderate 
the extreme nationalism and territorial rivalries which have poisoned 
relations between Central American countries, particularly El Salvador 
and Honduras. There has been some talk about reviving and revivifying 
the alliance as an effective security instrument, simply on the grounds 
that four of the Central American five are already pursuing a cooperative 
approach to regional diplomacy. It could not include Nicaragua, 
however, and begs the question of how that country would fit into 
some hypothetical security arrangement. 
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III. WHAT PEACE PROPOSALS ARE PRESENTLY ON THE TABLE? 
(a) Identification and chronology. Because the traditional instruments 
of regional diplomacy have not proven of value in the present Central 
American conflict, there has been a burgeoning of ad hoc multilateral 
proposals. At present, five viable peace plans are on the table. 
In chronological order, they are: 
(1) THE SIX-POINT HONDURAN PEACE PLAN, announced by Foreign 
Minister Paz Barnica in a speech before the OAS on March 
23, 1982; 
(2) THE SAN JOSE DECLARATION of foreign ministers of countries 
interested in the promotion of democracy in Central America 
and the Caribbean (Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, and Costa Rica), proposed October 4, 1982; 
(3) THE TEN-POINT CANCUN DECLARATION announced July 17, 1983 
by the Presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Panama (the so-called "Contadora countries"). 
(4) THE SIX-POINT NICARAGUAN PROPOSAL, announced July 19, 
1983 by Directorate Coordinator Daniel Ortega, and later 
submitted to the United Nations; 
(5) THE FOUR-POINT U. S. PROPOSAL contained in President Reagan's 
letter to the four Contadora presidents, July 27, 1983. 
(b) Analysis of the plans. All of the plans address certain common 
themes--the need for an end to intervention, either on the part of the 
Central American countries in each others• affairs, or by outside powers; 
an end to the acquisition of offensive armaments, or at least a freeze 
at existing levels; a shift away from political conflict and towards the 
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more construc~ive path of economic and social development; and some 
procedures for verification of whatever agreements are finally reached. 
More important are the elements which are not common, for they 
define and explain the impasse at which we presently find ourselves. 
Thus, alone of the five plans the Nicaraguan is utterly silent on 
the subject of democracy and pluralism. The United States, Honduras, 
and the countries of the San Jose declaration all favor reduction 
or ultimate withdrawal of all foreign military advisers. Neither 
Nicaragua nor the Contadora countries have anything to say on the 
subject; conversely, the Nicaraguans and Contadora would prohibit 
the 11 existence 11 or 11 installation 11 of foreign military bases, and 
in the case of Nicaragua, the holding of military exercises by foreign 
armies anywhere in C.entral America. On the subject of verification, 
the U. S. prefers an OAS mechanism, while the Nicaraguans would recur 
to the United Nations Security Council. Contadora, the Hondurans, 
and the San Jose countries have left open how international supervision 
would be organized. 
Thus the two major sticking points are democracy and the role of 
foreign military advisers or forces, although the difficulties of 
setting up an adequate system of verification should not be underestimated. 
That the US prefers the OAS, while the Nicaraguans would go to the 
United Nations is not merely a matter of taste, nor is it surprising 
that the other parties have not yet defined how they expect any 
agreement to be enforced. For how all of these questions are ultimately 
decided will in effect shape the outcome in Central America. 
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IV. WHAT IS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE? 
It is a diplomatic process calling for a comprehensive regional 
settlement in Central America, launched by the foreign ministers of r~exico, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama at a meeting on Contadora Island off 
the coast of Panama in January, 1983. It has been unanimously endorsed 
by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community, as 
well as the governments of Spain and the United States. Under its 
auspices a series of meetings have been held at the ministerial and 
vice-ministerial level, as well as one conclave of Contadora chiefs 
of state in Cancun, Mexico in July. The most recent Contadora meeting 
in Panama City September 7-9, produced a 21-point 11 0ocument of Objectives .. , 
essentially a compilation of points found in all of the peace plans 
(Section III, above). This approach--seeking, as it were, the lowest 
common denominator--does not resolve existing differences but at 
least keeps Contadora alive, which at present all parties to the 
process appear to favor. 
V. WHO ARE THE CONTADORA PLAYERS AND WHAT ARE THEIR OBJECTIVES? 
(a) The Contadora Four. 
MEXICO. Mexico's basic view is that the Central American crisis 
is the product of centuries of socio-economic backwardness and political 
oppression. While acknowledging the role of outside forces (e.g., Cuba 
and others), it minimizes their importance, and insists that the entire 
thrust of regional diplomacy should address itself to presumed root 
causes rather than ephemeral politico-military 11 fixes 11 • 
The Mexicans also believe that it is possible to co-opt important 
sectors of the revolutionary left, and in so doing presumably moderate 
their political views and wean them away from the Cubans and the Soviets. 
They profess to believe that U. S. policy has precisely the opposite 
effect, although in fact the Mexicans are not particularly bothered 
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by what for Washington would be the 11 Worst case 11 scenario--the Cubanization 
of much of Central America. For them this would be preferable either 
to overt U. S. military intervention, or even, extended assistance 
to the Salvadoran government or the counter-revolutionaries in and 
around Nicaragua. Until quite recently (actually, the September 7-9 
meeting of Contadora in Panama City), the Mexicans have abstained 
from advancing democracy and pluralism as one of the conditions 
for settlement, and they have generally been the sturdiest pro-Nicaraguan 
element of the Contadora coalition. Whether this represents a 
permanent shift in Mexican policy remains to be seen; if it does, 
the implications are highly significant. 
Although this position has elicited much resonance in the 
American liberal community, it should be noted that there are concrete 
limits to Mexican pragmatism. What is perfectly acceptable for El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, or even Honduras is somewhat less so for Guatemala, 
a state With which Mexico maintains a long and inadequately policed 
boundary and from whence there is a constant flow of i 11 ega 1 migrants. 
The activities of guerrillas on both sides of the border has led to 
a significant increase in Mexico's military presence in the states of 
Chiapas and Campeche, and what is more, quiet but effective cooperation 
with the:.armed forces and government of Guatemala. 
Mexico's objectives are two-fold: (1) to stake out a position which 
will provide an alternative to the dominant U. S. presence in the area, 
and (2) to defuse criticism of domestic policies by its own left. The 
latter is particularly important at a time when the imperatives of 
economic austerity threaten to undermine the country's political 
stability. Mexico•s revolutionary posturing in world affairs has also 
purchased a long period of peace with the Cubans, who have foreborne from 
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supporting there the kind of destabilizing activities they have been caught 
sponsoring in Colombia and Venezuela. Within this framework, the 
Contadora process has the additional virtue of keeping the United 
States at the conference table, from which it presumably would be 
unable to act unilaterally, guarantees the survival of a Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua, and holds out at least the possibility of a 
negotiated U. S. withdrawal, which for Mexico would probably be its 
11 best case .. scenario. 
VENEZUELA. As the major democracy in the region, Venezuela has 
long been interested in the nurturing of free political systems about 
its immediate periphery. It shares Mexico's oft-stated repugnance 
for oppressive, unrepresentative regimes, but regards democratic 
pluralism as the proper remedy. Venezuela also hopes to avoid either 
regional war or unilateral U. S. intervention, but regards the victory 
of the revolutionary left as an equally undesirable outcome. It 
also views the Cuban role in far less benevolent terms, but is fearful 
of taking too strong a stand against Castro for fear of becoming 
involved in quarrels with the Eastern bloc, with whom it maintains a full 
and productive commercial relationship. Also, ~n order to maintain 
its credibility at home, the Venezuelan government must avoid identifying 
too closely with the United States, although on Central American policy 
there are in fact many important areas of convergence. 
With Sandinista Nicaragua Venezuela can be said to have walked 
the extra mile: it was frankly supportive of the revolution against 
Somoza, offered aid with no political strings attached to the infant 
Government of National Reconstruction (GRN), and has continued (along 
with Mexico) to provide it with oil on the same preferential basis as 
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it does other Central American countries. It was hoped that these actions 
would obtain for Caracas an important lever of influence with the new 
regime in Managua; this has not proven to be the case. Consequently, 
Caracas has quietly begun to assist democratic elements in the 
labor movement, church, universities, and business community, while 
publicly insisting that it has not given up on the GRN. In El 
Salvador, Venezuela strongly supported the provisional government of 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, largely because of common ties to Christian 
Democracy, but since Duarte•s replacement after the March, 1982 
elections, Venezuelan enthusiasm for the regime in San Salvador has 
no tab 1 y receded. 
Venezuelan objectives in the area are (1) to preserve democracy 
in Costa Rica and Honduras, and to encourage openings in Guatemala 
and greater movement in El Salvador; (2) the 11 domestication 11 of the 
Nicaraguan revolution and its gradual turn towards pluralism, (3) 
reduction of outside influence in the area, particularly military 
influence, from whatever source; (4) isolation of Central America•s 
problems from the East-West conflict, and (5) the forging of a regional 
consensus. In this connection Venezuela prefers to preserve unity 
among the Contadora Four even at the risk of foregoing concrete 
achievement. 
COLOMBIA. In the Contadora process, Colombia has assumed an 
unaccustomed role in the region, one it previously claimed it did 
not want. The Betancur administration seems less interested in resolving 
concrete issues, however, than in bringing about a harmonious (but 
unspecified) outcome. Colombian objectives are thus simple, undramatic, 
and also rather unilluminating: (1) to assure that the Central American 
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nations are able to work out their own differences among themselves, 
independent of East-West tensions, and (2) to bring an end to outside 
involvement. Colombia is only lukewarm to the U. S. notion of linking 
reduction of tensions to the democratization of Nicaragua. 
Colombia's position, vague though it may be, rests upon a very 
broad .domestic consensus. For both the Center-Right and Center-Left, 
peace in Central America on almost. any terms is preferable to continued 
conflict, with its attendant risks. For the Center-Left, it implies 
the preservation and consolidation of the Sandinista regime, and 
--if accompanied by a U. S. withdrawal and the suspension of military 
aid--the collapse of the Salvadoran government. (Guatemala and Honduras 
are regarded as ripening fruits that will fall eventually of their 
own accord.) For the Center-Right, peace means the preservation 
--for now, at least--of the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Costa Rica. It also eliminates the embarrassing 
necessity of having to comment on any unilateral U. S. action or to 
choose up sides between the United States on one hand, and Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and the Soviets on the other. 
PANAMA. Of all of the Contadora nations, Panama is most fascinated 
by the process, since it is anxious to promote itself as a venue for 
international diplomacy. On the substantive issues it is vague and 
erratic, largely a reflection of its fragmented domestic politics, 
in which pro-Cuban~lements are--within the government itself, if not 
among the general public--at least as strong as those in the Center or 
on the Right. Although in recent months the Panamanians privately 
have been far more supportive and understanding of U. S. policy 
than their public postures would suggest, a slight shift within the 






(b) The Central American Core Four. 
GUATEMALA. Initially this country was not receptive to the 
Contadora process because it felt it had little to gain from the intro-
mission of other Latin American countries into strictly Central American 
matters; in particular, it resents Mexico, not merely for its public 
embrace of the Sandinistas and the retlels in El Salvador, but from 
longer-term suspicions of a more powerful foreign neighbor. It has 
always rejected the notion of bilateral relations with Nicaragua, 
against whom it favors a unified approach by the Core Four. 
HONDURAS. A strong proponent of Core Four unity against Nicaragua 
as well, Honduras nonetheless fears that El Salvador and Costa Rica 
might be unreliable partners, and attempt to make a separate deal 
with Managua. It also harbors apprehensions that Guatemala might 
act in some precipitous fashion which would sunder the alliance. 
In general it views the OAS as an alternative should Contadora break 
down, and has used that forum effectively to make a well-documented 
case against Nicaraguan aggression. 
COSTA RICA. This country is the strongest advocate of pluralism 
and democracy in the isthmus, and therefore somewhat embarrassed to be 
linked with Guatemala in even a provisional diplomatic alliance. 
At the same time, it profoundly regrets the outcome of the Nicaraguan 
revolution, which it strongly supported. Towards the latter country it 
pursues a two-track policy--repeatedly expressing interest in a negotiating 
solution, while winking at anti-Sandinista activities on its own soil. 
In general, Costa Rica has strong feelings of insecurity that the 
Contadora initiative does not alleviate. It cannot withdraw from the 
process without appearing to be the spoiler, but it fears that any 
agreement to which the Nicaraguans are a party will be worthless, 
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eventually leaving them to face alone the full force of Sandinista wrath. 
EL SALVADOR. In principle this tiny, embattled republic has favored 
a regional approach, but regards Contadora mainly as a 11 tension-
relieving11 mechanism. The Salvadorans share the Guatemalan view that 
a final peace agreement should come from the Central American countries 
themselves, with the Contadora Four merely acting in a ratifying role. 
The common objective of the Core Four is to end Nicaraguan support 
for Salvadoran guerrillas and to promote movement towards democracy 
in Nicaragua itself. Only if the Contadora process can produce this 
result will it be regarded by them as a success. 
(c) Other parties to the Contadora process~ 
NICARAGUA. Before the launching of the Contadora initiative, 
Managua persisted in the view that its outstanding foreign policy problems 
should be resolved bilaterally--with Honduras on one hand and the 
United States on the other. (Although it has repeatedly denied 
misconduct with respect to its Central American neighbors, it has 
always insisted that such issues are the proper subject of state~to-
state negotiations.) 
However, because the Contadora initiative has won the endorsement 
of so many governments, the Nicaraguans have been forced to at least 
nominally support it. Under the pressure of the U. S. military presence 
in Honduras, Managua now offers to agree to a multilateral reduction 
of arms shipments to El Salvador. Unfortunately, nothing in that 
proposal alleviates Core Four concerns over implementation or 
verification of any agreements the Nicaraguans might sign. 
For the Nicaraguans, a successful conclusion to the Contadora 
process would be an end to counter-revolutionary activities based in 
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Honduras and Costa Rica, tacit U. S. recognition of the sanctity of its 
own revolutionary process, and a free hand in the region, not subject 
to external sanctions, or, at any rate, not amenable to enforcement under 
any document or agreement. 
CUBA. The Cubans are in much the same position on Contadora as 
the Nicaraguans. While they have no parti·cular interest in the peaceful 
resolution of regional conflict, they find it convenient to endorse 
the initiative, since it obligates them to nothing particular, and 
to desist would render them vulnerable to serious criticism in 
Latin America and Western Europe. Havana's objectives are virtually 
identical with those of Managua, with the additional wrinkle that 
any peace conference to which Castro were invited, there to sit along-
side other hemispheric chiefs of statei would be valued as one more 
step out of the isolation in which he has languished since the 
imposition of OAS sanctions twenty years ago. Apart from this, the 
Cubans appreciate Contadora for much the same reason as the Mexicans--
presumably it restrains the United States from taking precipitous 
action against Nicaragua, or even against Cuba itself. 
THE UNITED STATES. The United States has been favorably disposed 
to the Contadora approach from its inception, because it has engendered 
a spirit of unity among the Central American Core Four, and because 
it has preempted other efforts to resolve the crisis, particularly 
by the Nicaraguans, Soviets, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to move 
discussions to the United Nations. Further, by devising their own 
initiative, the Contadora Four have been forced to take an active 
responsibili·cy for dialogue, facing the reality that a perfect solution 
cannot be precooked. It also relieves the United States of considerable 
domestic and international pressure to produce a result of its own> 
which in any case--just because of its unilateral character--would be 
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difficult to sell to the Contadora powers. 
U. S. difficulty with the Contadora Four is not difficult to explain. 
(1) Above all the U. S. is interested in bringing the process to a 
definite conclusion, and as such is willing to risk failure in order 
to pin down specifics. (2) One of the four U. S. objectives--the spread 
of democratic pluralism--arouses no great interest in Mexico, or even 
in Colombia and Panama. The other three U. S. objectives (non-intervention, 
removal of the conflict from the East-West confrontation, and the 
promotion of long-term economic development in Central America) sound 
unobjectionable. But the U. S. interprets non-intervention to 
include a ban on support for subversive elements seeking to destabilize 
other countries, to which Nicaragua, Cuba, and to some extent Mexico 
could be expected to take umbrage, at least if applied across the board. 
Washington also understands that the most efficient way to isolate 
the conflict from larger strategic struggles is to accomplish the 
ve·rifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers, 
and a certifiable freeze on the acquisition of offensive armaments. 
Both of these presuppose rather complicated enforcement mechanisms 
that so far no Contadora country has been willing to contemplate. 
President Reagan's insistence that the four U. S. objectives are 
11 inextricably interrelated .. in his letter to the Contadora presidents 
on July 25, 1983 adds an additional, discomfiting measure of 
specificity to the U. S. position. 
(d) Analysis of the Contadora process. Since the Contadora 
initiative was launched in January, the distinguishing characteristic 
of more than half a dozen meetings has been an inability to reach 
a working consensus. The principal difficulties have been 
(1) the initial refusal of Nicaragua to deal with the 
Core Four except on an individual basis; 
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(2) Costa Rica's attempt--unsuccessful because of Mexican 
opposition--to obtain a permanent border/observer 
force to assure its neutrality and protect it from 
Nicaraguan incursions; 
(3) the inability to agree on an agenda for ministerial 
and vice-ministerial meetings; 
(4) the excessively general framework of Contadora 
declarations (e.g., the Cancun declaration); 
(5) the constant unwillingness of the parties to grapple 
with mechanisms of verification and control. 
VI. WHAT WOULD A CONTADORA-BASED SOLUTION LOOK LIKE? 
There are three possible variations. 
A Mexican-Nicaraguan version, with the benevolent approval of Cuba. 
The key provision would be the withdrawal of foreign military advisers 
and forces, and the right of each country to its own form of government 
(
11 ideological pluralism"). Conceivably such a plan could win the support 
of Colombia and Panama, although it would have to be sold to the U. S. 
and Venezuelan governments, and virtually imposed upon the Central 
American Core Four. It would probably also disarm that segment of 
the U. S. Congress, press, and public critical of the present direction 
of American policy. 
If our sole objective in Central America is to find a graceful 
and immediate method of disengagement, then this is a perfectly conceivable 
option. However, if we retain even a residual concern for the stability 
and democratic evolution of the countries concerned (leaving aside 
the issue of their international orientation) it can only work if 
(a) the Nicaraguans live up to whatever agreements they sign, and (b) 
that no enforcement mechanisms are necessary, or that all parties 
can agree to them if they are. 
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The dangers of this option are not merely that it may fai 1 in its 
primary objective (to bring peace to the area), but even in its 
presumptive secondary goals (remove Central America from the East-
West conflict, enhance U. S. credibility, promote democratic institutions 
and human rights). It also runs the serious risk of provoking a 
backlash in U. S. opinion, since the most articulate voices so far 
have been those of a minority not particularly representative of 
our people as a whole. Since the plan would have to be imposed 
upon an unwilling Central American Core Four, in all likelihood 
it would destabilize the governments concerned and provoke the 
further flight of resources and persons from the area. 
A U. $.-Venezuelan version, the centerpiece of which would 
be the gradual opening of political processes throughout the region 
towards pluralism and democracy where presently nonexistent. This 
would require negotiation past some very formidable diplomatic 
obstacles, including Mexican, Nicaraguan and Cuban resistance, 
Colombian reticence, and Panamanian ambivalence. Presumably, it 
would have the strong support of the Central American Core Four, 
particularly if accompanied by a significant economic aid package. 
It would be easily defensible before U. S. public opinion. 
This option can only succeed, however, if several of the major 
players--particularly Mexico--can be persuaded to alter their position. 
It also assumes that the Nicaraguans are so fearful of a U. S. 
invasion that they would be willing to hold elections even at the 
calculated risk of losing them. It will also require a rather 
extensive supervisory mechanism, which, to be fully effective, would 
have to contravene long-held notions of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Presumably a third version would be negotiations on a step-by-step 
basis, engaging all of the parties in a process from which none could 
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escape, and which would develop a momentum which would carry them (and 
the process itself) to a successful conclusion. We say 11 presumably 11 
because, unfortunately, even this could not be done without making 
critical choices which would be bound to imperil the process itself. 
The advantage of this approach is that it puts off the difficult 
questions until later to work on the more tractable problems now, 
without foreclosing any possibilities. The disadvantage is that 
practically all of the relevant issues are difficult and fraught 
with implications for the future. It would prolong the negotiating 
process and therefore postpone the search for alternatives. But 
during that time, the situation could deteriorate on the ground in 
such a way as to make the entire process nothing but an academic 
exercise. 
VII. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES IF CONTADORA FAILS? 
They are not many. (1) We could attempt to form a new, ad hoc 
negotiating framework, but it could not conceivably exclude Mexico 
or Nicaragua. (2) We could respond to Nicaraguan calls for bilateral 
negotiations, but this would isolate us from our Central American 
allies without necessarily producing a desired result. (3) We could 
simply withdraw from the Central American theater altogether, urging 
all of the parties to work out whatever solution they could devise. 
Unfortunately, this would lead neither to peace nor pluralism, and 
it would not remove the area from the East-West conflict. (4) We 
could recur to the OAS as the proper venue for discussions. This is 
precisely what the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives 
has already mandated in the Wright Amendment to the Boland-Zablocki 
Bill (HR 2760), which calls upon the President to seek a prompt 
recovening of the Organ of Consultation to discuss Nicaragua•s failure 
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to meet its commitments to the OAS and for violating hemispheric norms 
relative to respect for the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors. 
It also urges the President to use the OAS to 11 Seek resolution of 
the conflicts in Central America based on the provisions of the Final 
Act of the San Jose Conference of October, 1982, especially principles ... 
relating to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, 
denying support for terrorist and subversive elements in other 
states, and the nternational supervision of fully verifiable arrangements." 
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Long-Range Diplomatic and Political Options 
Factors External to Central America 
Robert E. Hunter 
Introduction 
This discussion paper will look at long-range U.S. diplomatic 
and political options for Central America primarily from the perspective 
of external factors -- in particular, the roles of the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, and Western Europe. It is designed to help the Commission in 
examining witnesses on this subject by posing some central issues, 
raising questions, and exploring some particular options. 
This paper is based on four premises: 
First, that a direct military solution to current U.S. problems 
in Central America is indeed possible. However, that would impose 
certain costs: a) going in, in terms of U.S. public attitudes, u.s. 
casualties, and reaction within the Hemisphere and among allies abroad; 
and b) coming out, perhaps including long-term U.S. occupation of 
particular countries and alienation of a number of Latin American 
countries. If we are not prepared to pay those costs, then alternative 
approaches need to be considered. 
Second, that any successful strategy will need to include a 
combination of military, political, and economic approaches and 
instruments. With broad bipartisan backing, this combination could 
be an effective assertion of American power in all its aspects. 
Third, that any strategy will probably be messy, and will 
challenge the American ability to manage any approach with subtlety 
over many years. 
Fourth, that any u.s. political and diplomatic strategy developed 
for the region should meet several tests. It should: 
promote u.s. interests; 
be easily understood by the u.s. public and by others; 
be able to gain broad bipartisan support in the United States; 
have a reasonable chance of being sustained over many years 
e.g., in view of developments within the region and of changes in 
U.S. administrations; 
-- gain sufficient support within the region and alsewhere in 
Latin America (e.g., in Mexico) to make it practicable; and 
--preserve other u.s. interests in the world -- e.g., in 
the Western alliance and East-West relations. 
However, a viable, long-range diplomatic and political strategy 
for Central America cannot be developed in the abstract. It will 
depend, in the first instance, on answers to at least two sets of 
prior questions: 
First, what are our basic goals for the region? The following 
choices, roughly in descending order of importance to the United 
States, are most evident: 
-- to prevent military intrusion by the Soviet Union and/or 
Cuba in Central America-- i.e., defining the region as "off limits" 
in this respect; 
-- to prevent any other use of the region as a base for Soviet/ 
Cuban expansion at the expense of U.S. interests; 
-- to contain the spread of violent revolution, or of other 
destabilization within the region that poses risks to u.s. interests; 
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to shape evolution and change within the region in ways 
that are supportive of u.s. interests; and 
to ensure the development of free, democratic, and 
pluralistic nations throughout the region. 
Clearly, the kinds of diplomatic and political options that 
should be considered by the United States will depend on how much 
we want to achieve -- in effect, the "bottom line" in terms of our 
interests, preferences, and capabilities. 
Second, do we have any real choice in the degree to which we 
will be involved in the region, and how much control we will need 
and want to exercise in diplomacy and other activities related to it? 
This question reflects a basic debate in the United States, in three 
parts: 
Are we able and willing to create a framework that will permit 
us in time to "step back" from deep involvement in the region? Or 
will we both want and have to continue playing a central role in the 
region whatever specific arrangements are made for it? 
-- Are we prepared to help establish a diplomatic and political 
framework and share major responsibility both for its structure and 
its conduct-- e.g., with Contadora or European countries? Or will 
we want to assume primary responsibility for any ongoing diplomatic 
and political efforts, largely tailored to our designs? 
-- Assuming that we were able to create conditions in which 
the region is not used by the Soviet Union, Cuba, or states like 
Nicaragua against regional countries or other u.s. interests, are 
we prepared as a nation to accept whatever developments take place 
within individual societies, whether or not we like them? Or will we 
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inevitably want to play a significant role in the internal politics 
of regional countries -- e.g., to prevent a Marxist-Leninist or other 
objectionable regime from taking hold? 
At the moment, this debate is most important in terms of the 
extent to which the United States is prepared to tolerate regimes 
such as that in Nicaragua, without employing sufficient military means 
to bring about their decisive internal change. For purposes of this 
discussion of political and diplomatic options, the premise of this 
paper is that we could accept such regimes. Of course, this premise 
may not be valid: for example, we may not be prepared to see any 
objectionable regimes in the Hemisphere other than that in Cuba; and 
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the concept of "revolution without frontiers" may mean that this premise 
conflicts with other u.s. objectives in the region, such as preventing 
Nicaragua from acting against its neighbors. But assuming the opposite 
implies that our focus, at least to gain short-term results, would 
need to be less on politics and diplomacy and more on other instruments, 
especially military force and other punitive measures -- subjects of 
other Commission hearings. 
The importance of these prior questions will be reflected in 
the issues, questions, and options that follow. 
Issue I: Soviet Involvement 
There is little dispute in the United States about the need 
to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a direct military 
presence in the Western Hemisphere, beyond its long-standing involvement 
in Cuba which, while not preferred by the United States, has been 
tolerated for more than two decades. There is also widespread support 
in the United States for limiting Soviet capacity to meddle within 
the region in ways that would be invidious to our interests -- e.g., 
in fomenting revolutions that would produce regimes hostile to us and 
to regional states or in promoting cross-border destabilization. 
Debate in the United States polarizes around the extent to which the 
Soviet factor is central to regional problems, around the level of 
Soviet involvement that is "tolerable," and around the costs of 
reducing or eliminating Soviet involvement. 
For the past several years, the Soviet Union has seen its 
involvement in the region as a low-cost, relatively low-risk, and 
potentially high-payoff policy. In terms of Central America itself, 
very little has been required in economic resources, as opposed to 
the high costs of direct aid to Cuba. In part through the use of 
proxies, Moscow has been confident that it could manage its exposure 
to prevent any basic crisis in relations with the United States or 
the Western allies in areas of the world intrinsically more important 
to it. Through the use of proxies and through the gradualism of 
its tactics, it has also been able to escape any real opprobrium within 
the Hemisphere, and thus has had considerable flexibility. Thus the 
opportunity to exploit problems for the United States in our own 
backyard a) to distract our attention and resources; b) to cause 
tensions within the Western alliance; and c) to try revitalizing the 
Soviet image as being in the revolutionary vanguard -- has been too 
valuable to pass up. 
So far, the Soviet Union has been reluctant itself to challenge 
the United States directly in areas beyond the Soviet periphery, 
despite the rise in Soviet conventional military capabilities and 
global reach. In Central America, the Soviet Union is also handicapped 
by a poor capacity to project military power. Yet there is debate in 
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the United States about whether that caution will continue to prevail 
for the foreseeable future. Similarly, at the moment the Soviets have 
made no commitments to countries in Central America that could not 
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be abandoned without serious loss of face. This is in marked contrast 
to Cuba, where Soviet commitment is evident despite the lack of a Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation. Yet there is debate about whether the 
Soviet Union will increasingly commit resources and run risks to ensure 
that friendly regimes, once established, cannot be overthrown. At the 
extreme, will the Brezhnev Doctrine be extended to the Western 
Hemisphere? 
These points thus pose a central issue: is it important for 
the United States, now, to establish clear limits on Soviet 
involvement in Central America in order to reduce the chances of larger 
problems later on? Is there, indeed, a basic issue of Soviet challenge 
and u.s. credibility in the Hemisphere that will have implications for 
other parts of the world? Alternatively, is Soviet interest in the 
region a) so ephemeral that a strong demonstration of u.s. will would 
reduce or end Moscow's role, or b) so responsive to our actions and 
consistency of purpose that a sustained policy would do the job? 
Judgments on these questions are critical to the future of u.s. 
diplomacy. 
In addition to assessments about Soviet motives and the depths 
of Soviet involvement, key questions include the following: 
,I Can the Soviet Union simply be warned off by the United 
States from challenging our primacy in the region ("sphere of 
influence")? 
' Can diplomatic and political efforts to reduce or eliminate 
Soviet meddling be expected to work unless things first change "on 
the ground"? That is, must there first be efforts either to dry up 
Soviet opportunities through political, economic, and social progress 
in particular regional states, to thwart Soviet objectives through 
military success, or to pursue some combination of the two? 
~~ Can we make distinctions between imposing limits on Soviet/ 
Cuban military (or military supply) involvement in Central America and 
accepting continued political support for revolutions like that in 
Nicaragua? 
~~ Can we reach broader understandings with the Soviet Union, 
involving other aspects of East-West relations, that could lead to 
a significant reduction or end to Soviet activity in Central America? 
' Do we have the capacity to orchestrate approaches towards 
the Soviet Union-- e.g., in raising risks-- without producing 
unacceptable responses in u.s. public opinion, from the Congress, 
among our allies, or in the Hemisphere? 
Selected Options 
Bearing these questions in mind, options for the United States 
in trying to shape Soviet behavior within the region include the 
following. We could: 
1. Simply assert that Central America is "off limits" to the 
Soviets. This could include asserting our primacy in the region, 
opposing Soviet introduction of weapons and advisors, and countering 
any application of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Central America. 
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For: This would put the Soviets on notice of our concerns -- and 
indeed, we have been following this option. If backed by a sustainable, 
overall policy for the region that gains broad bipartisan backing, 
the Soviets could get the message. Talking itself need not imply 
giving the Soviets legitimacy in the region. 
Against: Absent such a sustainable policy and results "on the 
ground," it would be hard to make this approach credible, except 
perhaps with regard to heavy weapons that heighten Soviet visibility. 
The Soviets would also make similar demands with regard to other 
regions. 
2. Try to isolate the Soviet Union within the Hemisphere 
through a sustained campaign of presenting the facts of Soviet 
involvement and ambitions. 
For: This could alert leaders and attentive publics in the 
Hemisphere to the Soviet role and, if successful, could reduce our 
own relative isolation on this question. As with President Reagan's 
handling of the Korean Air Lines incident, it could multilateralize 
opposition to Soviet actions. The Soviets' flexibility would thereby 
be reduced, and they could not as easily hide behind proxies. 
Against: It would not be easy to establish u.s. credibility. 
In addition, we would also need to demonstrate that we were paying 
adequate a~tention to regional and internal realities-- i.e., not 
just trying to shift the burden of the problem onto Soviet shoulders. 
3. Attempt to strike a global "deal" with the Soviet Union 
that would reduce or eliminate its involvement in Central America. 
For: Moscow would likely accept this approach, since it is in 
line with its concept of spheres of influence. It would also revive 
the concept of "rules of the road" in the behavior of the two 
superpowers. It would be more likely to be effective at a time of 
greatly reduced East-West tensions overall, in which the Soviets might 
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see attractions in the positive aspects of u.s.-soviet relations, in 
general. 
Against: Efforts to strike a global deal with the Soviet Union 
would beg the question of trade-offs on our part. Moscow would 
demand u.s. restraint in areas in contention where it has much to 
gain and we have much to lose-- e.g., in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, 
or involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The Soviets would gain 
significant advantages, while only giving up a secondary objective of 
its overall strategy. Our acknowledging the validity of spheres of 
influence would represent a substantial Soviet gain. 
4. Abrogate the u.s.-soviet understandings on Cuba as a means 
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of applying political pressure. These understandings, developed tnrough 
a variety of channels over several years, can be summarized as our 
not invading Cuba and the Soviets' not basing offensive weapons in 
Cuba. However, we could assert privately that Soviet/Cuban activities 
elsewhere in the region have implicitly violated these understandings 
and that henceforth they are null and void. This option does not 
depend on whether the Soviets have indeed violated the understandings; 
that pdint could simply be asserted. 
For: This option might force the Soviets to decide whether 
retaining their position in Cuba is worth more than continuing their 
activities elsewhere in the region. 
Against: The Soviets could respond by increasing their military 
presence in Cuba or elsewhere in the region, although this- could raise 
the stakes beyond Soviet interests in the region as a whole. More 
important, the Soviets would recognize that we will not accept the 
political or human costs of using military action against Cuba. The 
declaration could also be turned against us for propaganda advantage 
within the hemisphere, within the Western alliance, and in U.S. 
politics. The Soviets could also respond in some other region of 
their choosing -- e.g., in the Middle East or diplomatically over 
Berlin. 
A variant of this approach would be to tailor our overall 
strategy towards trying to pose a choice for the Soviet Union 
between increasing its involvement in the region and suffering a 
visible defeat, without calling into question the understandings on 
Cuba, itself. This would depend heavily on results "on the ground" in 
individual Central American countries. 
5. Extend the u.s.-soviet understandings on Cuba to the rest 
of the region, with "non-interference" the rule on both sides. 
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For: This could embed the Soviet Union in specific undertakings 
not to provide military weapons, advisors, and training, or to establish 
military bases, in exchange for establishing the legitimacy of the 
Nicaraguan regime and the outcome of any other changes in Central 
America and the Caribbean. 
Against: The Soviet Union would gain legitimacy as a power in 
the region, and there could be interminable squabbles over Soviet/proxy 
violations, especially in cross-border subversion, covert action, and 
traffic in small arms. Similar arguments about Soviet legitimacy 
would apply to our permitting Moscow to subscribe to a regional economic 
and political framework. 
A variant of this option would be to seek agreement on limitation 
of heavy weapons and modern aircraft, if Soviet abstention cannot be 
achieved by simple assertion of our primacy in the region. This would 
not, however, deal with the small arms and efforts at subversion that 
are also important. 
6. "Link" Soviet behavior in the region to other aspects of 
East-West relations, especially where we have advantages. We could, 
for example, step up support for insurgents in Afghanistan and be 
more assertive in opposing Soviet ventures elsewhere in the Third 
World. 
For: Such a strategy would require the Soviets to assess their 
priorities and could turn the question of diverted u.s. attention on 
its head. In addition, the Soviets have so far shown most concern 
for protecting core positions rather than the periphery i.e., with 
most emphasis on Cuba, Vietnam, and to an extent Syria. 
Against: Linkage implies that we have advantages in other 
areas, which may not always be the case; indeed, the Soviets could 
respond in areas of their choosing. As in the past, a declared 
strategy of linkage would also raise concerns in Western Europe and 
in u.s. public opinion. This would be particularly true if limiting 
the pursuit of arms control agreements were included in any linkage. 
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A more direct and more credible option would be to try denying 
the Soviet Union successes within Central America, itself. The Soviets 
can also not be sure that u.s. shows of force-- e.g., naval maneuvers 
are only that. 
A further variant of linkage, however, is the issue of political 
facts of life-- e.g., if a Soviet role in Central America were 
perceived in u.s. politics as making agreement on arms control 
impossible, as with SALT II and Afghanistan. 
7. Counter the Soviet role through a strategy focussed on 
the problems of the region and based on a regional framework for 
security plus social and economic progress. 
For: Putting the primary U.S. focus not on Soviet invqlvement, 
but rather on a regional political and economic framework, would, if 
successful, radically decrease Soviet opportunities. If broadly 
supported within the United States, such a regional framework 
could also signal to the Soviets that the u.s. has a consistent and 
sustainable approach to the region-- i.e., that we know our interests 
and are prepared to back them up over many years. Moscow would be 
less likely to be confused by, to make miscalculations about, or to 
exploit, changes in u.s. administrations. 
Against: A regional security, political, and economic approach 
may not work sufficiently well by itself, especially with continuing 
Soviet and Cuban efforts to obstruct and undermine it. 
Issue II: Cuban Involvement 
It is generally accepted that Cuba has so far had more of a 
stake in promoting revolutionary change in Central America than has 
the Soviet Union and that, indeed, Cuba took the lead in Nicaragua 
285. 
and in asserting the validity of violent revolution. For the Soviets, 
meddling in the region may have appeared to be a low-cost, low-risk, 
and potentially high-payoff tactic in a global struggle with the United 
States in a region peripheral to central Soviet concerns. For Castro 
the export of revolution has been a basic reason for being, although 
there are contending "pragmatic" strains in Cuban leadership, as well. 
There is, however, considerable debate about "which is the dog 
and which is the tail" in the Soviet-Cuban relationship, in terms of 
specific tactics within the region, the direction of Communist bloc 
efforts, overall risks to be run, and the possible curtailing of 
subversive efforts. Debate turns on several key questions, including 
the following: 
~~ Even though Cuba was in the vanguard, will the Soviet Union 
now be consistent in its support of violent revolution in the region? 
Indeed, has it already flashed a caution light, whether for tactical 
or policy reasons, because of recent u.s. actions? 
' Would the Soviet Union try to constrain Cuban activities 
even if it were to constrain its own because of a shift in its basic 
calculations about costs, risks, and advantages? 
,! Could the Soviet Union constrain Castro-- e.g., through 
limiting the transshipment of military supplies -- or would Castro 
try to export revolution even in defiance of the Kremlin? Would, in 
fact, the Soviets be able and willing to bring Castro to heel, at 
risk of potentially jeopardizing today's terms of their involvement 
in Cuba? 
' Are there potential differences between the Soviet Union and 
Cuba elsewhere in the world that could be exploited with benefits 
in the region e.g., on the long-term value of violent revolution 
and the risks to be run on its behalf? 
There is a second major strand of u.s. debate concerning what 
would be possible in u.s.-Cuban relations. This debate has a long and 
checkered history, beginning with the Cuban Revolution and repeated 
at regular intervals ever since. Several administration have made 
efforts to change the terms of the u.s.-Cuban relationship. The debate 
has clustered around the following questions, among others: 
,! Does keeping Castro uncertain about whether we would use 
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military force against Cuba constrain his actions elsewhere? Or is 
he able to use such uncertainties to ga1n deeper support within Cuba 
and sympathy elsewhere in the region-- i.e., in defying the United 
States? 
' Could we wean Cuba away from the Soviet Union by lifting the 
embargo and providing the Cuban economy with an alternative source 
of direct economic support? That is, can Cuba be "Finlandized?" Or 
does the ideological character of the Castro regime make the Soviet 
Union and Cuba political bedfellows in any event? 
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,I Would lifting the embargo against Cuba or taking other positive 
steps help us elsewhere in the Hemisphere? Or would it simply signal 
inconsistency in our overall approach? 
' Is there any basis for a u.s.-Cuban "deal" in which the 
latter would be accorded economic benefits and greater legitimacy 
within the Hemisphere in exchange for curtailing its revolutionary 
activities elsewhere? Or is Castro committed to his line whatever the 
United States does? In effect, does Cuban policy have to be confounded 
"on the ground" in Central America and the Caribbean? 
Selected Options 
Bearing these questions in mind, options for the United States 
in dealing with the Cuban role in Central America include the 
following (this list does not include invading Cuba or imposing a 
blockade, on the assumption that these would impose costs that would 
not be politically sustainable at home or abroad): 
1. Try to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Cuba. 
This could entail a) efforts to raise the risks and/or lower the 
benefits to the Soviet Union of challenging the United States in the 
region-- e.g., through one or another form of linkage, countering 
Soviet efforts "on the ground," or creating an effective regional 
framework~ b) dealing over Cuba's head with the Soviets (as in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis): c) trying to wean Cuba from the Soviet embrace: 
or d) trying to exploit any Soviet-Cuban differences beyond the 
immediate region-- e.g., in Ethiopia or in Angola. 
For: Any successful effort to split basic Soviet and Cuban 
policy towards the region could reduce the overall threat and sow 
confusion in basic bloc policy. 
Against: The mechanisms for achieving this goal are not clear. 
Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is critical at home and would be 
a constraining force elsewhere -- even though, in any "client" 
relationship, the client also has leverage. And this may simply be 
a case of the wish being father to the thought. 
2. Lift the trade embargo against Cuba, and potentially offer 
some economic aid as part, for example, of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. 
For: This might have some limited, positive effect in the region 
in reducing the impact of Cuban propaganda against u.s. "imperialism." 
Simply lifting the embargo could create some domestic discontent in 
Cuba in the likely event that trade with the United States would not 
develop to any real degree. 
Against: If past Cuban positions are a valid guide, Castro would 
be unwilling to trade anything for this u.s. concession. Any gains 
elsewhere in the region would not likely be substantial. This shift 
in u.s. policy would be hard to justify at home, politically, unless 
Cuba did indeed change its behavior not only in Central America but· 
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also in Angola and elsewhere. Without substantial u.s. aid -- the 
Soviets now provide close to $5 billion annually -- this would 
not jeopardize the Soviet-Cuban connection and up to a point could 
be welcomed in Moscow. Cuban trade with other Western countries is 
already 30%, and has had no impact on Cuba's behavior. And the West 
would have to extend credits to make trade meaningful, with problems 
somewhat analogous to credits provided to other bloc countries. 
Variants of this approach would be a) to lift the embargo on 
medical supplies, which would have propaganda advantages in the 
Hemisphere; b) to work towards normalized immigration; or c) to open 
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up travel to Cuba and family contacts, thus focussing on the "successor 
generation" in Cuba and working for long-term change. Travel would, 
however, provide foreign exchange to Cuba, and Castro may be able to 
handle an influx of visitors better than before. 
3. Pursue a two-track policy of a) lifting the embargo -- in 
whole or in part -- and/or travel restrictions, plus perhaps also 
offering economic assistance or credits with political strings attached 
concerning Cuba's external behavior; and b) opposing Cuban ventures 
abroad -- both in the region and in places like Angola -- through 
a combination of political, economic, and military instruments. This 
could also include setting up Radio Marti. 
For: This would have the advantages of Option 2, and would also 
polarize Cuba's choices more clearly. In the event that Cuban export 
of revolution were being beaten "on the ground," this would provide 
some face-saving for Castro and might be the basis of a long-run deal, 
including such things as air piracy and the Soviet intelligence base 
in Cuba. It could also provide a basis for working on the "successor 
generation" in Cuba. 
Against: A two-track policy would pose many of the difficulties 
in political explanation that attend the duality of u.s.-soviet 
relations-- e.g., understanding Soviet brutality but also recognizing 
the need for arms control. If Cuban activities were being thwarted 
within the region, there would be little need for the positive step. 
And for Cuba to consider any long-term deal would probably also require 
our keeping "hands off" Nicaragua, as well as places like Grenada. 
4. Invite Cuba to join any larger political and economic 
framework for the region as a whole. 
For: This would have propaganda advantages in the region, and 
would show a good-faith attempt to embed Cuba in a regional system. 
Against: Cuba would exploit this position to try undermining 
any regional arrangements and to call into question U.S. compliance, 
while continuing its own subversive activities. Castro would gain 
legitimacy without changing his nature. 
5. Counter the Cuban role through a strategy focussed on the 
problems of the region and based on a regional framework for security 
plus social and economic progress. 
For: This approach could decrease Cuba's opportunities for 
meddling in regional developments by putting it in the position of 
opposing gains for all Central American states. This would be 
especially true if the approach were couched in terms of support for 
democracy and non-interference. With proper safeguards, it would also 
push Cuba back onto indirect methods of subversion. 
Against: Given its position in the region and its ideological 
fervor, Cuba would be in a better position than the Soviet Union to 
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confound regional arrangements, especially during a period of uncertain 
social and political change within individual Central American states. 
Issue III: West European Concerns and Involvement 
u.s. involvement in Central America is only beginning to achieve 
real saliency in Western Europe, where in general there is a greater 
focus on more pressing problems and developments. Knowledge of 
Central America is also sparse, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal the 
best informed. In general, there is a spectrum of opinion from 
north to south in Europe, with greatest emotional reactions against 
u.s. policy in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, and somewhat 
greater appreciation of U.S. dilemmas among the Latin countries, 
especially because of the direct experience of Socialist governments 
in dealing with Communists. Some governments, like that of Mitterrand 
in France, can afford to be critical of the United States to appease 
their left-wing, because of the low saliency of Central America. There 
is also some division al9ng generational lines (the "successor 
generation"), analogous to nuclear debates. 
European political groups (plus elements of the Church) -- most 
notably the Socialist International -- have also been deeply involved 
in Central America, most often carrying poor signals in both directions: 
the value of the Central American radical left to Europe, and doubts 
on u.s. policy to Nicaragua and elsewhere. The SI has, however, become 
somewhat disillusioned as it has gained more experience with the 
Sandinistas. There has also been some sense of "saving the Americans 
from themselves," by offering an alternative to u.s. "irrationality" 
that could lead Nicaragua to the Cuban model. 
In general, European interest and concern can be expected to rise 
in step with increasing u.s. involvement, most particularly if u.s. 
troops were introduced. If experience elsewhere in the world is a 
reliable guide, most of the allies -- with some exceptions, depending 
on the character of individual governments -- would become concerned 
about three basic problems: 
,, that u.s. diplomatic and military attention will be diverted 
from West European problems to those of a region not seen as germane 
to European security, at least in the terms we have so far posed them; 
,, that the United States will take actions that will raise risks 
of military conflict and of worsening North-South relations, in general 
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i.e., that we can't be trusted to act responsibly. At the extreme 
there would be concern in Europe that a new Vietnam psychosis could 
develop among the American public, with implications for u.s. commitment 
to European problems and security; and 
,, that the United States will overemphasize the Soviet dimension 
of Central American problems, at risk to the benefits of relatively 
relaxed East-West tensions within Europe, itself, and perhaps also to 
arms control. 
At bottom, West European governments, in general, are likely to 
object less to u.s. actions in Central America that meet several tests: 
--u.s. policy must comport with overall u.s. interests, as 
comprehensible in Western Europe; 
-- It must be seen as consistent, sustainable, and having broad 
support within the United States; 
-- It should focus more on economic and political developments 
within the region, itself, and limit the use of military force to 
a clearly secondary role; and 
-- It must not divert u.s. attention, especially over the long-
term, from West European concerns; and it must not pose added dilemmas 
in East-West relations. 
Even then, it is not clear that any deep and active engagement 
of the United States in Central America, where that would entail direct 
u.s. involvement in military conflict, will prevent the rise of West 
European anxieties. If we had compelling reason to introduce u.s. 
forces, the price of the European reaction could be worth paying. If 
not, the European factor could be a severe constraint. 
There are several pertinent questions, including the following: 
' Can key West European governments and public opinion come 
to understand the issues involved in Central America for the United 
States and, by extension, for the West as a whole? Can European states 
come to accept u.s. definitions of appropriate responses, especially 
ones that entail the projection of military power? This has been 
difficult enough with regard to Persian Gulf security; how much more 
difficult will it be with regard to Central America, where so far the 
allies in general see few if any direct interests for them? 
' Can the United States tailor its approach to Central America 
to take account of West European anxieties and still get the job done 
however we define it? 
,I Will, indeed, U.s. involvement in Central America begin to 
impose costs on the Atlantic alliance -- either in diverting u.s. 
attention, in complicating East-West relations, in spilling over 
onto security issues (especially nuclear issues like INF), or in 
breeding u.s. hostility to European criticism? 
' By contrast, would any West European states be able and willing 
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to play a role supportive of U.S. efforts in Central America? What 
would be the parameters of any such efforts? Would resources be 
forthcoming from Europe? Can groups like the Socialist International 
play a constructive role? 
• Would there be any value in our sharing leadership with any 
West European states-- e.g., Spain-- in creating and managing a 
political and economic framework for Central America? Would either 
side be willing to do so? 
Selected Options 
Bearing these questions in mind, u.s. options in dealing with 
West European allies over Central America include the following: 
1. Mount a sustained diplomatic effort in Western Europe to 
get across u.s. concerns and responses towards Central America, 
designed in the first instance to reduce opposition to u.s. policies. 
Also continue to seek European diplomatic representation in Central 
America and an end to exporting criticism of u.s. policies to the 
region. 
For: Education of key European governments in Central American 
issues is a first requirement. Provided u.s. policies can be shown 
to "add up" in terms of overall Western interests, this would help 
to neutralize opposition at the level of governments, even if public 
opinion remained skeptical. 
Against: As with other issues, consulting with allies is no 
real substitute for policies that can gain West European support on 
their merits. Where the U.S. focus were being diverted from Europe, 
the problem would be doubly difficult. 
2. Seek out individual European countries to open a sustained 
294. 
dialogue with Cuba, on our behalf. 
For: This would permit a level of contacts deeper than now 
politically possible. Spain would have advantages based on history 
and culture. 
Against: We can talk with the Cubans now. We could lose 
control over the dialogue. And Castro might exploit it to our 
disadvantage. 
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3. Seek European support for an economic assistance program in 
Central America, including the Caribbean Basin Intitiative, preferences, 
and direct aid. 
For: An overall economic program would gain added legitimacy 
and thus would provide regional states with a sense that they were 
not totally dependent on the United States. 
Against: Few European states would want to commit significant 
resources, and they would likely want a serious measure of control 
over other u.s. policies towards the region. 
4. Seek European involvement in selling arms to Central American 
countries and in training local forces, plus continuing ties with 
the regime in Nicaragua. 
For: Arms sales and training would offer an alternative to 
dependence on either the United States or on the Soviet Union/Cuba. 
Politically, this would enable Nicaragua to keep open the door to the 
West. The United States would be able to act at one remove, for both 
sides' benefit. To some extent, the Soviet and Cuban role could be 
diminished. 
Against: Encouraging any arms sales would create political 
difficulties for the United States, especially if weapons were 
diverted for cross-border or internal subversion. In Nicaragua, it 
is questionable how much having an alternative to dependence on the 
Soviet Union and Cuba would really affect the situation. Arms sales 
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to Nicaragua without a "change of heart" in Managua would just complicate 
matters. European states would be reluctant to train local forces 
without a major share in overall u.s. decisions. 
One element of this option would be to encourage Britain to keep 
forces in Belize. 
5. Seek direct European involvement in developing and managing 
an overall political and security framework for Central America. 
For: Any such framework would have less of a "made in America" 
stamp and would gain broader legitimacy both within the Hemisphere 
and elsewhere. This would also permit us to step back somewhat from 
total management of Central American problems for the West. There 
might be some European support, especially if couched in democratic 
terms and if this were seen as an alternative to possible u.s. 
"irrationality." 
Against: There would be great reluctance in Europe to share 
leadership or to get involved in any such arrangements so far from 
home 1although Spain might be an exception). As loath as most 
European governments have been to support u.s. efforts, the region 
does continue in their eyes to be America's backyard, with our having 
primary responsibility. Any European state that were involved would 
also want to share in making decisions for which it would have to 
take some responsibility. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
(These will be provided on request in the course of the hearings). 
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Appendix: A Model Framework 
The preceding list of options has referred to a possible political 
and security framework for Central America. There could be many 
variants. The following are principles of one such variant: 
~I It could draw upon experience with the abortive Central American 
Defense Council of 1965 (CONDECA), which included all the regional 
states except Honduras (although CONDECA itself reflected circumstances 
that are now obsolete and it is not a good precedent to cite). 
~I Its basic principle would be the sovereignty, independence, and 
integrity of all six Central American states, plus commitment to 
democracy. 
~ Each state would undertake not to engage against its neighbors 
in any military attack; transfer of military arms -- overt or covert; 
training of the military personnel of a neighboring country; or 
any form of subversion, direct or indirect. 
~I Each state would undertake not to accept arms from third parties 
that exceeded certain sizes, types, and capabilities. Any arms provided 
from outside would be from Western sources. The total permissable 
size of military forces in each state would be stipulated in the 
framework document. No military forces, bases, or advisers of non-
Central American states would be permitted, other than those provided 
for in the Panama Canal Treaties. 
~ The United States would be a party to the agreement, and would 
participate as a matter of course in arrangements applying to military 
and security issues. 
~ The framework would be administered overall by a permament 
council of ministers of the six Central American states, with the 
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United States as a permanent, non-voting member. The chairmanship would 
rotate, but any two Central American states could call the council into 
plenary session. 
,I The council would include procedures for conflict-resolution 
among member states. 
• The council would be assisted by a military advisory board, 
drawn from all six Central American states, with the United States 
as observer. 
,I Verification provisions would be spelled out in the agreement, 
as a permament feature. Individual verification teams would be composed 
of representatives of the host country and of two other Central American 
countries, with u.s. technical advisers. These teams would be permitted 
full access to territory and facilities both on a routine basis and 
on a challenge basis whenever requested by any two Central American 
states. Other states, as agreed by four of the six Central American 
states, could be invited to replace the United States in providing 
technical assistance for verification in any particular team. 
' Other states, as agreed to by any four of the six Central 
American states, could be associated with the agreement (with Belize 
potentially a full partner). 
' The United States would undertake not to intervene in any 
state that remained in compliance with the framework agreement. u.s. 
interpretations of this provision could be overturned by any four of 
the six Central American states. 
' The six Central American states could request that other states 
in the Hemisphere undertake mutual pledges of non-interference. 
' The United States would undertake to provide specified levels 
of economic assistance to any contracting Central American state 
deemed, on an annual basis, to be in compliance with the terms of 
the agreement by vote of four of the six regional states. The United 
States would agree to undertake its best efforts to secure further 
economic support from other Western states and institutions on the 
same basis. 
' The agreement would be registered both with the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States. 
' This framework should be proposed by a state other than the 
United States, either within Central America or Western Europe --
perhaps Spain. 
' This framework should be developed in stages, including the 
active particapation of the Contadora states~ and it should be 
integrated with any long-term economic program for the region. 
Discussion 
This framework assumes the following: 
' that a comprehensive framework is indeed possible; 
' that the United States would accept the current regime in 
Nicaragua; 
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~~ that the Sandinistas would, for an economic and political price, 
be prepared to give up the export of revolution; 
11 that the verification provisions are indeed practicable-- e.g., 
that the region is not inherently too "porous;" 
,I that the United States (and others) would be prepared to 
commit the level of economic resources that is required; and 
11 that the Soviets/Cubans would not develop ways of confounding 
it 0 
Its advantages include the following: 
~I it provides a political basis and reference point for regional 
security and political evolution. 
~I it provides for a system of mutual security guarantees, with 
incentives for compliance, voting procedures, and verification; 
~I it would permit a majority of regional countries to determine 
whether all of its members were in compliance; 
~I it would permit the United States to step back somewhat from 
management of political and security problems; 
,I it could provide a basis for bipartisan support in the United 
States; 
,I it could be attractive to West European countries, and might 
elicit the support of some of them; and 
11 if it worked, it would reduce opportunities for the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. 
Its defects include the following: 
,I it begs the question of the process of internal change in 
Central American states; 
,I it begs the question of the willingness of the Sandinistas to 
subscribe to democracy, even in principle; 
,I it would require the emergence, simultaneously, of political 
maturity and mutually-supporting calculations about risks and benefits 
on the part of all Central American states; 
,I it imposes limits on the United States-- e.g., on the 
right to intervene -- that could set a precedent that would affect 
u.s. flexibility if the framework collapsed or if other objectionable 
regimes emerged in the region; and 
~ by itself, it would not solve the problems of the region. 
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MODEL U.S. APPROACH IN CENTRAL A~ERICA 
ROBERT E. HUNTER 
The following is the outline of a possible long-term approach 
for the United States in Central America. 
1. Basic Principles 
,, Long-range U.S. goals should be based on those presented by 
President Reagan to the Congress on April 27th: 
democracy, reform, and human freedom~ 
economic development~ 
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support for the security of the region 1 s threatened nations~ and 
dialogue and negotiations, both regional and internal~ 
,, We should oppose any expansion of the Soviet Union 1 s military 
power in the region beyond its position in Cuba~ 
~~ We should oppose Soviet/Cuban interference in Central America; 
~~ We should place key emphasis on the principle of bipartisanship, 
recognizing that it is central both to a sustainable, regional strategy 
and to dealing with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Western allies 
in Central America; 
~I We should make a major, long-term economic commitment to the 
nations of Central America, subject to certain conditions concerning 
the activities of individual countries (see Appendix); 
~I We should put primacy on regional negotiations and regional 
solutions, and promote the active engagement on a sustained basis 
vf appropriate outside countries-- e.g., the Contadora group and 
selected West European countries (such as Spain). This means emphasis 
Model Approach 
on "multilateral hegemony;" and 
~ We should be prepared to accept the principle of non-
intervention, provided other countries (within and without Central 
America) also adhere to this principle. This implies working for 
long-term rather than short-term political change in Nicaragua. 
2. Steps to Take 
A. Soviet Union. We should: 
,I recognize that the Soviets are most likely to be impressed 
by U.S. approaches that meet three tests: 1) they have bipartisan 
support and can be sustained over changes in u.s. administrations; 2) 
they gain support within Central America and other nations of the 
Hemisphere; and 3) they gain support -- or at least neutrality -- on 
the part of the Western allies; 
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,I adopt a low rhetorical profile on Soviet engagement within U.S. 
debate, while presenting the facts of that engagement to Hemisphere 
governments-- i.e., to multilateralize opposition to Soviet involvement; 
,I keep Central America on the agenda of u.s.-soviet discussions, 
highlighting our concerns and our opposition to Soviet involvement, 
especially in arms and training. To avoid misunderstanding and 
miscalculation, the primary focus should be on the unacceptability 
of any strategic use of Cuba or any Soviet military bases elsewhere 
in the region; 
~I strike no "deals" with the Soviet Union, but also not call 
into question understandings on Cuba; and 
,I rely primarily on "lowering the benefits" to the Soviet Union 
::.·ather than trying to "raise the risks." 
~odel Approach 
B. Cuba. We should: 
~I retain the embargo on trade with Cuba, so long as Cuba is 
actively exporting revolution; 
~ eliminate trade restrictions on pharmaceuticals and relax 
travel restrictions; 
~I establish Radio Marti, appealing especially to the successor 
generation; 
• continue to oppose Cuban involvement in Angola; and 
~I oppose Cuban activities in Central America, itself, through 
a coherent and sustainable regional approach (outlined below). Cuba 
should not be invited to take part in regional arrangements. 
C. Western allies. We should: 
~I work to heighten understanding of Central American issues 
among governments, to get increased diplomatic representation in 
the region, and to reduce unhelpful involvement by the Socialist 
International and other non-official groups; 
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~I soft-pedal (and make more sophisticated) rhetoric on Soviet 
involvement -- other than specific risks to allied interests such as 
supply lines -- and increase rhetorical emphasis on regional problems; 
~I underscore the principles of democracy and non-intervention; 
~I seek European support for a long-range economic program in 
Central America; 
~ try to engage Spain (and others, if appropriate), in regional 
diplomacy; and 
~ within a comprehensive framework, seek European military 
training in individual Central American countries, and permit limited 
and controlled European arms sales -- under certain circumstances 
M.ode 1 Approach 
(see Appendix) to Nicaragua, as well. 
D. Militarv. We should: 
~~ indicate to the American people the limits of possible u.s. 
military involvement: limited to key interests, but not to changing 
governments; 
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• keep the mandate of support for the Contras tied to Nicaraguan 
export of revolution and regional negotiations, and not to the 
character of the regime; 
~I be prepar.ed to halt support for the Contras provided Nicaragua 
will negotiate, but make clear that this support will resume if it 
does not respond with support then provided overtly rather than 
covertly; 
,, limit direct u.s. military engagement in Honduras and other 
regional states to small-force training, tailored to appropriate 
tactics and limiting the U.S. impact on the society; 
• continue training and advice to the El Salvador government, 
with appropriate tactics and clearly tied to the political process; 
,, limit shows of force where we do not intend to apply force; and 
• present terms and conditions on which the U.S. would not 
intervene directly-- e.g., absence of Soviet/Cuban bases. 
E. Political. 
• Continue the four assurances of President Reagan's April 27 
speech, with minor modifications: 
-- support any agreement among Central American countries 
f0r the withdrawal -- under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions 
-- 0f all foreign military and security advisers and troops. 
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help opposition groups join the political process in all 
countries and compete by ballots instead of bullets. (In Nicaragua, 
however, this should be seen as a long-term, not short-term, goal). 
support any verifiable, reciprocal agreement among Central 
American countries on the renunciation of support of insurgencies on 
neighbors' territory; and 
-- help Central America end its costly arms race and 
support any verifiable, reciprocal agreements on the nonimportation of 
offensive weapons. (This should recognize the half-way house of some 
Western arms supplies); 
~ Build a regional political strategy on the work of the Contadora 
group, while also trying to involve Spain; and 
~ Work towards a security arrangement such as that contained 
in the Appendix. 
F. Economic 
,, Make a long-term commitment of resources and seek support from 
other Western nations, along the lines of the Appendix, as well as 
through international and regional institutions. 
G. Institutional. We should: 
~ Work to refurbish the OAS and the Rio Treaty, in general; 
~~ Draw on the best working-level expertise on Central America 
in the u.s. government, and keep it in place for several years; 
~I Develop continuity in our military advisory teams; and 
~ Develop a long-range, working partnership between Congress 
and the executive branch, including key Congressional staff members 
possibly continuing the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. 
u.s. Interests in Central America 
Ambassador William H. Luers 
(The ideas presented in this paper are the author's own and 
are not intended to represent the positions or opinions of 
the Department of State.• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans believe that their country has a special mission 
in the world and that belief in the "American exceptionalism" 
has in fact grown over the past 2~0 ye~rs. Since George 
Washington first set limits on u.~. foreign relations, 
presidents have seen u.s. national interests expand as we have 
become increasingly entangled in the affairs of virtually all 
of the peoples of the world. John Quincy Adams defined the 
country's vision of itself as "a nation coextensive with the 
North American continent destined by God and nature to be the 
most populous and most powerful people ever combined under one 
social compact." 
In the 2_0th century the interests of the United States have 
become involved in the affairs of nations everywhere. We have 
become, since World War II, the world's largest trading nation, 
the largest aid donor, the most enthusiastic supporter and 
financial backer of virtually all of the new international 
institutions dedicated to rule by law and to economic 
development. We have been the advocate for the dozens of new 
nations which were born, as we were 150 years earlier, from 
colonialism. Many nations and peoples of the world came to see 
their own interests entwined with those of the United States. 
Interdependence became the glue of this new patchwork of over 
150 sovereign states. The vast majority of these states came 
to believe that their future was closely bound to how wisely 
and generously the United States managed its role in this new 
interdependence. 
The nations of the Western Hemisphere were the first to 
seek institutional expression for the management of 
interdependence. The New World has for over a century shared a 
common destiny. In Thomas Jefferson's words, "America, North 
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe 
and peculiarly her own." These sentiments were echoed by the 
liberator Simon Bolivar and other leaders of the independent 
nations of Hispanic America. 
The United States wanted to ensure that the geographic 
region to its south did not pose threats to its own security 
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and political interests. The other American states wanted to 
ensure that the North American power committed itself firmly to 
policies consistent with being a "good neighbor." It has been 
the North American self image of its own "exceptionalism" in 
the New World that has often been offensive to other American 
states. Yet all the states of the Western Hemisphere sought to 
defend their different national interests through the pursuit 
of common objectives and ideals -- liberty, cooperation, 
economic development, the exclusion of extra-hemispheric powers 
and peace. The Inter-American System, as it has come to be 
known, has been remarkable in the past in providing the setting 
for the achievement of these ambitious objectives. In most 
cases the objectives of American states coincided closely with 
their national security interests, since they realized early on 
this interconnection. One of the more prominent writers on 
national interest, Hans Morgenthau, has explained his view on 
this aspect of interdependence: "The national interest of the 
nation that is conscious of not only its own interests but also 
that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with 
the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of 
political morality. In an age of total war it is also a 
condition for survival." 
The test of our leadership and wisdom in managing our 
international responsibilities comes when these multiple u.s. 
interests seem to conflict with each other. The resolution of 
conflicts between u.s. national interests has severely taxed 
the American political system over the past two decades. We 
have on occasion been bold in our choice. We have frequently 
been wise. The decision of the Reagan Administration to send 
u.s. troops to accompany forces of other Caribbean states into 
Grenada was an instructive case of a president setting 
priorities among many u.s. national interests. There were on 
the one hand u.s. interests in ensuring the protection of the 
lives and well-being of American citizens, to support the 
appeal of the small democratic nations of the Caribbean, to 
help protect their special political culture, and to 
demonstrate the unacceptability of the arbitrary use of force 
by a few to change the course of a nation, both militarized and 
politicized by the Soviets and the Cubans in the Caribbean. In 
apparent conflict with those interests was the u.s. interest in 
upholding the principle of non-intervention, which has become 
the keystone of the Inter-American System and a first 
principle, although often violated, of the UN Charter. The 
choice was not an easy one, but to delayed this decision would 
have been to make another choice of potentially fateful 
consequence. 
Another serious and often more difficult task of presidents 
is to resolve conflicts that arise when the national interest 
of the u.s. conflicts with the interest of another state. The 
u.s. holds firmly to the principle that conflicts among states 
will be resolved by peaceful means. Yet in a world in which 
other nations are arming and using military force to project 
307. 
power across frontiers, the United States cannot declare itself 
unwilling to defend, by force if necessary, its own vital 
interests and those of its allies, friends and neighbors. The 
definition of what interest is considered vital is thus the 
ultimate test of statesmanship. 
u.s. interests as they pertain to Central American issues, 
are a blend of history, geography, economics and current 
events. Any effort to make sharp distinctions among them is 
likely to appear artificial. Yet we believe it is necessary to 
convey some sense of the complexity of the tangled U.~. 
interests in the world today. Our interests are not 
homogenous. We must constantly make choices about which 
interests are paramount. We found it useful, therefore, to 
divide our discussion of U.S. interests into four broad 
categories: political and moral, economic and social, security, 
and global. 
Before discussing these four broad areas, a few 
observations about the special nature of u.s. interests in 
Central America are appropriate: 
-- Our historic involvement in the region has been 
primarily to pursue our security interests and political ideals 
not, as is often popularly believed, to pursue economic gain. 
In his important study on "Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in 
the Caribbean 1900-1921," Dana G. Munro concludes: "If we look 
back on the history it seems clear that the motives that 
inspired (U.S.) policy were basically political rather than 
economic. What the u.s. was trying to do throughout the period 
with which this history has dealt was to put an end to 
conditions that threatened the independence of some of the 
Caribbean states and were consequently a potential danger to 
the security of the U.S. Revolutions must be discouraged; the 
bad financial practices that weakened the governments and 
involved them in trouble with foreigners must be resolved; and 
general economic and social conditions, which were a basic 
cause of instability, must be improved." Because our 
interventions in the region were primarily for a political 
purpose, not colonial, our involvement has been episodic, has 
depended on political attitudes in the U.S. and has been 
responsive to events in Central America. 
--The u.s., unlike other major nations in the 20th 
century, has not had to be concerned with threats to its vital 
security interests on its borders or periphery, with the 
exception of the Cuban missile crisis and subsequent concerns 
with the Soviet/Cuban connection. For most nations "defense of 
vital national security interests" immediately evokes concerns 
with the frontier areas. The Soviet Union has used its 
military force directly since World War II to secure its 
periphery, from which it has historically been threatened. For 
Americans, however, it is a wrenchingly new experience to think 
of threats near our border. 
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-- Finally, the perception that other nations have of u.s. 
interests in Central America is as critical to United States 
policy as is our own understanding of those interests. The 
United States is perceived by geography and history to have a 
hegemonic or quasi-imperial relationship with the nations of 
Central America. Indeed our past relationship of intervention 
and involvement confirms an historic u.s. effort to dominate 
events in that part of the world. Other nations, therefore, 
will draw important conclusions about the u.s. ability to 
manage military, economic and political power, international 
law, collective security, and diplomacy from how we define and 
defend our complex of interests in Central America. 
II. POLITICAL AND MORAL INTERESTS 
The political and moral interests are our oldest historic 
interests in Central America and the Caribbean. They are part 
of the ideology, the rhetoric and the dreams of the New World. 
The calls for democracy, liberty, respect for human rights and 
hemispheric solidarity have echoed throughout the Western 
Hemisphere even though the reality has often been different 
from the dream. In the 20th century, since our security 
interests have rarely been challenged from our borders, 
Americans have concentrated their thinking about Latin America 
in ideological and political terms. The Good Neighbor Policy 
and the Alliance for Progress were for a political purpose. 
And both were presented with an energy and commitment that were 
moral. The political issues dominate u.s. public thinking 
about Central America. The political issues also dominate the 
reality of Central America. As we have said before, the 
central issue is the legitimacy of government. This is not a 
mindless conflict. It is an expression of a drive for power. 
To the extent that we have been interventionist, hegemonic 
or quasi-imperial in our relationship with Central America 
since the early 19th century, we have been so primarily to 
promote our political and regional security interests. We have 
sought three goals: to promote stable and friendly 
governments, to promote more just governments, and to exclude 
the influence of extra-hemispheric powers. We have pursued our 
own self-interests. We have also proclaimed a moral purpose. 
In the pursuit of our objectives we have at times given less 
emphasis to the promotion of just governments, in order to 
ensure stability and to exclude extra-hemispheric powers. We 
will here discuss three political interests: democracy, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and the hemispheric system. Then we will turn 
to the moral dimension. 
The first political interest has to do precisely with our 
historic desire to try to shape the type of political systems 
that govern in Central America. we have established strong 
alliances with some of the most despised despots of Central 
America in the name of internal stability and anti-communism. 
Yet, over the past 25 years, we have invested enormous economic 
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and political resources in the promotion of economic 
development, free political institutions, and democracy. 
Should the United States have as one of its "interests" the 
building of democracy in Central America? There are a variety 
of responses that North Americans give to this central question. 
One point of view argues that "democracy is not an export 
commodity." It is not the business of the United States to 
concern itself with the shape of political institutions in the 
nations of Central America, since that is a form of 
interventionism. Moreover, "elections" are meaningless in a 
country at civil war or in countries where social inequities 
deprive most of the people of a chance to participate in the 
political process. The nations of Central America must be left 
to their own devices, which will probably result in social and 
political revolutions that will not please but need not 
threaten the U.S. 
Another point of view argues that the nations of Central 
America, with the remarkable exception of Costa Rica, lack the 
educational base, economic development, leadership, and 
political culture even to contemplate in the foreseeable future 
the formation of "democratic systems" as we know them. While 
the u.s. must take an interest in the political direction of 
these countries, the nations of Central America should not 
become Marxist-Leninist or allied with Cuba or the Soviet Union 
nor should they become conspicuous violators of human rights. 
The u.s. would most certainly fail if it sets as one of its 
interests in Central America the evolution of democratic 
systems. We will have to be realistic and seek to bring about 
and work with anti-communist but relatively benign governments 
that are supported by the military and traditional elites. 
There is a third point of view which holds that as 
difficult as the building of democratic institutions might be 
in the countries of Central America, it is nonetheless one of 
the few objectives that can galvanize U.S. political support 
and mobilize the backing of the other democracies and 
democratic political groups in the hemisphere (e.g., the 
Socialist International and Christian Democrats). According to 
this point of view, when the u.s. has placed the protection of 
"liberty" and the promotion of economic development at the 
center of its expressed political interests in the western 
Hemisphere, we have pursued policies which found the greatest 
resonance among Latin democratic and popular leaders. Those 
who argue this view note that both major democratic parties of 
Venezuela believe, and have stated publicly since 1958, that 
the promotion of democracy and the support of democratic 
governments in the hemisphere is the primary way in which the 
democratic state of Venezuela seeks to protect its "national 
security." This view goes on to argue that although elections 
do not make democracy they are at least a point of departure 
which, combined with other institutions, could provide the way 
to pacify and eventually to eliminate insurgency and violent 
opposition. 
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This third point of view on democracy ought to be supported 
based upon a determination that no u.s. Government can refuse 
to adopt policies that support the evolution of democratic and 
pluralistic systems. To deny that goal would be to deny 
ourselves. The trends throughout South America over the past 
decade, moreover, have moved those countries relentlessly 
toward more open political systems. The Latin Americans 
themselves have never lost faith in this endeavor. We can do 
no less, even though the problems of building pluralistic 
systems in Central America are formidable. 
The second set of political interests deals with the issue 
raised by the Monroe Doctrine and its variations over the past 
150 years. Should the United States today still hold that it 
is in our political and security interest to consider any 
attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system 
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety"? That principle has long since been modified and 
internationalized within the Rio Treaty and the various actions 
and resolutions of the Hemispheric System. Yet in the 
Caribbean Basin, despite the Cuban presence, should we not 
still adhere to some policy of excluding extra-hemispheric 
powers? 
One point of view argues that such a position was overtaken 
by events long ago because of the Soviet/Cuban alliance, and 
that it is offensive to the other nations of the hemisphere. 
According to this point of view, the United States should 
finally bury the Monroe Doctrine and recognize that the nations 
of the Western Hemisphere have entered the modern world as 
full-fledged participants. The United States should indeed 
encourage the full participation of our Western European allies 
in the economic and political development and crisis management 
of events in the Caribbean Basin. 
There is a second point of view which argues that the basic 
Monroe Doctrine principle should still apply in some form to 
the Caribbean Basin. The United States should perhaps try to 
multilateralize the Doctrine with other hemispheric powers but 
our political interest in keeping the Soviet Union, its system 
and its allies out of the Caribbean Basin should be clearly 
stated. Those who hold this view might differ on whether to 
extend the exclusion to Western Europeans. Some could argue 
that the Western European attitudes toward Central American 
developments, particularly their large scale assistance to 
Nicaragua and Cuba, demonstrate cleary that they play a 
spoilers role and conduct policies at odds with or 
diametrically opposed to u.s. interests. Moreover, in view of 
the differences, European disruptive involvement in the 
Caribbean Basin simply adds another element of tension in the 
NATO alliance. 
Yet others would argue that, despite the differences in the 
past, the u.s. must make every effort to encourage the key 
311. 
• 
European democracies such as Germany, Spain, England, Portugal, 
France and The Netherlands, most of which already have 
substantial political or economic interests in the region, to 
play a more constructive role in the Caribbean Basin. Moreover 
since developments in the Caribbean Basin may become 
increasingly an area of new U.S. military attention, the NATO 
Alliance interests might be affected. 
Although no reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine is 
particularly desirable or useful, a u.s. statement of the 
region's emerging views of what it wants could be a more 
important and more binding multilateral assurance. The 
.. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States made a statement 
regarding Grenada which helped define their own objective. 
Likewise, the Contadora Group and the Central American 
Democratic Community are moving carefully and wisely toward a 
definition of what they would like to see established as norms 
for the nations of the region. 
A third political interest relates to the inter-American 
system. For most of the post World War II period, the 
tranquility of the Western Hemisphere has been guaranteed in 
large part by the capacity of the Western Hemisphere nations to 
resolve their own problems. Hemispheric tranquility has been a 
major asset to the United States and the United States has a 
major interest, as does the rest of the hemisphere, in 
maintaining that tranquility. Unfortunately that tranquility 
seems to be corning to an end. The problems in u.s. hemispheric 
relations are interconnected and are now seriously beginning to 
threaten u.s. interests, including our vital security 
interests. The following is a short list of problems: 
The $300 billion debt owned by Latin American 
countries, if not managed well, could result in a collapse of 
the international monetary system and the top u.s. banks. 
The internal economic and social strains in the major 
Latin American countries resulting from the two years of world 
economic depression threaten the stability of political systems 
in the major Latin American states, and the assumption of 
rational governance in the region. 
The growing nationalism of Latin nations combined 
with the increased ideological strains among them are leading 
to heightened tensions over old border disputes and greater 
attention to military preparedness. The enormous build-up of 
sophisticated weapons in Cuba and Nicaragua makes those nations 
pacesetters in the regional arms race at a time when funds for 
military expenditures are just not available. The commitment 
of Cuba and Nicaragua to a "revolution without frontiers" 
suggests a prolonged period of guerrilla warfare in the region. 
The Falklands/Malvinas war broke the long tradition 
of Latin reluctance (except in Cuba) to engage in modern 
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warfare against foreign armies. Argentina showed itself 
capable of using effectively sophisticated missile systems and 
nearly defeated the British Navy. Other Latin American nations 
have been forced to think of building up their military 
forces. This event must focus even greater world attention on 
the Argentine nuclear program, which could produce a nuclear 
explosion in the next few years. 
The Falklands/Malvinas War also revealed the profound 
weakness in the OAS and the Rio Treaty -- the key mutual 
security institutions that, despite their poor international 
reputation, have helped to resolve or avoid dozens of conflicts 
between the American states over the past 30 years. The member 
states were deeply divided over the appropriate role of the OAS 
and Rio Treaty in the conflict. Neither organization could 
head off the military confrontation. The weakened u.s. 
capacity to work with and through the inter-American system 
limits u.s. diplomatic options significantly. 
One view of how the u.s. should deal with this unraveling 
and disintegration of the inter-American system is to 
strengthen the existing institutions -- the OAS, the Rio Treaty 
and other regional organizations. According to this view, if 
the u.s. were to place more trust in and pay more attention to 
the hemispheric relationship, we could revive it and find 
regional solutions to border disputes, and other political 
problems, as well as find ways to improve our peacekeeping 
efforts in such trouble spots as Central America. Many of 
those who hold this view also believe that the hemispheric 
system would be more effective were Cuba to be reincorporated. 
Another point of view would argue that the unraveling of 
the inter-American systems is probaby irreversible. If it is 
not irreversible, the United States should not expend much 
political capital on trying to reverse it. The u.s., by its 
actions on behalf of the "system," could only make matters 
worse~ According to this point of view the strains, 
ideological and national, are so great within the OAS and over 
the Rio Treaty that the U.S. can resort to these traditional 
ways of dispute resolution only under most unusual 
circumstances. Should the inter-American system be revived it 
would only be at the initiative of the leading Latin American 
nations themselves -- a situation which now seems highly 
unlikely. Therefore, according to this view, the u.s. should 
seek political support primarily through ad hoc regional and 
sub-regional agreement and special accords-to deal with the new 
emerging issues. We would probably need to associate ourselves 
with one, or perhaps a series of sub-regional political groups 
in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere over the next several 
years to give shape to a genuine sub-regional political 
approach. Those who know the hemispheric system best realize 
that it has worked because of informal groupings and issue 
oriented alliances, not because of formal votes or the 
institutional strength of the system. 
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This complex of political issues is burdened by a history 
of unfulfilled dreams and fulsome rhetoric. Passions have been 
high and real accomplishments low in the wake of these decades 
of frustrated aspirations. Despite these disappointments the 
u.s. ought to be determined to reaffirm the oldest American 
ideals of the New World. The Americas were to cherish liberty, 
to be separate and different from Europe, and to work together 
toward their common purpose. Despite the current Central 
American crisis conditions and the imperfect state of liberty 
and cooperation in the Americas, the Commission found hope in 
the trends across the hemisphere in the 20th century. We are 
able to say that events have pointed toward the original dreams 
of Bolivar and Jefferson. 
No u.s. government can refuse to adopt policies of working 
with the nations of the hemisphere toward more open, 
pluralistic systems based on consent. The democratic form of 
government has been confirmed as the aspiration of the American 
peoples whenever their consent has been sought. Therefore, as 
difficult as the conditions are in Central America, those goals 
of pluralism, government by consent, and respect for human 
rights must be retained as u.s. policies and objectives. 
Moreover, the nations of this hemisphere can prosper only 
if they retain their distinctive character and independence 
from external powers. Only the Cuban regime in the Western 
Hemisphere has chosen to adopt a political system from, and 
full dependency on, a European power. It is precisely that 
dependency that has alienated the Cuban government from the 
other nations of the hemisphere and from its own people. The 
various declarations of the Contadora group and the Central 
American Democratic Community are beginning to define the 
elements of a multilateral statement of purpose and direction 
that is needed in lieu of mere affirmation of the Monroe 
Doctrine. The United States should support these efforts. The 
nations of the Caribbean Basin seek a community of states which 
are democratic, free from external military and political 
dominance and determined not to interfere in each other's 
internal affairs. 
The hemispheric system, in the final analysis, should 
remain a part of United States' efforts to cooperate with the 
other American states. As we approach together the matrix of 
economic, social, political, and security problems this 
hemisphere confronts today, the regional organizations and the 
spirit behind them will play a role. The crisis of confidence 
in the OAS and Rio Treaty cannot be changed by a u.s. 
initiative. If these institutions are to be revived, the other 
American states will need to begin. We do believe that the 
u.s. must convey to the states in the region our commitment to 
work with them on initiatives proposed by them. The sustenance 
and strengthening of the OAS, the Rio Treaty, and other 
organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, would be in the interest of the United States if other 
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hemispheric nations determine it is in their interest. These 
organizations could serve their purpose in the years ahead as 
fora in which the will to cooperate can be generated. The 
organizations themselves will not make the cooperation happen; 
the American states will. u.s. purposes in this hemisphere 
must continue to be defined as a multilateral enterprise. If 
existing organs are refurbished or new ones created, the u.s. 
should cooperate in the endeavor. 
Finally, the moral interests that urge North Americans to 
concern themselves with the rest of the hemisphere are strong. 
The spirit of the past 150 years that has driven the United 
States to seek more just governance in Latin America has 
appeared at times as patronizing and interventionist. That the 
United States has on occasion sought to justify our actions on 
moral grounds has offended Latin dignity. Yet in our proudest, 
most helpful periods of cooperation the people of the United 
States have demonstrated generosity and caring for the Latin 
people, who are increasingly becoming a major part of our own 
nation. This drive to concern ourselves with social justice, 
hunger, sickness, unemployment, education, and the human 
condition in Latin America is a part of the idealism, and 
indeed part of the arrogance of the North American 
exceptionalism. That we believe we can and must help has been 
both a bond with and an albatross for our neighbors. Certainly 
one of the greatest tasks for the u.s. Government is precisely 
how to energize the North American people again to renew our 
commitment to the people of this hemisphere without succumbing 
to a new era of interventionism. 
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTERESTS 
The economic and social interests are the most concrete, 
most easily defined U.S. interests in Central America. Much of 
the discussion related to the "defense of u.s. interests" in 
this century has centered on the tangible "interests" of 
foreign investment, resources, trade, and the property and 
rights of u.s. citizens. Despite the earlier assertion in this 
chapter that historically our interests in Central America and 
the Caribbean have been primarily political in nature, there 
has been a long history of dispute between the u.s. and 
governments in the region over such issues as expropriation of 
u.s. investment without "prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation," and other nationalistic moves against U.S. 
investment and trade. Moreover, as the u.s. moved from being a 
regional to a world power in this century and from being a 
self-contained economy to a major world trader after World Har 
II, economic and trade issues have tended to dominate relations 
in the Hestern Hemisphere, except when a political crisis 
arose. Americans are concerned with the movement of people, 
products, money and ideas to Latin America, yet their concern 
with the political issues of human rights and democracy often 
overrides these more concrete interests. 
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It is therefore important to stress that the tangible u.s. 
economic interests in the five Central American countries are 
small: 
we are sovereign over no territory in Central America. 
Direct u.s. investment in Central America amounts to 
less than 0.5 percent of the total u.s. foreign investment 
worldwide. 
We import minimal strategic materials from Central 
America. 
The countries of Central America account for less 
than 2.3 percent of the total exposure of u.s. banks in the 
western Hemisphere. 
In trade, Central America has a declining share of 
the u.s. market. It took 1.2 percent of u.s. exports in 1979 
and supplied 1.0 percent of u.s. imports. 
These data reflect the poverty in natural resources and in 
productive capacity of the Central American nations, and the 
low intrinsic value to the u.s. of our economic relations with 
that small isthmus population (20 million people in the five 
countries). 
The important economic interests we have in Central America 
are derivative, not direct. How will the far more important 
u.s. economic interests in the Caribbean Basin region and in 
Latin America as a whole be affected by developments in Central 
America? It is useful to enumerate some of those important 
u.s. economic and sovereign interests in the areas directly 
adjacent to the five countries of Central America: 
The u.s. is sovereign over Puerto Rico and the u.s. 
Virgin Islands and has an important interest, shared with other 
nations in the region, in the continuing functioning of the 
Panama Canal. 
Mexico is our largest southern neighbor and our third 
largest trading partner in the world. In 1982, the u.s. 
imported $15 billion from Mexico and sold $11 billion to 
Mexico. Mexico is our largest foreign supplier of oil and 
could supply up to 25 percent of our petroleum imports. The 
interaction of people, products and money with Mexicio is on a 
scale unmatached by any other nation. Economically, 
politically and in human terms, what occurs in Mexicio is vital 
to u.s. interests. 
The Caribbean Basin is a major source of strategic 
and other important raw materials. Venezuela and Mexico, 
combined with the Caribbean based refineries, supply 25 percent 
of our imported petroleum products. Mexico is a principal 
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supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, bismuth, 
salenium, barium, rhenium and lead. Nearly 60 percent of 
imports of bauxite and alumina come from Jamaica, Guyana and 
Suriname. 
The Caribbean Basin countries have $18.5 billion in 
direct U.S. investment, over half of which is in Mexico, 
Venezuela and Colombia. The Basin countries exported $25.7 
billion to the U.S. in 1980 and imported $25.8 billion in the 
same year. Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia were by far our 
largest trading partners in the region. 
The population of the Caribbean Basin, including 
Mexico, is about 160 million. It could reach 278 million by 
the year 2000, a percentage of which will most certainly move 
to the United States, legally or illegally. Immigration 
specialists predict that this region will provide the largest 
flow of legal and illegal immigration in the next decade. 
The Caribbean Basin countries own nearly half of the 
total debt of $300 billion to commercial banks and 
international lending institutions. The impact on these 
countries of debt management efforts, requiring greatly reduced 
investment and imports resulting in increased unemployment and 
negative growth, is likely to have a significant near- to mid-
term affect on the political systems and economic future of 
those countries. 
The sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) through the 
Caribbean are important to the commerce of the entire region, 
and important to the activities of the u.s. Navy. 
In contrast to the small economic interests in Central 
America, the tangible economic interests in the Caribbean Basin 
as a whole are significant. They are vital since they mesh 
with political and security interests involved in our 
relationship with Mexico. When we consider the broad U.S. 
economic and social interests in the Western Hemisphere, the 
Central American dimension can be seen as the weakest link in a 
chain that extends to the southern cone. The conceptual 
problem is to determine how to relate these larger economic 
interests to developments in Central America. There are two 
broad views on that linkage. 
One point of view argues that the low level of u.s. 
economic interest in Central America is a good indication of 
the minimal intrinsic importance of that poor region. 
Precisely because the regional powers are so much more 
important to the U.S. and are most directly affected by events 
in Central America, we should follow the lead of Mexico, 
Venezuela, Colombia and Panama. Even if one were to follow a 
worst case domino theory, the regional powers would deal with 
revolutionary change and help bring about largely nationalistic 
regimes. The economic realities for those small countries 
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would demand that they accommodate to the u.s. and the region, 
since the Soviets will not support those nations. Mexico, 
Venezuela and Colombia, according to this argument, would not 
be seriously threatened by revolutionary developments and it is 
not our role, in any case, to be the protector of these 
sovereign states. As to the Panama Canal, it would be unlikely 
that any Panamanian government would risk the wrath of its 
neighbors by restricting traffic. In any case, according to 
this view, the importance to the u.s. of the canal is not so 
great as it used to be. The marginal increase in Soviet/Cuban 
naval activity that might result from closer Soviet relations 
with one or more Central American countries is not likely to 
affect significantly either the commercial or security aspects 
of Caribbean sea lanes. There is and should be no connection 
between the debt management in Latin America and events in 
Central America. If the u.s. should try to make such a 
connection, we would confuse matters even more. 
There is another point of view which sees an important link 
between our larger Caribbean Basin interest and Central 
America. Indeed, this view would link much of our entire 
hemispheric relationship directly with events in Central 
America. This view is based on the assumption that the region 
is entering a period of great uncertainty resulting from the 
economic and social turmoil of the past two years, the 
breakdown of the hemispheric system, heightened role of the 
Soviets and Cubans in the region and the growing likelihood of 
ideological and military warfare. This is a highly unstable 
period for a region which has been accustomed to relatively 
peaceful and cooperative relations and quite consistent 
economic growth for two decades. The challenge to the 
democratic governments in the region of managing the near- to 
mid-term economic crises is demoralizing and may well affect 
the assumption of rational governance. The strain on these 
systems is real. Moreover, the uncertainty over u.s. policies 
and soviet/Cuban activities forces government and military 
institutions to think more and more about national 
self-interest -- regional obligations and traditional alliances 
are given even lower priority amid serious turmoil and crisis. 
It is a region composed of governments entering a period of 
major readjustment to frightening new realities and a 
pessimistic future. Because of the debt crises, for example, 
what Latin American governments decide about their economies 
will, for the first time in history, have a profound effect on 
the u.s. and on the international financial system. Moreover, 
regional governments are in no position today, becasue of the 
economic and social problems at home, to take bold decisions or 
a leadership role in resolving the problems of Central 
America. They therefore must look to the u.s. for leadership. 
There is a strong and persuasive argument that the broad 
economic and social interests that the United States has in 
Latin America are closely linked to the current crisis in 
Central America. Even though our economic and social interests 
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in quantifiable terms are not large in Central America, the 
accumulated responsibility of over one hundred years of u.s. 
involvement in the region plus the potential for large scale 
migration from that region to the u.s., give us both a moral 
and practical need to take very seriously the well-being and 
economic growth of the five Central American countries. 
Although it can be debated how closely linked the origin of 
revolutionary activity is to the economic crisis, we must 
recognize that resolution will come only through a combination 
of effective diplomatic, political, economic and security 
programs. No United States policy toward Central America can 
be perceived as a purely security oriented policy. Yet 
economic growth is not possible while guerrilla war rages. 
Here, the Alliance for Progress is instructive. The u.s. must 
demonstrate that the major resources we will direct toward the 
region will be for the reconstruction of the economies and the 
social fabric of those small countries. 
The economic stagnation and debt burden of the entire Latin 
American and Caribbean region provide a backdrop that gives the 
Central American crisis a striking profile. If the regional 
powers, such as Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama, were 
experiencing today the economic growth and optimism that they 
showed in the 1970's and early 1980's, they would be more able 
to devote resources and energy to support a constructive 
resolution of the Central American problems. The current 
economic uncertainties and insecurities of governance that flow 
from the combined burden of debt and reduced trade and 
investment, limit the capacity of the regional powers to find 
both economic and political resources to confront these 
momentous regional, political and security problems. We 
believe these countries are facing a future that is frightening 
for them because of this combination of new challenges for the 
Western Hemisphere. Should the existing political structures 
of one of the major countries find the explosive forces too 
difficult to contain internally and resort to extreme solutions 
either with regard to management of debt or internal political 
structures, there would likely be an unraveling of the current 
creative climate created by the Contadora group and other 
regional efforts. The possibilities of a regional solution, 
therefore, appear now to rest on a fragile economic and 
political base. Yet despite these gloomy prospects that the 
hemispheric nations face over the near term, we continue to be 
encouraged and impressed by the will of governments to confront 
simultaneously debt management, political evolution to 
democracy, and a creative foreign policy. Despite the 
unprecedented problems most countries like Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico have faced over the past year, they are still 
managing responsibly to work through their difficulties in 
differing ways. 
Therefore, the U.S. must see these linkages between the 
economic and social problems of the region and those we are 
facing in Central America of a security and a political sort as 
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part of the overall fabric of the inter-American system. The 
web of interests demands that programs and policies be 
conceived as a strategic whole. 
IV. SECURITY INTERESTS 
Security interests are vital interests. The President is 
obliged to resort to whatever means are necessary, including 
military force, to defend the national security when it is 
seriously threatened. Under security interests we have 
examined two distinct categories: 1) The actual level of 
threat posed by the Soviet/Cuban and their allied military 
build-up in the Caribbean Basin and 2) the degree of threat to 
the u.s. security posed by one or more new Soviet or Cuban 
allied regimes in Central America. 
Here too there are differing points of view. For some 
Americans, U.S. security interests will not be seriously 
threatened unless the Soviets establish identifiable air and 
sea bases, deploy missiles, or enlarge their aircraft and other 
forces in the region. Hostile governments, ~ se, in Central 
America could not threaten the u.s. To the extent that they 
threaten the security of their neighbors, then their neighbors 
will deal with them or ask us to help. Whatever the level of 
military security interests involved in Central America today, 
they are less important than our long term interests in 
establishing constructive relationships within this 
hemisphere. According to this view, none of the countries on 
our periphery could conceivably become a serious threat to the 
u.s. and, in view of the mobility and intercontinental capacity 
of modern weaponry, the old geographic considerations relating 
to security interests are irrelevant. 
A second view argues that, over the past four years, the 
expansion of Soviet and Cuban hostile forces in the Caribbean 
Basin and the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Central 
America pose potentially serious challenges to traditional U.S. 
thinking about its national security. The current "threat" 
from the region is not so alarming or sufficient to call for 
the direct application of u.s. force. The trends are, however, 
sufficiently portentous to require a re-evaluation of u.s. 
force capacity, structure and deployment, and to require a 
reassessment of the likelihood that u.s. military action in the 
region may be required over the next five years. 
There is yet a third, more alarming position which argues 
that u.s. security interests are already seriously threatened 
by an armed Cuba with strong Soviet backing allied with the 
increasingly totalitarian Sandinista regime. According to this 
point of view, it is essential for the United States to reverse 
the trends in the Caribbean Basin. The u.s. must also adopt 
policies now which would eliminate the threat posed by the 
Sandinista regime and severely restrict future Cuban adventures 
in the region. According to this view, the p~esent Sandinista 
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government will only increase the security threat to the 
countries in Central America and consequently to Mexico, Panama 
and the United States, and ultimately to Venezuela and 
Colombia. The Sandinista regime will continue to promote 
violent revolution and will increase its military and 
inevitably its economic and political dependence on the Soviet 
Union. 
Reflecting on these views, one would be constrained to 
conclude that although the present level of Soviet military 
force and basing systems in the Caribbean Basin areas does not 
signify change in the strategic relationship with the Soviet 
Union, the long-term trends of current developments on our 
border could constitute a major and even fundamental shift in 
u.s. security concerns. A dynamic process is under way that 
has already resulted in disturbing increases of Soviet and 
Soviet-allied military presence in the Caribbean area since the 
1960's. Should the soviets manage to achieve multiple sites to 
locate aircraft, ships, personnel and intelligence gathering 
capability, increasing amounts of u.s. forces would have to be 
directed toward that area. The evolution of Soviet military 
capability in the region, simply because of the Cuban facility, 
demonstrates that in a certain sense Cuba, without the missiles 
that were removed in 1962, has become an even more important 
and secure strategic outpost than if missiles had actually been 
deployed. The u.s. must set out now to stop an increase of 
Soviet military presence and to reverse the already disturbing 
trends. 
The second set of security interests relates to the threat 
posed to the United states by the emergence of one or more 
revolutionary regimes in the region that resemble Cuba or 
become allied to the Soviet Union. The discussion of this set 
of interests is complicated by the belief of some people in the 
u.s. that revolutionary regimes in Central America would not 
necessarily be, or remain for long, genuinely Marxist-Leninist 
totalitarian governments. Some Americans argue that because of 
the nationalism inherent in Central America, the reality of the 
economics of the region and the pressure of neighbors, 
revolutionaries would eventually adapt to regional politics. 
While possibly unfriendly to the u.s., these regimes would not 
actually pose a security threat either to the u.s. or to the 
other states in the region. 
There is another point of view which argues that given our 
experience with Castro and the sandinistas, given the knowledge 
we have of the guerrillas in the rest of Central America and of 
the politics of the region that virtually require revolutionary 
nationalists to be violently anti-u.s., the emerging regimes 
would most likely be Marxist-Leninist. The geopolitics of 
Europe demand that communist states press for independence from 
their giant neighbor, the soviet Union. "Titoism" was a 
victory for national communism, because Yugoslavia is in the 
shadow of the USSR. The frustrated independence efforts of 
321. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are testimony to this 
persistent geopolitical reality that states seek independence 
from neighboring superpowers. Yet the further the communist 
state finds itself from the Soviet Union, the less likely it is 
to need independence from it; indeed, the more likely the state 
is to become more closely allied with Soviet foreign policy 
objectives. Cuba, in the shadow of the u.s., and VietNam, 
near China, are two compliant Soviet client states. A 
Marxist-Leninist state in our neighborhood would have to be 
both anti-u.s. and closely allied with Soviet power. The 
question for the u.s. Government is, therefore: At what stage 
would a Marxist-Leninist regime seriously threaten u.s. 
national security? 
The current threat to u.s. security from the communist 
exploitation of revolutionary developments in Central America 
seems to be a more immediate source of concern than the 
incremental increase of Soviet and allied military presence in 
the area. The potential for the consolidation of a Sandinista 
Marxist-Leninist government, allied with the soviet Union and 
Cuba and committed to the export of revolution across its land 
borders, contributes significantly to the region's disorder. 
Should one or more additional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
states emerge in the region over the next three to five years, 
the entire Caribbean Basin would be threatened, including some 
of the larger nations such as Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. 
The threat would come from the dramatic polarization and 
probable militarization of the region. We do not foresee in 
this event a simple domino theory of communist states. What we 
would expect to see would be the shrinking of the political 
center and the failing of confidence of the region's struggling 
democrats. Nations would arm themselves more. Military 
institutions would take forceful measures against real or 
imagined terrorists. such polarization and fear could lead to 
serious setbacks to the encouraging democratic trends in Latin 
America. 
Of course, in an abstract sense a Marxist-Leninist state 
does not necessarily have to be antagonistic to the u.s. or to 
its security interests. We can and have coexisted and even 
cooperated with Marxist-Leninist states, from Yugoslavia to 
China. We must find a way to live peacefully with the Soviet 
Union and its allies. Yet in the Caribbean Basin, Cuba and 
Nicaragua have already demonstrated the threat that a 
militarized, revolutionary and Soviet-allied government brings 
to a backward and depressed political and economic 
environment. We must make decisions about u.s. security based 
on our experience, not on our hopes. But it is precisely the 
political and military affiliation of the revolutionary 
insurgents in an economically and politically weakened Central 
America that poses the greatest immediate threat to U.S. and 
regional security. 
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V. GLOBAL INTERESTS 
All Americans recognize that the United States has global 
interests. Since the Vietnam War, however, Americans have 
become ever more deeply divided over how to define them. The 
debate over Central American policy engages directly those 
competing perceptions of which u.s. global interests should 
determine our approach. Two broadly different conceptual 
approaches, and one important variant emerge. 
One view holds that our global interests should be defined 
by an overriding commitment to rule by law and to preserving 
world peace by strengthening international instiututions. We 
should pursue a principled approach which stresses respect for 
human rights and greater attention to the major global problems 
-- economic development, third world debt, world population 
growth, non-proliferation, pollution and the impact of modern 
technology. This view holds that maintaining a balanced power 
relationship with the soviet Union is essential to u.s. 
security. Yet the East-West issues are dwarfed by the larger 
global challenges to mankind. Nationalism in the developing 
world ultimately will work against the hegemonic ambitions of 
both superpowers. The u.s., therefore, should not use force to 
counter the adventurism of the Soviets and their surrogates. 
The Soviet obsession with military security issues and 
political influence should not distract us from our broader 
purpose. u.s. leadership will prevail if we concentrate our 
efforts on the economic, social and humane global interests. 
In Central America, according to this view, our overriding 
interests are to adhere to a policy of non-intervention, of 
respect for national sovereignty and self-determination and of 
strengthening our record in the promotion of respect for human 
rights. Disruptive political revolution is an outgrowth of the 
economic and social inequities of the region. The Soviet and 
Cuban effort to take advantage of these developments should not 
provoke the u.s. to go against its broader global interests, 
unless there is a clear case of Soviet or Cuban military action 
or attempted action. Over the long term, the small nations of 
the Caribbean Basin can present no threat to u.s. national 
security unless they serve as soviet bases, which is not likely 
to occur and which alone would justify our intervention. 
A second view holds that our primary global interests are 
determined by strategic questions of military power and the 
balance of politico-economic power in the world. U.S. 
interests, in this view, are to ensure that our nation 
continues to be the leader of the free nations of the world 
through the maintenance of u.s. military and economic power and 
world respect for that power. According to this view, the 
erosion of u.s. power and the world perception of that decline 
over the past decade have contributed significantly to 
instability in the developing world, to the more aggressive 
military adventures of the Soviet Union, and to the general 
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lessening of the ability and the authority of the United States 
to be a leader in the promotion of international peace and rule 
by law. We cannot serve as an example to the world if we are 
not seen as strong. 
The current turmoil in Central America, in this view, is 
perceived as the most recent and most serious result of a 
deterioration in the u.s. power position over the past decade. 
~ihile the Soviets and Cubans may not have created the 
conditions that brought about the revolutionary conditions in 
Central America, Soviet policies in support of Cuban efforts to 
promote violent revolution in Central America, combined with 
the progressively greater military and official presence of the 
Soviets and Soviet allies in the region, are trends that must 
be reversed. The costs of their not being reversed would be 
high over the next five years: 
The u.s. would have to dedicate increasingly greater 
resources and military assets to that area thus limiting its 
capacity to defend other vital u.s. interests in Europe and the 
Middle East. 
This more bold Soviet/Cuban thrust, if even 
marginally successful, could encourage higher risk Soviet 
behavior and imply that despite their own serious domestic and 
foreign problems, the balance of power was actually shifting in 
their favor. 
Other nations where our vital interests are more 
directly engaged, most particularly Mexico, Panama and 
Venezuela, would be seriously affected by the deterioration of 
u.s. influence in Central America and by the expansion of 
revolutionary/guerrilla activity. 
Other European allies and our partners around the 
world, despite what they say now about our Central American 
policies, would be stunned and profoundly disturbed by 
significant new Soviet/Cuban inroads into our southern 
periphery. 
These two competing views of u.s. global interests have 
deep roots in the making of American foreign policy. Every 
modern President has sought a proper mix between the moral and 
power imperatives in shaping u.s. policies. The American 
people yearn to have a powerful and trusted nation. These 
yearnings are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Yet in the 
post-Vietnam period a sharper conflict has arisen between these 
two broad American views of how we should act internationally 
as a nation. There are those who believe that we should also 
renounce, or at least forego, the use of force and that we 
should have military power but not use it except under 
circumstances of direct and immediate military threat to the 
U.S. or to NATO. 
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The post-Vietnam period has given birth to an important 
variation on the traditional debate between power and principle 
in the conduct of United States foreign relations. A large 
body of Americans concluded after Vietnam and other u.s. and 
Soviet misadventures in the Third World that the United States 
simply cannot effectively project its power in the developing 
world, except under very limited circumstances. This pragmatic 
point of view holds that u.s. governments have proven 
themselves so inept at counter-insurgency, at promoting 
democracy, at controlling covert action and at deploying U.S. 
power in areas we know little about that we should simply 
desist. Moreover, congressionnal restrictions on presidential 
power, combined with the low public tolerance for foreign 
involvements that could cost u.s. lives and resources, severely 
limit the capacity of presidents to sustain policies and 
programs to victory. Failure in pursuit of a power role in 
Central America is likely to have a more damaging affect on the 
u.s.-soviet balance, the region and our allies than not 
engaging the issue at all. 
There is a strong Eurocentric bias to the pragmatic view 
that the U.S. should not project its power where it has proven 
itself incapable. The containment policy was originally 
designed to stop further soviet expansion of its borders. 
Containment was conceived, along with the idea of NATO, in the 
European context. That the u.s. fought two costly wars in Asia 
in pursuit of containment severely diverted u.s. attention from 
the fulcrum of our global interests in Europe. That we failed 
in Southeast Asia demonstrated to those who have always viewed 
Europe as the centerpiece of u.s. foreign relations that we 
should not again permit ourselves to be distracted. 
Preoccupation with Latin America can only divert us from our 
historic and far more important Atlantic alliance structure. 
Therefore, even if we were capable of engaging u.s. power 
effectively to control the spread of Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary regimes in Central America, it would not be worth 
the high cost. Moreover, the Eurocentrist pragmatists argue 
that Soviet interests in the Caribbean Basin are so minor and 
their assets there so meager that it is hardly likely that 
current trends there could have any significant effect on the 
strategic balance, much less threaten our national security. 
Nevertheless, the United States probably has no choice but 
to conduct a foreign policy which is global in its vision, and 
which is strategic to the degree that it comprehends the 
effects of action in one part of the world on developments and 
attitudes elsewhere. We concluded, moreover, that a global 
strategy demands that we seek to make our policies coherent 
across geographic frontiers. It also demands that we seek an 
even blend of the multiple ideals and power responsibilities 
that determine our central role as the mightiest country of the 
free world. What we seek in Central America must be consistent 
with what we seek in the larger world. Yet the problems in 
Central America pose special challenges to u.s. policy 
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precisely because, as we have discussed in this chapter, the 
mix of u.s. interests is so complex. We refused to accept the 
false dichotomy between the maintenance of a principled policy 
and the exercise of u.s. power to ensure that the principles 
for which we stand are preserved. That the United States has 
been clumsy, hesitant, inconsistent and unsuccessful on 
occasions in its efforts to assert u.s. power can be admitted; 
it must not be used as an alibi to disqualify us from a 
leadership role among free nations. For in the end global 
security and progress depend on that role. our experiences 
have prepared us to be more dependable, coherent, measured and 
persistent in the defense of our interests and those of others. 
Although it is not necessary to attempt to make a judgment 
here on whether or not the Soviet Union is an expansionist 
power or simply an opportunistic superpower, one must recognize 
that the central issue in determining how seriously U.S. global 
interests are threatened in Central America is the degree to 
which the Soviet Union has itself become directly involved in 
trying to shape the course of events to its advantage on the 
North American continent. 
On this central point one can conclude that a disturbing 
shift in Soviet policies over the past few years makes the 
Central American turmoil more than just another series of 
national struggles over which groups or which concepts will 
govern. In addition to this shift in Soviet policies, u.s. 
interests have been challenged by the internationalization and 
militarization of the internal struggles over who will govern 
in the small nations of Central America. The challenges today 
are more serious than they were in the early 1960's, when the 
Kennedy Administration designed the Alliance for Progress as 
part of the u.s. response. What distinguishes the 1980's from 
the 1960's with regard to the Soviet threat in our hemisphere 
is that today: the Soviets have a global military capability 
and vocation; there is an authentic revolutionary situation in 
Central America; for the first time, the Soviets have supported 
the Cuban strategy of promoting revolution in Central America; 
Cuba is no longer not the only Latin country promoting 
revolution, since Nicaragua, which borders three other Central 
American countries, is directly engaged in what it has called a 
revolution without frontiers; and the United States, because of 
Vietnam and our prior involvement in Latin America, has a 
lingering incapacity and unwillingness to use even limited 
military measures to defend the region. 
The soviet Union is now openly seeking to influence 
directly and through its allies the course of the revolutionary 
events in Central America. It is not a given that there is an 
immediate danger that the soviets will succeed in their 
efforts. Yet the trends in soviet efforts to manipulate events 
in our neighborhood, if not reversed, could lead over the next 
several years to a significant shift in the global deployment 
and focus of u.s. power, resources and attention. 
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VI. CONCLUSION ON U.S. INTERESTS 
As u.s. interests are examined closely, one is drawn more 
deeply into the American domestic differences over what we want 
and what we believe we can achieve as a nation. The world 
around us, particularly the nations of Central America, 
demonstrates little malleability -- little susceptibility to 
our entreaties. Those societies are remarkably resistant to 
outside pressures, yet sadly prone to revolution and 
unraveling. One must conclude that the United States is limited 
in its capacity to change events over the short term. 
Yet it can also be concluded that we have the time and 
capacity to affect events positively as long as we do not set 
for ourselves a goal of fixing the Central America problem 
quickly in order to be able to forget about it for another 
decade. We must set a horizon of five to ten years of 
intensive resource expenditures and policy attention in order 
to protect the broad u.s. interests in the region. 
This paper has tried to demonstrate the complexity of the 
interests that a sound bipartisan United States policy must be 
designed to defend. There must be choices made between 
regional and global, between moral and security, when those 
interests are conflicting. There are no easy choices. 
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SOVIET POWER IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND THE'" CARIBBEAN: 
THE GROWING THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY 
Carl Gershman 
The significance to the United States of developments 
in Central America and the Caribbean Basin cannot be 
appreciated apart from a consideration of the Soviet Union's 
role in the region and its implications for American 
national security. Over the last quarter of a century, 
with the imposition in Cuba of a Communist regime allied with 
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Moscow, the Soviet Union has steadily, if at times imperceptibly, 
expanded its power and presence in the region. This steady 
advance, which is reflected in Soviet doctrinal shifts registering 
Moscow's heightened capabilities and ambitions in the region, 
has been marked by an immense increase in Cuba's military 
capability and greatly stepped up aid to regional insurgent 
forces. With the coming to power in 1979 of pro-Cuban groups 
in Nicaragua and Grenada, the ability of the Soviet Union and 
Cuba to promote armed struggle and to project military power 
throughout the region was vastly enhanced. 
These developments, especially if view.ed in the 
context of the Soviet Union's growing global power and its 
unprecedented peacetime military build-up, pose a grave 
and growing threat to what Hans J. Morgenthau once called 
"the permanent national interest of the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere." They also threaten the well-being 
of the region's peoples who have suffered from escalating 
levels of violence, economic destruction, and social 
dislocation. Not least, the deteriorating regional 
conditions threaten the NATO Alliance owing to the special 
importance of the Caribbean Basin as a geopolitical zone 
the "strategic rear," as the Soviets call it, of United 
States global power. 
The critical importance of the Caribbean Basin to 
American security and the growing threat to U.S. interests 
there is still not adequately appreciated in this country. 
As Americans, we have been so accustomed throughout most of 
our history to security in our own hemisphere that we have 
come to think, as Walter Lippmann wrote four decades ago, 
"that our privileged position was a natural right." In fact, 
it was the divisions in Europe and the supremacy of British 
seapower that allowed us to uphold the Monroe Doctrine 
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with minimal effort during the last century. The only significant 
breach of the Doctrine came during the American Civil War 
when Napoleon III, taking advantage of our debilitating 
internal conflict, installed an Austrian archduke in Mexico 
City and Spain briefly reannexed Santo Domingo. The Monroe 
Doctrine remained essentially intact for a full century 
thereafter, until the intrusion of Communism into Cuba. 
That event, which prompted Khrushchev to declare that 
the Monroe Doctrine had "outlived its times" and had 
died "a natural death," might have been expected to challenge 
the complacency with which Americans have tended to regard 
their security in the Hemisphere. But the 1962 understanding 
with the Soviet Union, according to which the Soviets would 
not introduce offensive weapons into Cuba and would curtail 
Cuban aggression in the Hemisphere in exchange for our 
assurances against invading Cuba, allowed the belief that "the 
Cuban problem" had been effectively contained. Subsequent 
~istory has shown, however, that this belief was both premature 
and mistaken. 
In the aftermath of the 1962 agreement, the Soviet 
Union and Cuba followed different policies toward the 
Hemisphere. Cuba, hoping to replicate its own revolution 
in other countries, followed the foco theory of Castro and 
Che Guevara which was based upon the belief that protracted 
guerrilla warfare in the countryside could create the political 
as well as military conditions for the overthrow of established 
governments. The Soviets, showing a Leninist distrust of 
"infantile leftism," preferred to prepare the ground slowly 
and systematically for a future challenge to the U.S. 
While not opposing Cuban support for armed struggle in Venezuela, 
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Colombia, Guatemala and several other countries, the 
Soviets concentrated on expanding their diplomatic, economic, 
and cultural ties in the region and on strengthening the 
influence of local Communist parties in broad electoral 
fronts and the trade unions. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, this strategy 
appeared to be paying off. While Cuban-supported guerrillas 
suffered repeated setbacks, the Soviets were encouraged 
by the victory of Allende in Chile, the success of the Broad 
Front in Uruguay, and the return of Peron to Argentina, as 
well as by ''progressive" military coups in Peru, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Panama. In 1971, Boris N. Ponomarev, the 
chairman of the international department of the Central Committee 
of the Soviet Communist Party, welcomed "the upsurge of the 
revolutionary movement on the Latin American continent" which 
had "tremendous importance to the world revolutionary 
process." Emphasizing the strategic significance of this 
development, Ponomarev wrote, 
Seemingly quite reliable rear lines of American 
imperialism are becoming a tremendous hotbed of anti-
imperialist revolution. A tremendously powerful 
revolutionary movement is developing by the side of 
the main citadel of imperialism, the U.S. These 
changes are having and, unquestionably will continue 
to have, a strong impact on the further changes in 
the correlation of world forces in favor of the 
international working class and socialism. 
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A number of developments came together in the 1970s 
causing the Soviet Union to abandon the relatively cautious 
approach it followed in the decade after 1962 arid to adopt 
a policy of revolutionary armed struggle, thus setting the 
stage for the current crisis in Central America. 
The first of these developments was the overthrow 
of Allende in Chile and the subsequent right-wing takeovers 
in Uruguay, Argentina, and Bolivia. The effect of these 
events was to discredit the Soviet line concerning the "peaceful 
path" to Communism in Latin America. While the Soviets 
continued officially to uphold this line -- they did not 
abandon it completely until the Sandinista victory in 1979 
they also embraced the armed struggle, as indicated by the 
Havana Declaration of Latin American and Caribbean Communist 
parties in 1979: 
The utilization of all legal possibilities is 
an indispensible obligation of the anti-imperialist 
forces ...• Revolutionaries are not the first to 
resort to violence. But it is the right and duty of 
all revolutionary forces to be ready to answer 
counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary 
violence. 
Second, with the triumph of Soviet-backed forces in 
Indochina, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, the 
Soviets adopted a much more aggressive policy toward the Third 
World, reflecting their view that the "correlation of forces" 
had shifted dramatically against the West. In the Soviet view, 
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changes in the balance of strategic and conventional 
forces had created the conditions for further Soviet gains 
in Third World struggles, which the Chief of the Soviet 
General Staff Academy, I. Shavrov, called "epicenters" in 
the global East-West struggle. Under these favorable 
conditions, wrote Soviet Central Committee member and Third 
World specialist Karen Brutents, the decisive issue was no 
longer the defense of the Soviet Union but "carrying on the 
offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a 
whole in order to do away with them." 
Third, the Soviets dramatically strengthened their 
military capability in the Caribbean, in line with their global 
build-up. This development was marked by the "Sovietization" 
of Cuba, which fell into line behind Soviet policy after 
1968, and by a dramatic increase in Cuban military forces. 
Cuba's total armed forces, which numbered less than 50,000 in 
1960, more than doubled by 1970 to 109,500. With the beginning 
of Cuba's Africa operations in the mid-1970s, these forces 
expanded once again, from 117,000 in 1975 to 175,000 in 1976. 
In addition to acquiring valuable combat experience in Africa, 
these forces received upgraded training and sophisticated 
weaponry, including an impressive array of tanks, armored 
cars and personnel carriers, heavy artillery, surface-to-surface 
missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, self-propelled anti-
aircraft weapons, and surface-to-air missiles. This build-up 
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included an expansion of the Cuban Navy, which acquired Osa 
patrol boats equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles, 
as well as the expansion and modernization of the Cuban Air 
Force, which received advance models of the MiG-21MF in 
1975 and MiG-23/27 fighter bombers in 1978. 
The Soviet military presence in the Caribbean also 
increased dramatically during this period. A seven-ship 
Soviet task force entered the Caribbean in July 1969, beginning 
a series of regular visits that gave the Soviets a routine 
naval presence in the region. Though the Soviets were 
forced to halt their construction of a nuclear submarine base 
at Cienfuegos in the fall of 1970, Soviet nuclear submarines 
and diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines made repeated 
visits to Cuban ports thereafter, and new naval basing and 
repair facilities were under construction at Cienfuegos 
by the end of the decade. In addition, Soviet TU-95 
Bear reconnaissance aircraft began to be deployed in Cuba in 
1975, and several new airfields were constructed capable 
of accommodating the Backfire strategic bomber. Increased 
numbers of Soviet military advisers, technicians, and 
instructors arrived to supervise and service the build-up 
of Soviet and Cuban forces. 
As an indication of the increasingly close 
collaboration between these forces, significant numbers of 
Soviet pilots were sent to Cuba in 1976 and 197B to replace 
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the Cuban pilots who were sent to Africa to defend the 
pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. The 3000-man 
Soviet brigade in Cuba also indirectly aided Cuban military 
activities: as a guarantee of the Soviet commitment to 
the survival of the Castro regime, it allowed Cuba to pursue 
a more aggressive policy in the region without fear of a 
retaliatory U.S. strike. 
Fourth, just as the increase in Soviet global 
power was accompanied by a major build-up in the region, 
the retreat of U.S. global power during the same period was 
matched by a corresponding regional decline. Between 1968 
and 1981, U.S. military personnel in the Basin decreased 
from over 25,000 to under 16,000, and U.S. military installations 
in Panama, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo were downgraded or 
closed down entirely. At the same time, the rise of the 
"Vietnam syndrome" in the United States created a climate of 
indifference to u.s. security concerns in the Basin and 
stimulated calls for ending what some disparagingly called 
the American "hegemonic presumption." The resulting power 
vacuum altered the geopolitical dynamics of the region, 
inviting new foreign intervention -- from the Socialist 
International as well as the Soviet bloc -- and contributing 
to increased Balkanization and political instability. These 
trends were accelerated by the enunciation of a new human 
rights doctrine during the Carter Administration which 
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signaled the withdrawal of support for Central American 
governments previously backed by the United States. 
Fifth, rapid social and economic changes in Central 
America during the previous quarter of a century forced new 
pressures to the surface in the mid-1970s that made the 
region an inviting target for insurgency. The sustained 
economic growth of the 1960s produced a new middle class and 
an urban working class whose political aspirations were 
blocked by the traditional oligarchs, and whose rising 
economic expectations were frustrated during the recession 
that followed the first OPEC oil price rise of 1973-74. 
The shattering impact of the second oil price rise of 1979-80 
brought to a head seething social conflicts which, as they 
turned more violent, worsened the economic collapse. 
Sixth, by the mid-1970s and increasingly thereafter, 
Cuba had developed a much greater institutional capacity to 
promote guerrilla warfare than it possessed during the 
previous decade, and its revolutionary strategy was much 
more sophisticated than the failed foco strategy of Che Guevara. 
The principal institutional instrument for promoting 
insurgencies was the Americas Department, which was 
established in 1974 to centralize Cuba's operational control 
over covert revolutionary activities throughout the Hemisphere 
and particularly in Central America. The Americas Department 
brought together the expertise of the Cuban military and 
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the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) in a 
coordinated operation that included covert operations in 
the field, networks for the movement of intelligence and 
other personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad, 
and extensive cultural and propaganda activities tailored 
to discredit targeted governments and to build support for 
armed opposition groups. The Department's activities also 
included supervision of a network of guerrilla training 
camps and indoctrination schools on the island where trainees 
from throughout Latin America received 3 to 6 months of 
instruction in guerrilla warfare tactics, weapons use, and 
propaganda and agitation. 
The revolutionary strategy pursued by Cuba in target 
countries involved the creation of separate military and 
political fronts, as well as the establishment by such fronts 
of relations with a broad array of non-Communist allies, 
both domestic and foreign. This strategy, as it developed in 
the course of the Nicaraguan revolution, required in the first 
instance the unification of traditionally splintered insurgent 
groups as a condition for increased Cuban military advice 
and assistance. Just as the creation of such unified military 
fronts allowed Cuba to exercise control over the armed 
struggle, so too did the creation of broad political fronts 
with non-Communist oppositionists allow the guerrillas to 
coopt such forces and neutralize them as rival alternatives 
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to the existing government. This objective was also 
served by the armed struggle itself, which undermined the 
political center by sharpening the increasingly violent 
confrontation between left and right. 
The popular-front tactic had the added advantage of 
allowing the guerrillas to disarm critics by posing as 
non-Communist democrats, a posture given further credibility 
by the alliances formed with non-Communist Latin governments, 
Euorpean Socialists, political forces in the United States, and 
church and human rights groups. These alliances strengthened 
the international legitimacy of the guerrillas and helped 
delegitimize the target government, and they neutralized U.S. 
opposition even as they legitimized support from Cuba as 
just one of many foreign backers of the insurgents. 
This highly sophisticated and subtle strategy was 
successfully applied in Nicaragua, with far-reaching 
consequences for the future of Central America. In March 
1979, after more than a year of effort, Castro announced the 
unification of the three guerrilla factions of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN). During the next three 
months, Cuba escalated -- but also cleverly masked its 
military involvement, transshipping through Panama to Costa 
Rica 450 tons of weapons for use in the "final offensive." 
It also provided the FSLN with some 200 military advisers, 
who manned the heavy artillery and other sophisticated weapons, 
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and with an "internationalist brigade" drawn from Central 
and South American terrorist groups. In addition, an 
intelligence center was set up at the Cuban Embassy in San 
Jose under the control of Julian Lopez, the DGI officer 
sent to Costa Rica the previous year to coordinate Cuba's 
assistance to the FSLN. 
In the meantime, a Broad Opposition Front (FAO) had 
been established in 1978 consisting of political representatives 
of the FSLN (the so-called "Group of 12") and leaders of 
political parties, trade unions, and business 1and professional 
groups. Though the FAO was disbanded after the militarization 
of the conflict had given the FSLN preeminence in the 
opposition, the Front had, in the words of an FSLN document, 
"allowed the channeling of external help from many sources 
and without restrictions, while limiting the maneuvering 
of the most reactionary forces within the U.S." 
Among the principal sources of such external help 
were the governments of Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica, 
which provided important material, logistic, and political 
assistance. Other sources included Westn European Socialist 
Governments and the Socialist International, and human rights, 
church, and political groups in the United States. Instead 
of moderating the revolution, as many of these external 
actors had surely hoped to do, they supported the democrats 
and the "extreme left" without distinction, thus conferring 
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democratic legitimacy on the latter and limiting the options 
available to the U.S. Their involvement also helped Cuba 
conceal its decisive role. 
The success of the armed struggle in Nicaragua 
brought about a basic revision of Soviet doctrine regarding 
revolution in Central and Latin America. The editor of 
Latinskaya Amerika, Sergo Mikoyan, called the Nicaragua 
revolution an event of "colossal international importance" 
demanding a "reexamination of established conceptions" in 
light of the fact that "only the armed road has led to victory 
in Latin America." Another contributor to the Soviet 
publication stated that "The Nicaraguan experience demolished 
the previous simplistic interpretation of guerrilla actions, 
confirmed the justice of many of Che Guevara's strategic 
principles and crystallized his idea of creating a powerful 
popular guerrilla movement." The President of the Soviet 
Association of Friendship with Latin American Countries, 
Viktor Volski, called the armed victory in Nicaragua a "model" 
to be followed in other countries, while Boris Ponomarev 
included for the first time the countries of Central America 
among Third World states undergoing revolutionary changes of 
"a socialist orientation." 
The new line was unanimously endorsed by the leaders 
of the Central American Communist parties. For example, the 
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), which had previously 
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described the country's insurgent groups as "adventurist" 
and "bound to fail" -- and was accused, in turn, of 
"decadence" and "revisionism" -- made a complete about face 
and established itself as the revolutionary arm of its 
front group, the National Democratic Union (UDN). The 
party secretary Shafik Jorge Handel wrote in Kommunist, the 
theoretical organ of the Soviet Communist Party, that 
the Salvadoran revolution "will be victorious by the armed 
road .•. there is no other way." 
The change of line was also embraced by Communist party 
leaders from elsewhere in Latin America. Luis Corvalan, the 
leader of the Chilean Communist party who had earlier derided 
the Castroites as "petty-bourgeois revolutionaries," now 
called for armed struggle, as did Rodney Arismendi, the first 
secretary of the Uruguayan Communist party. 
The change in doctrine was accompanied by a new 
build-up of Cuban and now also Nicaraguan military forces, 
and by an effort to export the Nicaraguan revolution. By 
the early 1980s, Cuba had become by far the most formidable 
military power south of the United States, "a kind of vast 
floating military base," as Robert S. Leiken has aptly put 
it, "united by a Soviet-built central strategic highway 
and railway system ... " Including army ready reserves, Cuban 
armed forces in 1981 totalled 227,000. This represented 
over 2.3 percent of the population, fully 10 times the 
341. 
average proportion of military personnel to population 
in ten other leading countries of the Basin (including 
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Central American states). 
Moreover, this figure does not include a paramilitary 
force of 780,000 consisting of a Youth Labor Army (100,000), 
a Civil Defense Force (100,000), a Territorial Troop 
Militia (over 500,000), Border Guard Troops (3,000), the 
National Revolutionary Police (10,000 plus 52,000 auxiliaries), 
and the Department of State Security (10,000-15,000). 
Whereas the Soviet Union annually delivered an 
average of 15,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba during 
the 1970s build-up, 66,000 tons arrived in 1981 and about 
the same amount the following year. The new equipment 
enhanced the mobility and firepower of Cuba's ground 
forces, which have an overwhelming numerical superiority in 
weapons over Cuba's Latin neighbors, as well as a qualitative 
advantage. The Cuban Air Force now possesses more 
than 200 combat jet aircraft, including three squadrons of 
MiG-23s whose combat radius, if they could refuel in 
Nicaragua and Grenada, would emcompass all of Central America 
and the eastern Caribbean, southern Mexico, and northern 
South America. The Air Force is also equipped with Mi-8 
helicopter gunships and Mi-24 assault helicopters, as well 
as AN-26 and other transport aircraft which give Cuba a 
logistic capability much greater than it had at the time of 
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the airlift to Luanda in 1975. This capability could 
be used to deploy quickly to crisis points within the 
region the Special Troops Battalion, a 3-4,000 man all-
purpose elite force under Castro's personal command. The 
expansion of the Cuban Navy that began in the mid-1970s 
has continued with the acquisition of three Foxtrot- and 
Whiskey-class submarines, a Koni-class frigate, 24 fast-attack 
missile craft, 24 fast-attack torpedo craft, and 22 fast-
attack patrol craft, as well as coastal patrol craft, 
minesweepers, and landing craft. 
A corresponding military build-up has taken place 
in Nicaragua. According to Nicaraguan army commander 
Joachin Cuadra, by the end of 1982 the Nicaraguan forces 
had grown to be "four times as big and eight times as 
strong" as Somoza•s Guardia Nacional. With a population of 
just 2.7 million, Nicaragua has 25,000 regulars and 80,000 
reserves and militias, a force that already vastly overshadows 
that of Honduras, with only a 15,000 man force, and Costa 
Rica, which has no armed forces at all. Moreover, the 
Nicaraguan force is rapidly being built up through broad-
based conscription and Soviet bloc logistic support. 
Nicaragua has added nearly 40 new military bases, 
as well as a powerful array of Soviet Bloc weaponry, including 
some 50-60 T-54/55 tanks -- the heaviest by far in Central 
America -- 1,000 East German trucks and armored personnel 
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carriers, heavy artillery, assault helicopters, anti-
aircraft weapons, mobile multiple rocket launchers, patrol 
boats, and amphibious ferries. The first delivery of 
sophisticated Soviet electronic gear of a type seen 
previously in Cuba took place in December 1982, giving 
Nicaragua the ability to intercept signals from throughout 
Central America that would be especially useful in locating 
Honduran military communication sites. 
The acquisition of these and other weapons accelerated 
during 1983, with 14 deliveries arriving from the Soviet 
Union between January and August, compared to 11 such 
deliveries in all of 1982. Libya has also succeeded in 
delivering military equipment to Nicaragua after its failed 
attempt earlier this year to transship through Brazil arms 
labelled as medical equipment. 
The foreign military presence in Nicaragua 
includes Soviet, East European, Libyan, and PLO advisers, 
along with a 2,000 man Cuban force that is reportedly 
headed now by the former commander of the Cuban forces in 
Angola and Ethiopia. East German advisers have reorganized 
Nicaragua's internal security apparatus and intelligence 
system and set up a military communications network linking 
Managua with Havana and Moscow, while the Soviets are 
supervising the reorganization and "Sovietization" of the 
Nicaraguan economy. The Cubans have constructed a major 
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strategic road between Puerto Cabezas and the interior, 
facilitating the movement of troops and supplies to suppress 
and 1:emove indigenous Indian residents of the region. 
They have also supervised the extension of the airfields 
at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the Atlantic Coast and 
Montlimar on the Pacific Coast to accomodate advanced jet 
aircraft. About 70 Nicaraguan pilots who were trained in 
Bulgaria are now in Cuba, where it is reported that about an 
equal number of advanced MiG warplanes designated for 
Nicaragua have recently arrived. 
The Nicaraguan leaders have made no secret of their 
intention to use this new military capability to promote 
revolution through armed struggle in Central America. 
The Economist (May 16) quoted Defense Minister Humberto 
Ortega as follows: "Of course we are not ashamed to be 
helping El Salvador. We would like to help all revolutions." 
Similarly, Interior Minister Tomas Borge told columnists 
Evans and Novak earlier this year that the Sandinista revolution 
was the vanguard for similar revolutions throughout the 
region and that "the energies released here will be universal 
in all Central America." 
The effort to export the Nicaraguan revolution to 
El Salvador began almost as soon as the Sandinistas had seized 
power in Managua. As had earlier been the case in Nicaragua, 
the first priority was to unite the various Salvadoran 
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guerrilla factions. A meeting in Havana in December 1979 
resulted in an initial unity agreement, after which a 
combined military command was formed called the Unified 
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). A joint command and control 
apparatus was established in the Managua area, and logistic 
and training support for the guerrillas was organized on 
Nicaraguan soil with Cuban and other Soviet Bloc assistance. 
The training of the Salvadoran guerrillas in military 
tactics, sabotage, explosives, and special commando 
operations has taken place in Cuba as well as in Nicaragua. 
One Salvadoran guerrilla who defected to Honduras in 
September 1981, for example, reported that he and 12 others 
were sent for training from Nicaragua to Cuba, where over 
900 other Salvadorans were also being trained. 
Cuba is also intimately involved in the arms 
supply to Salvadoran guerrillas, both by shipping arms 
destined for El Salvador directly to Nicaragua and by 
coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam, 
Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe. In December 1981, after meetings 
in Havana with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, Castro directed 
that external supplies of arms to FMLN units be stepped 
up with a view toward mounting an offensive that would disrupt 
the elections planned for March 1982. In addition to 
ammunition, these supply operations have included greater 
quantities of sophisticated heavy weapons, including M-60 
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machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 antitank 
weapons. Confirmation that Nicaragua remains the primary 
source of these weapons was given by Alejandro Montenegro, 
a high-level Salvadoran FMLN leader captured during a raid 
on a guerrilla safehouse in Honduras in August 1982. 
One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro had already 
made five trips to Managua that year to pick up arms 
for the insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas 
to carry concealed weapons. 
Montenegro also provided evidence of the role 
played by Cuba and Nicaragua in the Salvadoran armed struggle. 
He said that he personally had attended two high-level 
meetings with Cuban officials in 1981, one in Havana and 
the other in Managua, to review the situation in El 
Salvador and to receive strategic advice. Another captured 
Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola, admitted to 
attending a platoon leaders course in Cuba in July 1979. 
He also confirmed that the Sandinistas control weapons 
delivered to Nicaragua for the Salvadoran insurgents, and 
that the guerrillas have to seek permission from the 
Sandinista authorities to draw on the supplies. He added 
that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an extensive base 
of operations in and around Managua, and even provide a school 
for their children. 
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After years of combat, the Salvadoran guerrilla 
headquarters in Nicaragua has evolved into an extremely 
sophisticated command and control center. Guerrilla planning 
and operations are guided from this headquarters, and Cuban 
and Nicaraguan officers are involved in command and 
control, coordinating logistical support for the insurgents 
which includes food, medicines, clothing, and money as well 
as weapons and ammunition. 
The Salvadoran insurgents have not denied their 
relationship with Cuba and Nicaragua. In a broadcast last 
year, the Salvadoran guerrilla Radio Venceremos declared, 
"We are and will continue to be friends of the peoples and 
Governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and we are not ashamed of 
this." It added: "We have conducted important logistics 
operations clandestinely, which have served to provide our 
forces with arms and ammunition for long periods of time. 
We have conducted these operations using all the means 
available, and, therefore, have used the entire Central 
American region and other countries." The purpose of these 
operations, the broadcast pointed out, was the destruction 
of the Salvadoran economy. 
This past spring, for example, the guerrillas 
announced a heightened campaign to disrupt the planting of 
cotton and the processing of coffee, products that account 
for 60 percent of El Salvador's export earnings. In an 
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effort to stop trade and communication between El 
Salvador and Honduras, they increased the destruction of 
bridges. Following the destruction of the bridge at El 
Amantillo in April, the guerrillas announced that they 
would kill anyone who tried to repair it. They have attacked 
the rail system, hoping that the paralysis of traffic 
between the capital and the East Coast would discourage 
growers and investors. They have also ordered continued 
operations against energy and transportation facilities and 
have destroyed hydro-electric plants. 
As a result of these massive attacks, unemployment 
has increased from 7 percent to 40 percent since 1979, 
per capita income is down by over 30 percent, the eastern 
part of the country has been blacked out for most of the 
year, half of the country's buses have been destroyed, schools 
have been closed, and hundreds of thousands have fled, 
including many of the best educated and trained citizens. 
El Salvador has not been the only target of the 
armed struggle in Central America. Guatemala exemplifies 
Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to create a unified guerrilla 
command as a first step in mounting a sustained insurgency. 
In the fall of 1980 the four major Guatemalan guerrilla 
groups met in Managua to negotiate a unity agreement. It 
was signed in November -- in Managua -- in the presence of 
Manuel Pineiro Losada, the Chief of Cuba's Americas Department. 
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Following the unity agreement, which set the goal of 
establishing a Marxist-Leninist state, Cuba agreed to increase 
military training and assistance for the Guatemalan 
guerrillas, including instruction in the use of heavy 
weapons. Arms smuggled from Nicaragua overland through 
Honduras have included 50mm mortars, submachine guns, rocket 
launchers, and M-16 rifles that have been traced to u.s. 
forces in Vietnam. 
Reflecting the Nicaraguan experience, the Guatemalan 
guerrillas have adopted a comprehensive political-military 
strategy which combines a commitment to prolonged armed 
struggle with an awareness of the need to establish popular 
front organizations and links with the media, churches of 
all denominations, human rights organizations, trade unions, 
political parties, and sympathetic governments. A General 
Revolutionary Command (CGR) has been established by 
the leaders of the four insurgent groups to plan military 
strategies and strengthen ties to front organizations and 
international solidarity networks in Mexico, Central America, 
the United States, and Europe. 
Honduras has also become a target of Cuban and 
Nicaraguan assisted armed struggle. Until 1981, Havana and 
Managua maintained links with Honduran terrorist groups 
primarily for the purpose of transporting arms to insurgents 
in El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, the ground 
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was laid for armed struggle with the formation of the 
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH) . In 
El Nuevo Diario, the pro-government Nicaraguan newspaper, 
a founder of the FMLH described it as a political-military 
organization formed as part of the 11 increasing regionalization 
of the Central American conflict ... Evidence of Nicaraguan 
and Cuban involvement came when Honduran authorities 
raided several guerrilla safehouses in late November 1981, 
detaining a number of guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans. 
Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas 
revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the 
instigation of high-level Sandinist leaders, that its chief 
of operations resided in Nicaragua, and that members of the 
group had received military training in Nicaragua and 
Cuba. 
The strategy pursued in Honduras until March 1983 
involved a series of urban terrorist incidents, most of which 
saw Salvadoran guerrilla groups working together with 
Hondurans. Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists 
have admitted that explosives used in bombing attacks in the 
Honduran capital were obtained in Nicaragua. Other information 
indicates that the Cubans had a hand in planning the seizure 
of 108 hostages in San Pedro Sula in September 1983. 
In March 1983 the Communist effort to destabilize 
Honduras took a new turn with the announcement that four 
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extreme left groups had formed a Unified Revolutionary 
Coordinating Board. The April 21 issue of Barricada, the 
Sandinista organ, published the new group's declaration 
of "Popular Revolutionary War" which called on the Honduran 
people to rise up against the government and armed forces 
and against "U.S. imperialism." 
Subsequently, on July 19, 96 Honduran guerrillas 
launched an unsuccessful raid from Nicaragua into Olancho 
Department. The 24 guerrillas who deserted or were captured 
told a fairly consistent story of their recruitment and 
training. In almost all cases they were recruited by deception, 
having been told that they would receive some type of 
training in mechanics or agriculture. They were not told 
that they would be sent to Cuba. The training took up to two 
years and included 4 to 6 months in Cuba at the guerrilla 
training school in Pinar del Rio. There they received 
instructions in ideology, weapons, intelligence, and military 
tactics. At the same camp were guerrilla trainees from 
other countries, including El Salvador and Guatemala. For 
some, the stay in Cuba included "volunteer labor" as farm 
workers or servants at state guest houses. Following their 
stay in Cuba, they were sent to Nicaragua for additional 
training before their entry into Honduras on July 19. Statements 
by Havana and Managua indicate that despite the failure of 
this raid they will persist in efforts at rural insurgency 
and destabilization in Honduras. 
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Costa Rica remains the most politically stable 
nation in Central America but it, too, has not been able to 
isolate itself from the turmoil in the region. For the 
past two years, Cuba and Nicaragua have used terrorism and 
diplomacy to intimidate Costa Rica into neutralism. The 
July 1982 bombing of the Honduran Airline office in San 
Jose, for example, took place at Nicaragua's direction. The 
captured terrorist who placed the bomb said that Nicaraguan 
diplomats in Costa Rica had recruited and trained him 
for the operation. Though Nicaragua denied complicity, the 
accused diplomats were caught in flagrante, declared persona 
non grata, and expelled from the country. The captured 
terrorist also stated that the bombing had been part of a 
broader Nicaraguan plan which included sabotage, kidnapping, 
bank robberies, and other acts designed to discredit Costa 
Rica internationally. Since the beginning of 1982, several 
guerrilla arms caches and safehouses have been uncovered in 
Costa Rica. 
Terrorist attacks have continued to occur in San 
Jose, along with a joint Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan campaign 
attacking Costa Rican democracy. There have also been 
incidents involving Sandinista forces along the border, 
including the recent Nicaraguan attack on the Costa Rican 
border installation at Penas Blancas which Costa Rica denounced 
at a specially called meeting of the OAS Permanent Council. 
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The cumulative effect of the armed assault on 
Central America and of the overall growth of Soviet and 
Cuban military power in the Caribbean Basin has been to 
pose a major threat to the "strategic rear" of the United 
States. The view that U.S. security is only threatened by 
the establishment of Soviet military bases in the region 
or by the deployment of SS-20 missiles there -- a step 
repeatedly threatened by the Soviets, most recently by the 
chief of the Warsaw Pact forces in connection with the 
planned deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles in 
Europe -- overlooks the vital strategic importance to the 
United States of a secure Basin. 
Until now, the United States has been able to act 
on the assumption that its "strategic rear" was secure and did 
not require a large diversion of military resources for its 
protection. The Western Alliance has benefited from this 
"economy of force" posture since, as Congressman Dante B. 
Fascell has pointed out, "in a real sense it is the non-
threatening environment close to home that permits the United 
States to concentrate so much manpower, equipment, and 
attention on Europe." 
This situation has already begun to change as the 
United States has had to expend increased military resources 
and growing attention on the crisis in Central America. In 
the event of a collapse there, the reversal of our posture 
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would be swift and drastic, requiring the diversion of 
significant resources to protect our southern border and the 
Caribbean Basin. Were the United States ever to be tied 
down within this region in such a manner, our ability to 
fulfill commitments in Europe and elsewhere in the world, not 
to speak of our own security and well-being, would inevitably 
suffer. 
The Basin is also important strategically, since 
as much as 70 percent of u.s. seaborne reinforcements to NATO 
would transit the sealanes leading from the Gulf Coast 
and the Panama Canal in the event of a Soviet armed attack 
in Europe. The goal of interdicting such reinforcements is 
an important element in Soviet strategic thinking, as set 
forth in 1979 by Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov 
in his book, Naval Power in Soviet Policy: 
To achieve superiority of forces over the enemy 
in the main sector and pin him down in secondary 
sectors ••• means to achieve sea control in a theater 
or a sector of a theater the enemy will be 
paralyzed or constrained in his operations and 
thereby hampered from interfering with our 
operations. 
The Soviets have already achieved a far greater 
interdiction capability than the Nazis had during World War 
Two, when 50 percent of u.s. supplies to Europe and Africa 
were shipped from Gulf ports. At that time, German U-boats 
were able to sink 260 merchant ships in just six months, 
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despite the fact that the Allied forces enjoyed many 
advantages, including a two-to-one edge in submarines and 
the use of Cuba for resupply and basing operations. The 
Germans, meanwhile, had to operate from the Bay of Biscay, 
4,000 miles across the Atlantic and without the benefit of 
aircover. Today these advantages have been reversed. It 
is the Soviet Union that now has the two-to-one edge in 
submarines and can operate and receive aircover from Cuba, 
a point from which all 13 Caribbean sealanes passing through 
four choke-points are vulnerable to interdiction. 
The Soviet ability to carry out a strategy of 
"strategic denial" is further enhanced by the presence near 
Havana of the largest Soviet-managed electronic monitoring 
complex outside the Soviet Union, as well as by the deployment 
of TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft. 
The strategic position of the Soviet Union in the 
Caribbean would be considerably strengthened if Grenada were 
used for refueling and stationing tactical and transport 
aircraft or as a site for naval refueling, both real 
possibilities with the construction of a new airport at 
Port Salines and the reports of Soviet plans to build naval 
facilities on the island. The establishment of new Soviet 
military positions in Grenada would give Moscow a routine 
military presence in the Eastern Caribbean, while the 
acquisition of new positions in Nicaragua -- especially the 
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construction of a naval base on the Pacific Coast, where 
a fishing port is being built -- would extend the Soviet 
reach to the Pacific Basin. Either development would constitute 
a major gain for Soviet strategy. 
The sea routes of the Caribbean are also important 
economically to the United States, since they now carry 
nearly half of all the crude oil and other foreign cargo 
shipped to this country. Moreover, the Basin itself is a 
growing source of critical raw materials. Mexico supplies 
33 percent of the crude oil currently imported by the U.S. 
and has reserves estimated at 45 billion barrels, roughly equal 
to the reserves of such major producers as Iraq and Abu 
Dhabi. Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago supply another 8 
percent of u.s. crude oil imports, while 56 percent of the 
refined petroleum products imported to the u.s. come from 
Basin refineries. In addition, Jamaica and several other Basin 
countries supply 85 percent of the bauxite imported to the 
u.s. and nearly 40 percent of the alumina. 
Beyond the issue of u.s. strategic interests in 
the Basin, the overriding fact is that our credibility world-
wide is inevitably engaged in an area so close to the United 
States. The triumph of hostile forces in our "strategic rear" 
would be read as a sign of u.s. impotence -- the inability 
successfully to define our objectives, manage our policy, and 
defend our interests. 
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A consensus on policy ,.muld need to be based upon a 
common understanding of the nature of the problem facing the 
United States in Central America. The view heard frequently 
that the problem is essentially internal, deriving from 
poverty and repression, does not take adequate account of the 
scope of the external threat facing the region and the extent 
to which the Soviet Union and CUba are exploiting the serious 
problems of very ~llnerable Central American societies. Since 
their strategy of armed struggle wre«!ks havoc with any effort 
to promote economic opportunity, a democratic political center 
and free institutions, and a more professional military -- the 
pillars of any meaningful policy of reform in Central America 
it is hard to see how it is possible to deal effectively with 
internal problems without resisting the external threat. As 
President Kennedy's Latin American task force declared in its 
report that led to the creation of the Alliance for Progress, 
"good wishes and economic plans do not stop bullets or hand 
grenades or armed bands." 
Today the threat is greater -- far greater -- than it was 
in 1961 when the task force declared that it "resembles, but 
is more dangerous than, the Nazi-Fascist threat of the Franklin 
Roosevelt period and demands an even bolder and more imaginative 
response." Moreover, today 1-.re have fewer resources at our 
disposal -- economically, militarily, strategically, politically. 
We are still, ten years after the -.;vithdra·.ral from Vietnam, 
divided over our foreign policy and national purpose, over our 
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understanding of the threat we face and our sense of our 
proper role in the world. 
The deterioration in the region to our immediate south has 
been such, however, that we cannot afford paralysis in defending 
our national interests and in achieving our national purposes. 
The fact that such paralysis could be attributed to the con-
tinuing absence of a national consensus on foreign policy in 
the United States would not mitigate the consequences of failure. 
As George Kennan once wrote, "History does not forgive us our 
national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our 
domestic politics." 
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AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA: 1939 - 1983 
Richard W. Barrett 
Introduction 
Down through the years, a succession of American presidents have estab-
lished for one reason or another programs aimed at assisting the political, 
economic, social, and military development of our Latin-American neighbors. 
In most cases, these programs have been carried out by agencies specifically 
established for that purpose. In other cases, Presidents have relied upon 
the delegation of specific program authorities exercised by existing agencies 
in the accomplishment of desired objectives. In addition to these extraordi-
nary measures, Presidents have at times attempted to obtain their objectives 
by strengthening the impact of existing programs throught the establishment 
of special devices to improve coordination among responsible agencies. In 
almost all cases, these efforts have either been abandoned, fallen in disuse, 
or superseded by later events. The purpose of this paper is to review these 
developments, particularly with respect to their organizational and managerial 
implications with a view toward seeing what if anything might be gleaned from 
this experience that would prove useful to the Commission in the course of 
its present deliberations. Toward this end, the paper will: 
o review the history of the programs special arrangements referred 
to above. 
o present short profiles of those that appear to have some relevance 
to current conditions. 
o analyse the forces operating for and against establishment 
of those selected for discussion and, to the extent possible, 
evaluate their success. 
o outline a number of options that appear worthy of the Commission's 
conside~ation. 
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o present the author's conclusions and recommendations. 
It should be emphasized at the outset that because of a tight deadline 
and rather strict financial arrangements the paper relies heavily upon the 
memories and predilections of a relatively small number of persons who were 
involved in the events described. In this sense, the paper should be viewed 
more as a product of oral history than the result of an extensive scholarly 
review of the written record. While every attempt has been made to present a 
balanced point of view, the author is aware that certain biases are inevitable 
and that in the final analysis they are his. He also knows that he must 
therefore take full responsibility for all matters of opinion expressed as 
well as any errors of omission or commission that may be found in the final 
product. 
Several additional explanatory notes are in order. One is that the paper 
deals primarily with the administration of bilateral assistance. Such refer-
ences as may be made to multilateral institutions are included only insofar 
as they contribute to bilateral efforts. Second, the paper is rather weak 
with respect to roles of the military establishment and the intelligence 
community. Aside from the limitations on time and money mentioned above, the 
reason for this lack of attention is due to the infeasibility of obtaining 
the security clearances necessary to research and report upon events in these 
areas of activity. Third, the reader's attention is invited to the chart 
attached as Appendix A which depicts the chronology of the major events 
described in the body of the report. 
In conclusion, the author would like to express his appreciation to 
several friends and former colleages, particular Melbourne Spector and William 
Parks for their help and encouragement. 
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A Brief Review of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs 
For students of public administration, the end of World War II marked 
the beginning of a new epoch in the management of the nation's foreign 
affairs. With their roots in a history of isolationism, U.S. relations with 
other countries prior to the war were studiously correct and essentially 
bilateral in nature. Responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs within 
the Government bureaucracy rested almost exclusively with the Department of 
State which performed the traditional diplomatic functions--representation, 
reporting, and negotiation--and administered the consular activities asso-
ciated with the movement of U.S. citizens abroad and the acceptance of 
foreigners into the United States. 
All this changed with the War and its aftermath which saw the U.S. emerge 
as the most powerful of the new superpowers and the acknowledged leader of 
the free world. Its relations with other countries now became infinitely 
more complex involving many new activities including the furnishing of 
economic, technical and military assistance. In addition, it found itself 
participating in a number of newly established international organizations 
dealing with such diverse subjects as the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, the development of underdeveloped countries, the mutual security of 
allies, the health and welfare of the underprivileged people of the world, 
and the stability of worldwide financial and monetary systems. 
These changes in the international scene brought with them tremendous 
changes in the ways in which the government managed its foreign affairs. 
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First, the State Department lost its monopoly. Other agencies that hereto-
fore had been totally occupied with domestic matters suddenly found they had 
legitimate and sometimes pressing interests overseas. The Departments of 
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, among others, established their own 
11 foreign offices 11 and began to demand representation not only in councils at 
home but also at our posts overseas. The military, once considered rela-
tively benign during peacetime, became a full-time and sometimes bellicose 
partner in the formulation and implementation of postwar policies. 
This explosion of international activity posed the Government's 
organizational planners with the most challenging set of problems they had 
encountered since the early days of the New Deal when they were confronted 
with a similar eruption of new activities on the domestic front. First, they 
had to decide where and how to house the new initiatives in economic and 
military assistance, and second they had to devise ways to coordinate the 
increasing number of international activities being carried on by agencies 
primarily engaged in domestic affairs. 
The pattern that emerged for dealing with the first of these two problems 
was remarkably similar to the one created by President Roosevelt when he set 
up the alphabet-soup agencies of the New Deal. Like their predecessors in the 
Roosevelt administration, President Truman's organizational planners decided 
it would be unwise to entrust such bold new enterprises as European recovery 
to such old-line agencies as the Department of State and the Treasury. Con-
sequently, when the Marshall Plan was proposed in 1947, they persuaded the 
President to create a new agency to put the plan into effect. It is signifi-
cant to note that the authorities under which that agency, the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, operated were granted first to the President and 
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then delegated from him to the head of the agency by an executive order. 
This pattern was repeated four years later when President Truman 
inaugurated his Point Four program of technical assistance to underdeveloped 
countries. Again the planners decided that the new program required a new 
agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration was launched under a 
delegation of Presidential authority. 
Meanwhile in Europe, under pressures generated by the Cold War, the 
emphasis had shifted away from economic recovery toward measures designed 
to increase the security of the free world. In response, the President 
decided in 1951 to replace ECA with still another new agency, the Mutual 
Security Agency. Recognizing the nee~ to involve other agencies, principally 
the Department of Defense, and the need to coordinate their activities with 
the technical assistance and economic development programs, his planners also 
established the post of Director of Mutual Security to oversee the total 
assistance effort. To strengthen the Director's ability to perform this 
role, the Presidential authorities were delegated to him for re-delegation 
to the heads of the operating agencies. This arrangement was continued as 
a part of the Reorganization of 1953, which consolidated the functions of 
MSA and TCA under a single agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, and 
1955, which transferred the military assistance programs to the Department of 
Defense and the economic and technical assistance programs to the Department 
of State to be administered by the semi-autonomous International Cooperation 
Administration. 
The inauguration of John F. Kennedy in 1961 brought with it a new burst 
of enthusiasm for foreign aid, particularly as it promoted the development 
process advocated by Rostow and Miliken; several new initiatives, Food for 
Peace, the Peace Corps, and the Alliance for Progress, and a host of new 
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organizational dilemmas. In the year immediately prior to Kennedy•s 
inauguration, the Senate, apparently upset over inter-agency squabbles 
involving loans and grants for economic development and the relationship 
between trade and aid, called upon the President to conduct a study of the 
Government•s foreign economic programs with a view toward improving coordina-
tion and strenthening their role in the attainment of U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. The results of this 'tudy, which was carried out by an inter-
agency task force under the direction of the then Bureau of the Budget, were 
given to President Kennedy•s organizational planners toward the end of 1960 
and eventually became the basis for the establishment of the Agency for 
International Development in the fall of 1961. Among the important decisions 
taken in conjunction with that action were to (1) appoint a Food for Peace 
Director as a part of the White House establishment, (2) create an indepen-
dent agency to administer the Peace Corps, (3) diminish, but not eliminate, 
Treasury•s control over loans to foreign countries and contributions to 
international banks, and (4) locate the administrative support for the U.S. 
contribution to the Alliance for Progress in AID under the direction of a 
single individual who served in the dual capacity of head of the AID bureau 
for Latin America and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. After con-
siderable debate, military assistance was left in the Department of Defense, 
and AID was made an independent agency reporting to the Secretary of State 
and the President. With the exception of several minor embellishments that 
will be touched upon later, this pattern has remained intact and the arrange-
ment described governs the operation of foreign assistance programs today. 
To complete the picutre of the Government•s foreign affairs establish-
ment, one must, of course, include the military, the intelligence community, 
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and the international activities of the so-called domestic agencies. While a 
full description of this system is well beyond the scope of this report, it is 
perhaps worth reviewing the roles of some of the more active players. First 
there is the Department of State, the agency charged with primary respon-
sibility for the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign 
affairs. Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a full 
picture of the sometimes arcane workings of the senior executive department. 
It might, however, be useful to point out that the organizational structure 
of the Department combines four different types of offices: one for geography, 
one for functional specialties such as economic affairs and the gathering of 
intelligence, one for certain specified operations such as passport and 
consular services, and one for administrative support. It might also be 
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useful to point out that through the years, depending upon the international 
situation at the moment and the personalities of those involved, the exercise of 
power between these sets of offices, particularly the two concerned with 
geographical and functional matters, has shifted back and forth. 
The largest single organizational issue to confront the Department since 
the end of World War II has been to decide how to deal with the emergence of 
the assistance programs and the intrusion of domestic agencies into the 
international arena. As we have seen, a succession of Presidential advisors 
counseled against assigning the assistance authorities directly to the 
Department. While accepting this advice, Presidents have continued to 
expect the State Department to exert 11 leadership 11 over foreign affairs and 
have frequently grown impatient when the Department has failed to live up to 
these expectations. Faced with these ambivalences, the Department has tended 
to retreat to its own turf--that of policy making and the conduct of formal 
diplomatic relations--leaving operational matters to others and thereby forcing 
the President to resort to extra-departmental devices for the coordination of 
inter-agency activities. The relative influence of the Department within 
this system has ebbed and flowed largely as a function of the principals 
involved, the pressures of external events and their internal political rami-
fications. 
From an organizational standpoint, the two constants in this kaleidoscope 
have been the State Department desk in Washington and the U.S. ambassador 
overseas. As the only two points in the chain of command that are concerned 
with the totality of the U.S. activities in a given country, the Department•s 
regional bureaus and foreign missions are natural coordinate points for the 
exchange of information and, in those instances where foreign policy is 
concerned, executive direction. As Presidents• exasperations over their 
inability to issue commands and assign responsibility for action increased, 
more and more emphasis was placed on the role of the ambassador as the 
President•s representative not only with respect to the country to which he 
was assigned but also with respect to the heads of U.S. agencies operating in 
that country. This trend reached its apex in 1961 when President Kennedy 
issued a letter that formally put the ambassador in charge of all U.S. 
activities except those assigned to military commands. With the exception of 
a relatively short-lived assignment given to Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann 
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by President Johnson in 1963, no such designation has been made in Washington. 
The net effect, therefore, of the Kennedy letter has been to give the ambassador 
a definite set of responsibilities in the field but no way of exercising his 
authorities in Washington except through the State Department which does not 
have a similar mandate with respect to other agenices engaged in the conduct 
of foreign affairs. The SIG and IRG arrangements instituted in the middle 
60s tried to overcome this deficiency but they have proved largely ineffectual 
and this ambiguity in the chain of command between the President and the 
ambassador remains unchanged today. 
As matters now stand, then the U.S. foreign affairs establishment con-
sists of: 
o the Department of State and its sister foreign affairs 
agencies, i.e., AID, USIA, and the Peace Corps. 
o other agencies involved in foreign assistance including DOD and the 
Department of Agriculture and, with respect to contributions to inter-
national financial institutions, the Department of the Treasury. 
o the military command structure under the direction of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
o the intelligence community. 
o elements of a number of executive departments and agencies 
primarily concerned with domestic affairs but with important and 
legitimate interests overseas. 
From a Presidential standpoint the principal devices for coordinating 
the work of these various elements are the National Security Council 
apparatus in Washington and the ambassadors and the country teams in the 
field. The following section will take a closer look at the evolution of 
foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the devices that have been 
used through the years to improve their coordination and effectiveness. 
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Latin American Assistance Programs and Their Coordination 
The first officially sanctioned inter-governmental assistance program 
was initiated in the spring of 1939 when Congress authorized the President 
to detail "for temporary service of not exceeding one year at a time any 
person in the employ of the United States to give advice and assistance 
on request to the government of any American nation." This action was taken 
to regularize a previously ad hoc practice of sending U.S. government 
employees to provide technical assistance to countries that requested such 
services. The original act was expanded somewhat a month later to authorize 
departments and agencies to join with Latin American countries in reciprocal 
undertakings authorized by resolutions and recommendations signed by the 
21 American republics at international conferences held in 1936 and 1938. 
To administer these early operations the President established an inter-
agency committee, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural 
Development, consisting of representatives in over 25 bureaus of some 18 
executive departments and agencies, under the chairmanship of, interestingly 
enough, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Except for a 
small secretariat provided by the State Department, the Committee had no 
staff nor was it authorized to operate or direct programs in its own right. 
Its main functions were to consider estimates submitted by each member agency 
of the applications it expected to receive from Latin-American governments 
during the coming fiscal year, draw up a budget for the expenditures required 
to support the applications the Committee approved of and, under the auspices 
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of the Department of State, present its recommendations to the President and, 
following his review, the Congress for its consideration and action. Once 
funds had been appropriated, the Committee met again to apportion them among 
the agencies who were responsible for arranging and administering the detail 
of the individuals or work groups to the requesting country. Starting with a 
budget of just over $300,000 in 1939, the work of the Committee gradually 
expanded to the point where its annual budget averaged nearly $4 million 
during 1948- 1950, the last three years of its existence. In all, the 
Committee brokered approximately $26 million from its inception in 1940 until 
its activities were transferred to the Technical Cooperation Administration 
in 1950. These funds supported the temporary assignments to close to 2,000 
U.S. government experts, and the training in the U.S. of some 3,000 foreign 
nationals in the fields of agriculture, public health, resource development, 
social welfare, and education. Judged in today•s terms these are rather small 
sums. The work of the Committee, however, did provide some useful insights 
for future generations of organizational planners. The first lesson was that 
piecemeal responses to requests received from the Latin-American governments 
did not, in most cases, result in building a sound basis for the economic 
development of the host country. With this realization came a recognition of 
the need for some sort of overall plan or strategy against which individual 
requests could be evaluated. The second lesson came when the State Department 
realized that it could not effectively perform its role as chairman of the 
Committee without some expression of explicit authority and the provision 
of additional stafff to carry it out. Proposals to rectify both of these 
deficiencies were being circulated at the time of the Committee's demise. In 
reviewing subsequent chapters of the history of foreign assistance in Latin 
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America one wonders whether or not these early lessons were ever fully under-
stood. 
The outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939 brought forth a 
very different approach to providing assistance to our Latin-American neigh-
bors. In August 1940, as a result of a governmentwide review of a memorandum 
prepared by Nelson Rockefeller urging the President to initiate a joint 
economic program to safeguard and strengthen the economy of the Western Hemis-
phere as part of our defense effort, the Council of National Defense issued an 
executive order establishing a subordinate unit to itself an Office for 
Coordination of Commerical and Cultural Relations between the American 
Republics. The order also appointed Mr. Rockefeller as the head of the office 
with the title of Coordinator and responsibility for establishing and main-
taining 11 liaison between the Advisory Commission of the Council of National 
Defense, the several departments and establishments of the Government and 
such other agencies, public or private, as he might deem necessary or desir-
able, to insure proper coordination of ... the activities of the Government 
with respect to Hemisphere defense, with particular reference to the commer-
cial and cultural aspects of the problem ... In addition to his assignment 
as Coordinator, Mr. Rockefeller was made a member and chairman of an Inter-
Departmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs which included the President 
of the Export-Import Bank and representatives of the Departments of State, 
Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce and which was to 11 Consider and correlate 
proposals of the Government with respect [to] Hemisphere defense, commercial 
and cultural relations and to make recommendations for action by appropriate 
Government departments and agencies... In July 1941, the title of the Office 
was shortened to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs 
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(CIAA), the term by which it became commonly known. 
True to form, Mr. Rockefeller wasted no time in tackling his new assign-
ments and, with characteristic vigor, quickly established a full-blown agency 
to carry out whatever mandate he had been given. By the end of the year, 
the Office of the Coordinator consisted of four operating sections--one for 
cultural affairs, one for communications, one for commercial development, and 
one for trade and financial matters--plus a full complement of staff and 
support offices including four special consultants listed on its organization 
chart as W. Benton, H. R. Luce, Anna M. Rosenberg, and B. Ruml. The organiza-
tion of the office clearly reflected the dual purposes of its mission--propa-
ganda and economic development--but only the latter realy interested the 
Coordinator. It is also the one that persisted well after the war was over, 
and along with the work of the Interdepartmental Committee described above, 
formed the basis of the postwar worldwide assistance programs. 
The CIAA also spawned two organizational innovations that would have 
additional lasting effects on subsequent development efforts in Latin 
America. Trained in the ways of private enterprise and impatient with 
the bureaucratic trappings of government, Mr. Rockefeller in 1942 secured 
a charter under the laws of Delaware for a government-owned corporation 
called the ''Institute of Inter-American Affairs," whch was authorized to 
conduct cooperative programs with the Latin-American Governments in the 
promotion of public health and in agricultural development. In 1944, a 
similar corporation, called the "Inter-American Educational Foundation, Inc.," 
was organized with authority to provide similar cooperation in elementary 
and vocational education. In 1947, the two corporations were consolidated 
and reincorporated by an act of Congress to be henceforth known simply as the 
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Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Institute continued to function as a 
constituent unit of the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs 
until that office was abolished by executive order of the President in 1946 
at which time the Institute became part of the Department of State. In the 
fall of 1949, the Institute•s Congressional charter was extended until June 
30, 1955. On March 1, 1951, it became the regional office of the newly 
established Technical Cooperation Administration for programs in Latin 
America. 
The operations of IIAA differed from the technical assistance provided 
under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Committee in two significant 
respects--one, its activities were joint operations between the United States 
and individual Latin-American countries, and two, its activities were conducted 
along program lines with a program consisting of a number of related projects 
in each of its three fields of interest, agriculture, health, and education. 
The device created for putting these concepts into operation was the servicio, 
the second of the two great innovations that came out of the Office of the 
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs. Each of the Institute•s programs was 
embodied in an international agreement between the government of the United 
States and the government of the cooperating country. In the typical case, 
these documents, known as program agreements, stipulated that the work that 
was agreed upon by both parties would be performed by a cooperative service 
or servicio that was to be established within the appropriate Ministry of the 
host country. The servicio was intended to function as an integral part of 
the Ministry but with a special semi-autonomous status not unlike that of the 
IIAA itself. The servico•s independence was further enhanced by the fact 
that operations were supported by a joint account funded by contributions 
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from both parties and staffed by employees of both countries. In order to 
preserve U.S. interests, with but one exception, the director of this staff 
was the chief of IIAA's technical mission answerable both to the minister (as 
the head of the servicio) and to the President of the IIAA (as the head of 
the technical mission). 
The special genius claimed for this device by its originators was 
that it encouraged intimate daily cooperation between U.S. technicians and 
administrators and host country technicians and administrators on common 
problems involved in the achievement of their mutual objectives. A less 
ingenious reason for its popularity with generations of technicians and field 
administrators might be found in the aphorism that those who serve two 
masters in fact serve none. While this may be an overly cynical point of 
view, it is true that the servicios managed to feed at several public troughs 
for a number of years unemcumbered by most of the restraints placed upon 
other governmental institutions. Whether or not this freedom was benefical 
or even necessary in order to achieve the objectives for which the IIAA 
was established depends upon one's concepts of public responsibility and the 
means ordinarily adopted for enforcing it. What is important to note is that 
those in charge of technical assistance in Latin America and the cadre of 
technical experts they recruited have a long history of seeking to avoid what 
they consider troublesome and unnecessary constraints imposed on government 
agencies at home and abroad. What is even more important to note is that this 
attitude of being above and beyond what they considered short-term and self-
centered political realities led them to largely ignore local political insti-
tutions and the role such institutions must play in the development process. 
These feelings have become deeply imbedded in the subculture of the assistance 
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movement and, as we shall see, have had important effects not only upon the 
content of their programs but also the organizational forms created to carry 
them forward. 
Aside from the administrative flexibility they provide, adherents of the 
servicio point with pride to the success these organizations have had in 
gaining local support for projects deemed desirable by U.S. experts. In 
financial terms the record shows that in their heyday, the years from 1942 to 
1950, the servicios attracted contributions in money and kind at least equal 
to and in many cases surpassing the U.S. input. The actual figures for this 
period are roughly $66 million in local contributions against $63 million in 
U.S. investment. 
Two further characteristics of IIAA operations are noteworthy for the 
impact they have had on subsequent organzational development. One is the fact 
that at no time during the years of its individual existence did the agency 
make any serious effort to integrate its three major programs into one. Each 
of these programs had its own operating division in Washington which estab-
lished its own set of servicios in the field. The failure to provide central 
capabilities in Washington also adversely influenced the development of 
government-wide planning facilities in the field thereby further strengthening 
the technical bureaucracies at the expense of the central governments. The 
dominance of the technical specialties in IIAA carried over into the days 
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TCA, FOA, and ICA and became a major organizational issue during the establish-
ment of AID in 1961. 
The second characteristic worth notinq is the nature of IIAA•s relation-
ships with other U.S. agencies. Both in Washington and in the field, IIAA 
carried out its operations more or less as though it were not a part of the 
U.S. government. As we have seen, it was originally chartered as a quasi-· 
governmental entity under the laws of the state of Delaware. Its sponsors 
and directors were members of a Presidential office operating under extra-
ordinary wartime powers. Either conciously or not, these originators took no 
notice of an already existing mechanism for delivering technical assistance 
to Latin America, the Interdepartmental Committee. As a matter of fact, they 
considered the government employees used as technical experts under that 
system as inappropriate to the job at hand. They also drew inspiration from 
a President who had long felt that bold new initiatives could not be left 
with stodgy old government agencies. As a result of all these factors, 
the Institute maintained a certain aloofness, some would even say arrogance, 
toward other agencies of government. While this posture was certainly 
tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by the powers that be, the President 
was forced to intervene on behalf of the State Department when the Institute 
attempted to dispatch its emissaries overseas without the appropriate diplo-
matic clearances. However, these early attitudes of aloofness persisted and 
resulted in the evolution of an elite corps of professional assistance 
technicians who to this day resist assimilation into the larger foreign 
affairs community. 
The IIAA lost much of its corporate individuality when it became a part 
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of the worldwide Point Four program in the early 1950s. While it continued to 
operate as a regional bureau under TCA, it no longer possessed its own staff 
and administrative support functions. It did retain much of its culture and 
many of its field operations, although beginning in 1951 the separate programs 
in the field were placed under a single director for technical assistance 
located in the U.S. embassy. Also, at about the same time, previously rejected 
efforts to develop coordinated country programs were introduced at the 
Washington level under the auspices of newly established program-planning 
committees. 
The effects of the reorganization of 1955 were much more far-reaching. 
In the first place, it for the first time put all of the foreign assistance 
programs under one roof, the Foreign Operations Administration. Second, it 
brought in vital new leadership under the direction of Harold Stassen that 
was determined to create a vigorous, hard-hitting institution out of the 
jerry-built collection of agencies it inherited. Centralization and unifica-
tion were the words of the day. The effects on Latin America were immediate 
and profound. Under direct orders from President Eisenhower, IIAA was 
reduced to a paper shell despite the fact that its charter had two more years 
to go. Its personnel were forced into a new central personnel system which 
many refused to join, choosing instead to return to the home bases in other 
government agencies and academia. Program planning procedures were strength-
ened. New forms of assistance, including economic aid and military assistance, 
were added to the already existing technical assistance operations. In the 
field, strong, fully staffed USOM's replaced the weak and relatively ineffec-
tual directors of technical cooperation and brought their operations closer 
to the embassy than had been the case previously. Still, many of those that 
remained clung to their old ways. Of all the regional bureaus in FOA, the 
Latin-American bureau gave the highest priority to technical assistance and, 
despite the efforts to achieve more integrated programming, the old interests 
in agriculture, health and education predominated. Even the addition of 
military assistance to the agency's portfolio had less impact on the Latin-
American operations than those of other regions since the MAAG continued to 
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report through a command channel, CINC South, thereby preserving to" a great 
extent the bureau's isolation from military programs and their influence in 
the area. In the field, even the servicios survived attempts to subordinate 
their activities under the newly established USOM's. In short, as so often 
happens in the case of seemingly cataclysmic organizational change, once the 
dust has cleared it's pretty much business as usual. 
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The reorganization of 1955 signaled a return to the pluralistic approach 
to the delivery of foreign assistance. Largely in response to the often 
feverish machinations of foreign aid activists to devise new ways to bamboozle 
what they perceived to be a hostile Congress, the decision was made to break up 
the FOA on the grounds that it was a sitting duck for the enemies on the Hill 
and that the cause could better be served by hiding whatever eggs there were 
in a larger number of baskets. Thus, military assistance was returned to the 
Pentagon, new loan programs which did not meet the standards of existing 
central banking institutions were placed in a newly created Development Fund, 
and administration of the extremely powerful P.L. 480 program of exchanging 
agricultural surpluses for local currencies that could be used for develop-
ment purposes remained with the Department of Agriculture. The leftovers 
were placed in the International Cooperation Administration, established as a 
semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State which for the first 
time was forced to take on some direct responsibility for foreign assistance 
programs. 
The 1955 reogranizations had a twofold effect on Latin-American assis-
tance. On the one hand, the divestiture of responsibility for military assis-
tance and the strictly financial aspects of economic aid opened the door for 
a resurgence of the old technical assistance advocates and along with it a 
transfer of power from central programmers with their country-wide focus to 
technical experts who were as always more interested in promoting their 
individual functional specialties than in developinng integrated country pro-
grams. On the other hand, the establishment of ICA as an agency of the State 
Department brought the technical assistance types once again face to face 
with their diplomatic counterparts. Relations between the two had never been 
good, but largely due to the separation of powers that had existed since the 
establishment of IIAA as an independent agency, they had usually been if not 
cordial at least civil. The transfer of its employees to State Department 
rolls even as members of a "semi-autonomous" agency immediately raised a 
host of nasty administrative questions. What sort of a personnel status 
would the newcomers have? Certainly not Foreign Service appointments! 
Would they be entitled to the cherished diplomatic passport and afforded 
diplomatic status abroad? Where would they be housed? How far down did the 
lines of supervision extend? Who submitted the foreign assistance budget and 
who defended it on the Hill? Who had final authority for program content? 
These and other questions greatly exacerbated the already strained relation-
ships between the two agenices and in the ensuing years led to a spate of 
studies dealing with such things as the conflicts between "short-term 
political considerations" and ''long-term economic benefits," the need for 
common personnel systems, and even a serious proposal for the establishment 
of a Department of Foreign Affairs that would encompass not only State and 
Aid but also the information functions that had remained relatively unnoticed 
in a separate agency since the days of the Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs. 
The fact that these tensions were controlled at all was due more to a 
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set of fortuitous circumstances than by any grand design of the organization 
planners. The reorganization of 1953 that transferred the functions of MSA 
to DOA retained the position of Director of Mutual Security as the arm of the 
President responsible for dispensing the Presidential authorities contained 
in the annual Mutual Security Acts. This arrangement continued through the 
FOA period when the function was largely perfunctory since practically all the 
authorities granted the President were immediately transferred to the head of 
FOA. However, when these authorities were more widely dispersed as a result 
of the 1955 reorganization, the position of the Director of Mutual Security 
assumed a renewed importance. Through a quirk of fate, a single individual, 
Douglas Dillon, was given the dual assignment of Director of Mutual Security 
and Under Secretary of State for Econmic Affairs, the third-ranking position 
in the Department. The happy circumstance of Dillon's tolerance for ambiguity 
and extraordinary managerial abilities combined with the fact that his dual 
role gave him what amounted to line authority over all aspects of foreign aid 
including ICA and the State Department regional bureaus produced what many 
observers believe to be a high-water mark in the administration of foreign 
assistance. 
Despite the enormous scope of Dillon's authority, there were significant 
facets of the assistance effort that he did not control. Several proved 
particularly bothersome. One involved foreign lending operations that were 
largely controlled by the Treasury Department; another was the use of local 
currencies generated under P.L. 480 which was totally controled by the 
Department of Agriculture, and the third included questions involving the 
relationships between trade and aid which were dealt with rather unsuccess-
fully by a succession of White House-chaired interdepartmental committees. 
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It was Congressional doubts over the adequacy of coordination of these activ-
ities that caused the Senate to request a study of foreign economic activities 
in the spring of 1960. As indicated earlier, the report of this study provided 
a basis for the later creation of AID which from an organizational point of 
view attempted to reunify the major assistance activities in a more independent 
agency organized along geographic rather than functional lines with a strong 
emphasis on an integrated long-term economic development programs. More will 
be said about its success in achieving these objectives in later sections of 
this paper. 
For Latin-American hands, the early 60s will be remembered primarily as 
the years of the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance, or the Alianza as it 
was known to its Latin admirers, meant many things to many people. To some 
it was a slogan. To others it was a multi-national program. And to still 
others it was a catchword for U.S. economic assistance efforts in Latin 
America. For those who worked for AID, the Alliance became a synonym for 
AID's Latin-American program and the regional bureau responsible for its 
implementation. In point of fact, the Alliance was a little of all of 
these things. The term first appeared in a speech made by John F. Kennedy 
in Tampa, Fla., in October 1960. In this speech, Kennedy declared his belief 
in a Western Hemisphere where all were joined together in an alliance consist-
ing of "a great common effort to develop the resources of the entire hemis-
phere, strengthen the forces of democracy and widen the vocational and 
educational opportunities to every person in all the Americas." Kennedy's 
interest and sense of urgency prompted him to set up a task force on Latin 
America under the chairmanship of Adolph Serle with the charge of putting 
some flesh on the ideas expressed in his Tampa speech. Among the recommenda-
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tions submitted by the task force in its final report was one dealing with 
organizational matters which though not accepted at the time would reappear 
toward the end of Kennedy•s administration and which has remained a live 
issue off and on ever since. This was Berle•s assertion that the nature of 
the effort envisioned and its relative importance required that within the 
State Department the principal officer for Latin-American Affairs be given 
the rank of Under Secretary. It is not clear exactly how or when this 
proposal was turned down, but it is known that Mr. Berle rejected President 
Kennedy•s request to become the principal officer in the Department for 
Latin-America Affairs because that position was not elevated to the rank of 
Under Secretary. 
In the meantime, the organizational issues surrounding the management of 
U.S. participation in the Alliance were caught up in the more general reorgan-
ization of foreign assistance activities. After several false starts in the 
winter of 1961, this matter had been assigned to another task force chaired 
by Henry Labouisse, the newly installed head of ICA. Along with the question 
of how to deal with the lending and the trade and aid issues mentioned 
earlier, this group now had to decide how to handle all of the new Kennedy 
initiatives including Food-for-Peace, the Peace Corps, and of course the 
Alliance for Progress. The expressed desire to create a unified aid approach 
suggested putting all of these functions in a single agency. Proponents of 
each, including a number of new appointees, naturally wanted to retain or, in 
the cases of the new programs, achieve independent status. The process of 
deciding who was in and who was out was heated and at times even bloody. In 
the end there were more winners than losers. The principal soft loan agency, 
the Development Loan Fund, was absorbed but Treasury retained a strong voice 
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in developing the policies and standards under which loans could be made and 
outright control of U.S. representation on, and contributions to, the interna-
tional banks. The Director of Food-for-Peace ended up in the White House but 
without direct program authority which remained in Agriculture. The Peace 
Corps became an independent agency. Only the Alliance was a clear loser. 
Despite several sporadic attempts to obtain an independent home, the function 
of supporting U.S. participation in the Alianza became a part of AID's 
Latin-American program administered by the Assistant Administrator for Latin 
America who for public consumption was also dubbed Coordinator of the Alliance 
for Progress. 
Considering the ambiguities surrounding the creation of AID, not the 
least of which is the provision in its enabling legislation stating that its 
Administrator reports to the Secretary of State and the President, it is not 
surprising to find that the President soon found himself enmeshed in inter-
agency squabbles and frustrated by his inability to assign responsibility to 
any one person for carrying out his wishes. With his strong interest and 
heavy commitments in Latin America, President Kennedy grew especially impa-
tient with the lack of responsiveness resulting from what he perceived as 
inadequate leadership in that area of the world. Accordingly, shortly before 
his fateful trip to Dallas, he requested Secretary Rusk to undertake the 
steps necessary to establish an Under Secretary of State for Latin America 
who would be responsible for all U.S. programs operating in that hemisphere. 
While that specific request died with President Kennedy's assassination, 
the idea of a single official responsible for all Latin-American Affairs did 
not. As one of his first actions upon taking office, President Johnson sent 
a letter to former Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, then our ambassador to 
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Mexico, asking him to return to Washington to serve as his special representa-
tive to oversee all U.S. programs in Latin America and, in addition, to accept 
the positions of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and 
the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. 
Immediately upon his arrival in Washington to assume his new duties, 
Ambassador Mann assembled a small working group to iron out the details of 
his multiple assignment. After some deliberation, this group concluded that 
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if he were to fully live up to the President•s expectations, Ambassador Mann 
would need, in addition to his official designations as Special Assistant to 
the President, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and 
Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, some visible symbols of his status 
plus explicit delegations from the heads of those agencies that exercised 
authority over the major foreign assistance programs. Operating on this con-
viction, members of the group started to work at establishing the Ambassador•s 
position. Space for his use in the West Wing of the White House was secured, 
letterheads designed, and arrangements made for a limosine and chauffeur, all 
obvious signs of importance and a constant reminder of his special relationship 
to the President. Other members of the group researched the lines of authority 
and prepared drafts of the necessary delegations as well as an executive order 
to formalize the substance of the President•s letter. In the meantime Ambas-
sador Mann had been testing the waters himself, particularly through talks 
with Secretaries Rusk, Dillon and Freeman, and AID Administrator Bell. As a 
result of these conversations, the Ambassador decided that he needed nothing 
more than the expression of Presidential intent he already possessed and 
turned down the White House emoluments which he feared would affront his 
old colleague Dean Rusk and the various delegations which he felt were 
unnecessary in view of the relationships he had established with the afore-
mentioned principals. Thus, another attempt to elevate the position of the 
senior official in charge of hemispheric affairs above the level of assistant 
secretary failed and, with Ambassador Mann's departure, Presidental hopes 
for a single point of responsibility vanished once again. 
It is interesting to note that in its next reincarnation as the first 
recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission's report of 1969, the status of 
the single-voice notion rose to the level of a Secretary in charge of his own 
department of Western Hemisphere Affairs. It is also interesting to note 
that this Commission also recommended that an Institute of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs be set up as an operating corporation under an Economic and Social 
Development Agency to be created in the Executive Office of the President to 
supersede AID. Never let it be said that Mr. Rockefeller lacked persistence. 
Another organizational innovation launched by President Johnson early 
in his administration met a similar fate for quite different reasons. 
Prompted by his boyhood experiences in Texas, LBJ always had a special fond-
ness for U.S.-Mexican relations. His predilections in this area led him to 
meet with the President of Mexico in the spring of 1966 to discuss ways to 
improve relationships between their two countries. Out of these talks came a 
joint declaration "to improve the relations between the frontier cities on 
the borders of both countries and to elevate the life of those who live in 
the Border region." This declaration was followed by an exchange of notes 
stating that both countries would establish a joint commission to study 
existing border conditions and the steps needed to improve them. Early 
in 1967, almost one year after the President signed the initial declaration, 
an executive order, whose contents for some unknown reason were classified, 
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was issued creating the U.S. Section of the United States-Mexico Commission 
for Border Development and Friendship. The U.S. section of the Commission 
consisted of the relevant assistant secretaries of the Departments of State, 
Interior, Health, Education and Welfare, Labor, Commerce, Transportation, 
and the Deputy Administrator of the Office of Equal Opportunity under the 
direction of a full-time Chairman appointed by the President. Lacking 
legislative authorization, the U.S. section, aka CODAF, was forced to 
rely on contributions from other agencies, most notably the Department of 
State and the Office of Equal Opportunity (Sargeant Schriver was a great 
believer in the program) for staff support and operating expenses. At the 
height of its activity, the U.S. section of CODAF had a full-time complement 
of 25 persons most of whom were on detail from participating agencies and an 
operating budget of over $500,000. In 1968, partially because of its general 
dislike of the practice of supporting Presidential commissions by transfers 
of funds appropriated for other purposes and partially because this particular 
commission was one of LBJ's pet projects, Congress severely restricted the 
amount of contributions that could be made to suport CODAF. The administra-
tion thereupon proceeded to seek legislation ratifying its existence and 
authorizing direct appropriations to support its work. In the delibertations 
over the form of the authorization, the Chairman unwisely insisted upon a 
continuation of his status as a part of the Executive Office of the President. 
His stubbornness on this point earned the enmity of the Department of State 
and contributed to the failure to obtain the necessary authorizations. The 
Chairman resigned in the spring of 1969 and was replaced by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. CODAF itself went out of 
business at the end of the year due to a lack of funds. 
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The story of CODAF has been dealt with at some length because it illus-
trates perfectly what happens when a well-intentioned Presidential initiative 
is left to the tender mercies of the bureaucratic establishment and the 
Congress. As the account shows, these sorts of projects require sustained 
Presidential attention and support if they are to survive in the bureaucratic 
jungle. If, in this case, the Chairman had used his time to create a base of 
support within the bureaucracy rather than insisting upon his independent 
status and if the President's attention had not been diverted by the pres-
sure of other more important matters, CODAF's fate might have been different. 
Faced as it was, however, with Presidential indifference, bureaucratic hos-
tility, and Congressional jealousy, its demise was inevitable. 
Except for several innovative attempts to improve the coordination of 
its disparate elements, which will be discussed in the next section of this 
paper, the organization of foreign assistance has remained relatively stable 
since the establishment of AID in 1961. There have, of course, been a number 
of structural and procedural changes within AID itself, but these also have 
been relatively minor, reflecting changes in the geographical configuration 
of its clients, the general international situation and the usual shifts 
in emphasis between geographic and functional orientations. The only serious 
attempt at changing the basic structure occurred in 1980 when, largely in 
response to pressure from Senator Humphrey and Congressman Zablocki of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, an attempt was made to establish an umbrella 
agency, the Internatonal Development Cooperation Agency, to oversee the 
activities of AID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the programs 
of the State Department involving U.S. particpation, and the newly established 
Trade Development Program. The Agency was also supposed to exert a greater 
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influence on the actions of U.S. Representatives on the multilateral develop-
ment banks and the Food or Peace programs. Finally it was contemplated that 
a new unit, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, would 
be established as an additional operating unit to facilitate the transfer of 
U.S. technology and scientific knowledge to other nations in the free world. 
Needless to say, this rather amb'itious undertaking lived barely long enough 
to see the light of day and at present consists only of a small staff dealing 
with the trade and development program and a paper organization under the 
titular chairmanship of the Administrator of AID. 
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Efforts to Improve Coordination 
of Latin-American Assistance Programs 
As indicated earlier, because of their very nature and the importance 
occasionally bestowed upon them, the Latin-American assistance programs have 
been the subject of a number of special arrangements designed to produce a 
more coordinated U.S. effort. Several of the more important of these came 
into being during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and are discussed 
in this section. Experience gained from these arrangements together with 
that provided by the organizational entities discussed in the previous 
section will form the basis for the evaluations and recommendations that 
follow. 
When President Kennedy took office in 1961 he had already expressed an 
active interest in Latin American affairs and in fact proposed a specific 
approach to improve the quality of life in the countries to the south of our 
border. Even before his inauguration, he had a task force under the chair-
manship of Adolph Berle busy working on the details of that proposal as well 
as the general tack he should take in grappling with the problems he foresaw 
taking place in this hemisphere. From an organizational standpoint the task 
force got hung up on Berle's view that nothing could be accomplished until 
the senior officer in charge of Latin-American affairs in the State Depart-
ment was elevated to the level of an Under Secretary. The vacuum created 
when this proposal proved unacceptable was eventually filled by an alliance 
between a Presidential staff assistant, Ralph Dungan, and the incoming Assis-
389. 
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin. Dungan•s 
involvement came about first as a result of his duties with respect to 
filling Presidential appointments in AID and other foreign affairs agencies, 
and was broadened some time later when he was assigned responsibility for 
following developments in Santo Domingo after the assassination of Trujillo. 
Martin, who had a background in economic affairs, came to the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs in the spring of 1962 succeeding Robert Woodward. The two 
men quickly developed a bond of mutual respect that grew into a day-to-day 
working relationship that transcended the formal channel of command between 
the White House and the Department of State and eventually enabled Martin to 
assert many of the pregrogatives Berle had sought for his proposed Under 
Secretary. 
Early in his tenure, Martin, with Dungan•s blessing, established an 
inter-agency committee known as the Latin-American Policy Committee which he 
chaired and which consisted of representatives of all of the foreign assis-
tance agencies including the Defense Department. Originally convened to 
assist Martin in the preparation of country policy papers, the group soon 
became what was in effect a steering committee for the day-to-day operations 
of the member agencies in Latin America. Under Martin•s tactful but firm 
leadership the Committee held regular weekly meetings, kept minutes of its 
proceeding, which were distributed within the member agencies, and monitored 
the implementation of decisions reached as a result of its deliberations. 
Most observers would agree with Martin•s assertion that the LAPC was a most 
effective coordinating device. Its weakness was the fact that its success 
rested on Martin•s determination to assert his leadership and the fact that 
his relationship with Dungan enabled him to do so. After the departure of 
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the two men, the Committee lost much of its effectiveness and eventually 
became part of the SIG-IRG system. 
As indicated earlier, the coordination of desperately placed functions 
was at times accomplished with varying degrees of success by the simple act 
of appointing a single individual to two or more positions of responsibility. 
As we have seen, the use of this practice in Latin-American affairs began 
with the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller who was already the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs when he was appointed to the position of Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. In the earlier 60s Teodoro 
Moscoso held the title of Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress along with 
his position as Assistant Administrator of AID for Latin America. We have 
also discussed the successful reign of Douglas Dillon as Director of Mutual 
Security and Under Secretary of State and the less successful tenure of Thomas 
Mann in the triple posts of Special Assistant to the President for Latin-
American Affairs, Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Often these arrangements 
reflect last-ditch efforts to paper over deficiencies in organizational 
planning. Moscoso's dual appointments, for example, represented a compromise 
between those who wished to establish the Alliance as an independent agency 
and those who believed it should be part of AID. In this instance the 
separatists lost, for in practice the title of Coordinator proved to be 
virtually meaningless. Sometimes, as was the case with the Dillon assignment, 
the dual assignments did in fact give the incumbent two sets of authorities. 
In these instances the practice did provide a mechanism for resolving and 
coordinating complimentary but disproportionately placed activities. However, 
as we have seen in the case of the Mann appointments, even in these instances 
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effective coordination depended upon the willingness of the incumbent to 
wield the power his assignments afforded him. It would appear from these 
experiences that the old maxim that power belongs to those who takes it holds 
true and that, by and large, titles mean little unless they are accompanied 
by real authority and/or a determination to govern. 
Double-hatting of a different sort was used at lower levels in an 
attempt to harmonize the economic and political aspects of the Alliance. 
These efforts took the form of combining the staffs of the State and AID 
country desks under the direction of a single officer who reported to 
Ambassador Mann during his tenure and following the dissolution of his 
triple assignments to both the Assistant Secretary of State and AID Assis-
tant Administrator. This latter arrangement proved to be almost unworkable 
because of difficulties inherent in having to report to two masters and the 
fact that for career purposes members of the combined staffs still belonged 
to different systems. 
On the procedural front, a major attempt to improve coordination was 
undertaken by reviving the country programming process pioneered by IIAA 10 
years earlier. This effort, known as the Comprehensive Country Programming 
System, or CCPS for short, took as its points of departure the authority 
vested in the Ambassador by the Kennedy letter and the invigorated country 
planning process instigated under the auspices of W. W. Rostow, a Presidential 
assistant who later became head of the policy planning staff in the Department 
of State. In its simplest terms, the CCPS was an attempt (1) to link the 
policy directives produced by the Rostow enterprise to the actions of U.S. 
agencies under the command of the U.S. ambassador, and (2) to strengthen 
the ambassador•s ability to manage these resources by providing him with 
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what were in effect country budgets. The designers of the system, who came 
from the administrative arm of the Department, immediately encountered 
two obstacles that plagued the effort from its inception in December of 
1962 to its demise in the summer of 1967. The first of these was that in the 
judgment of the program designers the existing agency data bases did not 
provide information about agency activities in a form that would enable the 
ambassador to conduct an adequate review of agency programs. This led the 
group working on the project to embark on a series of independent data-
collecting exercises that included a requirement for allocating time spent in 
the performance of a long list of activities. These exercises, which were 
eventually conducted in some 35 countries, created a furor within the estab-
lishment where they were viewed as attempts to substitute administrative 
controls for professional judgments. The second difficulty resulted from the 
designers' contentions the lines of action contained in the policy papers 
being turned out of the Rostow enterprise were not expressed in the quanti-
tative terms needed in order to relate to the resources required to carry 
them out. This led the program designers to suggest changes in the contents 
of policy papers which was viewed as further intrusion of administrative 
types into substantive matters. Opposition in these two areas, aided and 
abetted by the intransigence of the system's designers, contributed heavily 
to the decision to abandon the effort in 1967. Unfortunately, the heat 
created by these details tended to divert attention from the solution of the 
basic problem, namely the coordination of foreign operations in the face of 
intense institutional rivalries. 
The most recent to establish a U.S. integrated program in Latin America 
is the Caribbean Basin Initiative which was conceived in the spring of 1982 
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and has been growing ever since. Essentially the effort consists of a series 
of actions agreed to by the governments of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the 
United States to improve the economic status of the countries in the Caribbean 
Basin. The U.S. portion of the program consists of a number of mutually 
reinforcing measures in the fields of trade, taxes, and financial assistance 
designed to improve the economy of the region. These measures are being put 
into effect under the terms of an Act of Congress entitled the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act which authorizes the President to confer under 
certain specified conditions duty-free status for articles imported from 
Caribbean Basin countries. The Act also authorizes other Federal officials 
to take additional actions in connection with excise taxes and related 
trade matters calculated to assist in the improvement of economic conditions. 
At present there is no single point of responsibility for carrying forward 
these or other measures being taken as a part of the President's initiative. 
Most observers believe that unless and until such a point is established, the 
program will have only a marginal impact on conditions in the area. 
In the final analysis, all of the experiments described in this section 
tend to point up the fact that there is no substitute for well-conceived 
organizational strategy based upon sound theory and established principles. 
Viewed in this light the actions described above are in effect measures taken 
to compensate for the failure to resolve a number of fundamental issues 
arising in connection with the inception of the foreign assistance programs 
20 years ago. We will examine the reasons for this failure as well as the 
pressures leading to the search for its remedy in the next section. 
394. 
Factors Operating For and Against 
A Coordinated Approach 
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Throughout the long history of the foreign assistance effort there have been 
factors operating for and against the integration of the various types of 
assistance, and at the same time there have been forces operating for and against 
the better coordination of the foreign assistance effort with other facets of 
foreign affairs particularly those associated with the formulation of foreign 
policy. This section attempts to identify these plus and minus forces and 
assess their impact on the development of the overall effort. 
Probably the most powerful force operating in favor of a coordinated 
approach is the prevailing notion that somehow coordination is good and 
uncoordination is somehow bad. Whether or not this has something to do with 
the basic human needs that seem to favor unity over disunity is much too 
exotic to be answered here. What can be asserted, however, is that the 
propensity for coordination exists and that it sometimes manifests itself as 
a subliminal conviction not susceptible to rational analysis or debate. 
Having encountered and occasionally been trapped by this mysterious force, 
the author has learned to approach blind assertions of pressing needs for 
coordination with a degree of caution bordering on skepticism. Experience 
has shown that it always behooves the organizational planner when faced with 
such assertions to ask the essential question: 11 Coordination for what? 11 In 
the absence of a cogent answer to this usually unasked question, the planner 
is ordinarily better off spending his time on other matters. This is not 
said in jest but to underline the fact that attempts to inject coordination 
into situations where there is not a real community of interest usually end 
up being nothing more than a futile exercise. 
The history of organizational planning in the field of foreign affairs 
suggests that too little attention has been given to identifying those areas 
of common interest that require and are susceptible to some degree of coordi-
nation and separating such cases from those situations where coordination is 
in fact merely a question of organizational and managerial aesthetics. Put 
another way, to be successul an organizational plan for coordinating diverse 
activities must meet the test of felt needs. The situation with respect to 
U.S. efforts in Central America seems to satisfy this requirement. 
A second factor favoring coordination is the desire of persons in author-
ity to affix responsibility. The major cause of Presidential dissatisfaction 
with the management of foreign affairs comes from the President's inability 
to (a) find someone with enough authority to carry out his orders, and (b) 
find someone to blame when things go wrong. These kinds of frustrations are 
typical in organizations where there are no clear lines of authority and 
where responsibility for actions is widely shared. The natural tendency in 
these situations is to plead for more coordination even when a more sensible 
solution might be a realignment of responsibilities. This is not to suggest 
that it is possible in all instances to design organizations in which there 
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are clearly defined lines of authority and fixed points of responsibility. 
Indeed, the complexity of modern life has led to a complete re-evaluation of 
orthodox theories with respect to these matters. More and more planners have 
come to look upon organizations as holding ponds of relevant skills and energies 
that can be arranged in an infinite variety of groupings to accomplish tasks 
necessary to achieve the organization's objective. The mechanism for managing 
activity in these organizations is the program, a document stipulating the 
combination of resources needed to accomplish the tasks that over time will 
achieve the desired objectives. More will be said about this approach to 
management in the final section of this paper. 
A third factor in favor of coordination is a desire on the part of each 
of the participants in a potentially related activity to know what each other 
is doing. This desire seems to spring from a natural tendency on the part of 
an individual to understand the relationship of his part of the action to the 
whole. A somewhat related psychological force is the sense of well-being that 
comes from participation in any form of group activity. In sports this force 
is called team spirit. These two items--the desire for information and the 
sense of participation derived from group activity-- ranked first and second 
on a list of forces leading to collaborative behavior in study of the opera-
tions of the Brazil "country team" in Washington done during the middle 60s. 
This study also showed isolation and the withholding of information among 
participants to be powerful deterrents to the collaborative process. 
A fourth factor favoring the establishment of coordinating devices is 
a clear sense of urgency. Some of the examples previously noted have come 
about as a result of a real or perceived crisis. Others stem from a sense of 
urgency engendered by the President or some other highly influential indivi-
dual. Experience shows, however, that while the creation of a sense of 
urgency may facilitate the initial establishment of coordinating mechanisms, 
sustained efforts are required to keep them in operation. Many times such 
efforts are not desirable since the need for coordination may disappear as 
the crisis subsides. 
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Turning to the factors operating against coordination one would certainly 
start with the related forces associated with institutional rivalry and the 
protection of one's turf. In foreign affairs these two factors have been a 
constant and powerful source of dissension and disunity since the emergence 
of the foreign assistance programs in the middle 40s. As we have seen, the 
seeds for this discord were probably sowed when the decision was made to 
locate responsibility for the Marshall Plan in the Executive Office of the 
President. To some extent this action was foreshadowed by the establishment 
of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs when it promptly 
staked out its own turf in Latin America and thereby laid the groundwork for 
subsequent battle between the apolitical technical experts of the IIAA and 
the ever-cautious diplomats of the State Department. However, Mr. Rocke-
feller's backyard enterprise did not have anything near the impact of the 
Marshall Plan which placed a highly visible intruder on the hallowed grounds 
of Europe and which started the clash between long-term economic development 
and short-run political considerations. 
There were plenty of reasons for not assigning the economic recovery 
program to the State Department. For one thing, as originally conceived, the 
effort was regarded as temporary in nature. Second, once the basic decisions 
had been made, it was relatively free of political overtones. Third, it 
required an expertise not then available within State and which would have 
been difficult to recruit under the Department's personnel system. Given 
these circumstances the establishment of a new agency equipped with a new set 
of administration procedures tailored to getting its mission accomplished 
quickly seemed to make a lot of sense. One wonders, however, what the future 
would have been had the job been turned over to the State Department. Would 
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the distinctions between the objectives of economic development and the 
political considerations necessarily involved in their achievement been as 
sharp? Would the technical assistance programs, had they also been assigned 
to the State Department, been as successful in avoiding the problems involved 
in developing viable political institutions? Would the diplomatic community 
become more proficient in the use of various new tools of diplomacy? We can 
only speculate on the answers to these and many other questions. We can, 
however, feel fairly secure in assuming that many of the impediments to 
harmonious relations among the agencies engaged in the conduct of foreign 
affairs would have been avoided and the need for special coordination devices 
would never have arisen. 
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Alternatives and Recommendations 
In presenting a paper such as this, it is usual to conclude by presenting 
a number of alternative courses of action, ordinarily three, two of which are 
strawmen and one of which represents the author's preference. This paper 
departs from this practice only to the extent that the author will make his 
preference known and will attempt to explain the reasons for his choice. 
The foregoing material suggests three models worthy of the Commission's 
consideration. They are: 
o An independent agency with full operating authority to 
undertake such programs as the Commission or its successor 
sees fit to recommend to the President and the Congress sees 
fit to approve. 
Following the example of the Mutual Security agency, this agency would 
have cognizance over all operations normally associated with conduct of 
foreign affairs with the exception of command military forces and the formal 
conduct of diplomatic relations. The agency would be authorized to engage 
in these operations itself or to enter into agreements with other public and/ 
or private institutions for their performance. In addition, the agency 
would have the administrative authority to hire, fire, contract, purchase, 
or transfer persons, goods and services as required to carry out its mission. 
o The appointment of a special assistant to the President to 
oversee a multi-agency initiative. 
Under this model, operating authority would remain with the agency 
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responsible for performing the activities to be included in the President's 
initiative. Requests for such additional funding as may be required to carry 
out these activities would be developed and packaged by the special assistant 
for inclusion in that agencies' appropriations for expenditure under the 
agency's existing legislative authority. 
o A special office reporting to the President to manage 
a Presidential program authorized by an Act of Congress 
and funded by appropriations made to the President. 
Following the example of the Director of Mutual Security, the head of 
this office would supervise the allocation and use of special authorities 
granted to the President and redelegated to the several agencies engaged in 
the conduct of foreign affairs. The President would seek standby authority 
to establish such additional institutions as deemed necessary on the under-
standing that such authority would only be used if it was determined that a 
task could not be performed by an existing organization. 
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Obviously, the final choice of an instrument to carry out the Commission's 
recommendations depends in large part upon the nature of those recommendations. 
All other things being equal, the author's preference is for the third alterna-
tive. It embodies the best features of what most observers believe to be the 
most effective arrangement devised thus far for the management of foreign 
affairs programs. It makes full use of the President's prestige at home and 
abroad, and by so doing enhances the chances of securing necessary author-
izations from the Congress. It provides a single point of responsibility 
with sufficent power to make things happen. It is extremely flexible, permit-
ting rapid changes in the configuration of agency participation. And, best 
of all, it is relatively easy to install and, once the program is developed, 
comparatively simple to operate. 
Certain obvious candidates have been omitted from the list of alternatives 
presented above. The most notable of these is the establishment of a quasi-
governmental corporation such as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and 
contemporary versions of the servicios created to carry out the Institute•s 
operations in the field. The reasons for this omission is not a reflection 
on the contributions these institutions made during the period of their 
existence, but rather a considered judgment on the part of the author concern-
ing their appropriateness at this time. In the case of the Institute itself, 
the authorizations necessary to create a similar organization today would not 
be forthcoming from this or any other Congress. Furthermore, even if the 
Congress were to charter a government corporation for the purposes contem-
plated, its operations under current law would be considerably more circumspect 
than was the situation during the days of the IIAA. 
With respect to the servicios the author admits to a strong bias against 
devices designed to remove public businesses from the political process. More-
over, given the current situation in parts of Central America, it would appear 
to be extremely risky to set in motion a program of semi-autonomous locally 
run entities to deal with existing economic problems in that part of the world. 
In short, if there was a time for the Institute and the servicios that time 
is passed. 
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OUTLINE OF A MEDIUM TERM U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY 
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA 
by 
M. Haris Jafri 
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to sketch an outline 
of a medium-term u.s. economic policy toward Central America, 
in the form of answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 15 and 17, of 
this questionnaire entitled "Questions on Central America". 
The recommendations cover the "problem" countries - Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
2. Since the economic problems of these four countries are 
quite similar, the recommendations are expressed in regional 
terms at this stage. However, differences do exist among these 
countries and specific country-by-country recommendations would 
be presented shortly. 
3. Questions 1, 2 and 3. 
a) U.S. Interests in Central America: Apart from national 
security considerations, the u.s. has an important economic 
stake in Central America in terms of its exports to, and 
investments in, the region. Most of the exports of Central 
America find their market in the u.s. and the region obtains 
the bulk of its imports from the u.s. The u.s. is the source 
of most of the investment and trade financing received by the 
region. Thus, Central America is economically dependent on the 
u.s. - a factor of great political importance. 
b) Recent Economic Performance in Central America: The 
preservation of the close economic (and hence political) ties 
between the u.s. and Central America calls for sustained 
economic development of the region. In fact, the region has 
retrogressed economically since 1979, largely as a result of 
higher oil prices, worldwide recession, high interest rates and 
political instability in the region. With the decline in world 
demand, the region's export earnings fell because of lower 
export prices while it had to pay a steeply increased oil 
import bill. Higher interest rates increased the burden of 
external debt service. Instead of net capital inflow on which 
the region had been so dependent traditionally, there was a net 
outflow of capital, particularly bank and private sector 
capital, during this period. All these factors aggravated the 
weakness in the balance of payments of the region, which 
consequently reduced the rate of economic growth. The u.s. can 
play a crucial role in stimulating the economic growth of these 
countries in the short run through a well-conceived program of 
increased balance of payments assistance. 
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c) Constraints on growth in Central America: Apart from 
intensified balance of payments pressures which have 
constricted the economic development of Central America in 
recent years, there are numerous institutional, structural, 
administrative and financial shortcomings that continue to 
inhibit sustained growth. The more important of these 
inhibitions are: 
i) Political instability, civil war, a pervading 
sense of insecurity. 
ii) Outmoded and inefficient systems of land tenure. 
Firm and gradual implementation of well-conceived land reform 
measures (particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala), designed 
to improve land utilization while reducing the concentration of 
land ownership, is a political and economic imperative. 
iii) Perhaps the most serious deficiency, given the 
important role of the public sector (the government and the 
state enterprises) in development, is in the field of public 
administration. The administrative weaknesses are pervasive 
and are related to laws, organization, procedures and 
personnel. As a result, day-to-day administration involves 
waste and delays; project preparation and formulation is 
inadequate; the utilization of available foreign aid funds is 
slow; there are large deficits in the government budget and in 
the financial performance of state enterprises. These 
deficits, besides having an adverse impact on the monetary 
situation and the balance of payments, make it impossible for 
these countries to provide the domestic counterpart funds 
necessary for the utilization of foreign aid. 
iv) All these countries have large budget deficits 
which accentuate inflationary pressures and balance of payments 
problems. In all these countries, changes in tax laws and 
improvements in tax administration are needed to increase the 
flow of tax revenues, while determined efforts have to be made 
to control the growth of current expenditures. 
v) Similarly, the deficits of t~e state enterprises 
(which ultimately impinge on the budget) require more realistic 
pricing policies (to increase revenue) and measures to control 
current expenditures. 
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vi) Inflation is a serious problem in all of these 
countries and its control must have a high priority. At 
present, given the large budget deficits, the burden of 
fighting inflation falls unduly on monetary policy. 
vii) There is room for improvement in monetary policy 
through a more efficient use of monetary instruments. In 
particular, realistic interest rate and exchange rate policies 
have to be pursued consistently, in order to achieve and 
maintain domestic and external monetary equilibrium. 
viii) To achieve greater flexibility in the pursuit of 
monetary policy objectives and to promote a more efficient 
mobilization of domestic savings, it is necessary in these 
countries to bring about changes in banking structures and 
banking practices. n1is can largely be achieved by actions of 
the monetary authorities (central banks) but, in some cases, 
changes in banking laws would be needed. 
ix) As for (nonbank) development finance 
institutions, the countries of the region are well-endowed with 
such institutions, both public and private. Instead of the 
creation of more institutions of this kind, some amalgamation 
and consolidation is in order, so as to have fewer but more 
efficient institutions. This will also lead to better 
utilization of the relatively scarce technical personnel. 
x) The economic planning agencies in all these 
countries need thorough reorganization and reorientation. 
Emphasis has to be shifted from ambitious long-range plans to 
realistic short and medium-term plans - plans that are better 
tailored to resource endowments and financial constraints. An 
appropriate balance has to be struck between investments in 
infrastructure and quick-yielding projects. Given the level of 
economic development of the region and its geography, an 
outward-looking export-oriented strategy would serve better 
than one oriented towards import substitution. While the 
involvement of the public sector would continue to be 
significant, every effort must be made to promote private 
sector production and investment. To this end, planning and 
development policies have to be attuned to the working of the 
price mechanism and not to run counter to it. Hence the need 
for economic pricing for agriculture and for the products and 
services of state enterprises, market-related interest rates, 
and realistic exchange rates to provide a stimulus for the 
sustained growth of exports of the region. 
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d) u.s. Policies towards Central America: The basic 
ingredients of a medium-term u.s. economic policy towards 
Central America are: 
i) Sustained economic recovery in the u.s. and lower 
interest rates. This would, in itself, stimulate Central 
American exports, reduce the debt service burden and promote 
U.S. private investment in the region. 
ii) The overall strategy should be to assist the 
governments of the region to place greater reliance on private 
initiative and the working of market forces in the development 
process (see 3.c.x. above), particularly in view of the sad 
state of public finances in all these countries (see 3.c.iv. 
above). 
iii) The measures included in the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) are a welcome first step towards the promotion 
of u.s. trade with, and investment in, the region. 
iv) Given the political and security stakes involved, 
an expanded program of u.s. economic aid to the region, mostly 
on concessional terms (grants and "soft" loans) must form part 
of the medium-term policy. It is important that the increased 
aid be. "tied" (in a politically acceptable way) to self-help 
measures to be implemented by these countries in the areas 
mentioned in 3(c) above. (This does not preclude the 
possibility of some of this aid being given on purely political 
grounds or under emergency conditions.) The "tying" of aid to 
performance would apply to both components of aid - balance of 
payments support and project aid - with different types of 
conditionality. Hence, there is a close link between economic 
aid (financial assistance) and technical assistance (see 3.d.v. 
below). 
v) The most important ingredient of medium-term 
policy is a vastly expanded program of tedhnical assistance. 
Technical assistance is needed not only for the effective 
utilization of available foreign aid but across-the-board in 
all the areas mentioned in (c) above. In the light of my 
experience in Central America, technical assistance has to go 
beyond training, advice and reports, and must involve close 
supervision and follow-up ("leading by the hand") from the 
beginning of a task to its conclusion, given the present state 
of organization and administration in the region. For such an 
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undertaking, the human resources of the u.s. Government alone 
would not be enough; the vast array of talent at the disposal 
of the u.s. private sector would have to be mobilized. By way 
of example, I may mention the work of Presidential Agricultural 
Mission in Honduras in 1982 or that of the International 
Executive Service Corps (IESC). I was able to help IESC 
establish an office and begin large-scale operations in 
Honduras in 1982. 
vi) A major objective of u.s. policy is to work 
towards a reduction of the glaring inequalities in income 
distribution in Central America (which breed discontent). 
However, apart from the political and economic imperative of 
land reform (see 3.c.ii above), any drastic measures of income 
redistribution would, at this stage, be counter-productive 
because they would discourage private saving and investment in 
the short run and thus reduce economic growth. If economic 
growth can be sustained through the policies outlined in this 
memorandum, income inequalities would gradually be reduced 
partly through the application of tax measures but largely 
through the creation of new jobs and improvements in nutrition, 
health, education and housing. 
4. Questions 4, 15. and 17 
a) The adverse impact of the international economic and 
financial crisis on the economic growth of Central America 
since 1979, has been mentioned in 3(b). With the deep 
involvement of international (IMF, World Bank, IDB), and 
regional (BCIE) financial institutions in Central America, no 
new institutional arrangements or emergency IMF or World Bank 
programs are needed. However, improvements are possible in two 
areas. First, with respect to the IMF standards of 
conditionality, it may be recalled that the standards have been 
more rigorously applied (in practice) since 1981 at the strong 
urging of the Reagan Administration. The u.s. Executive 
Director in the IMF Executive Board can now urge some 
relaxation (in practice) of the IMF standards of conditionality 
for Central Amrica. Second, the IDB is currently heading the 
inter-agency Consultative Group for Central America. The work 
of this Group needs to be expedited, made more concrete and 
focused more on the short run. 
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b) The EEC countries and Japan (particularly Japan) have 
increased their aid programs for Central America in recent 
years. The u.s. may try to persuade these countries to step up 
their aid further. 
5. Further Work 
Concrete recommendations will be submitted shortly in the 
areas indicated in 3(b) and 3(c), with specific ones for each 




HONDURAS - Policy Measures in Selected Areas 
1. Land Reform (3.C.ii of my October 18 memorandum) 
Concentration of land ownership is not a matter of serious 
concern at this time, thanks to the implementation of a land 
reform program initiated in the mid-seventies. The main thrust 
of this program is sound -- to offer some degree of security of 
tenure to the tillers of the soil and to provide land to the 
landless by bringing new land under cultivation. However, the 
implementation of the program has encountered difficulties 
because of serious shortcomings in the administrative capacity 
of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INA), the agency 
mainly responsible for the implementation of the land reform 
program (see "2. Public Administration" below). For the 
development of the agricultural sector, there are problems 
related to production, marketing and pricing policies which 
need more urgent attention at this time than land reform (as 
analyzed in the best study on this subject: the report of the 
1982 u.s. Presidential Agricultural Mission for Honduras). 
2. Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. In the case of most central government agencies and 
those of the rest of the public sector, the administrative 
shortcomings have been clearly identified, and solutions 
specified, in reports prepared by foreign experts. However, 
action on the recommendations has been slow or non-existent, 
even though some of these reports are several years old. The 
shortcomings stem from weak or incompetent leadership at the 
top and are compounded by a scarcity of capable personnel at 
the middle levels. It is a very common experience that 
decision making, even on simple matters, is delayed for no 
apparent reason except just plain inertia. 
b. The efficient functioning of these agencies is, in many 
cases, also hampered by antiquated or poorly drafted laws, 
defects in organizational structure, and faulty procedures. 
Examples of deficient laws are the Mining Code, the Income Tax 
law, the Customs law, and the Public Credit law. Among the 
examples of poor organization are the National Planning Council 
(CONSUPLANE), the National Industrial Development Corporation 
(CONADI), the Water and Sewer Agency (SANAA) and the Forestry 
Development Corporation (COHDEFOR). Examples of faulty 
procedures are those for Customs appraisal, for determining 
income tax and sales tax liability, and for approval of 
purchase orders relative to projects financed with foreign 
credits. · 
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c. Administrative weaknesses plague routine government 
work as well as the formulation and implementation of projects, 
leading to increased expenditures; the same weaknesses also 
reduce the flow of revenues. Hence, the deficits in the 
government budget and in the financial performance of the state 
enterprises are larger than they otherwise would be. 
d. Equally harmful consequences can be observed in various 
phases of the life-cycle of many projects, particularly in 
terms of the wasteful utilization of foreign credits. The 
construction of a new cement plant at Bijao (Cementos de 
Honduras) is a prime example of economic waste. More than $100 
million in foreign credits have been invested in the plant 
which is still incomplete. If the plant is completed (at the 
cost of another $40 million), there would be substantial excess 
capacity and the surplus can be exported only at a significant 
loss, given the costs of production. The new sawmill in 
Olancha (partially completed), financed with large foreign 
credits, is a similar example. Given the constraints on the 
availability of lumber and the level of expected final demand, 
the sawmill would have to operate below capacity and at a loss 
for an indefinite period. The near fiasco of the new port, 
Puerto Castilla (also financed with foreign credits), is due to 
poor supervision during construction, which has led to a still 
unresolved dispute between the Honduran Government and the 
contractors, with OPIC in the middle. Apart from these 
examples of clear economic waste, administrative weaknesses 
lead to delays in various stages of project execution --
purchase orders, work orders under contracts already signed, 
assignment of domestic and foreign technical personnel 
(including unexplained transfers and dismissals), and 
implementation of recommendations of technical experts. 
Another serious problem is default on scheduled external debt 
service (including some u.s Government loans), often involving 
small amounts, because of administrative neglect (aside from 
the question of scarcity of foreign exchange). 
e. The following is a list of ministries, government 
agencies and state enterprises with major administrative 
weaknesses: Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Economy; Ministry 
of Natural Resources; National Planning council (CONSUPLANE); 
National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA); National 
Housing Finance Company (FINAVI); National Housing Institute 
(INVA); National Port Authority (ENP); Forestry Development 
Corporation (COHDEFOR); Water and sewer Agency (SANAA); 
Agricultural Marketing Institute (IHMA); Social Security 
Institute (IHSS); Banana Corporation (COHBANA); Coffee 
Institute (IHCAFE); National Food Purchasing Institute 
(BANASUPRO); and National Agrarian Reform Institute (INA). 
411. 
3. Technical Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. Assistance related to projects. At present, most 
project financing in Honduras by u.s. and other governments and 
by international agencies is linked to some kind of technical 
assistance. The main problem is that, while the solutions are 
evident in many cases and have been clearly identified in the 
reports of technical experts, these recommendations are not 
acted upon for various reasons, mostly through inertia. Apart 
from persistent "suasion" or "pressure" by lenders (including 
slowing down or stopping future disbursements on existing 
loans), it would be very useful if the lenders assign one 
high-level "expert" (or several depending on the size of the 
project) for each project with executive responsibilities. 
This "expert" would work with the national authorities in 
assigning priorities among the recommendations of the technical 
experts and closely following up action ("leading by the hand") 
on the recommendations (from the beginning of a task to its 
conclusion, if necessary). It is my experience that a good, 
on-the-spot "expert" can prove to be very effective. 
Fortunately, the Ministry of Public Works, which is responsible 
for the execution of many public sector projects, has good 
leadership and is the strongest ministry in administrative 
terms. · 
b. Assistance for general administrative improvement: The 
correction of the pervasive administrative weaknesses is a 
time-consuming process, needing determined efforts over time. 
However, significant improvement in the short run can be 
expected from the following actions: 
i. Short (4-6 weeks) training programs in the u.s. 
or in Honduras for groups of middle-level officials in the 
weakest agencies. These programs must be tailored to the 
specific problems of the agency concerned. 
ii. As in the case of project assistance, the 
assignment of one (or several, if need be) high-level "expert" 
with executive responsibilities would be very productive. 
Again as in the case of projects, reports of technical experts 
are available on most of the pressing administrative problems. 
The problem is implementation. This "expert" would work with 
the national authorities in assigning priorities among the 
recommendations and closely following up action on the 
recommendations (from the beginning of a task to its 
conclusion, if necessary). 
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c. Implementation of the above. 
i. The above recommendations involve a large 
expansion of the existing technical assistance programs and the 
human resources at the disposal of the u.s. Government alone 
would not be enough. Every effort has to be made to mobilize 
the vast array of talent available in the u.s. private sector 
-- universities, foundations, other non-profit institutions and 
corporations -- in this undertaking. 
ii. Coordination with the technical assistance 
programs of other governments and of international agencies, 
whose activity is substantial in this field, is essential to 
avoid overlapping. Instances of such duplication have not been 
rare in Honduras. 
iii. The local USAID Mission would have the primary 
responsibility for identifying the needs for short training 
programs and for high-level "experts," as well as for 
coordination with the technical assistance programs of other 
governments and international agencies. 
4. Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum) 
The large deficits in the government budget and in the 
financial performance of the state enterprises (which, in turn, 
affect the government budget), accentuate inflationary 
pressures and balance of payments problems and make it 
impossible for Honduras to provide the domestic counterpart 
funds necessary for the utilization of foreign aid. Changes in 
tax laws, improvements in tax administration, and more 
realistic pricing policies, are needed to increase the flow of 
avenues, while determined efforts have to be made to control 
the growth of current expenditures. 
a. Tax laws: There is a voluminous amount of material 
available in Honduras consisting of tax reform recommendations 
made by international experts - the problem as usual is that of 
implementation. In early 1982, an IMF tax expert made some 
recommendations for changes in income tax and sales tax laws -
focused on some urgent problems and for immediate 
implementation. Some of the recommendations (which were made 
prior conditions for the IMF standby) have been implemented but 
others are pending. In late 1982, an IMF Customs expert made 
recommendations for changes in the Customs law; l~gislation was 
presented to the National Congress towards the end of 1982 (a 
prior condition under the IMF standby), but nothing has 
happened since. The following changes in tax laws are 
necessary in the medium term in order to increase the 
elasticity, and buoyancy of the tax structure: 
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i. Income tax. Exemption of lower income brackets; 
elimination of a large number of economically meaningless tax 
exemptions (102 different laws give tax exemptions); changing 
the present flat income tax rate for individuals and 
corporations to a progressive tax for different brackets of 
individual income and a different flat rate for corporations; a 
new law consolidating tax exemptions and giving economically 
meaningful tax incentives. 
ii. Sales, excise and consumption taxes. Increasing 
the coverage to include many products and services not at 
present covered; increasing the sales tax rate to the general 
Central American level; increasing the excise tax on alcoholic 
and other beverages, on gasoline and on automobiles. 
A new consumption tax on luxury goods was introduced in 
1982, but it was a drastically watered down version of the tax 
recommended. The law should be amended to enact the original 
recommendations. 
iii. Customs tariff. The present customs tariff is 
20 years old and is a mixture of specific and ad valorem 
rates. The law submitted to the National Congress in 1982 
combined the specific and ad valorem rates into new ad valorem 
rates, adjusted for the inflation of the past 20 year~ for 
different categories of imports. Enactment of this law is of 
high priority. 
b. Tax administration. In recent years, the tax 
collection efforts became very lax and tax evasion (or plain 
non-payment of taxes) greatly increase. Some tax 
administration measures were enacted in 1982, including a very 
important one -- a steep increase in the penalties for late 
payment of all taxes. However, the collection of these 
penalties has been very lethargic so far. Also, the 
adjudication of disputed tax payments takes a long time and, in 
the meantime, the taxpayer gets away with non-payment. In 
1982, tax experts from the IMF as well as the IRS recommended 
measures to improve tax administration. The following is the 
agenda for action in the near future: 
Collecting the legal penalties for late payment of taxes; 
streamlining the system for adjudication of tax payments; 
compiling a register of taxpayers; strengthening the Customs 
appraisal office; issuing a tax payment certificate and making 
it a requirement before a taxpayer can receive any kind of 
government services (passport, licenses), bank credit and 
foreign exchange. 
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c. Pricing policies for state enterprises. In 1982, there 
were rate increases for electricity, port services and water 
(prior conditions for the IMF Standby), but they were well 
below the recommended levels. This process should continue, in 
line with the principle of economic pricing for the services of 
state enterprises. 
d. Expenditure control. In 1982, serious efforts were 
initiated by the Budget Bureau (DGP) to control current 
expenditures, thanks largely to the personality and competence 
of the present incumbent (who enjoys high-level political 
support so far). These efforts have to be continued, 
including: further improvement of information systems; 
institutionalizing the control of DGP (which is, at present, 
largely personal) through the enactment of a law which has been 
drafted but whose presentation to the National Congress has 
been repeatedly delayed; clear demarcation of checkpoints for 
control of current expenditures; strengthening, through 
technical assistance, of the newly-established section in the 
DGP for asserting effective DGP control over the expenditures 
of the state enterprises; enactment of the Public Credit Law 
(drafted but presentation to the National Congress repeatedly 
postponed) designed to prevent indiscriminate contracting of 
foreign credits by state enterprises. 
5. Domestic financial system (3.c.vii and viii of my 
October 18 memorandum) 
a) With respect to the banking system, the main areas of 
action are: 
i. Greater flexibility in interest rates. The 
Central Bank maintains fixed interest rates which are not low 
at present but are discretionary. It would be better to have 
greater movement in interest rates in line with specified 
domestic and international indicators. Also, some interest 
rates, such as on loans to the agricultural sector, are fixed 
at low levels, which effectively discourage the flow of bank 
credit to those areas. 
11. The enforcement of legal reserve requirements by 
the central Bank is not immune from charges of favoritism. 
Also, the penalty for legal reserve deficiencies is rather mild 
and needs to be increased greatly. However, this would need an 
amendment of the Central Bank law. 
111. The domestic banking system is branching out 
into trust instruments, money market instruments and ownership 
of "financieras" and holding companies. The banking law is old 
and has not kept pace with these developments. As a result, 
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these new activities are unregulated and abuses have come to 
light. A new draft of the banking law has been prepared but, 
for political reasons, there are little prospects of its being 
presented to the National Congress. 
iv. The bank supervision function of the Central 
Bank needs considerable improvement. At present, the Central 
Bank has an IMF adviser in this field but, after his departure, 
further technical assistance from the FED or FDIC would be 
needed. 
b. The main problem area is that of non-bank financial 
intermediaries, particularly official development finance 
institutions. In some countries of the Third World, there have 
been instances of the failure of one such initiative but the · 
successor institution has done well. In Honduras the process 
seems unending. First, there was the National Development Bank 
(BANAFOM) which failed. Its successor institution, BANFINAN, 
went bankrupt. Now the successor institutions of BANFINAN, 
viz., CONADI and BANADESA are on the verge of failure. All 
these failures have been for the same reasons, all the mistakes 
in the book, viz., corruption, political influence, technically 
bad loans and utilization of short-term, high-interest foreign 
credits to finance domestic long-term loans (on which the 
borrowers do not meet debt service payments). Several 
international agencies, including the World Bank, are currently 
trying to save CONADI, but the Honduran government has been 
very slow in taking promised actions. CONADI is virtually 
bankrupt and BANADESA and FINAVI are in a weak financial 
position. Concrete recommendations by international experts on 
all these institutions are in the hands of the government --
all that is needed is implementation. 
6. IMF conditionality (4a of my memorandum of 10/18/83) 
Wh1le the analytical framework underlying IMF 
recommendations has remained the same in recent years, the IMF 
standards of conditionality have, in practice, been more 
rigorously applied since 1981 at the strong urging of the 
Reagan Administration. It is, however, true that the same 
analytical framework permits some flexibility in the setting of 
the key targets. Much depends on the assumptions made and 
nobody can deny that the assumptions made by IMF missions have 
sometimes proved erroneous. Hence, the u.s. Executive Director 
in the IMF Executive Board can now urge some de facto 
relaxation of the IMF standards of conditionality as applied to 
Central America. However, with this relaxation, the IMF must 
make it clear that it would be very strict in its appraisal of 
the "performance criteria," in order to avoid the "patching up" 
that is a common feature of successive standby programs. 
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7. u.s. Trade policies toward Central America (3d.iii of my 
October 18 memorandum) 
The measures included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(C.B.I.) represent useful first steps to help the region. 
Further measures that may be considered are: (a) a closer 
association, short of a common market, giving preferential 
access in the u.s. market to Central American exports. A 
pattern could be the relation between France and its former 
African colonies, such as the Lome Convention; (b) the u.s. 
could study the feasibility of providing additional 
compensatory financing for central America, which may be linked 
with or independent of the IMF Compensatory Financing 
Facility. However, in view of the difficulties encountered by 
the modest C.I.B. measures in the u.s. Congress, it is doubtful 
if a study of additional measures would be worthwhile. 
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COSTA RICA - MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS 
l. Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum) 
Given its democratic traditions, the system of land tenure 
in Costa Rica has evolved as the most equitable one in Central 
America. Costa Rican agriculture is dominated by large-scale 
commercial farming for domestic consumption and exports. 
Medium and small-scale farming needs a strengthening of the 
existing programs of the provision of extension services and 
the channeling of bank credit. In the medium term, a system of 
rural cooperatives should be established to improve the 
economic functioning of very small farms. 
2. Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. Public administration in Costa Rica is the most 
efficient of the four Central American countries covered in 
this study. However, administrative shortcomings of the kind 
mentioned in the case of Honduras do exist in Costa Rica, 
although to a lesser extent. 
b. The ministries, government agencies and state 
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are: Ministry 
of Planning; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry; Social Security Institute (CCSS); Petroleum Refinery 
(RECOPE); Electricity Institute (ICE); Development Corporation 
(CODESA); and National Production Council (CNP). 
3. Technial Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. Assistance related to projects: Same recommendations 
as in the case of Honduras, except that the need for high-level 
"experts" with executive responsibilites is much less. 
Technical assistance related to externally financed projects 
has made a vital contribution and should be continued and 
amplified. The Ministry of Public Works, responsible for the 
execution of most public sector projects, has performed quite 
effectively. 
b. Assistance for general adminitrative improvement: Same 
recommendations as in the case of Honduras, except that the 
need for high-level "experts" with executive responsibilities 
is much less. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
Development Corporation (CODESA) and the National Production 
Council (CNP) need the assignment of such high-level experts. 
Short (4-6 weeks) training programs for middle-level officials 
would be of great benefit to all the agencies menioned above. 
4. Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum) 
Large deficits in the government budget and in the 
financial performance of the state enterprises (which, in turn, 
affect the government budget) were the prime factors underlying 
the high rates of inflation and severe balance of payments 
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problems experienced by Costa Rica during the period 1978-82. 
Determined fiscal adjustment measures were taken in 1982, 
including increased taxes, improvements in tax administration, 
higher prices for the services of state enterprises and tighter 
expenditure control. Further efforts are needed. 
a. Tax laws: The main emphasis in the short run should be 
on maintaining the higher tax rates introduced in 1982, in the 
face of pressures for tax reduction. A medium-term program 
should have the following ingredients: income tax reduction by 
decreasing the present steep progressivity of individual income 
taxes and replacing the present steeply progressive corporate 
tax rates by a flat rate; elimination of many existing income 
tax exemptions and consolidation of the remaining exemptions, 
in order to compensate for the revenue loss from the proposed 
reductions in income tax rates; replacing the present 
single-stage sales tax by a value-added tax; simplification and 
consolidation of the large number of existing consumption and 
excise taxes; changing the customs classification from the 
NAUCA to the Brussels classification and replacing the present 
specific and ad valorem rates by ad valorem rates; reduction of 
export taxes. 
b. Tax administration: The efforts, seriously initiated 
in 1982, to improve tax administration should be vigorously 
pursued over the medium term, particulalry in the areas of 
income tax and customs duties. The proposed USAID technical 
assistance in these two fields should be quite valuable and 
should be implemented forthwith. 
c. Pricing policies for state enterprises: As in the case 
of tax laws, the main emphasis in the short run should be on 
maintaining the higher prices introduced in 1982 for the 
services provided by state enterprises, in the face of 
resistance to the increased tariffs. In fact, in mid-1983, 
electricity rates and the prices of petroleum derivatives 
(other than gasoline) were reduced. Over the medium term, firm 
adherence to the principle of economic pricing (adjust prices 
in line with costs, for example, raising the prices of 
petroleum derivatives in the case of an increase in the price 
of imported crude) would be essential. 
d. Expenditure control: Measures of expenditure 
restraint, initiated in 1982, should continue to be implemented 
steadily over the medium term. The areas needing special 
attention are: further improvement of information systems; 
clear demarcation of checkpoints for control of current 
expenditures; and the creation of a corps of trained Budgetary 
Authority representatives to monitor the budget execution of 
the agencies and enterprises. To this end, it is necessary to 
provide technical assistance to the newly-established Budgetary 
Authority and the Presidential Commission for the Reduction of 
Public Expenditures, so that they may effectivey exercise their 
functions. 
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5. Domestic Financial system (3.c.vii and viii of my October 18 
memorandum) 
a. The domestic financial system of Costa Rica is 
relatively developed and is adequately equipped to perform the 
function of mobilization of financial resources. The factors 
that inhibited financial savings during the period 1977-82 were 
broader in scope -- such as "the Central American situation" 
and the worsening of Costa Rica's credit-worthiness abroad as a 
result of high inflation (82 percent increase in consumer 
prices in 1982) and large balance of payments deficit (a loss 
of $279 million of net international reserves in the two years 
1980 and 1981). As a result of monetary, fiscal and exchange 
policy measures implemented in 1982 and 1983, substantial 
progress has been made in reducing inflation, the payments 
deficit has turned into a surplus, and domestic savings have 
begun to be mobilized. 
b. To consolidate the gains in the monetary sphere, the 
above policies have to be steadily followed over the medium 
term. The recent reduction in interest rates is a matter of 
some concern. It is important that positive real interest 
rates are maintained in order to provide a continuing stimulus 
to the mobilization of savings. 
c. As for non-bank financial intermediaries, the main 
problem is the deficit of the Development Corporation (CODESA), 
which has to be financed by the Central Bank. The Government 
has decided to sell some of the enterprises controlled by 
CODESA, but progress has been slow. This decision should be 
implemented as soon as possible. 
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EL SALVADOR - POLICY MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS 
1. An Overview (3.b of my October 18 memorandum) 
Of the factors adversely affecting the economic growth of 
Central America since 1979 (as outlined in Section 3.b of my 
October 18 memorandum), the crucial negative factor in the case 
of El Salvador during this period has been guerrilla warfare 
and economic sabotage. As a result, it is unrealistic to 
discuss medium-term economic policies amidst the pervading 
uncertainty~ most economic policy actions have to "hold the 
line" as much as possible -- to keep up production and the 
implementation of at least some developmment projects, to 
repair the damage from economic sabotage, to restrain inflation 
and to contain the balance of payments deficit. In the case of 
the public sector, the short-term priorities would be to 
improve efficiency and to limit the budget deficit and the 
deficits of the state enterprises. In the case of the private 
sector, agriculture and large-scale manufacturing have been 
hard hit by the armed conflict and revival of production and 
investment is not to be expected in the foreseeable future; 
however, the remarkable dynamism of the Salvadoran private 
sector is manifested in the mushrooming of medium and 
small-scale production, much of which has not yet been 
quantified statistically. 
2. Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. The concentration of wealth and land ownership in the 
hands of a few families has been a prime factor behind the 
turmoil in El Salvador. Thus, meaningful land reform is a 
political and economic imperative in El Salvador, especially 
since many of the large land holdings have been utilized 
inefficiently. 
b. The present regime drew up a land reform program and 
has so far implemented Phase I (expropriation of holdings over 
500 hectares) and Phase III (distribution of expropriated land 
to tenant farmers renting the land). Phase I affected about 17 
percent of total agricultural land; the expropriated land 
produced more than half the sugar cane and about two-fifths of 
the cotton crops. Some 30,000 farmers (some eight percent of 
farm families, two-thirds of which were organized in 
cooperatives), were the beneficiaries of Phase III, receiving 
about 1.7 hectares on the average. Phase II (expropriation of 
properties of 100 to 500 hectares) of the program has yet to be 
implemented. 
c. The implementation of even Phases I and III has 
suffered from a lack of strong political will. The still 
powerful oligarchy has done its utmost to disrupt the program, 
including harassment of the new owners and land reform 
officials and technicians, and attempts by former owners to 
regain possession of the expropriated land. The government has 
seemed unwilling or unable effectively to counteract these 
disruptive activities. 
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d. The experiences of land reform in many third world 
countries shows that: (i) A successful program must include 
technical assistance and supervision, provision of inputs, bank 
credit and price incentives; (ii) Even under the best of 
conditions, there is an initial negative impact on production. 
In the case of the successful programs, there has been a strong 
recovery of agricultural production after the initial setback. 
e. As expected, there has been a drop in agricultural 
production in El Salvador, particularly that of cotton. This 
certainly does not prove that the program has been a failure, 
as has been claimed in some circles. The reasons for this fall 
in agricultural output after land reform may be summarized as: 
(i) lack of strong political commitment and disruption by 
vested interests (see 2.c. above); disruption by guerrillas; 
uncertainty regarding the implementaton of Phase II; 
deficiencies in technical assistance and supervision in the use 
of inputs; and inadequate supply of inputs and of bank ~redit. 
As for the drop in cotton production, an additional factor has 
been the structure of relative prices which has favored a shift 
to basic grains. 
f. The land reform program in El Salvador was well 
designed but its implementation has fallen far short of what 
was needed. The necessary policy actions are suggested by the 
analysis in 2.e. above. Most important is a strong political 
commitment to land reform on the part of the Salvadoran 
Government and its resolute implementation. Given the existing 
political and security conditions, this implementation has to 
be gradual but there must be sustained and visible progress in 
order to have the desired political impact. 
g. The first priority is the consolidation and full 
implementation of the reforms, already undertaken (Phases I and 
III). Next, the implementation of Phase II should begin as 
soon as possible. An expanded program of technical assistance 
from the u.s. and international agencies would be vital for 
proper administrative and technical implementation of the land 
reform. 
3. Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum) 
a. Before the civil war, the public administration in El 
Salvador was one of the most efficient in the region. However, 
the level of efficiency has greatly deteriorated during the 
years of armed conflict and economic sabotage. 
b. The ministries, government agencies and state 
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are: Ministry 
of Finance; Ministry of Agriculture; Agrarian Reform Institute 
(ISTA); Social Security Institute (ISSS); National 
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Administration for Water and Sewerage (ANDA); Port Commission 
(CEPA); Agricultural Development Bank (BFA); and Foreign Trade 
Institute (ISCE). 
4. Technical Assistance (3.d.v. of my October 18 memorandum) 
Same recommendations as in the case of Honduras. El 
Salvador needs large-scale technical assistance for projects as 
well as for general administrative improvement. Technical 
assistance requirements comprise specific task-related 
expertise, short training courses for middle-level officials 
and high-level experts with executive responsibilities. The 
highest priority should be given to technical assistance 
related to the implementation of land reform. 
5. Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum) 
As a result of the civil war and the consequent 
administrative laxity, there have been large and growing budget 
deficits in the past three years. New tax measures were 
enacted in 1983, but they fell short of what was recommended in 
the budget as presented to Congress. Furthermore, the 
implementation of these tax measures has been half-hearted, 
particularly with respect to tax collection from the dominant 
rich families. Efforts for expenditure control have not made 
much headway due largely to the war effort and economic 
sabotage. The following actions are needed. 
a. Tax laws: The first priority is the enactment of the 
remaining measures recommended in the budget as presented to 
Congress. Next, the replacement of the stamp tax, a 
cascade-type turnover tax, which is the largest single source 
of the indirect taxes on domestic transactions) and of assorted 
consumption taxes by a single-stage sales tax or a multi-stage 
value-added tax would greatly increase the buoyancy of the tax 
system. 
b. Tax administration: The poor tax collection from the 
high-income group is a political rather than an administrative 
problem. Improvement in this respect awaits high-level 
political decisions. 
c. Expenditure control: Efforts in this respect have been 
rather feeble so far. It is not an easy task in view of the 
armed conflict and economic sabotage. Another complication is 
that cuts in expenditures for social services would increase 
discontent and thus run contrary to the war effort. However, 
there is a considerable margin for cuts in current expenditures 
by reducing waste and increasing efficiency (see 3. above). 
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d. Counterpart funds: Fiscal discipline would be improved 
if USAID became less permissive in allowing diversion of 
counterpart funds from their earmarked purposes (projects) to 
general budget support. 
e. Floating debt: The large increase in unpaid bills, a 
reflection of the fiscal stringency, is an unhealthy 
development and must be avoided. 
6. Domestic Financial System (3.c. vii and viii of my 
October 18 memorandum) 
Given the above-mentioned constraints, monetary 
institutions have been performing their functions as 
effectively as possible in the circumstances. Improvements are 
possible in the following areas: 
a. Because of severe liquidity problems, numerous 
enterprises are not in a position to repay their outstanding 
debts. A refinancing operation (domestic debt rescheduling) on 
a limited scale was authorized by the Central Reserve Bank in 
1983. It would be useful to amplify this scheme under the 
sponsorship of the Central Reserve Bank with government 
participation (budgetary funds or government guarantee), 
co-financing by commercial banks, and possibly some help from 
USAID funds. 
b. In 1982, the Central Reserve Bank imposed legal reserve 
requirements on the expanding trust funds portfolio of 
commercial banks. Action is needed to extend the control·of 
the mon~tary authorities over the rapidly expanding operations 
of the nonbank financial intermediaries, whose outstanding 
credit to the private sector has risen to the equivalent of 
one-third of total financial system credit to that sector. 
424. 
GUATEMALA - POLICY MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS 
1. Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum) 
Land reform has not figured as a priority item in the 
policy mix of the previous or the present regime. Ownership of 
arable land, while not characterized by the extreme inequality 
of distribution of El Salvador, is concentrated in the hands of 
relatively few families. There is a large number of very 
small, uneconomic land holdings of marginal fertility. The 
problem of landless peasants is acute in the mountainous and 
sub-mountainous areas inhabited by the indigenous population, 
in which the guerrillas find most of their recruits. It is of 
the highest political priority to provide land ownership to 
this population. A phased, modest beginning can be made on the 
lines of the land reform designed in El Salvador, with 
supplementary policy actions recommended in the section on El 
Salvador. 
2. Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum) 
a) The quality of public administration, in spite of some 
deterioration as a result of the present insurgency, is better 
than that in El Salvador or Honduras. 
b) The ministries, government agencies and state 
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are: Ministry 
of Public Works; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of 
Education; and Social Security Institute (IGSS). 
3. Technical Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum) 
Same recommendations as in the case of Costa Rica. 
Technical assistance is needed for projects as well as for 
general administrative improvement. Technical assistance 
requirements comprise specific task-related expertise and short 
training courses for middle-level officials, vvith relatively 
little need for high-level experts with executive 
responsibilities. High priority should be assigned to 
technical assistance related to the design and implementation 
of a land reform program. 
4. Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum) 
Large budget deficits were incurred during the period 
1979-81 (rising from one percent to 7.5 percent of GDP). 
However, vigorous expenditure control measures, implemented in 
1982 and 1983, have greatly reduced the size of the deficit. 
It is remarkable that this improvement in budgetary performance 
has been achieved through a reduction in expenditures. 
Unfortunately, most of the cuts have been in capital 
expenditures -- with obvious adverse impact on development. 
The other major weakness is that revenues have remained 
stagnant. There has been a serious erosion in "tax effort" 
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over the last four years, since government revenues fell from 
11 percent of GDP in 1978 to eight percent in 1982. Further 
efforts are needed. 
a. Tax laws: The lack of buoyancy in the tax system can 
be explained by its heavy dependence on specific tax rates and 
taxes on foreign trade. Quick implementation of the following 
changes, already being contemplated by the government, would 
increase revenues: changing the base of selected excise taxes 
from specific to ad valorem; new selective consumption duties 
on certain luxury-rtems; consolidation and reduction of 
numerous exemptions from customs duties; replacement of the 
stamp tax, a cascade-type turnover tax, by a new value-added 
tax. The last mentioned change is very important since it 
would improve the buoyancy of the tax system in the future. 
b. Tax administration: Quick implementation is needed of 
measures, already being contemplated by the government, to 
improve the collection of the property tax, the stamp tax, and 
customs duties. Also essential is a political commitment to 
make more serious efforts to collect taxes from the wealthy 
classes. Technical assistance for improvements in tax 
administration would be very valuable. 
c. Expenditure control: As mentioned earlier, expenditure 
reductions in 1982 and 1983 were achieved largely at the 
expense of capital expenditures. Efforts should be intensified 
to plan and implement reductions in current expenditures. 
Technical assistance is needed in this area. 
5. Domestic Financial System (3.c.vii and viii of my 
October 18 memorandum) 
Following a relatively lax monetary policy in the period 
1979-81 (leading to a loss of net international reserves of 
$600 million during the two years 1980 and 1981), tight 
monetary policies were pursued in 1982 and 1983 leading to 
balance of payments improvement. Since 1982, monetary policy 
instruments have been used flexibly and competently and the 
financial system has functioned relatively well. However, 
there are some problem areas: 
a. Because of the depressed state of private sector 
economic activity, many enterprises are not in a position to 
repay their outstanding debts and there has been considerable 
political pressure on the government to delcare a debt 
moratorium or arrange a refinancing operation (domestic debt 
rescheduling). At the end of 1982, a refinancing operation on 
a modest scale was initiated by the Bank of Guatemala. 
Consideration may be given to the expansion of this scheme 
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under the sponsorship of the Bank of Guatemala with government 
participation (budgetary funds or government guarantee), 
co-financing by commercial banks, and possibly some help from 
USAID funds. 
b. Because of certain legal rigidities in the interest 
rate structure (legal prohibition against increasing interest 
rates on existing loans) and lack of competitiveness in the 
banking system, domestic bank interest rates did not rise to 
the maximum permitted by the increase in interest rate ceilings 
authorized in 1981. The government is considering changes in 
the Central Bank law and other banking laws to bring about more 
interest rate flexibility and to encourage more competition 
among banks. This reform of the banking laws should be 
implemented as soon as possible. Technical assistance is 
needed in this area. 
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Preliminary Suggestions for the Kissinger Commission 
A. Trade Proposals 
(1) Export earnings of Central American countries will continue to 
be dominated by earnings from primary products, particularly 
agricultural commodities. To stabilize these, consideration 
should be given to a scheme guaranteeing commodity earnings 
against shortfalls caused by developments outside the control 
of developing countries. A possible multilateral approach 
could be for the United States to join the European Community 
in the Lome STABEX system provided it is expanded to include 
Central America. Other alternatives include a softening of the 
terms under which countries like those in Central America can 
take advantage of the IMF facility for compensatory financing 
or the establishment by the United States of its own bilateral 
program for Central America. 
(2) The United States affects prices of some of the region's 
products through its participation or lack of participation in 
the international coffee, cocoa and sugar agreements. Given 
the significance of the region to the United States and the 
region's heavy reliance both on export earnings from specific 
commodities and on the U.S. market, the United States should 
insist that as a condition for its participation in and support 
of these agreements it be allowed to show preference for the 
region's exports in its quota allocations destined for the 
United States market. 
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(3) Again given the region's reliance on the U.S. market for its 
exports of sugar, meat, and textiles, the United States should 
provide more favorable access to its markets for these and other 
products when access to the U.S. market is limited by quantita-
tive restrictions. Such ar.tion could be justified under the 
GATT since the GATT allows special factors to be taken into 
account. For example, special allocations could be provided 
for Central American sugar to take into account the almost 100 
percent reliance of the region on the u.s~ as an export market 
and its security importance to the United States. Gi~en the 
relatively small amount of sugar coming from this area 
(compared to other suppliers such as Brazil, the Dominican 
Republic, and Australia), such preferential access would not 
have a significant adverse effect on them but would be very 
beneficial to Central America. 
(4) Textiles are by far the most important non-traditional export 
coming from the region. Although textiles were specifically 
excluded from the CBI, the President announced more favorable 
access would be provided for the region when he unveiled the 
CBI before the OAS. Since current or potential quantitative 
restrictions under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) are a more 
significant impediment to trade than tariffs, such a policy 
could be of greater significance than duty free treatment. 
Also, given the small volume of Central American textile 
exports to the United States, this policy could be implemented 
with minimal impact on the U.S. textile program, particularly 
if its result were to be a transfer of some production from the 
major suppliers in the Far East (China, Taiwan, Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore) to Central America. 
A way to approach this would be to develop in concert with 
Central America countries prospective export levels which would 
allow these countries to guarantee sufficient sales to allow 
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the establishment of a specific number of production facilities. 
To the extent these facilities relied on U.S. origin inputs or 
represented production which would otherwise taken place in the 
Far East, more generous U.S. market access could be provided. 
Such treatment would be consisting with current U.S. policy to 
be strict with the Far East while expanding benefits to lesser 
developed regions. 
(5) One of the real innovations of the CBI is that for determining 
product eligibility, U.S. origin content can count towards 
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meeting up to 15 percent of the 35 percent local value added 
processing requirement. Moreover, Puerto Rican and u.s. Virgin 
Island inputs can account for the whole 35 percent require-
ment. However, the CBI requires that U.S. inputs receive final 
finishing in the Caribbean. In the real world, often the 
production process requires the finishing to be done in the 
United States. I suggest the Commission consider proposing to 
modify the rules of origin to allow U.S. inputs added in customs 
free zones before entry into the United States customs territory 
be allowed to be counted toward the required value added. 
(6) A special advantage of duty free treatment under the CBI is 
that imports from the region can only be restricted by import 
relief measures pursuant to Section 201 escape clause findings 
if CBI imports themselves are proved to be causing injury. 
Absent this provision, MFN or GSP rules would require all 
imports, including CBI imports, be subject to import 
restrictions pursuant to a Section 201 finding. Consideration 
should be given to extending this advantage to all CBI imports, 
not just duty free imports. Such an extension would provide 
benefits to those products specifically excluded from duty free 
treatment under the CBI (including textiles, leather products, 
footwear, and tuna fish) without injuring the U.S. industry. 
(7) To provide additional security for CBI exports to the United 
States as well as to counter opposition in the U.S. to greater 
market access for Central American countries, these countries 
should condier joining the GATT or the MTN codes of conduct. 
Participation in the GATT and the Codes, particularly the 
subsidy code, should be on conditions less strict than normally 
is the case. Participation in the subsidy code would enable 
Central American exports to receive the protection of the 
injury test in U.S. countervailing duty proceedings. 
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(8) At this stage of the economic development of Central America, 
more government intervention and assistance is required than 
would ideally be the case. In consideration of this, the 
Commission might consider recommending that the injury test in 
unfair trade cases contain a threshold greater than the material 
injury standard currently provided. Since such a test would be 
harder to meet, it would provide more security for Central 
American exports but would still protect u.s. industry from 
serious disruption from import competition. Such a special 
liberalization would perhaps be need only be in effect for a 
few years to allow new industries in Central America to "get 
off the ground." 
(9) All handicraft products should receive CBI duty free treatment. 
The legislation should be clarified to allow this in the 
textile and apparel areas, providing suitable safeguards are 
negotiated. Similarly, Central American countries should 
negotiate arrangements with the United States allowing 
handicraft entries. 
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(10) The European communities should be urged to extend Lome trade 
preferences to Central America, particularly since the United 
States is extending CBI benefits to Lome beneficiaries in the 
Caribbean (Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, Trinidad and the Eastern 
Caribbean). Similarly, in view of our close relationship to 
Japan, Japan should be urged to provide special benefits for 
Central America in investment and trade promotion. Japan 
currently provides such special benefits to the ASEAN countries. 
(11) Under ALADI, the Latin American Organization for Trade 
Integration, Central American goods can receive preferential 
access to the markets of the more advanced countries of Latin 
America, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, after appropriate negotiations. These negotiations 
should be undertaken and completed as soon as possible. In 
view of the necessity for Mexico and Venezuela to cut back on 
the benefits to the region of the San Jose Accords, these 
countries should particularly be urged to consider granting 
trade preferences. 
(12) Promote more efficient regional integration by: 
(a) promoting reintegration of Hounduras into CACM in a 
way which recognizes Honduras' need to receive 
special treatment in view of its lesser developed 
status within the common market; 
(b) promote closer ties between Panama and the CACM; 
(c) allow Belize to join CACM; 
(d) reduce the use of negative tariffs, which discourage 
further processing in CACM; and 
(e) reduce overall level of CACM protection. 
(13) Intensify AID efforts to promote exports through technical 
assistance in market identification, particularly in matching 
Central American production to market outlets and such product 
specific assistance as to upgrading product quality to meet 
U.S. standards or satisfy u.s. consumer demand. Quality 
control institutes can be established. 
B. Trade Related Initiatives 
(14) Current U.S. Government efforts should be better coordinated. 
Among the more important elements of this coordination should 
be: 
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(a) Continued leadership by Amb. Brock of the Trade Policy 
Committee in implementing the CBI, and particularly 
any Central American initiatives coming from the 
Commission. 
(b) Closer coordination between the Department of Commerce 
and AID in promoting Central America to the private 
sector. 
(c) Fuller involvement of the resource of the EX-IM Bank, 
OPIC, Small Business Administration (SBA), and Peace 
Corps, in the overall effort to implement recommenda-
tions of the Commission. 
(d) Full information exchange among the concerned 
agencies allowing "one stop shopping" for American 
and Central American principals interested in 
investing in, or exporting from, the region. 
(e) A small congressional advisory group should be 
created to work with the Executive Branch in 
implementing any Central American initiative as well 
as in developing new initiatives. 
(f) The establishment in each embassy of an office 
responsible for coordinating with the interagency 
group in Washington. 
(15) Private sector coordination with the government should be 
established either through bodies similar to the advisory 
structure for the trade policy or the more formal corporate 
structure recommended by the Americas Society. Such a group 
should focus on publicizing efforts, incentives and advantages 
for doing business with Central America, promoting venture 
capital investments, revitalizing Central American banking and 
financial facilities, and developing indigenous managerial, 
entrepreneurial and technical skills. 
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(16) The most immediate need confronting the region is to obtain 
more short term credit to permit the importation of raw 
materials and intermediate goods necessary for production 
within Central America, particularly production of non-
traditional exports. 
Ways to overcome this problem include: 
1) EX-IM bank credit similar to the recent $1.5 billion 
credit extension to Mexico and Brazil. 
2) To the extent that EX-IM Bank is limited in its 
exposure in Central America by its assessment of the 
capacity for eventual repayment, AID and OPIC should 
take up the slack. 
3) Commercial banks must be willing to expand their 
exposure in Central America with appropriate U.S.G. 
incentives. (The drying up of resources recently has 
been extraordinary.) 
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4) The IDB could act as a catalyst to bring together 
both public and private sector resources in making 
available and guaranteeing funds for Central American 
exporters needing imported inputs. 
(17) U.S. and Central American monetary authorities should work 
together to stem the outflow of private capital from the 
region. New facilities should be developed to reverse the 
outflow of capital and actually see funds flow back into 
Central America. Special foreign exchange deposits shoul~ be 
developed, perhaps jointly administred by American and Central 
American banks, which would pool funds to be used exclusively 
for Central American development. 
(18) Intra-regional trade is still an important engine of growth. 
Direct financial assistance should be provided to increase the 
credit availabile for intra-regional trade. Such facilities 
are currently limited, forcing trade contraction. 
(19) U.S. tax policy should be changed to encourage new investments 
in Central America. Two possibilities would be: 
(a) Allowing investment tax credits, and other tax 
advantages, for investments in Central America. 
(b) Tax sparing, by which the U.S. Treasury would forego 
taxing that portion of repatriated profits which is 
exempt from Central American taxes as a result of 
Central American government investment incentives. 
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(20) Allow Section 936 funds on deposit in Puerto Rico to be invested 
in Central America, while maintaining their tax deferred status. 
Allow additional Section 936 funds to be created so as not to 
drain productive resources from Puerto Rico. 
(21) Promote improved shipping through temporary subsidies which 
would allow shipping companies to offer (1) more frequent 
service than would otherwise be justified, and (2) low 
promotional rates between Central America and the United States 
and between points within Central America. This would allow 
Central America to escape the conumdrum caused by lack of 
competitive and regular transportation inhibiting exports, and 
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a lack of exports inhibiting competitive and regular transporta-
tion. If transportation rates reflected distance rather than 
traffic loads, the region would gain an advantage over the Far 
East. 
(22) Establish better coordination between aid donors and recipients. 
(23) Tourism is a significant foreign exchange earner which could be 
promoted through: 
(a) An "open skies" program to encourage air carriers to 
service the region. 
(b) Providing technical and financial assistance to 
encourage tourism in the area. 
(c) Removing the link between the granting the convention 
tax deduction and the necessity for negotiating tax 
information exchange agreements. If a linkage is 
necessary, a more realistic linkage would be to 
require beneficiary countries to cooperate with u.s. 
authorities in efforts to control the movement of 
funds connected with narcotics trade as a prerequiste 
for being deemed eligible for the convention tax 
deduction. 
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CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY ISSUES 
by Angel Rabasa 
Although political and socio-economic problems have 
contributed to the growth of insurgencies and the present state 
of civil disorder, the proximate source of the instability was 
the revolutionary change in Nicaragua. The emergence of a 
revolutionary state with international ties in the heart of 
Central America upset the internal political equilibrium in the 
northern tier of Central American states. It endangered the 
security of neighboring states, particularly El Salvador, 
through the Sandinistas politico-ideological challenge and 
their support of revolutionary movements elsewhere. The 
development of a military establishment of unprecedented size 
added a conventional military dimension to the threat. 
The Conventional Military Balance 
Since coming to power in July 1979, the Sandinistas have 
been attempting to consolidate their control of Nicaragua 
through the militarization of society, the establishment of an 
extensive internal security apparatus, and a large scale 
conventional military buildup, backed up by a substantial Cuban 
presence. The capabilities of the Nicaraguan ground forces 
that now numbers about 25,000 regulars are now far superior to 
those of any neighboring state and are improving steadily with 
Soviet bloc training and increasingly sophisticated military 
equipment. 
The buildup, which is perceived as out of proportion to 
that required to defend it against its neighbors, has alarmed 
Central Americans, particularly Honduras. Honduras' air edge 
is its only counterweight to Nicaragua's superiority on the 
ground. But Honduras is aware that this edge could be easily 
lost as the result of Nicaragua's acquisition of high 
performance aircraft or of a successful terrorist attack on the 
Honduran Air Force, such as the one which resulted in the 
destruction of much of the Salvadoran Air Force on the ground 
in January 1982. 
Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras has the logistical support 
capability to mount a sustained conventional attack on the 
other. Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan military buildup provides 
the Sandinista leadership the security shield behind which it 
can continue with relative safety its support of guerrilla and 
terrorist movements in other Central American states as well as 
an instrument of political intimidation and internal control. 
Hhile it cannot serve as a shield against u.s. military power, 
Nicaragua's military strength can render victory more 
difficult, and be much more costly to the u.s. in political 
terms. The ambiguity of the Cuban response to an invasion of 
Nicaragua also strengthens its position. 
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The Nicaraguan Insurgency 
The development of an anti-Sandinista insurgency in 
Nicaragua has restored a degree of symmetry to the Central 
American security situation. However, while this insurgency is 
a thorn in the side of the Nicaraguan Government, it has not 
grown to the extent that it threatens Sandinista survival. 
Anti-Sandinista forces are active through the entire 
northern border area and along the Rio San Juan, on the 
Atlantic coast, across the border from Costa Rica. The 
anti-Sandinista insurgents are divided into three major groups, 
and unity of effort has been hampered by deep-seated 
differences between the leaders of the largest anti-Sandinista 
armed organizations, the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) and 
Eden Pastora's ARDE. The Miskito and Suma Indian organization, 
the Mitsura Revolutionary Front, has cooperated with both FDN 
and ARDE. 
FDN, with about 7,000 fighters, operates along the Honduran 
border from Bocay, in north central Nicaragua, to the Pacific 
coast, and down into the Matagalpa area. FDN has recently 
developed a capability for air and sea attacks, which 
substantially complicates the Sandinistas counterinsurgency 
problems. ARDE is the fastest growing anti-Sandinista 
guerrilla organization, having surged from about 300 men 
earlier this year to about 3,000 at the present time. It has 
expanded its de facto control over most of the remote Rio San 
Juan area, placing the town of San Juan del Norte under virtual 
siege. It has operated as far north as the Bluefields area and 
the Rama road, the only hard surface road connecting the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua. The Mitsura 
Revolutionary Front, with 3,000 fighters, operates throughout 
the countryside in northern Zelaya, on the Atlantic coast, and 
along the Rio Coco border with Honduras. Mitsura operations 
have reduced Sandinista control to the major towns, such as 
Puerto Cabezas and Prinzapolka. 
Hith the exception of periodic large scale efforts by FDN 
forces to take the town of Jalapa, the northernmost town in 
Nueva Segovia department, near the Honduran border, the tactics 
of the anti-Sandinista forces have consisted of harrassment of 
Sandinista units and economic sabotage. Insurgent pressure on 
the Sandinistas has increased substantially in recent months; 
the insurgents have successfully attacked key economic 
installations and inflicted heavy casualties on Sandinista 
forces deployed against them. The insurgents, however, have 
not been able to seize any major towns, to break out of the 
relatively isolated areas where they operate or to generate 
sufficient active support to threaten the survival of the 
regime. The Sandinistas have so far only deployed Army 
reserves or militia units against the insurgents, leaving their 
conventionally trained front line forces defending the 
populated areas in western Nicaragua. 
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Time is probably on the side of the Sandinistas. Barring a 
dramatic increase in material support available to the 
insurgents, they are not likely to be able to carry the war to 
the Pacific heartland, where civil conflicts have been 
historically decided. In the meantime, the Sandinistas will 
continue their process of consolidation and their military 
buildup. This said, the insurgency has to be viewed in its 
regional context. At a minimum, it has distracted the 
Sandinistas from their regional revolutionary objectives; it 
must have been almost certainly taken into account in what they 
see as a more unfavorable regional security environment. In 
effect, the insurgency has carved out a place as a political 
reality that must be recognized in any future negations. 
The War in El Salvador 
In El Salvador, the war is at a stalemate. The guerrillas 
have limited popular support, but can probably continue the war 
as long as they receive external support. While there ia a 
unified guerrilla military command with headquarters in 
Managua, the strategies of the Salvadoran guerrilla groups have 
been shaped by the doctrine and situation of each of the 
groups. The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the most 
doctrinaire of the guerrilla groups, which maintains a strong 
presence in Chalatenango, has been in disarray since the murder 
and suicide of its leaders in Managua earlier this year. The 
dominant group is now the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), 
which is active in eastern El Salvador. ERP strategy has 
consisted of systematic attacks on the economic infrastructure, 
in order to precipitate an economic and political collapse, and 
military actions designed for political and psychological 
effect. They are especially interested in the effect their 
actions have on international public opinion, especially in the 
u.s., where they hope to discourage further support for the El 
Salvador Government. 
The number of guerrillas has remained stationary for the 
last two years: there are an estimated 6,000 front line 
guerrillas and a slightly larger number organized in militia 
and support units. The guerrillas, however, have demonstrated 
an increasing ability to maneuver and concentrate their forces, 
and to react to Salvadoran Army moves. They are also involving 
their militia units in operations together with their front 
line forces. 
In 1983, as in the past, the war has been characterized by 
a cyclical pattern, in which the initiative has been 
alternatively taken by government and guerrilla forces. From 
May to July, the government forces maintained the initiative 
with a countrywide operation which succeeded in throwing the 
guerrillas on the defensive everywhere and in severely 
disrupting the guerrilla infrastructure in the strategically 
important department of San Vicente, a north-south corridor for 
the transshipment of seaborne supplies for the guerrillas in 
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the northern area. In October (a period which coincided with 
the end of the u.s. fiscal year and uncertainty in El Salvador 
regarding the expected levels of u.s. assistance), the Army 
became less active and the guerrillas mounted a series of 
attacks in the east, beginning with an attack on the garrison 
in San Miguel, the country's third largest city. 
Underlying the ebb and flow of field operations, there has 
been over the past tvvo years a deepening of the guerrilla 
presence in the eastern departments. In the absence of 
significant Salvadoran military forces, the guerrillas operate 
at will throughout the countryside. They have established the 
rudiments of a civil administration and enforced a tax regime 
in areas under their control. Increasingly, they are able to 
mass their forces and overwhelm isolated garrisons, ambush 
relief columns, and in some recent cases, have inflicted heavy 
casualties on two of the government's new cazadores (hunter) 
battalions and on units of the u.s.-trained Atlacat battalion. 
The severity of guerrilla attacks on the transportation and 
electrical network in the eastern departments has resulted in 
the effective isolation of much of the area east of the Lempa 
River from the rest of the country. The nature and extent of 
guerrilla operations in the east has led to speculation that 
the military objective of the guerrillas in the eastern 
departments might be the establishment of a liberated zone, as 
a prelude to the extension of the war into the central 
departments. Whether the guerrillas would venture to proclaim 
a liberated zone until they are sufficiently strong to defend 
it is something that cannot be answered at this time. 
It should be noted, however, that the situation throughout 
the country is not uniformly favorable to the guerrillas. 
Apart from the disruption of their bases in San Vicente, the 
guerrillas have lost their infrastructure in western El 
Salvador and have been unable to reconstitute their support 
network in the cities. 
While the military situation continues to be essentially a 
stalemate, the guerrillas' campaign of economic disruption and 
sabotage has had devastating effects on the Salvadoran 
economy: the country's GDP has declined 25 percent in real 
terms in the last two years. In eastern El salvador, the 
economic decline has been even more precipitous. 
The Salvadoran military's new strategy, as reflected in the 
campaign that was initiated in San Vicente in May 1983, is to 
clear the guerrillas from the economically and strategically 
important areas in San Vicente, Usulutan and other departments 
and eventually reduce the insurgency to peripheral areas. The 
San Vicente operation was militarily successful, but the civic 
action component apparently lagged. It is unclear, in the wake 
of the guerrillas' fall 1983 offensive, how soon the Salvadoran 
armed forces will be able to implement the plan elsewhere. 
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Part of the reason for the Salvadoran military's inability 
to contain the guerrillas has been an insufficiency of manpower 
and resources. About three quarters of the Salvadoran armed 
forces are deployed in static positions that protect fixed 
installations, and leave insufficient maneuver forces to carry 
the war consistently to the guerrillas. This is an intractable 
problem that can probably only be solved through a substantial 
force expansion. Materiel is a serious problem. Even with the 
present force structure, there are critical shortages of basic 
equipment, including communications, medical equipment and 
airlift assets. 
The Salvadoran armed forces have also suffered from 
inadequate command and control, coordination and leadership. A 
recent major reorganization of the military command structure, 
which included the appointment of one of the Army's most 
competent and effective officers as Chief of Staff, the 
establishment of a 24-hour-a-day liaison between the Army and 
the Air Force in the General Staff and the assignment of some 
of the Army's best officers to key field command positions, is 
expected to improve command, control and coordination and to 
lead to a more aggressive prosecution of the war. 
The Public Order Situation in Guatemala 
The insurgency in Guatemala is much better encapsulated by 
the term terrorism than guerrilla warfare. There are about 
2,500 guerrillas in four groups loosely organized under an 
umbrella organization. The guerrillas lost critical ground in 
the fall of 1982 and have not yet recovered. There is 
guerrilla activity around Lake Atitlan (the Revolutionary 
Organization of the People in Arms- ORPA), in northern El 
Quiche and Huehuetenango (Guerrilla Army of the Poor - EGP) and 
in western Peten (Revolutionary Armed Forces - FAR). The 
guerrillas engage in harassment and terrorism (there has been a 
recent increase in terrorism in Guatemala City), but make no 
attempt to hold ground or to engage military units in sustained 
combat. 
The Guatemalan Army continues to apply the extremely 
successful counterinsurgency tactics developed by Chief of 
Staff Benedicta Lucas under the Lucas Garcia government and 
continued by President Rios Montt. At the heart of Guatemalan 
Army tactics are aggressive small unit patrolling and 
counterinsurgency operations in areas of guerrilla activity. 
Platoon size units are sent out for three to six weeks at a 
time. They regularly uncover guerrilla encampments and engage 
the guerrillas in firefights. The Guatemalan Army has been 
extremely ruthless in dealing with suspected guerrilla 
sympathizers. The most salient characteristic of the 
Guatemalan counterinsurgency effort is the organization of 
about 400,000 campesinos and Indians into Civil Defense 
Forces. Civil Defense units are poorly armed--only about one 
in ten is armed with a gun, usually an M-1 rifle--but they 
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provide security for villagers, go on patrol regularly and have 
taken heavy casualties in contacts with insurgents. 
The positive aspect of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency 
program is civic action. The Guatemalan Army has a long 
tradition of involvement in civic action projects as well as of 
severe violence. Under Rios Montt, in addition to becoming 
less indiscriminate about killing, the armed forces provided 
food and housing materials to villages participating in the 
Civil Defense program. The Guatemalan Government's financial 
crisis, however, as well as possibly the Mejia government's 
less complete commitment to the "beans" side of the Rios Montt 
government "beans and bullets" policy, has led to a slowdown of 
the civic action efforts. This could have a significant impact 
on the future of the insurgency. The immediate prospects, 
however, are for the persistence of a low level guerrilla 
threat, together with possibly an increase in urban terrorism. 
The contrast between the course of the insurgencies in 
Guatemala and El Salvador and between the responses of the 
Guatemalan and Salvadoran military to their respective 
guerrilla challenges might shed some light on the nature of the 
problem. A key factor is undoubtedly simple demographics. El 
Salvador is much smaller and more densely populated than either 
Guatemala or Nicaragua and consequently it was correspondingly 
easier for the Salvadoran guerrillas to attain the critical 
mass necessary for a major insurgency. Proximity to Nicaragua 
was another factor: it was probably not an accident that the 
guerrillas are most active in the eastern third of the country, 
vvhich is closest to the source of supplies in Nicaragua. A 
third reason lies in the mindset and doctrine of the Salvadoran 
armed forces. Unlike the Guatemalan Army, which experienced 
and defeated an insurgency in the 1960's, the Salvadoran 
military confronted a serious insurgency with no previous 
counterinsurgency experience and burdened by a doctrine which 
emphasized conventional warfare with Honduras. Only in the 
last year has the officer corps begun to assimilate the lessons 
of the last two to three years and have field-level commanders 
emerged whose primary experience has been in the area of 
counterinsurgency. 
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Statement of Robert L. Bernstein 
My name is Robert L. Bernstein. I am Chairman of the 
Helsinki Watch and a founder of the Americas Watch. 
The Helsinki Watch was organized in 1979 as a citizens' 
group to monitor United States compliance with the Helsinki 
Final Act and to maintain contact with citizens' groups 
abroad that were trying to document compliance in their own 
countries. It was patterned directly on the original 
Helsinki Watch founded in the Soviet Union by Yuri Orlov, 
and on the Charter '77 group in Czechoslovakia. Had those 
groups been allowed to survive and continue their work, which 
of course they had every right to do under the Helsinki 
accords, they would have been the founders of the first 
East-West movement for hurnan rights -- apart from government 
and apart from ideology. Unfortunately, as we all know, 
their membership has been dispersed and their leaders 
imprisoned. 
The u.s. Helsinki Watch has not gone untouched by Soviet 
hostility. Our strong belief that the provisions relating to 
human rights were the most important and fragile in the 
Helsinki Final Act led us to active effort in their defense, 
and to outspoken criticism of violations by the Soviet Union 
and by its communist satellites, as well as by other 
countries. In retaliation, the soviets canceled both my 
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visa and that of the Executive Director of the Helsinki 
Watch, and published virulent personal attacks on us through 
the state press. 
Yet our work continued. In 1981 we organized the 
Americas Watch, when it became apparent that the theory that 
we should respond differently to human rights abuses by 
Marxist totalitarian governments and non-Marxist 
authoritarian governments was becoming a basic tenet of u.s. 
foreign policy --stemming, perhaps, from the idea that it is 
possible to change non-Marxist authoritarian governments and 
that therefore we should cooperate with them. We believe 
that a policy that appears to accept human rights abuses in 
any country, regardless of political complexion, is contrary 
to American beliefs and American interests. We believe 
particularly that to vigorously criticize human rights abuses 
in countries dominated by the Soviet Union and then to 
over-look abuses in countries in our own hemisphere where 
cruel dictatorships are aligned with the United States, would 
be inhumane, unwise and indefensible. We also believe that 
these calculations have diluted the human rights element in 
our foreign policy, and that they do not reflect the strenth 
of our American tradition or the real feelings of the 
American people. Above all, we believe that promotion of 
human rights should be a consistent u.s. foreign policy 
goal. 
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Our committees are firmly convinced that the great 
struggle going on in the world today is not so much between 
communism and capitalism as it is between totalitarian or 
authoritarian government and human rights. We believe that 
communism was challenged and failed in Poland, that it failed 
in Czechoslovakia, and that it failed in Hungary. It wasn't 
that the people did not rise up to assert their rights and 
change the system: it was that Soviet tanks carne in to halt 
the change. 
In these and so many other struggles around the world, 
the legitimacy and appeal of human rights is overwhelming. 
World-wide concern with human rights is growing. Think of 
how often you read about and hear about human rights issues 
now, reported from all the corners of the earth, as opposed 
to only three or four years ago. Human rights, as a matter 
of international concern is, to cite the cliche, an idea 
whose time has come. 
The United States should be perceived in world forums 
and in its dealings with all other countries as the leader in 
defense of human rights --which are, after all, simply 
internationally recognized civil liberties. The basic civil 
liberties battles that have been fought here at horne are well 
known abroad, and the United States has stood for 200 years 
as the great bastion of human rights. Now, today, this is 
the critical need: to adapt our foreign policy to what have 
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long been our real beliefs and to project those beliefs 
evenly and firmly. Yet by sponsoring such brutally 
repressive regimes as those in El Salvador and Guatemala, the 
outlines OT our true position have become blurred and our 
credibility has been greatly damaged. 
Many today wonder.about the effectiveness of the 
Helsinki process in view of the deterioration of conditions 
in the Soviet Union and their repeated disregard for the 
meaning of their signature on the Helsinki Final Act. But it 
is precisely because of this that the Helsinki guarantees 
have been invaluable, exposing Soviet hypocrisy and alerting 
their citizens, and millions elsewhere, to the rights they 
are denied. The Helsinki talks in Madrid have provided a 
forum for publicizing violations in various countries, and 
for asserting the commitment of the United States to the 
Final Act. A way must be found to do this in Latin America; 
our actions supporting the human rights advocates in those 
countries must be as strong as they have been in Europe. 
For years, many have considered human rights 
organizations to be more idealistic than pragmatic. I 
believe that as you hear the reports of Aryeh Neier, Vice 
Chairman of both the Helsinki Watch and the Americas Watch, 
and Orville Schell, Vice Chairman of the Helsinki Watch and 
Chairman of the Americas Watch, you will see that the work 
our groups are doing is steadfastly tied to reality. 
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The Americas Watch has sent many missions into Central 
America and has published detailed, factual reports on what 
they have seen and heard there. These and other projects are 
supervised by a board unlike almost any other I can think of. 
This is not a staff-run operation, with a detached executive 
committee. Every week on Wednesday mornings from 8:45 to 
10:30, and at other meetings, a group drawn from business 
leaders, attorneys, university presidents, publishers and 
clergy comes together to give its time and thought to the 
place of human rights in an increasingly contentious world. 
The specific issues they confront each week are by no means 
always simple and clear. But they share a bedrock 
commitment that is always clear --one which I hope will play 
a major part in the deliberations of your Commission and 
which, if I may, I will end my remarks by repeating: above 
all, as calculations are made to deal with each new problem 
we face, we believe that human rights should remain an 
abiding and consistent u.s. foreign policy goal. 
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Statement of Aryeh Neier 
My name is Aryeh Neier. I am Vice Chairman of the 
Helsinki Watch and Vice Chairman of the Americas Watch. I 
will attempt to summarize the information that the Americas 
Watch has assembled on the human rights situation in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
First, a word about our information-gathering. Over the 
past two years, more than a dozen members of the Americas 
Watch executive committee and staff have travelled to Central 
America to gather information on the human rights situation. 
At the moment that we appear before this Commission, four of 
our researchers are in the region. We have interviewed heads 
of government, military commanders, police chiefs, prisoners, 
rank and file soldiers, priests, journalists, lawyers, 
judges, doctors, refugee workers and, most of all, victims of 
human rights abuses and members of their families. In 
addition, we maintain close contact with domestic human 
rights groups in those countries where they can operate. In 
the last two years, we have published eleven highly detailed 
reports setting forth our findings about the human rights 
situation in Central America. The information set forth in 
this testimony derives from those reports but has been 
brought up to date to make it as current as possible. 
In a number of instances, the information we have 
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assembled is at odds with information that has been published 
by the Department of State. It is our view that the 
gathering and reporting of information by the Department of 
State is designed to further the policies of the Department 
and accordingly is inadequate and biased. Just two examples: 
1) in reporting data on political murders in El Salvador, the 
Department of State relies exclusively on the extreme right 
wing Salvadoran press which in turn derives much of its 
information from the Salvadoran government. The State 
Department rejects the meticulous and painstakingly 
documented reporting by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San 
Salvador that is exclusively based on first-hand testimony 
from family members of those who have been murdered and 
witnesses to the murders. As is hardly surprising given the 
State Department's sources, its body count is far lower than 
that which we report; 2) in evaluating accounts of rural 
massacres in Guatemala, the State Department dismisses the 
testimony of refugees who have fled accross the border into 
southern Mexico, labelling them "guerrilla sympathizers" --
as if people would leave their land, their homes, and their 
communities for the squalor of a refugee camp in order to aid 
the guerrilla cause by telling lies about the Guatemalan 
armed forces. 
Here is what we have found out about the human rights 
situation in Central America. 
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EL SALVADOR 
Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants 
Since october 1979, human rights organizations affili-
ated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador 
(until May 1982, socorro Juridico; since May 1982, Tutela 
Legal) have tabulated more that 37,000 murders of civilian 
non-combatants by government security forces and by 
paramilitary forces allied with them. In the past year, 
political murders of civilian non-combatants tabulated by 
Tutela Legal have continued at the rate of about a hundred a 
week -- an astonishing number any place and all the more 
horrifying given the tiny population of El Salvador and the 
fact that the security forces should be running out of 
politically suspect persons to murder. 
In January, 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 430 murders of 
civilian non-combatants by government security forces and by 
paramilitary forces allied with them; in February, 1983, 
Tutela Legal tabulated 537 such murders; in March, 1983, 329 
such murders; in April, 1983, 386 such murders; in May, 1983, 
503 such murders; in June, 1983, 342 such murders; in July, 
~983, 424 such murders; in August, 1983, 318 such murders. 
All told, therefore, during the first eight months of 
1983, the Archdiocese of San Salvador recorded 3,269 murders 
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of civilian non-combatants by the security forces of the 
government of El Salvador and paramilitary forces allied with 
them. For purposes of comparison, the number of such murders 
recorded by the Archdiocese during the previous eight months 
--that is, May 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982 --was 
3,070. Accordingly, the number of recorded murders of 
non-combatants is rising. 
It should be noted, of course, that the number of 
murders that the Archdiocese records understates the total. 
The Archdiocese has difficulty obtaining information on 
political murders in parts of the country remote from San 
Salvador because it insists on obtaining first-hand testimony 
from witnesses or family members if a murder is to be 
included in its tabulations. 
Disappearances 
In addition to those known to have been murdered by the 
security forces, since October 1979 some 2,300 Salvadorans 
have "disappeared" following abduction by government ·security 
forces. In the past year, such tabulated disappearances 
following abductions have continued at the rate of about 
fifty a month. 
Most recently, members of the faculty of the National 
University appear to have been specially targetted by the 
security forces. On September 13, 1983, Professor Pedro 
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Flores was abducted by the security forces; on September 14, 
Professor of International Law, Hugo Francisco Carrillo was 
abudcted by plainclothesmen; on September 19, Professor 
Amilcar Martinez, chief of the Economics Section of the 
Department of International Relations was abducted by the 
security forces. As of September 27, 1983 we have been able 
to obtain no word on their whereabouts and fear that their 
names may have to be added to the list of the disappeared. 
In January, 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 56 disappear-
ances; in March, 1983, 33 disappearances; in April, 1983, 48 
disappearances; in May, 1983, 90 disappearances; in June, 
1983, 67 disappearances; in July, 1983, 57 disappearances; in 
August, 1983, 37 disappearances. 
All told, therefore, there were 420 disappearances 
following abductions by government security forces during the 
first eight months of 1983. For purposes of comparison, the 
Archdiocese recorded 358 disappearances during the last eight 
months of 1982. 
Again, this indicates an increase. Moreover, as those 
who disappear after abduction by the security forces and do 
not reappear within fifteen days (the criterion for 
tabulation as a disappearance by the Archdiocese) almost 
never reappear, by rights these should be included as 
political murders. 
If that were done, the number of recorded political 
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murders by the government security forces and paramilitary 
forces allied with them, since October 1979, would rise to 
more than 39,000. 
Torture 
Many of the bodies of civilian non-combatants murdered 
by government forces in El Salvador indicate that they were 
severely tortured and mutilated before being killed. 
Virtually all prisoners at Mariona -- where male political 
prisoners are held -- say they were tortured, by electric 
shock, beatings, simulated suffocations and hangings by the 
wrists, and many bear physical marks of torture. The 
practice is so widespread as to be routine. 
Political Prisoners 
In El Salvador, political prisoners are considered lucky 
that is, they are alive. At present, there are some 350 
acknowledged political prisoners. Prior to May 1983, there 
had been more than 700 political prisoners but, under an 
amnesty law, some 533 had been released by June 24. The 
number is rising again as approximately 150 additional 
political prisoners were confined between May and August 
1983. None of the 200 or so political prisoners not released 
under the amnesty has had access to defense counsel since 
Decree 507 was promulgated in 1980 and, though some have been 
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confined for more than two years (a few as long as five 
years) not one has been brought to trial. 
Freedom of the Press 
One opposition newspaper, La Cronica, was closed in 1980 
after its editor and a photographer were hacked to death. 
Another, El Independiente was closed in 1981 after several 
assassination attempts against its editor and after army 
tanks and trucks surrounded its building on January 15, 1981. 
Many journalists have been attacked in El Salvador and some 
have been killed, among them four Dutch journalists killed in 
March 1982 and an American journalist, John Sullivan, who 
disappeared and was murdered in 1980. Freedom of expression 
has been suspended in El Salvador and the surviving 
newspapers -- which are extreme right-wing -- are subject to 
censorship. 
Freedom of Religion 
Archbishop Romero was murdered in 1980 and subsequently, 
there have been frequent attacks on the church by government 
security forces, including the murders of four u.s. church-
women in December 1980. One consequence is that the Arch-
diocese of san Salvador today has 35% fewer clergy than in 
1977. In the past year, there have been several bombings and 
machine-gunnings of religious institutions and several 
pastoral workers have been murdered or have disappeared. 
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During 1983, individuals employed by religious institutions 
to provide care for displaced persons have been particularly 
victimized by political repression. Among the victims are 
the director of medical services in the displaced persons 
camp of the Lutheran Church of El Salvador who was abducted ' 
by the National Police in April 1983 and tortured and several 
employees of camps operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese 
of San Salvador who were abducted by the National Police in 
August 1983 and tortured. At this writing, the Lutheran 
Church official and several of the Catholic Archdiocese 
relief workers remain in prison. 
Repression Against Human Rights Monitors 
The staff members of organizations monitoring human 
rights practices have been particular targets for repression. 
Government security forces abducted and murdered two members 
of the staff of the El Salvador Human Rights Commission in 
1980; another disappeared in December 1981 (along with two 
employees of the Archdiocese); the public relations director 
of the Commission disappeared in August 1982 along with three 
other persons after abduction by security forces; Dr. Roberto 
Rivera Martelli, a founding member of the Commission whose 
clinic regularly treated victims of human rights abuses sent 
to him by the Commission, disappeared in February 1983 after 
abduction by a paramilitary group; and the President of the 
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Commission, Marinela Garcia Villas, was killed in March 1983 
in disputed circumstances. Patricia Cuellar, a United States 
citizen who worked for socorro Juridico was abducted by 
security forces with her father in July 1982 and disappeared. 
The System of Government 
National elections for a constitutional assembly were 
held in March 1982 with a very large voter turnout. The 
left did not participate in the elections, at least in part 
because it reasonably feared to participate. Six leaders of 
the left political coalition, the FDR, had been kidnapped 
from a press conference by security forces in November 1980, 
tortured, mutilated and murdered. The Christian Democrats 
took part in the election, but were handicapped because many 
of their leaders were murdered. 
A right-wing coalition prevailed in the election but was 
prevented from naming a provisional president by the 
intervention of the United States and the armed forces. 
Apparently, it was feared that the leader of the right-wing 
coalition, Roberto D'Aubuisson, would alienate support within 
the United States. 
At this writing, Presidential elections that were 
planned for late 1983 have been postponed. No date has been 
set. Whether the left will participate when elections are 
held is questionable. The armed forces have never withdrawn 
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a "hit list" in which they pledge to "relentlessly persecute" 
the principal political leaders of the left and the 
government has never even investigated the major episodes in 
which the armed forces murdered FDR leaders. In addition the 
Christian Democrats have continued to be victimized by such 
violence, diminishing their ability to fairly contest an 
election. In May 1982, the Christian Democratic Party 
accused the security forces of killing nine party leaders, 
six party activists and 22 peasant supporters during that 
month alone. In September 1982, the Christian Democratic 
Party denounced the murder of 35 mayors from its party, 9 of 
them in 1982. Attacks on the Christian Democratic Party have 
continued in 1983 including the murder of another Mayor in 
April; the abduction of a former Mayor and several other 
party leaders in June; and threats against the life of a 
Christian Democratic member of the National Assembly who had 
called for a crackdown on death squads in a May speech. The 
threats included the murder of a young man whose body was 
dumped in the parking lot of the hotel where foreign 
journalists stay with a press release in a pocket of the 
victim. One Christian Democratic mayor is known to have been 
killed in a guerrilla attack. An ARENA member of the 
National Assembly was murdered by a guerrilla group in June 
1983. 
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The System of Justice 
To all intents and purposes, there is no system of 
justice in El Salvador. Prisoners are rarely taken: most are 
killed. Those who are taken prisoner are never tried. The 
judiciary and the country's lawyers occupy themselves with 
civil suits while the slaughter goes on around them. 
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations 
No member of the regular security forces has been 
criminally punished for a human rights violation. In August 
1983 a Civil Defense member was convicted for a political 
murder, the first conviction for any of the 37,000 murders 
since 1979. 
Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross 
The International Committee of the Red Cross is 
permitted to perform its humanitarian mission in El Salvador. 
The ICRC had been prepared to leave El Salvador on its own 
initiative in mid-1982 because of the failure of the 
government to take prisoners. It was persuaded to stay, in 
part through u.s. intervention. In addition to monitoring 
the situation of prisoners, the ICRC returns prisoners 
released by the guerrillas to the government and provides 
food and medicine to some 90,000 displaced persons in combat 
areas. 
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Political Violence By Opposition Forces 
Guerrillas in El Salvador regularly commit crimes 
against property in an effort to disrupt the country's 
economy. Starting in May 1982, the human rights organization 
affiliated with the Archdiocese of San Salvador, Tutela Legal, 
began tabulating the killing of civilian non-combatants by 
the guerrillas. 
In January 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 7 murders of 
civilian non-combatants by the guerrillas; in February, 13 
such murders; in March, 6 such murders; in April, 6 such 
murders; in May, 7 such murders; in June, 4 such murders, in 
July, 8 such murders; in August, 5 such murders. All told, 
during the first eight months of 1983, the Archdiocese of San 
Salvador tabulated 56 murders of civilian non-combatants by 
the guerrillas, an increase over the 40 tabulated during the 
last eight months of 1982. 
In addition, during June, July and August of 1983, the 
Archdiocese tabulated 10 abductions by the guerrillas. 
Prior to May 1983, the guerrillas had a very good record 
of releasing captured prisoners to the International 
Committee of the Red cross. Their record contrasted 
favorably with that of the Salvadoran government's armed 
forces which only rarely take prisoners. However in May, 
June and July 1983, there were three incidents in which it is 
credibly alleged that the guerrillas executed a number of 
463. 
captured prisoners. Indeed, the guerrillas admitted 
executing five civil defense members in one of these 
incidents. 
Another guerrilla abuse involves a number of incidents 
of forceful recruitment in areas they have occupied. 
Refugees -- Displaced Persons 
More than a million Salvadorans -- twenty percent of the 
population -- have been driven from their homes. 
Approximately half have fled the country. The remainder, 
whose situation is especially desperate, live in displaced 
persons camps or in places that barely deserve to be labelled 
as camps within El Salvador. The displaced persons are 
disproportionately women and children as it is dangerous for 
adult males to inhabit these camps. The armed forces 
periodically sweep through these camps and adult males found 
there would be in danger as they might be suspected of being 
guerrillas. This ensures that family disruption is yet one 
more of the travails inflicted on Salvadorans. 
Very little of the enormous amount the United States 
spends on economic aid to El Salvador makes its way to the 
displaced persons. Much of the care that is provided comes 
from private agencies. A Salvadoran government agency, 
CONADES, operates some camps. 
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General Comment 
El Salvador is a human rights disaster area. There is 
no prospect of significant improvement. Though the United 
States has made strenuous efforts to persuade the security 
forces to curtail human rights abuses, these efforts -- even 
in such matters as the murder of u.s. citizens -- have been 
unavailing. The Salvadoran security forces are confident 
that u.s. support will continue, no matter what. Accordingly, 
they are not moved by u.s. strictures about human rights 
abuses. 
The Salvadoran government's authority derives mainly from 
its practice of terror. This seems the only explanation for 
the continuing enormous rate of political murders and 
disappearances by its security forces. By now, those forces 
should be running out of politically suspect persons to kill. 
They keep killing, however, to maintain the terror. 
It is nonsense to assert, as the Department of State does 
frequently, that El Salvador is undergoing a process of 
democratic development. Democracy implies choice and, 
plainly, the security forces will not tolerate certain 
choices. Accordingly, they have murdered or driven into exile 
the political leadership of the left and some of the political 
leadership of the center. Other principal targets for murder 
include those who advocate negotiations with the left and 
those who themselves denounce political murders. Religious 
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leaders, human rights workers, refugee and relief workers, 
union leaders, teachers, journalists and doctors have also all 
been special targets of political murders and disappearances. 
A sufficient number of such persons has been killed so that, 
in a tiny impoverished country such as El Salvador, it may 
well be that the possibilities for democracy have been 
eradicated for the foreseeable future. 
The refusal of the security forces to tolerate so much as 
a single conviction of one of their members for a political 
murder -- even in cases that have jeopardized u.s. assistance, 
such as the murders of the AIFLD representatives and the four 
u.s. churchwomen -- demonstrates that there is no realistic 
possibility of bringing about reform. Accordingly, the choice 
for the United states is to continue to sponsor the security 
forces, in full knowledge of their murderousness, or to end 
military support for El Salvador and seek other means to 
protect those security interests the United States may have in 
the region. The option of providing massive military support 
while trying to promote reforms is no option at all. It has 
been tried for more than three years and there is not the 
smallest sign of headway. 
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GUATEMALA 
Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants 
At least 12,000 civilian non-combatants were killed by 
Guatemalan government forces between 1978 and 1982 according 
to Amnesty International. In a single incident at Finca San 
Francisco in June 1982, more than 300 Indian villagers were 
massacred by Guatemalan soldiers. It is difficult to say how 
many have been killed in 1983 or how many are being killed now 
since no human rights organization is able to operate within 
Guatemala monitoring abuses. Information gathered by 
Americas Watch representatives indicates that the killings of 
Indians in the countryside continues, but we have not been 
able to monitor the situation systematically enough to provide 
a count. The most recent incident of mass killings of which 
the Americas Watch is aware took place in early September 1983 
at Chuabaj, in the vicinity of Chichicastenango, El Ouiche. 
Twenty-eight men were rounded up by members of the civil 
patrols from nearby communities and eight of them were killed. 
The others were beaten, but escaped death. 
An incident that has attracted widespread attention was 
the murder of a Guatemalan linguist working on a u.s. AID 
project, Patricio Ortiz Maldonado. Along with three 




Under the regime of President Lucas Garcia, 
disappearances in Guatemala City had been very frequent. 
These had been curtailed by the Rios Montt government during 
its first few months but, in late 1982, started to take place 
again. Several scores of disappearances are known to have 
taken place in 1983 but, again, the absence of a human rights 
monitoring group within Guatemala makes a count impossible. 
An example of a recent disappearance is the kidnapping of Jose 
Saturnine Tajarito who was abducted from his office in 
Chimaltenango on August 27, 19R3 by members of the Guatemalan 
Army. Two truckloads of soldiers took him from his office in 
the Fundacion ULEU, a small development organization supported 
by religious groups. No word of him has subsequently been 
available. University students are among those particularly 
victimized by disappearances. 
Torture 
The mutilation of Indians in the countryside by the 
Guatemalan army before they are killed is routine. Similarly, 
women are systematically raped before being killed. In 
Guatemala City, many of those who were held for trial by the 
special secret courts (see below) were first tortured. 
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Political Prisoners 
Under decrees that had been promulgated by the Rios Montt 
government, there was no right to personal liberty and 
arbitrary and unlimited detentions were permissible. The 
present situation is unclear and figures on the number of 
political prisoners are not available. There do not seem to 
be many as the Guatemalan army takes few prisoners. 
Freedom of the Press 
On June 28, 1982 the office of Prensa Libre was machine-
gunned by unidentified men. The government has prohibited the 
publication of information on the war, rural conditions, or 
political activity without permission. In March 1983, the 
Guatemalan newspapers were temporarily ordered not to print 
any comments from the Pope or the vatican criticizing the 
executions carried out after trials by secret courts. 
Freedom of Religion 
Under the Lucas Garcia regime, many priests were killed 
and, in El Quiche, the diocese was closed by the Bishop who 
went into exile. President Rios Montt announced that exiled 
priests may return to Guatemala on condition that they limit 
their work to spiritual matters. Few priests accepted this 
offer. General Mejia Victores said that the undue 
influence of the verbo church was one of the reasons he 
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overthrew Rios Montt. At this writing, it is too soon to 
evaluate religious freedom under Mejia. 
Repression. Against Human Rights Monitors 
No organization monitoring human rights operates above 
ground in Guatemala today. It is too dangerous. Lawyers who 
defended persons sentenced to death by the special secret 
courts have themselves been fined because they filed legal 
papers seeking to prevent the executions. As a consequence, 
no such legal efforts were made to stop the most recent 
executions which took place on March 21, 1983. Since the 
Mejia Victores coup, death squad activity has increased in 
Guatemala City and lawyers defending individuals accused of 
subversion have been the targets of frequent threats. 
The System of Government 
General Mejia Victores was installed in office on 
August 8, 1983 after a military coup. He governs by decree. 
He has pledged that constituent assembly elections will be 
held in 1984. It is too early to tell whether political 
parties will enjoy the rights to function and compete freely 
and safely for public support which would make elections 
meaningful. 
The System of Justice 
President Rios Montt established special secret courts in 
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which even the identities of the judges were unknown. No 
semblance of due process existed within these courts. They 
had the power to sentence defendants to death and, between 
September 1982 and March 1983, fifteen persons were executed 
after "trials" by these courts in which defendants never saw 
either their defense attorneys (in those cases where they had 
attorneys) or the judges who tried and sentenced them. The 
special secret courts violated Guatemala's international legal 
obligations in a great many respects and, in September 1983, 
the InterArnerican Court on Human Rights of the OAS found that 
the executions violated Guatemala's obligations under the 
American Convention on Human Rights. At the time he seized 
power, General Mejia Victores pledged to abolish the secret 
courts. At this writing, that pledge does not seem to have 
affected the status of those imprisoned after convictions by 
the secret courts nor the status of those who were imprisoned 
pending trials by the secret courts. 
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations 
In May 1982, two months after corning to power, President 
Rios Montt issued an amnesty that provides the security forces 
with immunity from prosecution for committing such crimes as 
murder, torture and rape. As a result of pressure from the 
United States, an officer was detained for the murder of 
Patricio Ortiz Maldonado and his colleagues but he was 
acquitted. 
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General Mejia Victores, then Defense Minister, had pledged to 
other officers that an acquittal would be forthcoming. 
Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross 
The International Committee of the Red Cross is denied 
access to Guatemala and, accordingly, is unable to carry out 
its humanitarian mission. 
Political Violence By Opposition Forces 
Several incidents have been documented in which 
guerrillas have committed murder and other serious violations 
of human rights. The Government of Guatemala attempts to 
attribute most such human rights violations to guerrillas, 
claiming that the guerrillas attire themselves in army 
uniforms. Refugees say they have no difficulty in 
distinguishing the army from guerrillas, pointing to command 
structure, training, beari'ng, and weapons as among the ways 
that they can differentiate. In particular, refugees point 
out that army assaults on their villages often are coordinated 
with attacks by planes and helicopters and that guerrillas do 
not have these weapons. 
Refugees interviewed by Americas Watch representatives in 
Chiapas, Mexico in March 1983 (where there are now close to 
100,000 Guatemalan refugees, most of whom arrived in the last 
year) were unanimous in insisting that they had been 
victimized by the Guatemalan army. 
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Refugees 
In addition to the 100,000 or so refugees who have fled 
across the border into Mexico, it was estimated in 1982 by 
Catholic Church officials that close to a million Guatemalans 
had become refugees in their own homeland. The Guatemalan 
government has resettled some displaced persons in villages 
abandoned by those fleeing the armed forces. 
At the Mexican border, the Guatemalan army has created a 
free fire zone and many refugees have been killed. In 
addition, the Guatemalan army has conducted several raids 
against refugee camps across the border. 
Within Guatemala, the army controls the food supply to 
refugees to coerce them to provide it with support. 
General Comment 
Over a period of several years, the Guatemalan armed 
forces have practiced terror in the countryside to gain 
control. In the process, many thousands of Indians have been 
killed and hundreds of thousands have fled their homes. Those 
who remain are forced to form civil partrols and must do 
forced labor. Crops are systematically destroyed so that the 
only food that is available to many Indians is dispensed by 
the army to those who become its allies and, in particular, to 
those who do the dirty work of killing other Indians who are 
less cooperative. The cultures of the Indians of Guatemala 
473. 
are being destroyed and a significant portion of the Indian 
population has been exterminated. 
474. 
HONDURAS 
Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants 
The incidence of extra-judicial killings by the security 
forces in Honduras is rising. Americas Watch has learned of 
49 murders by members of the security forces that took place 
from January 1983 to June 1983, 13 of which appear to be 
politically motivated. 
These cases include the murder in April 1983 of four 
brothers named Bustamante whose bodies were found in Olahoe. 
The family blames the police. Earlier in the month, a 
well-known economist, Salvador Diaz Valle, disappeared and his 
body was discovered several days later showing signs of 
torture. 
On March 29, 1983, the President and three other members 
of an agricultural union were killed near Progreso, Department 
of Yoro. Survivors attributed the killings to the military; 
the military attributes the killings to company security 
guards. On January 1, 1983, a communist leader was 
assassinated. The family accuses FUSEP, a police agency. 
Previously, in October, 1982, nine heavily armed men 
abducted and killed a leftist, Jose Luis Rivera. In June, 
1982, eight persons were killed in similar fashion in Santa 
Barbara. Three student leaders and officers of the union of 
university employees were abducted in August 1982 and their 
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bodies were found a few days later. 
Though such killings are infrequent in Honduras by 
comparison with El Salvador and Guatemala, they are, 
nevertheless, very disturbing, especially because they rarely 
result in prosecutions. 
Disappearances 
The leading Honduran human rights organization, the 
Comite para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CODEH) 
reported 15 disappearances between January 1981 and January 
1982 when a democratic civilian government took office. 
Subsequently, during 1982, 31 Hondurans disappeared after 
abduction by security forces; four subsequently reappeared 
alive; three corpses were found. In addition, 42 Salvadorans, 
5 Costa Ricans, one venezuelan, one Ecuadorian and one 
Guatemalan disappeared after abductions in 1981 and 1982. 
Americas Watch has learned of 22 additional 
disappearances during 1983, though in an encouraging 
development possibly reflecting the efforts of human rights 
groups, there were also 8 reappearances of persons who had 
been listed as disappeared. One of these was Inez Consuelo 
Murillo, a 25 year old lawyer arrested in the presence of 
witnesses in san Pedro Sula on March 13, 1983. She reappeared 
when she was brought to a court on May 31 where she testified 
that she had been held in clandestine safehouses during her 79 
days secret imprisonment. 
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The most recent abduction that has come to our attention 
was of Professor Joaquin Portillo of the University of San 
Pedro Sula, past President of the union of University 
employees. He was abducted on September 22, 1983 and, as of 
September 27, we have been unable to determine his 
whereabouts. 
The Honduran Congress has refused to acknowledge that 
disappearances are a problem. After many months of pressure, 
the Congress has recently organized a special committee on 
human rights but has conspicuously excluded from it Deputy 
Efrain Diaz Arrivillaga, a Christian Democrat, even though 
Diaz Arrivillaga had been the only member to request an 
investigation into disappearances. 
Torture 
Police brutality appears to be common. There have been a 
number of allegations of torture: on March 16, 1983, Raoul 
Zuniga accused the DNI and on March 17, 1983, Antonio Martinez 
accused FUSEP. 
Political Prisoners 
There have been a number of cases of arbitrary arrest and 
detention and peasant and trade union leaders appear to be 
particularly victimized. In a letter to President Suazo, the 
national peasant union (UNC) has claimed that 36 of its 
members were in detention and 230 were being prosecuted -
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apparently as a result of peaceful demonstrations and work 
stoppages. 
Freedom of--the Press 
Freedom of the press generally prevails in Honduras, 
though there have been some disturbing developments recently, 
including the arrest.of three photographers for Tiempo and El 
Heraldo while covering police actions against demonstrators, 
threats and the attempted shooting of journalist Nee Leiva on 
June 10 by two intelligence officers, and the expulsion from 
the country of UPI correspondent John Lantigua on May 5, 1983 
on charges of "disinforming" the world about Honduras. 
Freedom of Religion 
Freedom of religion prevails in Honduras. 
Repression Against Human Rights Monitors 
CODEH operates without restriction. Some of the victims 
of killings and disappearances have been lawyers, union 
leaders and student leaders who have defended left-wingers. 
The System of Government 
After 20 years of nearly continuous military government, 
Honduras elected a civilian government in November 1981 that 
took office in late January 1982. In spite of this welcome 
return to democratic rule, the armed forces remain the 
dominant power in the country. The civilian government has 
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done little to investigate charges of corruption and human 
rights violations by the armed forces. No serious 
investigation was conducted when two large burial grounds were 
discovered near Tegucigalpa in 1982. 
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations 
There is little or no investigation of human rights 
abuses and effective remedies against those responsible are 
unavailable. An exception was the indictment of Honduran 
military officers who abducted and abused a u.s. nurse, 
Cynthia Morin, and a Guatemalan doctor, oscar Giron, who were 
providing health care to Guatemalan refugees. 
Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
The ICRC has access and is able to carry out its 
humanitarian mission. 
Political Violence by Opposition Forces 
There have been several spectacular terrorist incidents 
in Honduras including kidnappings, an airplane hijacking, and 
the assassination of the son of a leading publisher. 
Refugees 
The treatment of Salvadoran refugees has been among the 
most serious human rights problems in Honduras. Many have 
been forcibly returned to El Salvador to face near certain 
death. Honduran armed forces have collaborated with 
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Salvadoran armed forces in attacking refugee camps. 
Salvadoran refugees have been victims of many killings and 
disappearances. 
Honduras also has thousands of Nicaraguan refugees and 
several hundred Guatemalan refugees. They have not been 
comparably mistreated. There are indications,, however, that , 
it has been Honduran policy to keep Miskito Indian refugees 
from Nicaragua together at the Mocoron refugee camp in order 
to foster their use in attacks against Nicaragua. 
The Honduran government has refused to sign the UN 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
It does, however, permit the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees and international relief agencies to provide care 
for those displaced from neighboring countries. 
Unfortunately the operations of these monitors and relief 
workers have often been made extremely difficult by the 
Honduran armed forces. A particularly serious incident took 
place on June 16, 1983 when the resident UNHCR officer was 
physically abused when she intervened on behalf of Guatemalan 
refugees who were being taken away from a refugee camp by 
Honduran soldiers. 
General Comment 
The critical question in Honduras is whether the 
civilian democratic government will demonstrate the strength 
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and the will to control its armed forces and to punish those 
responsible for human rights violations. Clear answers to 
that question are not yet in sight. The possibility that 
civilian democratic rule will prevail is increasingly remote 
given the tremendous militarization of the country that is 
underway. In most matters affecting human rights, the 
military commander, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, is the 
effective ruler of the country. 
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NICARAGUA 
Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants 
In December 1981, up to 50 Miskito mineworkers were 
allegedly murdered by soldiers at Leimus. The Nicaraguan 
government assured the Americas Watch a year and a half ago 
that it would investigate this incident, but we have no 
report on an investigation and no evidence that it has been 
conducted. A similar incident on a smaller scale is alleged 
to have taken place at San Carlos at about the same time. 
The more recent incidents that have come to the 
attention of the Americas Watch are the killings in April 
1982 of three persons in detention under circumstances that 
are not clear, and a report that a number of prisoners were 
executed at La Polvora prison in Granada. 
Disappearances 
Ten persons who disappeared in 1981 remain disappeared. 
Fifteen additional persons disappeared in the first two 
months of 1982, but they all turned up alive. Additional 
temporary disappearances continue to take place and it is 
never certain whether the disappeared person will turn up. 
Particularly in rural areas, authorities frequently fail to 
inform families when they have made arrests. The Permanent 
Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), a private organization 
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that has effectively monitored human rights both under Somoza 
and under the Sandinistas has published a list of some 70 
persons who have "disappeared" since mid-1982 from the 
Atlantic Coast region where the Miskito population is 
concentrated. About half of these cases have the 
characteristics normally associated with "disappearances" 
-that is, they involve arrests, abductions, or detentions 
following which the individual subsequently disappears. No 
information is provided as to the circumstances in which the 
remainder of the persons on the list disappeared. 
Accordingly, these may be disappearances or they may be cases 
of missing persons. CPDH reports that one of those who 
disappeared after arrest in July 1982, Manuel Thompson Clark, 
was seen alive by his family in May 1983 in a prison in 
Puerto Cabezas. It has been rumored that the remainder of 
the Miskitos listed as disappeared were killed by government 
soldiers and that the soldiers responsible were subsequently 
secretly court-martialed and executed. Americas Watch has 
obtained no evidence that would confirm this rumor. 
Torture 
There have been a few documented instances of torture, 
but it is not a routine practice. The most serious abuses of 
prisoners involve male Miskito Indians incarcerated in Puerto 
Cabezas. Credible accounts indicate that, for a period in 
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1982, they were subjected to systematic physical abuse by 
security personnel, including beatings. CPDH has recently 
reported threats and arbitrary punishment of prisoners in 
Tipitapa and Zona Franca, the two major prisons. 
Political Prisoners 
Under the State of Emergency that has been in effect 
since March 1982, prisoners may be detained without charges 
for security-related reasons. several hundred such 
detentions have taken place during the past year. Some of 
those detained have since been released. To date, the 
practice has been to prosecute about 25% of those detained in 
this way on various charges. 
In late 1981, three officials of a business organization 
and four leaders of a Communist trade union were imprisoned 
for publishing statements about the country's economic 
situation. They were released in early 1982. 
On May 5, 1983, some 18 leaders of the Central de 
Trabajadores de Nicaragua, a labor federation, were imprisoned 
under the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order and 
Security. Some have been subsequently released. 
Freedom of the Press 
An opposition newspaper, La Prensa, operates but it is 
harassed and, since March 1982, has been subjected to prior 
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censorship. There are no discernible standards for 
censorship. In addition, two radio stations that broadcast 
comments adverse to the Government were denied license 
renewals. A humor magazine, La Semana Comica, was recently 
closed for a month. 
Freedom of Religion 
There has been considerable tension between the 
Archbishop of Managua and the government, and difficulties 
between some other religious groups .and the government, 
particularly the Moravian Church to which the majority of the 
Miskito Indians adhere. The most severe interferences with 
religious freedom involve restrictions on the right of 
Moravian and other ministers to travel to East Coast regions 
where the Miskito Indian population is concentrated. Travel 
restrictions appear to have been eased recently. 
Repression Against Human Rights Monitors 
A private human rights organization, the Comision 
Permanente de Derechos Humanos, operates and effectively 
documents human rights abuses. In 1981, its former director, 
Jose Esteban Gonzalez, had a number of confrontations with 
the government, including an incident in which a mob that was 
allegedly organized by the Sandinista party attacked him at 
the airport when he returned to Nicaragua from a trip out of 
the country. Since then, the most serious interference with 
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CPDH was the arrest of a CPDH employee in July 1982. He 
spent two months in prison, apparently for distributing CPDH 
literature. 
The System of Government 
Since the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, 
Nicaragua has been governed by a directorate and a junta. 
Elections have been promised for 1985 but they are unlikely 
to be meaningful because opposition political parties have 
operated under severe restrictions and the most prominent 
political opponents of the Sandinistas have gone into exile. 
Recently there has been some relaxation on the restrictions 
under which opposition political parties operate, but there 
is no guarantee against reimposition of these restrictions. 
The System of Justice 
Nicaragua's judicial system has preserved a measure of 
independence. Capital punishment has been abolished. 
Appellate review of trial court decisions is sometimes 
meaningful. 
The most severe abuses in the last two years involve 
about 130 Miskito defendants convicted between December 1981 
and February 1982 in Puerto Cabezas in circumstances 
involving procedural shortcomings (on appeal, sentences were 
reversed or reduced and, at this writing, most have been 
released 46 of them in July 1983): and the denial of 
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habeas corpus in most judicial districts to prisoners 
detained for security reasons without charges. In addition a 
disturbing development has been the reestablishment of 
special courts, "Popular Tribunals" - apparently similar to 
those that operated in 1979 and 1980 - to try prisoners 
captured in current fighting against "contras" trying to 
overthrow or destabilize the government. It is not yet known 
how these special courts are operating in practice and the 
Nicaraguan government has thus far failed to cooperate with 
Americas Watch's efforts to monitor these courts. 
Apparently, however, their decisions are not subject to 
review by the Supreme Court and their proceedings are 
summary. 
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations 
There have been a number of instances in which those 
responsible for human rights abuses have been criminally 
prosecuted and punished but, so far as is known, no action 
with respect to those who may have been responsible for the 
most serious recent alleged abuse: those who may have 
executed up to 50 Miskito mineworkers at Leimus in December 
1981 (see above). 
Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross 
The International Committee of the Red Cross has access 
and is able to carry out its humanitarian mission. 
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Political Violence By Opposition Forces 
There are many documented instances of violence against 
civilian non-combatants, including medical personnel, by 
opposition forces fighting the Nicaraguan government. One 
well-known case involves the Barreda family from Jalapa, 
abducted with neighbors by the FDN (contras) in December 
1982. The Barredas were subsequently killed in Honduras. On 
August 23, Eden Pastora, leader of another group fighting the 
Nicaraguan government, announced that "25 Cubans" fighting 
with the Sandinistas were executed by firing squad in July. 
Subsequently, a cable from Pastora's forces said that 
"Commander Cero, who wants to demonstrate 'objectively' the 
presence of foreigners in the Sandinista army, has admitted 
that several Cuban prisoners have been executed, but said 
that 'it was a mistake by the companeros.'" 
Refugees 
The Nicaraguan government has systematically relocated 
Miskito Indians and other Indians from border regions. These 
relocations were carried out suddenly, without advance 
consultation with those affected. Their villages and 
property were destroyed. Thousands of Miskitos fled 
Nicaragua and took refuge in Honduras. 
The Nicaraguan government has established resettlement 
camps in the interior for some 8,500 Miskitos it evacuated 
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from the border with Honduras. The most significant abuse at 
these camps was that those resettled there were effectively 
required to stay there. Reports indicate that some 
restrictions on movement have recently been eased, though 
the Miskitos lack a realistic option of settling elsewhere. 
In addition, Miskitos relocated have not been compensated for 
their losses. Ir late 1982, the Nicaraguan government 
relocated an additional five thousand persons of varied ethnic 
backgrounds from the Honduran border where heavy fighting was 
taking place. It was during this relocation that a 
helicopter crashed killing some 80 Indian children. As best 
we can determine this relocation unlike the relocation in 
1981, did not involve duress. Most recently, there have been 
relocations from villages in the vicinity of Puerto Cabezas, an 
area where there is heavy fighting between the contras and 
Nicaraguan government forces. 
General Comment 
The most serious abuses in Nicaragua involve the Miskito 
Indians. They have lost their villages and their homes; many 
of them have been detained without .charges; they have 
received the worst treatment by the courts and in the 
prisons; some of them may have been massacred at Leimus in 
19811 and they have been restricted in their movements. 
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Nicaragua shows no signs of evolving in the direction of 
a democratic society in which freedom of expression is 
respected. On the other hand, the Americas Watch has found 
a drastic reduction in violent abuses since the overthrow of 
the Somoza regime in 1979. Again, the Miskito population 
appears to have been particularly victimized by those abuses 
that continue to occur. 
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Statement of Orville Schell 
My name is Orville Schell. I am Chairman of the 
Americas Watch and Vice Chairman of the Helsinki Watch. 
Robert Bernstein has told you why we created the 
Americas Watch and why the Helsinki Watch and the Americas 
Watch believe that efforts to promote human rights have a 
significant force in the world today. Aryeh Neier has 
summarized the information that Americas watch has assembled 
about the human rights situation in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua. My assignment is to tell you what 
steps you might recommend that will promote human rights. I 
will proceed country by country. 
El Salvador 
In El Salvador, the unrelenting practice of murder, 
kidnapping, disappearances and torture by the security forces 
indicates that they rely principally on terror to maintain 
their authority. Their very policy is terror. The refusal 
of the security forces to permit a single one of their 
members to be criminally punished for a human rights 
violation -- even in cases that outraged Americans such as 
the murders of the AIFLD advisors and of the four u.s. 
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churchwomen --demonstrates that they are impervious to human 
rights pressure from the United States. In our view, that is 
because they do not take that human rights pressure 
seriously. Our actions have made them confident that our 
support will continue no matter what. Accordingly, we should 
serve notice on El Salvador that our military support will 
end unless: disappearances stop: the army stops its free 
fire practices in guerrilla controlled zones: torture ends: 
and prosecutions and convictions of members of the security 
forces responsible for abuses take place quickly and in 
meaningful numbers. To be credible the threat of a cut-off 
of military support must be real. That is, we must actually 
end support if dramatic change does not take place quickly. 
The statements by our Ambassadors that it will take a decade 
or more to secure change are not good enough. They excuse 
the,continuation of abuses. If we believe those statements 
we should terminate all military support now. 
Guatemala 
In Guatemala, though the practices of the armed forces 
have not been so exhaustively documented as in El Salvador 
because of the absence of any domestic human rights group 
operating within the country, the available evidence 
indicates that overwhelming human rights abuses continue. Up 
to a few months ago, rural massacres were taking place in 
which entire Indian villages were destroyed and their 
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populations were wiped out. Disappearances in Guatemala 
City, which subsided during the early months of the Rios 
Montt regime, have resumed in quantity. Again, the 
government~s policy is terror. Even in sections of the 
country that appear to have been "pacified," it is a "peace" 
that has been imposed and that is maintained by terror. To 
the best of our knowledge, no effort is underway to punish 
those responsible for massacring Indians. 100,000 Guatemalan 
Indians have fled to Southern Mexico and many hundreds of 
thousands are displaced persons in their own country. 
Though the United States is far less centrally involved 
in Guatemala than in El Salvador, our support provides the 
only veneer of legitimacy to what should be a pariah nation. 
We make it possible for governments that depend on us, such 
as those of Taiwan and Israel, to supply its military needs. 
We should end all military aid to Guatemala, and all economic 
aid except for aid to meet basic human needs, and we should 
organize an international arms boycott. It should end only 
when there is clear and convincing evidence that the 




In Honduras, the human rights situation is not presently 
so grave that respect for our own laws requires us to end 
military aid. At the same time, we should recognize that the 
human rights situation is deteriorating in Honduras. 
Ironically, this has happened during the past two 
years, jugt at a time when the human rights situation should 
be improving because the country has returned to civilian 
democratic rule. During that period, however, the armed 
forces have increased their dominance over the country. The 
elected civilian government has shown itself powerless to 
deal with disappearances and other abuses committed by the 
armed forces. Though the Americas Watch does not oppose 
military aid to Honduras, we do oppose militarization of 
Honduras. We call on this Commission to recommend a policy 
towards Honduras that recognizes the need to draw a line 
between military aid and militarization. Military 
subservience to the democratically elected civilian 
government should be a condition for the continuation of 
military aid. 
Nicaragua 
In Nicaragua, the human rights situation is bad and 
continues to deteriorate. The Sandinistas have steadily 
eliminated the possibility of democratic development by 
imposing prior censorship on the press, restricting 
opposition political groups and labor unions, and by driving 
many of their most prominent political critics into exile. 
The worst abuses have been endured by the Miskito Indians and 
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other Indians who have been forcibly removed from their 
traditional lands and villages and required to live in 
resettlement camps. The Miskitos have also suffered 
discrimination in their treatment by the courts and prisons. 
At the same time, given the practices in the region, it 
must be noted that Nicaragua has not engaged in the 
systematic use of murder, massacres and disappearances. 
Incidents of violent abuse have occurred in Nicaragua 
-- again, especially victimizing the Miskitos -- but the 
numbers are comparable to those in Honduras rather than to 
those in El Salvador or Guatemala. 
The Americas Watch believes that United States support 
for the "contras" battling the government of Nicaragua is at 
least questionable on human rights grounds. First, some of 
those we are supporting are Somocistas who committed terrible 
abuses when they held power. Second, our support for the 
contras exacerbates the victimization of the Miskitos whose 
traditional lands and villages are in the path of the 
fighting. In addition, u.s. support for the contras raises 
questions about our adherence to our own laws and to our 
treaty obligations. Failure to adhere to law certainly has a 
bearing on human rights. 
In urging that you recommend these steps, we are not 
calling for United States abandonment of Central America. In 
our view, the United States would retain many military, 
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economic and diplomatic options. We do not recommend 
particular options to you because those matters are not our 
p~ovince. Members of this Commission are better qualified 
than we are to consider those questions. The steps we 
recommend are those that we believe the United states should 
adopt in order to promote human rights in the region. 
Here is what we would achieve if we undertook a policy 
designed to promote human rights. We would let it be known 
in Central America that we stand for human rights, not only 
for ourselves, and not only for those who are victimized by 
communist oppression, but also for those in nearby countries 
who are victimized by brutally repressive governments that 
claim to be our friends. At present, much as we proclaim our 
devotion to human rights, much as we practice human rights at 
home, much as we denounce oppression in the Soviet Union, 
Poland and Cuba, we have no credibility as friends of human 
rights in Central America. The victims of oppression in El 
Salvador and Guatemala identify us as their oppressors or as 
the accomplices of their oppressors. Even most of the 
victims of Marxist oppression in Nicaragua do not see us as 
friends of human rights. We may denounce denials of freedom 
that they endure today, but many of them remember that we 
were accomplices of Somoza and helped to sponsor the 
oppression that they endured just a few years ago. They may 
l 
also identify us as the sponsors of Somocistas seeking to 
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return to power. 
In addition to letting it be known in Central America 
that we stand for human rights - again, not only for 
ourselves, and not only for the victims of communist 
oppression - we would also ·let thi~ be known throughout Latin 
America and, indeed, throughout the world. Those of us who 
believe that the central struggle in the world today is 
between human rights and totalitarianism must realize that our 
side - what we like to think of as the human rights side - is 
crippled, perhaps fatally, by our identification with some of 
the most brutally repressive regimes on earth in.our own 
backyard. 
We appear here as advocates of human rights. We know 
that the members of this Commission are also advocates of 
human rights. Where we may differ, however, is that some of 
you may consider that at least in the short term, there is a 
contradiction between assuring the national s~curity of the 
United States and promoting human rights. It is possible 
that some of you have persuaded yourselves that, for now, we 
must put up with even such dreadful regimes as thos~ of El 
Salvador and Guatemala in order to maintain our national 
security. We take issue with this view because we believe 
that the national security of the United States depends on 
its credibility world-wide as a force for human rights. If 
their side is perceived as totalitarian, and the sponsor of 
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oppression in Poland and Afghanistan, our case against them 
is anything but strong if we are perceived as a democracy at 
horne and the sponsor of oppression in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. Yet that is the way we are perceived not only by 
much of the world but also by a significant number of 
Americans. Indeed, in my view and in the view of my 
colleagues in the Americas Watch, it is an accurate 
perception. 
One of the lessons of the Vietnam era is that where a 
significant segment of American public opinion vigorously 
expresses harsh criticism of the morality of our stand in 
another country, that criticism resounds throughout the 
world. As we are an open society, a moral society, committed 
to human rights at horne, attempts to suppress such criticism 
only serves to magnify it and, as we learned during the 
Vietnam era, the consequence can be to tear the country 
apart. 
We say to you today that any solution for the problems 
of Central America that continues to identify the United 
States with brutal repression is no solution at all. Far 
from it. It will not end the turmoil in the region. And the 
turmoil at horne may just be beginning. 
Americans are beginning to discover what is being done 
in our backyard by those whom we sponsor. The very creation 
of your Commission and the issuance of your report will 
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heighten awareness of what is being done. Either you will 
deal forthrightly with the terror in Central America or the 
information will emerge through attacks on the product of 
your Commission. The contradictions between our practice of 
human rights at home and our sponsorship of repression nearby 
will emerge more clearly. The consequences of increased 
awareness of those contradictions are, no doubt, as apparent 
to you as they are to us. 
Having stated our view that we believe that our national 
security would be enhanced by our identification with the 
cause of human rights for the people of Guatemala and El 
Salvador, let me now turn to those who object that the human 
rights situation would not improve if we withdrew our 
sponsorship of those governments. 
- it is objected that, though those governments 
are terrible, the Marxist-Leninist governments 
that would take their place if the guerrillas 
prevail could be even worse. 
In answering that objection, it must first be 
pointed out that it is hard to conceive anything 
worse than the governments of El Salvador and 
Guatemala. Matters may well be so far gone in El 
Salvador that, without our support, a Marxist 
revolution will prevail. That seems far less 
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likely in Guatemala, but is is also a possibility. 
If that happens, it would certainly be undesirable. 
The human rights situation will be bad, but 
hardly worse. In recent years, only the Pol Pot 
regime of Cambodia may have murdered a larger 
proportion of its own population than the 
government of El Salvador. As for the government 
of Guatemala, we can only guess at how many Indians 
it has killed. Perhaps something worse is 
possible, but that possibility does not seem a 
compelling reason for us to support and identify 
ourselves with such murderous governments. 
- it is objected that regimes such as those in 
El Salvador and Guatemala, bad as they are, 
tend not to endure forever. Marxist-Leninist 
repression such as might take place if the 
guerrillas triumph, on the other hand, tends 
to be permanent. 
In my view, those who make this comment misread 
the history of Marxist-Leninist repression. 
There is nothing inherent in Marxism-Leninism 
which assures permanence. What maintained such 
repression in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981, was not 
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the system itself but Soviet tanks. Without 
those tanks, the systems would have been 
transformed. Geography makes it impossible 
for those tanks to play the same role in 
Central America. Accordingly, though 
repressive Marxist-Leninist regimes may emerge 
if the guerrillas triumph, their permanence is 
far from assured. 
- it is objected that, if the united States 
withdraws from El Salvador, there will be no 
restraint whatsoever on the armed forces and 
a bloodbath will follow. 
To this I can only respond that a bloodbath 
has been underway for four years and that the 
world holds us responsible for it. 
We are not asserting, of course, that identification 
with human rights is the only component of national security. 
We are asserting, however, that identification with human 
rights is an essential element of our national security. 
Though we have refrained from recommending to you 
economic programs for the region, there is one urgent human 
rights need that should be considered in any recommendation 
that you make. Whatever the United States does should take 
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into account the tragic situation of refugees and displaced 
persons in the region. In the past four years, at least ten 
per cent of the people in the region have been forced to flee 
their homes. The majority remain as displaced persons in 
their own lands. Others have fled to nearby lands, including 
the United States. For urgent humanitarian reasons, as well 
as for the stability of the region, their needs should loom 
large in any thinking that this Commission does about 
economic assistance. 
Increasingly, prominent voices are heard calling for a 
military solution to the problems of Central America. We 
note, particularly, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle's 
recent speech in Baltimore. In the view of Americas Watch, 
such a solution would only compound the disaster of the 
region. We call on you to reject a military solution and to 
endorse a human rights solution, both because it is right and 
because we believe that it would serve the interests of the 
United States. Nothing else would bring so much credit to 
the United States in Central America, in the rest of Latin 
America, in the world, and with the American people. We 
recognize that the United States is allied with repressive 
regimes in many parts of the world -- in Pakistan, in Turkey, 
in South Korea, and in the Philippines -- and that those 
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alliances dilute our claim to stand for human rights against 
Soviet totalitarianism. But the damage is far greater to us 
from our support for repressive regimes in Central America 
because our identification with those regimes is far greater. 
The world holds us directly responsible for their murders, 
their disappearances, their torture. American citizens also 
hold us responsible for their murders, their disappearances 
their torture. Unless we commit ourselves to a human rights 
solution, it is a responsibility we cannot evade. 
503. 
STATEMENT OF Dr. Roland H. Ebel, Tulane University 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission: 
I have been asked to comment before this commission on the 
structural changes I see taking. place in the political systems 
of Central America and indicate some of the implications for 
American policy that might be drawn from an understandin,g of 
these changes. 
I believe, and have so expressed myself in print, that the 
current problems in the region are part of a long-term process 
of change in the fundamental economic, social and political 
structures of the Central American nations. If this is true, 
it will require that the United States learn to live with and 
adjust to a constantly changing and evolving situation that may 
take a considerable period of time to work out. At the same 
time, we will be confronted with problems and crises of a m::>re 
immediate and short-term character. 
What is the nature of the fundamental socio-political 
change in Central America? Simply this: the past 10 years 
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have witnessed a breakdown in a particular soci-political system 
I have elsewhere termed the Central American city-state. 
The Central American city-state can, be described as a 
polity in which almost all of the elements of modern life are 
either physically concentrated in the capital city, or, if 
physically located in other parts of the country, are closely 
tied to it. 
The Central American city-state was marked by a number of 
particular characteristics. First of all, almost all of the 
essential features of modern life and the institutions which 
carry them out were concentrated in a single city~-usually 
the capital city. The bulk of industry, commerce, education, 
mass communications, government and artistic and cultural insti-
tutions were located in a single urban complex. These societies 
became dual societies -- not so much in a class sense (~lthough 
class divisions. were clearly mark~d) but mor~ importantly in a 
geographic. sense in that a culturally and socially modernized 
population was concentrated in a single urban complex while the 
.rural areas, which .contained the mc;jority of the population 
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and natural.resour.ces, served as a resevoir of labor and materfel 
for· the urban center. Second, these urban centers, which not 
on1y contained the more pri vile,ged segments of the population 
but also had the greatest potential for modernization and growth, 
were protected from the masses and mass demands by their.armed 
forces. Third, these modernizing urban centers were linked to 
each other and to the international economic and political 
system through the multinational corporations, charitable founda-
tions, and such regional organizations .as the Central American 
Common Market, the Central American Defense Council, the Central 
American Nutrition Institute, etc. Ultimately, of course, these 
linkages tied these city-states closely to the United States. 
Finally, this combination of a modernized urban core 
(protected by the military and receiving economic and technical 
inputs. from e~ternal industr'iai .· co:un.tries, .. coexisting with an 
underdeveloped periphery of peasants and t<;>wnsfold) produced 
the paradoxical mixture of stability and instabili'ty that 
characteriz'ed Central American politics unt~'l the late 1970's. 
On the one hand, these nations were subject to a seemingly 
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endless succession of strikes, demonstrations, coups and 
threatened coups. On the other hand, these polities were quite 
resistant to ·re,al social and economic change and evidenced a 
marked continuity in domestic poll.cy and international posture. 
These polities were stablized by regular infusions of capital, 
~echnology, managerial expertise and military support-- primarily 
from the United States. They were unsettled periodically by the 
political actions of the only partially integrated lower middle 
sectors living in the urban centers (school teachers, students, 
clerical workers, etc.) by the emerging trade unions (and, 
occasionally, carnpesino organizations), and by the political 
and economic rivalries of the elites. 
A variety of political mechanisms were used during the 
1960's and early 70's -- with a modicum of success -- in an 
attempt to achieve greater stability. These, in brief, were: 
1. A system of officially sanctioned (or "licensed") 
political parties which rotated power among competing urban 
civilian-military factions every four years. (Guatemala) 
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2. A system of limited opposition, in which certain 
parties were allowed to compete in politics as long as they 
accepted minority status. (El Salvador) 
3. A system of economic and political payoffs to middle 
and upper sectors groupsin exchange for political quiescence. 
(Nicaragua) 
4. Military populism by which the military sought to make 
common cause with mass organizations. (Honduras) 
5. Democratic reformism. (Costa Rica) 
The Central American city-state system, stabilized by these 
political mechanisms and supporte~ by the United States, reached 
the apogee of its development in the latter 1960's. In many 
respects they were quite successful. First, they created fairly 
flexible, resiliant and tough political systems that produced 
at least a tolerable level of stability in the region and 
avenues of participation for the more ambitious urban middle 
class groups. Second, they generated fairly rapid economic 
development and modernization. (Central America showed up better 
than the rest of Latin America on the economic indicators.) 
Third, the system enabled economic integration to proceed. 
The negative results were, o.f course, that these systems 
which provided growing affluence and participation for the urban 
middle sectors and elites, increaingly alienated the lower 
classes and accellerated .·their mobilization into .radical groups:; 
and also that these nations' dependency on .the international' 
economic system was increased ,thus making them less self suffi-
cient and more· vulnerable to .world· economic. crises. 
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By the early 1970's it became fairly evident that these 
political systems were rapidly losing their viability. Among 
the factors undermining them was economic g:x;owth itself. This 
growth, while improving urban living standards substantially, 
also created a much more diverse, multifaceted economy. Because 
of the importance of government 801 icy to the furtctioning of 
a modern economy,, political rivalries between major interest 
groups for control of the state increased considerably. The 
military, which .had often previously mediated conflicts between 
these groups and protected them against mass demands, became 
increasingly divided and drawn into intraelite contests for 
economic advantage and by opportunities for personal enrich-
ment. These alliances (or "mafias" as one Guatemalan political 
leader put it) of economic, military and party leaders often 
had a paramilitary arm which was responsible for the numerous 
assassinations of political leaders in that country during the 
1970's. 
A second factor -- the rapid mobilization of the masses --
also was largely the result of economic growth. Between 1961 
and 1978 export agriculture grew considerably. This came about 
largely by the application of modern technology to larger and 
larger tracts of land -- land which by usage and custom had 
been available to the compesino for subsistence farming. The 
problem of land seizure was compounded by the continued growth 
of population in the rural areas. For ~ile, the expansion of 
industrial employment in the urban centers absorbed the rural 
migrant and functioned as a safety valve for potential-rural dis-
content, thus serving to shield the city;...state from excessive 
mass demands. The "oil shock" of 1973, however, had a catas-
trophic effect upon the urban lower classes. Industrial 
growth was almost halved, while between 19.72 and 1974 inflation 
increased sixfold. The result was a drop in real.wages which 
has been fairly steady evetJ since. Trade union organization 
and militancy were a natural consequence of this situation, 
particularly since the downward trend in wages and standards 
of living among the urban working classes was accompanied by 
increases in literacy, organizational techniques, and modern 
communications •. 
Urban working class militancy was matched in the country-
side by the development of cooperatives, village improvement 
socieites and religious study groups, all of which tended to 
politicize the campesino. 
The third factor undermining the Central American city-
state was the reduction of economic and political supports from 
abroad. This was composed of a number of elements: the Soccer 
War which seriously disrupted intraregional trade and industrial 
growth; the rise in oil prices which launched a wave of double-
digit inflation; the drop in commodity prices which made it 
difficult for the urban centers to earn the foreign exchange 
necessary to pay for the goods on which their living standards 
were based; and u.s. human rights policy which greatly reduced 
military assistance to the nations of Central America. 
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Given the many elements at work underming the area's 
political systems, it is not surprising that the Machiavellian 
forces of conflict and insurrection became dominant during the 
1970's. With the exception of Costa Rica, the failure of the 
middle class democratic revolutions of the 1940's and 1950's to 
establ$~h the electoral process as the only legi~imate means 
of achieving power and to open meaningful participation in 
their nations' political life to the urban and rural lower 
classes, created a city-state system that would last for a 
period of time but ensured that the revolutionary process 
would continue in other, less democratic forms. By attempting 
to wall off the modern urban center from the countryside and 
from the urban lower classes as well, the middle class populists 
not only failed to create an electoral base large enough to 
control the politics of the city-state democratically, but also, 
in the process, created an alienated group that eventually 
would be large enough and strong enough to attack that state. 
Still, during the 1960's the industrial working class was suffi-
ciently optimistic about its future in the Central American 
ci ty-s tate to keep it from making common cause with its rural 
counterparts, thus dooming the guerilla foco strategy of the 
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1960's to failure. During the 1970's, however, the intensification 
of elite rivalries and the failure of the partY: systems in 
El Sal vader, Guatemala and Nicaragua to provide a viable .road to 
power pushed many sectors of the urban middle and working classes 
into making common cause with .each other a:nd .. with the revolu-
tionary groups based in the rural areas. 
It is the linkage of alienated urban groups with a poli-
ticized campesineato which pose the immediate critical threat 
to the Central American city-state. As long as urban groups 
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stick together they can probably protect the city-s~ate. However, 
when coalitions are formed between rural and disaffected urban 
groups, the system is in serious jeapordy. 
What can be said about the future of the Central American 
city-state? Two broad possibilities present themselves. The 
first is the replacement of the city-state by the nation-state. 
This could come about in at least two ways: by the Nicaraguan 
model, which involves the attempt to create a nation-state by 
the defeat of the city-state and its principal supporters; or 
by the Costa Rican model, which i·s based on the voluntary opening 
up of the city-state to the political participation of all 
sectors of the nation. (While not·imposs·ible, there is not a 
strong cultural foundation for the successful implementation 
of the Costa Rican solution in most of Central America.) 
A second possibility is .that the city-state will save 
itself by becoming a fully developed garrison state. The likli-. 
hood of this happening in countries like El Salvador or Guatemala 
depends on three factors: the loyalty of the military 'to 
the traditional city-state, the willingness of the United States 
to support and finance it, and whether the bulk of the middle 
class casts its lot with the insurectionaries (as in Nicaragua) 
or with the elite (as in El Salvador). 
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u.s. policy seems to be oriented toward the second course --
saving the. Cl.ty-state. In reactib'n .. 9-gainst .succ.essful. re'volu~ion 
in Nicaragua, its' strategy in the region se~ms largely to be 
dedica;ted to strengthening the three legs of the tripod of 
supports which have traditionally undergirded it: en'co.uraging 
elections (aimed at restoring some degree of consensus within 
the urban groups), the military defeat of guerilla forces (aimed 
at depoliticizing the masses), and economic and military assistance 
(aimed at propping up the modern urban sectors and giving the 
·ml.li tary the capability to protect them). Whether this stra-
tegy will be successful over the short term or not will depend 
on the future of the world economy and the tenacity of the Ameri-
can government and the various contending groups. In the 
meantime, the price of sustaining the Central American city-
state is the thousands of innocent lives lost and the millions 
of dollars of labor and resources destroyed by violence. 
What are the implications that can be drawn from the 
changes in the.socio-political structure of the area that I 
have just described? First of all, we may be able to protect 
the existing city-state system over the short run through 
economic, military and political support. However, it cannot 
be preserved over the long term because the forces undermining 
it are too strong. Thus, just defeating the insurrectionary 
movements militarily is not going to preserve the city-state 
nor will it automatically produce a viable nation-state. This 
can only be achieved through political, economic, and socialpoli-
cies hammered out by the nations .themselves. At the same time, 
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over-reliance on a military solution to the disintegration of 
the city-state system runs the risk of turning these nations 
into garrison states. Furthermore, if such a policy simply 
protects the current beneficiaries of this system,it will simply 
initiate another cycle of insurrection. 
A second implication that can be drawn from an understanding 
of the history and structure of these natioRs is that:.economic 
growth, if limited to the modernized urban centers·, is .no 
panacea either. We must help these nations ecomonically as 
'best :we can, '.but within· a ·context of ·.a broader distribution of 
national income.· Unfortunateiy,· it often takes a rather 
thorough shake-up in the national power structure rto bring this 
abOut~ I believe we. have to ·be prepared .to.:·~ive with .·this· 
possibility if we want to see viable nations ·eventually .emerge 
on the isthmus. 
Of course, this raises the knotty problem of how to deal with 
radical regimes which, while dedicated to forging viable nation-
states out of city-states, threaten to strengthen their ties 
with our enemies. Here I believe we must separate our immediate 
strategic interests from the long term political development of 
these nations. Regimes dedicated to achieving radical change 
within·their socieites are not an intrinsic threat to the u.s. 
However, when they become a military base that threatens the 
security of their neighbors or the United States, strong action 
on our part may be required. To date we have automatically 
tended to equate domestic political radicalism with threats to 
our security. Although the two problems are not entirely 
514. 
separable, they are sufficiently so that constantly to equate 
them will make it virtually impossible for us to deal adequately 
with the long ~erm processes currently underway to create viable 
nation-states in the a•rea. 
Relative to El Salvador, over the short term I believe 
we should continue to help protect 'that •nation's· city-state 
at least through the electoral period and probably for a reason-
able length of time thereafter. If a settlement cannot be 
reached electorally, · we should· be. prepared tp accept a _power 
sharing formula that respects the rights and protects the basic 
interests of all, parties. Power sharing enjoys a long tradi-
tion in Latin America and has been ·used successfully ih·-a 
number of countries to solve endemic civil war and inter-
necine conflict. As a matter of fact, El Salvador's political 
settlement of the 1960's ~-·a quasi-power sharing arrangment 
probably brought her the greatest· degree of social peace and 
economic development in the century. Over the long term, the 
United States must be prepared to accept the alignment of 
forces that comes out of whatever settlement is achieved 
while, at the same ~ime, making it clear that we will not tolerate 
the positioning of offensive weapons in the area. 
With respect to Honduras which, incidentally, has never 
become a fully developed C.i ty-state, our policy there runs the 
dual risk of converting a fragile democratic opening into a 
garrison state while, at the same time, provoking the Nicara-
guans into becoming more militarized than they might otherwise 
have been. We should continue to supply sufficient military 
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assistance to Honduras for its legitimate security needs, while at 
the same time, encouraging the efforts of friendly Latin 
American nations to find a means of achieving a wider regional 
settlement. 
With respect to Guatemala, we should insist that the 
Mejia regime make good on its promise to hold fair elections 
as the price for our continued support. The social changes 
taking place there are massive -- the growth of the middle 
class, the politicization of the Indian and the remarkable 
growth of Protestantism being the. mo.st nqticeal;>le. The 
Guatemalan city-state, as it is now st~uctured, will ultimately 
not survive these changes. At the same time, these social 
changes constitute .9- possible. ,!:)ocio.logical ·fou,ndp.ti.on for 
democracy. .The Guatemalans have had experience with el,ections, 
having: transferred power peacefully that way seven times 
since 1945. Of those, five have been ·reasonably hones~. .There 
is at least a 50-50 chance that ari electoral s,olution can work 
in that country. 
In conclusion, the difficult task facing this Commission 
is to develop a policy that clearly distinguishes between the 
short term and the long term requirements of these nations, 
between their internal and external behavior, and between the 
political wishes of the United States and our pressing security 
interests. A second task, and possibly its most important, is 
to help the American people understand it. 
* 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY 
Testimony of Professor Tom J. Farer* to be presented before the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 
September 29, 1983 
Professor Farer is a Fellow of The Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution, on leave from 
Rutgers University where he is Distinguished Professor of Law. 
Currently a member of the Inter-American CommissJon-on Human Rights, 
he served as its President from 1980-82. 
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I will not begin by indulging the amiable cliche about your 
unenviable task. By definition public men aspire to serve the nation by 
clarifying and prescribing policy. So do most academics. 
To call your task enviable is not to disparage its difficulties. 
Both the President and most of his critics have announced goals for the 
United States in Central America which are very difficult to reconcile. 
Indeed, as I wrote recently in the journa 1 Foreign Policy, if democracy, 
human rights, economic development and security objectives can be 
reconciled at all, it is only through yet more intensive intervention in 
the region's affairs, 11 for ends uncongenial to conservatives, by means 
unsettling to liberals, and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional 
conception of the national interest 11 • The enormous obstacles to 
reconciliation stem directly from the political, social and economic 
realities of Central America. 
Before trying to sketch those realities and to suggest their 
implications for national policy, I probably owe you a mercifully brief 
autobiographical note which will suggest the values and experiences in 
which my analysis is rooted. Nominated originally by the Ford 
Administration and renominated four years later by its Democratic 
successor, I have twice been elected by the Member-States of the OAS to 
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. From 1980-82 I served as 
the Commission's President, the first North American to be sele.cted by his 
colleagues for that post. The Commission consists of seven people, 
usually 1 awyers and often with a background in government and academic 
life, who are morally and 1 ega 11 y obligated to promote and enforce the 
human rights codified in relevant treaties and declarations, and to do so 
completely independently of the governments of which they are citizens. 
I am not telling tales out of school when I say quite frankly that in 
the eight years I have served, the Commission has represented a broad 
swathe of the Hemispheric political spectrum extending from the right to 
the center-left, a space as wide as that which separates the right and 
left wings of the Republican and Democratic Parties in this country. 
Despite our ideological differences, we have consistently achieved 
consensus about the situation of human rights in the many countries we 
have examined. In the course of the Commission's work I, myself, have 
visited Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; three times in the latter 
case. I have also been in Costa Rica several times on human rights 
matters. The present Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, Fernando Volio, was 
my colleague on the Commission from 1976-1979, and the Foreign Minister of 
Honduras, Dr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, was for a number of years a lawyer on 
our staff. 
II. 
~~hat are the principal characteristics of the political institutions 
and practices of the Central American countries? 
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At least unti 1 the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, one 
could usefully divide them into two categories: Costa Rica and the rest. 
Costa Rica was and remains an authentic political democracy. That 
democracy coincides with three other societal characteristics: the absence 
of a highly-concentrated pattern of land ownership; the absence of an 
institutionalized officer corps; and ethnically a rather homogeneous 
population. Since other countries with comparatively homogeneous 
populations--most notably Argentina--have not yet managed to produce a 
democratic political culture, I am inclined to discount albeit not to 
exclude that factor as an explanation of Costa Rica's achievements. The 
other two factors are in conjunction unique not only for Central America 
but for the whole of Latin America. Even individually they are remarkable. 
The dispersion of land ownership can be traced back to the colonial 
period. The elimination of the officer corps is a more recent 
phenomenon. In 1948 when political adventurers attempted to set aside 
constitutional and electoral restraints by calling in the country 1 s small 
armed forces, Pepe Figueras led a coalition of citizen-soldiers to 
military victory. They then consolidated civilian rule by choosing not to 
rep 1 ace the officer corps. They recognized that as they 1 i ved under the 
shadow of the United States, they lived as well under its protection from 
e.xternal attack. They recognized, in other 1-10rds, that historically the 
only real function for armed forces in Central America has been to foster 
social mobility for middle-class lads with a taste for violence and to 
repress challenges to the distribution of \vealth and pmver. Since there 
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already existed in Costa Rica a rather broad consensus that the 
distribution of values was not conspicuously unjust and since Figueres and 
his colleagues were determined to use the political process to promote 
consensus-building social justice, an officer corps represented to them a 
cluster of vices without compensating virtues. 
Costa Rica has a constabulary; but it is small, lightly armed, and 
its most senior officers are non-professional apolitical appointees who 
only expect to serve during the term of the President who appoints them. 
I don't want to idealize this country which is, after all, run by men 
not angels. There is poverty despite welfare programs unusually broad for 
a country at its per capita income level. There appears to be neglect of 
H not outright discrimination against the black minority which lives on 
the Atlantic Coast. I am not blind to blemishes, but after a decade 
llfting rocks in various Latin American countries to see what's crawling 
around underneath, I cannot he 1 p being deep 1 y impressed by the c i vi 1 i ty, 
the tolerance, the commitment to majoritarian democaracy and the fair 
application of the law and the aspiration to social justice which 
characterize Costa Rican political elites. 
Through bad management and bad luck, the country has been hard hit by 
the global recession. Some have criticised its politicians for spending 
prolifigately to provide a very modest measure of economic security for 
its middle and lower classes, as if political elites should be punitively 
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singled out for such atypical concern. Well, Costa Rica's financial 
condition is doubtless grave. But we find the same illness ill- countries 
whose leaders could never be accused of undue concern for the impact of 
their policies on ordinary people. 
We have discovered how hard it is to build democracy in the Third 
World. Her.e is one that has built itself. If there is a scintilla of 
truth to our claimed passsion for the spread of this political species, 
then we should do what is necessary to help Costa Rica through this 
difficult period. 
III. 
I turn now to Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Before the fall 
of Somoza, they had every ugly feature so notably absent from Costa Rica: 
brut a 1 and parasitic armed forces; heavy concentration of 1 and-ownership 
and, for that matter, all other forms of wealth and status; and 
corresponding political institutions and processes which hid the substance 
of tyranny behind the thin, mocking forms of constitutiona 1 democracy. 
While sharing those primal characateristics, they differed in some not 
inconsequential ways. 
If El Sal vader was the country of the fourteen fami 1 i es, Nicaragua 
was the country of only one. The Somoza family's acquisitive passions 
achieved their apogee in the person of Anastasio whose achievements gave 
new meaning to the term k 1 eptocracy, that is, government a.s theft. It 
appears that the opportunities for profit created by the disastrous 
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earthquake of 1972 which practically wiped out the City of Managua turned 
mere passion into mania. Of the tens of millions of dollars poured into 
the country by public and private philanthropies, few seem to have 
contributed to reconstruction. Arriving in Managua for the first time, I 
had to be reassured that I had arrived in Managua rather than the 
shattered remains of an extinct civilization grouped around the 
Intercontinental hotel. It is estimated that by the time he resigned and 
fled the country, Somoza contro 11 ed entities producing 25 percent of the 
·gross nat1onal product. Of course any such estimate would not take into 
account the thin line between the national and the family budget. 
During most of the Somoza family's 47-year rule, the country's 
business, land-holding and professional classes had either collaborated 
with the regime or formed a tolerated, conspicuously ineffectual 
opposition which, by participating in elections and serving in the 
National Congress, lent some credibility to what was in fact an electoral 
farce. But as Somoza's galloping greed discouraged foreign investment, 
distorted the economy (which nevertheless grew at a not unimpressive 
rate), and progressively concentrated in his hands capital assets and 
investment opportunities, the bulk of these classes united behind Pedro 
Chamorro who had for years been Somoza' s most courageous, effective and 
consistent opponent. By the time Chamorro's assasination lit this tinder, 
the regime had been reduced to the fam11y, its civilian retainers, and the 
National Guard. The Guard was nothing more than a private army owing 
allegiance not to the abstraction of the state but to Somoza himself. 
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Nicaragua was in effect a country occupied by a kind of Cosa Nostra. And 
the rising sparked by Chamorro•s death was nothing less than that rarist 
of phenomena, an authentic multiclass rebellion against a nominally 
indigenous group seen to be as alien as a foreign army of occupation. 
Since the revolution the Commission has, at the invitation of the 
government of Nicaragua, conducted two 11 0bservations in loco 11 • The first, 
carried out almost exactly one year after Somoza•s departure, led to a 
report presented to the 1982 General Assembly of the OAS. It dealt with 
all aspects of the post-revolutionary condition of human rights. 
In June of 1982 I was member of a sub-commission which made a third 
visit, this time focused on the situation of the Miskito Indians. The 
report stemming from this last visit and a related one carried out in 
Honduras at the main refugee camp is still confidential because in the 
interim, at _the request of the Nicaraguan Government, the Commission has 
been attempting to arrange a friendly settlement of the complaints made 
against the Government by various Miskitos. 
I wi 11 be happy to answer questions about my observations of human 
rights conditions if you deem them relevant to your inquiries. Of course 
I think they are. But since the time for this initial presentation is 
limited and since I anticipate some of you will in fact wish to pursue the 
human rights question, let me refer briefly to several aspects of the 
Nicaraguan situation which you might not elicit through questions and 
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which are clearly relevant to the optimal shape of U.S. policy toward this 
country. 
First, I have been told not only by high officials of the present 
government but also by members of the credible opposition that the 
Sandinistas do in fact wish to preserve a private sector. They grudgingly 
recognize the need for its managerial and entrepreneurial skills. What, 
it seems to me, they have not vwrked out in their own minds is how to 
maintain an effective private sector while attempting to deny it political 
influence. The recent history of Brazil and Chile demonstrate, if 
demonstration were needed, that a vigorous private sector can coexist very 
cheerfully with harsh authoritarian government. But those governments did 
not have among their central political projects the promotion of equality 
and mass welfare and the political isolation of what the Sandinistas would 
call the "bourgeois classes ... 
Second, the Sandinista leadership is for the most part insular and 
inexperienced. These are generally quite young men and women with little 
direct knowledge of the world beyond Central America. For them the United 
States is personified by generations of U.S. ambassadors who hobnobbed 
with Somoza and of U.S. officers who provided technical assistance to 
Somoza•s goons. Conversely, they have a romantically-colored view of the 
~oviet Union and Cuba. 
But thirdly, despite being at the outset besotted with a naive, 
~1arxist conception of the universe and despite their provincialism not 
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always untainted by arrogance, they apparently have begun to discover the 
complexity not only of the outer world, but of their native land. For 
instance they apparently have stopped seeing the United States as a 
monolith driven by a Procrustean passion to shape every nation into a cog 
in a single vast capitalist machine. 
They also have begun to learn that Nicaragua is not Cuba. In Cuba at 
the time of Castro's accession landless laborers on the sugar estates were 
numerically predominant in the countryside. Castro could win their 
support without setting them up as successful, independent farmers. In 
Nicaragua, hmvever, even peasants who worked on estates usually had a 
little land. After the revolution they hoped for more. Driven by 
ideology alone, determined not to produce what they saw as a Kulak class 
of comfortable, organized and politically potent farmers, the Sandinist 
leadership refused to solve the minifundia problem. And it added injured 
pocketbooks to crippled hopes by suppressing the price of food produced by 
sma 11 farmers for Nicaragua's urban markets. As a result the wealthy 
ex-Somoc i stas in Key Biscayne and the ex-Guardia officers who run the 
"contras" have been able to recruit cannot fodder from among this 
embittered peasantry. Of course the great majority are not involved in 
the fighting . But like all similarly circumstanced farmers, they fight 
back by cutting back production. Momentum for land reform finally seems 
to be building with the Sandinist leadership. Probably from its 
perspective this is only a tactical step. But such a tactical step v1ill 
create pm~erful obstacles to the later socialization of agriculture. ~1y 
pri.mary point, however, is that ideological hallucination is yielding in 
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various areas to the educative force of experience. One can strike 
pragmatic inter-state deals with pragmatists. With fanatics there is no 
hope. 
Fourth, at least as of the time of my last visit and <according to my 
sources) even today in the midst of war, the country itself is still very 
accessible, almost transparent, and its political, social and economic 
institutions still in flux. 
Fifth, it clearly is the intention of the Sandinist Government to 
educate and mobilize into heightened political awareness and permanent 
political participation the great mass of the population which, until the 
assassination of Pedro Chamorro, was essentially passive, excluded and 
miserably poor. The Sandinistas presumably assume that in doing so they 
will facilitate perpetuation of their regime. My own assessment is that a 
mobilized, politically-aware population will not for long submit to 
government by junta, even a junta which enjoys the glamour of military 
victory and employs egalitarian rhetoric. 
This is a Catholic country; and it is a country with only a very 
small cadre of ideologically-committed activists. And even within the 
_cadre one senses considerable disparity in political vision as vtell as 
£ompeting ambitions. And it is a cadre without the resources or the 
skills required to make a centrally planned and managed and autarkic 
economy function. The need to relate to the international economy, to 
export to and import from capitalist countries and to encourage investment 
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will reenforce domestic pressures for a more pluralistic regime. But for 
the time being these forces cutting against the sustained cen-tralization 
of power are offset by the regime•s ability to invoke national pride and 
-intense fear of the old National Guard which is the backbone of the 
military force we have armed, payed and organized to oppose the Sandinista 
government. Paradoxically, the economic sanctions organized by the Reagan 
Administration also play into the hands of the most extreme Sandinistas; 
for they deprive the economy of almost all essential goods other than the 
ones the regime itself controls, and it justifies that control. Obviously 
monopoly control of food and heating oil and other necessities facilitates 
the regime's efforts to mobilize people into the militia and the civilian 
mass organizations. 
I think that one root of present policy is a theologically 
pessimistic assumption about the natural course of left-wing revolutionary 
regimes, in particular about their ability to perpetuate themselves 
without evolving into more participatory political orders. In light of 
the many paths left-wing authoritarian regimes have followed after their 
birth, I believe that assumption is unwarranted. 
IV. 
If one is interested in examples of stable, authoritarian rule, one 
need only take the brief boat trip across the narrow Gulf of Fonseca to El 
Salvador where a political and social order established several centuries 
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earlier during the colonial era remained essentially uncha-nged until 1979 
when a coup d'etat organized by younger officers offered the first promise 
of fundamental change. Independence from Spain had simply meant that the 
handfull of landowning families could rule undisturbed by Spanish 
bureaucrats, and had to use il home-gro'lm army rather than Spanish troops 
as their instrument for repressing and disciplining the peasant masses. 
As the World Bank has noted, among the several great pools of poverty 
in the world, Latin America is distinguished by its intense concentration 
of land holding. But even in an area where concentration is the norm, El 
Salvador's concentration was remarkable. 
You know, of course, that the officers who led the 1979 coup, having 
coopted leading members of the democratic political opposition to the new 
government, announced a sweeping land reform. This remarkable break with 
the past occurred precisely 3 months after the collapse of the Nicaraguan 
National Guard and was timed to coincide with the release of our 
Commission's Report on human rights in El Salvador, a report known by the 
El Salvadoran armed forces to be extremely critical. Our earlier report 
on the Somoza regime had, according to Somoza himself, been one of the 
factors leading him to conclude that his regime was doomed. Aside from 
this circumstant1al evidence my conversations with civilians who 
participated in the post-coup government confirm that the dominating force 
behind the coup was not moral regeneration through divine intervention, it 
Vias fear, fear that \-Jhat had happened in Nicaragua could happen in El 
Salvador: If the United States \.vere passive, the armed forces could be 
defeuted by rebels enjoying broad support. 
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The land reform, together with the nationalization of finance and 
exporting companies, was designed to win the approval of the United 
States, to appease peasant hosti 1 i ty and to break the po 1 i ti ca 1 power of 
an oligarchy rigidly hostile to social reform. But all of these steps 
were designed ultimately to preserve the military as an institution, a 
self-perpetuating autonomous force, a state within the state. Inside the 
armed forces there may have been, perhaps there still are a few 
idealists. As a rule, however, idealists would not be much attracted to 
an institution which had stolen the prior two Presidential elections, 
massacred unarmed supporters of the defrauded candidates, and was the 
notoriously corrupt instrument of a tiny oligarchy. 
Hhat has become evident in the disilusioning years since 1979 is that 
the principal division within the armed forces was between those who 
believed that they could best survive through reform and those who 
believed that massacre, a time-tested means, could continue to work. For 
me the most significant fact about the post-1979 years is that the 
diminished momentum of social reform coincides almost perfectly with the 
election of the Reagan Administration which even before it assumed office, 
had a 1 ready sent messages throughout Latin America that lt was 
unconditionally committed to the defense of all right-wing regimes. The 
fundamental dilemma of policy in El Salvador, or, for that matter, in 
Guatemala is how can we hope to reform systems of power which seem 
responsive only to the threat of their destruction, v1hen we begin by 
guaranteeing their survival. 
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The only semblace of a theory I have heard consistently articulated 
is that by training the officer corps our own officers will somehow 
inculcate them with democratic values. If public, pundits and politicians 
were not so amnesiac tn this country, the collective respons~ to this 
assertion would be a yawn of deja vu. In the early days of the Kennedy 
Administration I was responsible for the presentation of the military 
assistance program to Congress. Those were the days of the A 11 i ance for 
Progress with its theme of providing a shield behind which, under our 
prodding, the Latin Governments would somehow reform themselves. And one 
point I wrote regularly into the pesentation books for Latin America was 
the tremendous capacity we enjoyed for imparting democratic values to 
decidedly undemocratic military officers. 
Did I have a theory about how this might occur? Had I even bothered 
to investigate which officers with what sorts of ideas and using what 
means were carrying out this training? Of course not. It was just a 
well-intentioned slogan, although I don't think I quite appreciated it at 
the time. 
Since then I have had occasion to talk with Latin graduates of our 
training schools and with U.S. military men who know something about the 
programs. And I can assure you, gentlemen, that the inculcation of 
democratic va1ues does not rank high on the list of training priorities. 
On the contrary. Programs, to the extent they have an ideological 
content, reenforce the view instinct in Latin security forces that the 
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communists are everywhere, insinuating their way into every social 
institution. concealing themselves as reformists. And the milltary is 
therefore encouraged to develop total responses. National security 
b.ecomes a fig 1 eaf for mi 1 i tary efforts to dominate or destroy every 
institution which threatens the status quo. 
Would anything change if you sent me down to give lectures on human 
rights and democracy? Only on the implicit theory that these chaps we are 
training are fools who do not know what is in their interest. If only 
they v1ere more professional, if only they were au courant with modern 
methods of interrogation and sophisticated rules of engagement, I've heard 
it said, they would stop busting the skulls of babies, raping their 
mothers and castrating before garroting their fathers. 
What an arrogant and cheap delusion. Most of the Latin American 
military men <not to mention Right-Wing civilians) I have spoken to in 
countries where violations of human rights are epidemic are perfectly 
rational men led by experience to conclude that as their own objectives 
become progressively incongruent with the demands of an increasingly 
mobilized civilian population, ever more extreme forms of intimidation are 
required to maintain the essentials of the status quo, above all to 
maintain the dominant role of the armed forces and of the agro-industrial 
oligarchy on which they rely to make the economy work. 
Another conceivable theory justifying U.S. assistance to armies 
dedicated to their own hegemonic role is that somehow, someday, if 
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econom1c growth persists and the middle class expands, Central American 
states will duplicate the experience of Northern Europe and North America 
in producing welfare democracies and armies subject to civilian control. 
This is a very pretty idea. It could happen, but not I think unless these 
societies first undergo changes which go to the institutional roots of the 
status quo. In brief, I propose that producing reasonably just, stable 
and democratic systems in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras too 
requires changing basic institutions. Those changes, including the 
reduction and transformation of the armed forces, in that they constitute 
changes in bedrock features of those societies are literally "radical". 
If they were to occur, then after the event one would say: "These 
countries have experienced a revolution. 11 I see no signs that the U.S. is 
prepared to manage it. 
I imagine that some of you, citing cases like Peru in the late 
1960's, Turkey in the era of Ataturk or even Egypt's Nasser might wonder 
why such nationalist reformer~ have not emerged as dominant military 
leaders in Central America. Paradoxically, the one clear case of such a 
phenomenon occurrred in a country which in the past 30 years has become a 
synonym for state terror in the service of the status quo. I refer, of 
course, to Guatemala. Even conservative, circumspect Latin diplomats and 
lawyers and politicians refer privately to the typical Guatemalan officer 
and his .:ivilian political allies as "savages", men with an unparalleled 
instinct for butchery. The extent of that butchery--indiscriminate murder 
and unspeakable torture of professors, priests, students, labor leaders, 
politicians, or anyone who questioned the existing order is recounted in a 
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report of the Inter-American Commission covering the Lucas era. A report 
on the Rios Montt period will be published shortly. No doubt there will 
be a third. s i nee as awful as was the behaviour of the armed forces during 
Rios Montt's ascendancy, he nevertheless took a few hesitant steps in the 
direction of institutional change. Now he has been replaced by officers 
who are the old companions of General Lucas and in many cases tied to the 
pro-fascist parties of the political right. 
Where are the reformers in Guatemala? They emerged in the early 
1940's. A reformist faction in the armed forces backed the distinguished 
civilian leader, Juan Jose Arevalo. He served a presidential term, 
initiated reforms in land tenure and the conditions of rural labor and was 
succeeded by a military officer, Jacobo Arbenz. The single largest 
landowner in the country was United Fruit. Its old lawyer, John Foster 
Dulles, by now Secretary of State, cynically or otherwise accepted United 
Fruit's charge that Arbenz was a communist, and set about organizing his 
overthrow. The CIA coordinated the successful effort. It led in turn to 
a purge of reformist officers who had backed Arbenz. A second purge 
occurred in 1960 when cadets and some younger officers, their nationalism 
inflamed by the use of Guatemalan soil by the CIA for training the force 
which would soon invade Cuba, staged a coup. And that coup might well 
have succeded if the rebe 1 s had not been bombed and strafed by p 1 anes 
flown by Cuban participants in the forces undergoing training. Officers 
who survived were purged. Some including two outstanding men trained by 
the U.S. went into the hills and formed the first, guerrilla movements. 
Aided by us the Government launched the first of its counter-insurgency 
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campaigns using the time-honored tactics of massacring the peasant 
population in the areas of guerrilla operations. In Guatemala, the more 
things change, the mqre they remain the same. 
The situation in Guatemala underscores the pernicious illusion that 
elections equal democracy and legitimacy. Elections are, of course, a 
necessary condition of democratic government; but even the meagerest 
experience in Central and, for that matter, South America reveals that 
they are by themselves insufficient. One of the reasons my Commission has 
consistently rejected invitations to observe elections is our realization 
that we could do 1 ittle more than assure that the ballots were counted 
accurately. Yet we know that in the social, economic and political 
conditions obtaining in many countries, the ways of fixing the outcome of 
elections are as diverse as any other product of the human imagination. 
In the past several decades the self perpetuating military government 
of Guatemala has generally resorted to the cruder methods of open 
thievery, in essence announcing the result deemed appropriate. But in 
today's conditions a fair election could not be conducted even if ballots 
were counted with i mpeccab 1 e care. Why? Because during the past decade 
the armed forces and paramilitary agents of right-wing political groupings 
working in conjunction with various military factions have beheaded or 
crippled where they have not annihilated the intermediate institutions of 
the center and left: political parties; trade unions; peasant 
cooperatives; grass roots organizations of the Catholic Church; the 
professoriat; student groups. When one of Guatemala's most distinguished 
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diplomats, Dr. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, a former Foreign Minister of the 
Country, attempted several years ago to register a new party, he was 
allowed this privilege. And for his pains a few days later he was 
e-xecuted in broad daylight not far from the Presidential Pal ace. t-A,anue 1 
Co l6n Argueta, the former mayor of Guatemala City and another figure 
around whom moderate reformers might have coalesced was similarly gunned 
down. 
f~hen I met with Christian Democratic leaders in Guatemala City about 
a year ago, I asked them how they proposed to achieve the political 
integration of the country's Indian majority. We have tried, they told 
me. We sent party members into the Indian centers. ~e used both Ladinos 
and Indians as our representatives. Some were butchered; the survivors 
fled. Our incipient networks were thus broken. 
I anticipate that within a year elections will be held in Guatemala. 
1-lithout doubt the fascist parties of the right, we 11-funded, we 11 armed 
and organicallly connected to the armed forces will win. Should the U.S. 
then announced that 11 Democracy 11 has triumphed in Guatemala? 
Let me cone 1 ude with a word on Honduras, a country whose evo 1 uti on 
illustrates the tragic consequences of the policies we are pursuing in the 
name of democracy. On the one hand, Honduras js by far the most 
underdeveloped country in Centra 1 America. ~~hen I last looked its per 
capita income was the lowest in the Caribbean basin with the exception of 
Haiti. It was also widely perceived as the country for which the term 
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"banana republic" was conceived; not only or even primarily because of its 
dependence on this export crop, but rather because of its passive almost 
sycophantic relationship with U.S. interests controlling the growth and 
export of bananas. 
On the other hand, by comparison with their counterparts in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Somoza's Nicaragua, the Honduran military seemed 
benign. It tolerated the development of trade unions among its very small 
working class and of peasant unions as well. It at least dialogued with 
representatives of the poorer classes. It did not treat every effort to 
organize the lower classes as a threat to be liquidated forthwith. It 
even began a trickle of land reform. And in the wake of revelations that 
the successor to United Fruit had paid the then President, a general of 
course, a huge bribe in order to avoid the export tax on bananas, a group 
of younger officers forced the thief's resignation and quickened the pace 
of reform. 
Prodded by the middle class and the trade unions, and pushed as well 
by the Carter Administration, the armed forces finally resolved to restore 
civilian government. Full-fledged democracy was a bit much for them to 
S\-lallow. They manipulated the party registration laws to hamstring the 
Christian Democratic Party, since they regarded it as too reformist and 
uncontrollable. And they allowed the liberal candidate, Roberto Suazo 
Cordoba, to J.S sume offl ce on 1 y after he had agreed not to exercise his 
Constitutional power to replace officers whose commitment to civilian rule 
was doubtful. Neverthelesss, our Commission and everyone else in the 
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Hemisphere who we 1 comes the spread of democracy fe 1 t a surge of optimism 
about the future of Honduras. 
Optimism is dead. It is now evident that all major policy decisions 
in Honduran society--decisions about the budget, about foreign and defense 
pol icy--are made by a national security counci 1 under the control of 
General Alvarez. The civilian regime is now a facade. When you take a 
country with a long tradition of profound psychological dependence on the 
United States, a country without any tradition of mi 1 i tary subordination 
to civilian rule, a country with a small middle class and a still 
essentially passive peasantry; a country that is miserably poor. When the 
U.S. takes such a country and pours resources into the hands of an 
ambitious general and lends him the prestige of being our point man for 
Central American policy, the U.S. is· gutting the promise of civilian 
rule. It is doing more than that. Civilian government and the brief 
flowering of hope created a wi 11 to resist.. Genera 1 A 1 varez and the 
industrial interests with whom he is linked and with some support from the 
Moonies has been moving to crush incipient resistance. Opponents of 
Alvarez, critics of his policy of allowing Honduras to become a U.S. base 
for open and clandestine mi 1 itary operations, have already been 
threatened. There have been beatings and some disappearances. The 
~ciety is polarizing. And soon not even the fragile tradition of 
'dialogue will remain to commemorate a once hopeful experiment. 
I have not painted a pretty picture. ~~hat else could I do, being 
wedded as I am to the ethics of realism. 
v. 
It is fashionable in some circles to blame external forces for 
C-entral America's convulsi,ons. External forces have played an important 
role; but the main extern,al force is not military and communist; it is 
economic and capitalist. During the two decades ending in the late 1970's 
ripples from the dynamic centers of world capitalism coursed through 
Central America, helping tme region's states experience a novel period of 
sustained high growth. While a good deal of the resulting \'lealth passed 
through Central America lt.ke a dose of salts ending up in t·11ami, Geneva 
and other developing areas, growth did, nevertheless, expand the middle 
and industrial working classes. While it vastly increased the wealth of a 
few and modestly enhanced the income of a considerably larger number, its 
net effect on the poorer c 1 as ses--60-to-80 percent of the population in 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador--varied from marginal 
enhancement to absolute deprivation. Rapid growth meant inflation which 
is disastrous for those wlthout the means and 1 ever age to keep ahead of 
price increases. And rapid growth encouraged the rationalization of 
agricultural enterprise through the substitution of machinery and wage 
labor for tenant farmers. When the appetite for profit maximization 
penetrates less-developed areas it leads also to extra-legal land seizures 
by officers and oligarchs in control of the state machinery. 
As it displaces peasants and mutilates their time-honored 
expectations and as it expands the middle classes in countries \1here 
officers and oligarchs treat their perquisites as if they were holy 
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relics, growth generates revolutionary pressure. If this is disturbing to 
persons ready to sacrifice every American ideal on the altar of stability, 
it should be good news for those who welcome the proliferation of 
democracies. For what growth has accomplished in conjunction with the 
spread of the idea of human rights, thanks in part to the efforts of the 
Catholic Church, is to create the class and ideological materials 
requisite for building democracy. But it cannot be built by reenforcing 
the men and the institutions consecrated to channeling change within 
obsolet-e and anti-democratic forms. It can be built only by fracturing 
the old order of things. To fracture it we must present its defenders 
with the alternatives of change and defeat. The authoritarian left is our 
principa1 lever against the authoritarian right. 
As I have argued elsewhere, traditionally conceived national security 
interests do not require our involvement in Central America•s civil wars. 
Our military, economic and political weight enables us to impose a pax 
Finlandia on Nicaragua and any other Marxist regimes which may emerge. 
Traditional notions of security require only that such regimes deny 
military faci 1 i ties of any kind to extra-conti nenta 1 powers and do not 
invade their neighbors. However, if for idealistic reasons we wish to do 
more than national security requires, then we must act like a great po'rter. 
The place to begin is with language itself. As we use 1--t today, 
"non-intervention" means intervention to guarantee the survival of an 
obsolete class of rulers. As building blocks for democracy the armed 
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forces of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are about as adequate as 
their Polish counterpart. As long as we deceive ourselves with this sort 
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One of the key factors leading to the present situation in Central America is the high rate of population growth in 
the countries in the region. In most of these countries nearly half the population is made up of children under 15 years of 
age. Each year the number of these young people entering the labor force has exceeded the number of jobs the 
economies can provide. The numbers of the under-and unemployed have continually increased. Partly because of the 
systems of land tenure, but largely because of rapidly growing numbers of young people, there h:1s been and is a swelling 
flow from the rural to the urban areas. It has been impossible to build the necessary infrastructure of water supply, 
sewerage, streets, housing and administration. The numbers without real jobs have increased. Without adequate job 
opportunities, many of these young people constitute a potential source of political and economic instability. Many 
others contribute to the pool of migrants moving north to Mexico or the United States. 
A prompt and determined action to reduce birth rates would help alleviate these destabilizing demographic trends. 
This is an analysis by The Futures Group, under a contract with the Agency for International Development, to 
illustrate the exponential growth of the populations of the Central American Countries and its effects on the economic 




1. POPULATION GROWTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
The high fertility in past decades has produced very large annual increases in the number of children born. The 
reduction in mortality has led to a rapid annual increase in population. Over the past 50 years, the population of about 5 
million in 1930 has quadrupled to more than 20 million. 
If the present annual increase of nearly 3% should continue, the population of Central America would double in only 
23 years. 
Year Pop_ulation 
1930 pop. 5,342,000 
1940 - 6,424,000 
1950 - 8,270,000 
1960 - 11' 190,000 
1lJ/O - 15,277,000 
1980 - 20,696,000 
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2. POPULATIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
The populations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1980 and, as estimated, in 1983: 
1980 1983 
Costa Rica 2,213,000 2,400,000 
El Salvador 4,797,000 4,700,000 
Guatemala 7,262,000 7,900,000 
Honduras 3,691,000 4,100,000 
Nicaragua 2,733,000 2,800,000 
Total Population 20,696,000 21,900,000 
Source: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries: 
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3. TOTAL FERTILITY RATES, BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, 1930-1980 
Population growth is the result of changes in fertility, mortality and migration. 
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is the number of children born alive to the average woman during her 
reproductive life, is particularly important. It was exceptionally high during the 1930-1965 period. It has now dropped 
but is still high at an average of 5.6 for the region. 
The· Birth Rate (the number of children born per 1000 in the population) has been at a high rate even for developing 
countries until the late 1960s when economic and social development and the beginnings of family planning programs 
began to reduce it in some countries -particularly in Costa Rica. 
The Death Rate (deaths per 1,000 in the population) has declined more rapidly, particularly as a result of reductions 
of deaths of infants and young children. In 1930 it was 22.2 per 1000. By 1980 it had dropped to 8.6 per 1000. 
The Natural Rate of Increase (NRI) is the difference between the birth rates and the death rates. In Central 
America the NRI increased to 1970 when it began to diminish slightly. The current rate is approximately 3% per year. 
Migration is a component of population change. Iri Central America migration has increased in importance in 
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4. AGE DISTRIBUTION AND CHILD DEPENDENCY- COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES 
The age distribution of a population is as important in relation to economic and social development as changes in 
size. High fertility, producing numerous births, and decreasing infant and child mortality, generate a population with a 
high percentage of chiid dependents, children under the age of 15. 
Central America with a high total fertility rate of 5.6 (Honduras has 6.5) and a diminished mortality rate, has a 
very high child dependency rate - about 45% of the population is under the age of 15 in contrast to about 23% in the 
United States. 
In Central America for every 100 adults of economically productive age there are about 90 children to be supported 
and educated. A developed country typically has two to three adults of economically productive age for each dependent 
child. 
This difference in age distribution between Central American countries and the typcial industrialized country 
makes a very large difference in the portion of its economic output that each country is required to use for caring for 
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For each dependent child in Central America there is only about one working- age adult. 




5. MOMENTUM OF POPULATION GROWTH 
In countries where· there has been a high fertilty rate for a number of years, there is an enormous built-in 
momentum of population growth. 
Each year as an age group of women moves out of their reproductive years, a younger group two to three times as 
numerous enters their reproductive years. The succeeding age groups of children already born who will reach 
reproductive age in each of the next fifteen years or so will be even larger. 
Even if by some dramatic change in fertility, starting to-day the women of this under 15 age group would have, on 
the average, only two children during their reproductive life, the population would continue to grow for another 40 years 
or so and would not level off until it had almost doubled. 
Even though each woman would be having an average of only two children, there would be many more young women 
so that more children would be born every year than older people would die. The number of persons born every year 
would continue to exceed the number dying for about 40 years or until these children- in smaller numbers- also passed 
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6. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE BIRTHS 
Actual numbers of births are of course the basic generators of population growth. Future births can be calculated 
from anticipated or assumed future fertility levels. For this analysis projections of future births are made under several 
such assumptions. Three different assumptions are used to show the effects of population factors in Central America: 
A High fertility continued: 
A Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 5.6 in 1980, reduced to 4.7 by 2000 and 4.4 by 2010. 
B A 3-child average attained by 2000 (and 2.55 by 2010). 
C A 2.1-child average attained by 2000 and continued. 
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7. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH 
Using the same three assumptions of future fertility levels as in projecting future births, and considering a future 
rise in longevity from 60.1 in 1980 to 65.7 in 2000 and 67.7 in 2010, it is possible to project future population growth as 
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8. PROJECTIONS OF AGE DISTRIBUTION 
As pointed out in Unit 4, above, age distribution is as important a factor in population as actual numbers. The 
differences in future age distribution with high fertility continued and with lower future fertility rates are very 
significant. 
With high fertility continued, as shown on the left-hand chart, the ratio between the numbers of people of 
economically productive age and the child dependents will remain roughly the same. 
With lower fertility, as shown on the right-hand chart, the ratio of people of economically productive age to the 
child dependents would quickly improve. By 2030, the population age pyramid will be essentially the same as for a 
developed/industrialized country. This change is the result of reduction in fertility and is an essential element of the 
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9. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE OF ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE AGE-- PAST 
The group of young people becoming 15-19 years of age is potentially the most volatile in the population of a 
country. They contain the group of young people entering the labor market each year seeking jobs. They also contain 
the largest group of young couples marrying and beginning their families. They are the group who, if unsuccessful in 
finding jobs or in obtaining the social equity they believe is due them constitutes a potential source of political and 
economic instability. 
With the high fertility levels of the past, this 15-19 age group has grown very rapidly. It has increased from 





























10. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE OF ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE AGE-- FUTURE 
In 1980 there were 2,274,000 young people 15-19 years of age. With high fertility continued, the numbers of young 
people moving into this potentially volatile age group each year will continue to increase dramatically. 
With lowered fertility, the growth will continue for 15-20 years because the children are already born who will 
enter this critical age group in the future. Thereafter, however, the reduced fertility rates will result in significantly 
smaller numbers entering this age group each year. 
The differences between the numbers in the 15-19 year age groups under an assumption for high fertility continued 
and for a 3-child family average attained by 2000 can be seen in the charts below. If fertility continues its present 
modest declining trend (Projection A), the 15-19 age group will grow to over 5 million youths by the year 2010.' With a 
three-child average family by 2000 (Projection B), the young adult cohort will have about 4 million in 2010, or one million 
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Urban areas are growing rapidly both in numbers and in percent of the population in all developing countries. This 
is particularly true in Central America. 
In 1950, of the 8.3 million population about 1.7 million, or 21% were in towns or cities over 10,000. By 1980, of 
the nearly 21 million population, about 8.5 million or 41% were in urban areas. This urban growth has been augmented by 
substantial migration from the rural areas. The rate of urban growth during these 30 years was about 6.5%, or twice the 
rate of the country as a whole. 
By 2000, of the 37 million total population if high fertility is continued, 19.5 miHion or 61% will live in cities. Of 
that number about 13 million will have been born there and 6.5 million will have moved there. These increases will 
produce urban growth rates of about 4.5%, much higher than the overall growth rate •. 
The very rapid urban growth has already put a heavy burden on cities to provide the basic requirements of streets, 
water, sewers, houses, transportation and administration. This task will become even more difficult with the much 
larger numbers in the future. 
Emigration 
Legal emigration from Central America to the U.S. has grown tremendously over the past 30 years from about 2000 
per year in the early 1950s to over 16,000 in 1980. 
With the very large increases projected both for the size of the labor force and for the number of unemployed in 
future years, Central Americans who are unsuccessful in finding work will have two options: remaining unemployed or 
migra_ting to other more prosperous countries in search of work. 
The numbers of clandestine entries into the U.S. every year is unknown. However, in the light of Mexican data, an 
estimate of one illegal for every legal immigrant seems quite conservative. This suggests that the proportion of 
immigrants to the labor force is about 0.5% per year. With the anticipated growth in unemployment;-an increase in 
mlg~ants to 1% of the labor force per year in the near future is highly possible. Thus, some 100,000 potential immigrants 
per year is a distinct possiblity. The actual number will of course be determined as much by the policies of the United 
States as by the pressures from Central America. 
With lower fertility the future size of the labor force and of the unemployed and underemployed while still growing 
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12. NEW JOB REQUIREMENTS- IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
A primary objective in each of the countries of Central America is to increase employment and to reduce 
unemployment and underemployment. High population growth makes this objective increasingly difficult to achieve. 
The new job requirements each year are mostly needed by the young people of the 15-19 year age group who are 
seeking to enter the labor force. In the year 1960 the new jobs needed were about 90,000. In 1970 the number was 
140,000. In 1980 it was 190,000. New jobs required in future decades will be as indicated in the chart. Increased efforts 
started now to reduce fertility will make little difference until after 199 5 because the children who will be entering the 
labor market up to that time are already born. However, a reduction in fertility started now would make a substantial 
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13. NEW JOB REQUIREMENTS - IN URBAN AREAS 
The movement of people from the rural areas into the urban areas seeking jobs makes the requirements for jobs in 
the urban areas increase more rapidly than for the region as a whole. The lack of productive jobs and the resulting 
unemployment and underemployment contribute to more serious social instability. Under these circumstances: 
o It is impossible for nations to attain their objectives of reasonably equitable distribution of income 
for their peoples. 
o The number of people and families in poverty continues to increase. 
o Many of them are unable to live decent human lives. 
o Many may resort to crime or become easy victims of radical and violent movements of right or left. 
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14. INVESTMENT REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE TO CREATE NEW JOBS 
As Central America's labor force grows, the region's economy must expand to help create new employment. 
Investments are key to economic expansion and consequently to new job creation. At present, Central American nations 
should be investing about 5 billion dollars annually to produce the economic expansion necessary to absorb a labor force 
increasing at over 3% yearly. Central American nations are not able to invest this amount of money, and consequently 
un- and underemplyoment has risen. 
By examining the relationships among national investments, GDP and labor force growth rates, it is possible to 
estimate future investments required and available to accommodate new job seekers. This estimate is accomplished by 
using a savings rate of 15% of GDP and an incremental capital output ratio of 3.5%. By the year 2000, there will be 
major differences in investment needs under our three population growth projections. By 2010, the differences will be 
startling. With the continued high fertility assumption (A), Central American nations will have to invest 21 billion 
dollars annually to accommodate labor force growth. 
Under the optimistic projections of AID economists (5%-6% annual GDP growth through the end of the century) the 
Central American economies will only generate about $16 billion for domestic investment. Under projection A, then, 
there will be an annual investment shortfall of $5 billion. Under the 3-child and 2-child family size projections, there 
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15. LABOR FORCE AND CHILD DEPENDENTS- HONDURAS 
In Honduras, as in other Central American countries, high fertility is producing a very large annual increase in the 
labor force. As noted earlier, because the children are already born who will enter the labor force up to about 199 5, an 
increased effort started now to reduce fertility would not change the size of the labor force up to that year. By 2000 
and 2010 lower fertility rates would reduce the future projections, but not greatly. Even the lowest fertility projection 
would provide a labor force of more than ample size to do the work of building the country. 
On the other hand, the number of child dependents generated by the different fertility rates would change rapidly, 
as shown in the chart. 
o With high fertility continued, by 2010, for every 100 members of the labor force there would be 
about 140 child dependents; 
o With a 3-child average projected by 2000, by 2010 for every 100 members of the labor force there 
would be about 89 child dependents; 
o With a 2-child average projected for 2000, by 2010 for every 100 members of the labor force there 
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16. NEW JOBS AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED- HONDURAS 
Critical to the future stabilty and development of the Central American region is the capability of providing 
employment to the fast-growing group of young adult job seekers. At present, in Honduras some 40,000 job aspirants 
enter the labor market each year. By the year 2010, under continued high fertility, 114,000 people will be looking for 
new employment opportunities annually. Under the 3 child family projection, only 62,000 will enter the job market 
annually after the year 2000, or a difference of over 50,000 per year. 
Employment is largely a function of the growth in a nation's economy. There is a relationship between growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment creation. In Latin America, this relationship, known as the elasticity of 
employment, is about 0.5%. Thus, for each 1% of growth in GDP, the employed labor force can increase by about Yz%. It 
takes, then, a GDP annual growth rate of 6% to absorb a labor force growing at 3% yearly. 
In Honduras, economic performance has been poor in the 1980s. Its economy actually contracted in 1982 and is 
continuing to contract in 1983. Its growth rate for 1980-85, then, will produce few if any new jobs. Using the optimistic 
GDP growth projections of AID economists, we can project employment creation over the next several decades. 
Assuming a 6% growth rate from 1985 to 2010 (equal to the highest rates every attained by Honduras). Honduras will 
still experience major deficits in employment opportunities because the rate of growth of new entrants to the labor force 
will outstrip the ability of Honduras' economy to provide jobs. Under projection A (high fertility), 60,000 new jobs 
seekers will become unemployed· or underemployed each year by 2010. If a 3-child family is attained by the year 2000, 
only about 10,000 people will Jack full employment annually by 2010. Under projection C, a 2-child family by 2000, there 
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17. THE AGRARIAN REFORM 
For centuries land has been the lifeblood of the Honduras campesino; however, rapid population growth tied with 
uneven land distribution patterns made land inaccessible to much of the rural population. By 1972, well over half of the 
rural families - about 240,000 - were landless or living on minifundia of less than 5 hectares. In an effort to solve the 
problem of inequitable land distribution, the Honduras government launched an ambitious Agrarian Reform in 1972 (later 
revised in 1975). The statutory basis for the program, Law 103, declares that each rural family unit will be provided not 
less than 5 hectares nor more than 10 hectares of irrigated land or the equivalent in other kinds of land;. Ultimately, 
under the Agrarian Reform, farms of less than 5 hectares would be abolished. 
Although the land reform program has fallen substantially short of its goal, it did result in temporarily reducing the 
intensity of demand for land. By 2000: 
o With high fertility continued, the number of landless families in the rural areas entitled to land 
under the Agrarian Reform will exceed the total cultivable land available and more than half such 
families, about 420,000, could be landless or living on minifundia. 
o If a 3-child family average were attained by the year 2000, it would be possibJ.e to attain the 
Agrarian Reform objective for all rural families. 
0'1 
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A reduction in fertility will greatly reduce the pressure on the agricultural land base and, consequently, the 
.forestry resources. To meet the Agrarian Reform objective, large tracts of forest land would have to be diverted from 
forestry to various farm uses (e.g., for pasture, house plots, farm buildings, or even cultivation). 
o If high fertility continues, by 2000 about 1.2 million hectares of forest land, or 24 percent of the 
total forested land, would have to be diverted to various farm uses. By 2010, about 1.7 million 
hectares or 30%. 
o If a 3-child family average were attained by 2000, just over half as much forestland (650,000 
hectares) would have to be diverted to farm uses by that year as would be required if high fertility 
continued. 
o If a 2-child family were achieved by 2000, only 530,000 hectares would have to be diverted to 
farming by that year. 
Although forest land that is used for farming nas a certain productive value, this value is only a small fraction of 
the value that this same land might generate were it to be exploited for its wood products rather than farming. 
o The 1.2 milion hectares of forest land projected that would be required for farm uses if high fertility 
continued to the year 2000, would yield about 4 billion lempiras if it were exploited for its wood 
products; only about 870 million lempiras if put to agricultural use, a loss of about 3.1 billion 
lempiras. 
o If a 3-child family average were attained by the year 2000, the net loss would be only 1.6 billion 
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18. INFANT MORTALITY AND BIRTH INTERVAL- HONDURAS 
As part of the National Development Plan, the Honduran Government seeks to create an adequate national health 
service for the entire population, with particular emphasis on the provision of health care for rural communities. Rapid 
population growth hinders this effort in two ways: 
1. High fertility is itself an important cause of maternal and child illness and death. Studies done in 
different countries of the world have documented the hazards of child bearing at very young and 
older ages and with short intervals between births. Pregnancies occuring at too young or too old an 
age (younger than 20, over 35), especially if repeated at short intervals (less than 2 years) or for 
more than 4 children are risky for both mother and child. The risk is further compounded if the 
mother is undernourished. While the degree of the problem varies from country to country, the 
relative danger from these conditions is the same. 
2. The high rate of growth makes it difficult for the Government to provide enough trained medical 
personnel, hospitals and clinics, and other services to meet the health needs of the population. 
*For a summary of this research see: Abdel R. Omran "Health Benefits of Family Planning for Mother and Child," World 
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INFANT MORTALITY AND BIRTH ORDER- EL SALVADOR 
In addition to child spacing and maternal age, the order of birth has been shown to be highly related to infant 
mortality. The technical term for birth order is parity. The firstborn child of a woman has a parity of one, the 
second born child a parity of two, and so forth. 
Children of high parity are much more likely to die in infancy and childhood than their older siblings. In part, this 
is because, particularly in poor families, fewer resources will be available to meet the basic needs of high-parity infants, 
as compared to the first- or second born child. Moreover, conditions .of high parity tend to be closely linked to early 
childbearing and short birth intervals. In El Salvador, infant mortality is between 60 and 80 deaths per thousand live 
births for the first four children. For the fifth birth and above, the infant mortality rate more than doubles to 160 
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19. POPULATION AT HIGH HEALTH RISK- HONDURAS 
There are several ways to look at the burden of health care population growth places on a country. A particularly 
appropriate measure is the increase in the size of the population at highest risk of sickness and death.-- the women of 
reproductive age and the children under the age of five. In Honduras one out of every 10 infants dies within a year of 
birth. More than 41 percent of all deaths each year occur to children under the age of 5. Diarrhea, pneumonia and 
malnutrition are the major causes of more than 50 percent of all deaths to children in this age group. High fertility is a 
major factor in maternal and child illness and deaths. With lower fertility, health conditions would improve for mothers 
and children. More of a mother's attention and a greater proportion of a family's resources could be used for the care of 
each child. 
Women in their reproductive years and children under the age of 5 totalled 1.4 million in 1980. 
o With high fertility continued, by 2010 there would be 4.0 million women and children in these age 
groups. 
o With a 3-child average family size attained by 2000, the population at risk health risk in 2010 would 
be 2.9 million. The reduction would be 27.5 %. 
o With a 2-child average family size attained by 2000, the population at high health risk in 2010 would 
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20. NUTRITION - CALORIES PER FAMILY - HONDURAS 
Among the wage-earning poor in developing countries, the family income is likely to reach its maximum 
size early in the life of the family and increase little if any over the years. The continuing greatest daily 
expenditure from a family's total income is for food. Generally, because of other essential household needs, 
no more than 60% of a poor family's income can be spent on food. It is possible therefore to compute the 
maximum calories per day such families can afford. For such families in Honduras this maximum is shown by 
the horizontal line. 
For an average family with seven children and assuming they are born two years apart, the family 
requirments for calories would exceed ·the total supply available to the family by the time of the birth of the 
fourth child. Thereafter, the entire family would be undernourished or, as is more usual, the youngest child 
or children would suffer. 
For a three child family, with children spaced four years apart, there would be sufficient calories even 
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21. COSTS TO MEET HEALTH REQUIREMENTS- HONDURAS 
In 1980, the Government spent about 74 million lempiras in health services. This averaged only 20 
lempiras per person ($10). If that level of health spending should be continued, future expenditures would be: 
o With high fertility continued, 140 million lempiras in 2000 and 200 million lempiras by 2010. 
o With a 3-child family average attained by 2000, the expenditure would be 125 million lempiras in 
that year and 150 million lempiras in 2010. 
o With a 2-child family average attained by 2000, the expenditure would be 120 million lempiras in 
that year and 135 million lempiras in 2010. 
In order to provide a higher level of health services in accord with the World Health Organization's 
program of "Health For All By The Year 2000," the rate of expenditure per person would have to increase 
substantially. Therefore the marginal difference in costs required to serve the population with high fertility 
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22. PRIMARY AGE CHILDREN AND ENROLLENTS- HONDURAS 
Honduras has made a grat effort to achieve its national educational goals, among them Universal 
Primary Educaiton for its children up to the age of 14. RAPID population growth has made this expensive 
and, as yet, unattainable. 
In 1980 there were 723,000 children of primary school age (6-14). About 80% were enrolled in primary 
and preparatory schools. 
o If high fertility continues, by 2000 there would be about 1,350,000 children 6-14, an increase of 87%. 
o If fertility declines to a 3-child family average by 2000, there would be about 1,070,000 children 6-
14 in that year, an increase of 48%. 
o If a 2-chld family average could be reached by 2000, there would be about 900,000 children 6-14 in 
that year. Thereafter the number of children of primary school age would decline. 
If fertility declines to a 3-child family average by 2000, it wouuld be possible to have all children of 
primary school age enrolled by about 2000, at no more cost than to have 80% of the children enrolled with 
high fertility continued. 
The cross-hatched area on the chart represents savings in schools that would not have to be 
constructed, teachers who would not have to be prepared, operating expenses that would not have to be paid. U1 
~ 
~ 
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23. EFFECTS OF A DELAY IN STARTING A PROGRAM TO REDUCE FERTILITY 
Because the popula,tion is growing so rapidly, and because of the momentum of population growth, any 
delay in reducing the rate of growth will seriously affect the.future size of the Central America population. 
As~;uming that a program to reach a 2-child family"i:werage will take 20 years to implement, the demographic 
effects of such a delay may be illustrated as follows: 
o If the program begins in 1985, the population in 2010 will be 40 million, and in 2050 it will be 54 
million. 
o If the program begins in 1990, the population in 2010 will be 45 million, and in 2050 it will be 63 
million. The five year delay will make adifference of 9 million' people by 2050. · 
o If the program begins in 1995, the population will be 49 million in 2010, and in 2050 it will be 73 
million. ·As a consequence of the ten year delay, Central Americawill have 19 million additional 
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24. FAMILY PLANNING- REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALLER FAMILY SIZE 
A recent series of fertility surveys has provided considerable knowledgeable about family planning practices in 
Central America. The practice has grown since 1950 when only about 10% of currently married women* were involved. 
By 1980, about 30% of married women, or nearly 1 million women, were using some form of family planning method. 
Despite this increase, the average married Central American woman still has about six live births during her 
reproductive years. 
There is a wide range of family planning practice in Central America. In Costa Rica, 65% of currently married 
women practice family planning while in Guatemala, the figure is only 18%. In El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
practice is between 21% and 34%. 
Not all women who want to limit their family sizes have me4ns available. The evidence indicates that for every 
Central American woman using contraceptives, there is one who wants no more children and who does not use 
contraceptives. This is the "unmet demand" for family planning services.** 
The unmet demand is highest in Guatemala where 72% of women who want no more children are not using family 
planning methods. It is lowest in Costa Rica where 26% of married women who want no more children are not 
contraceptives. In numerical terms, nearly 1 million married women are engaged in family planning in the 5 country 
region. About the same number of other women who desire no more children are not using contraceptives. There is 
apparently a considerable and growing demand for family planning services currently unfilled. 
In order to attain a 3-child average per woman by 2005, family planning practice will have to rise from the current 
30% figure (about l.O million) to 60% of the married women of that year, or about 3.7 million women. 
To attain a 2-child average .per woman by 2015, it would be necessary for family planning practice to increase to 
7 5% of the currently married women of that year, or about 5.1 million women. 
*Currently married women defined as those in formal marriages, consensual and visiting unions, and common law 
marriages. 
**Estimates of "unrnet demand" also take into account the number of women not able to bear children, those currently 
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25. THE COSTS TO ATTAIN A THREE CHILD FAMILY BY THE YEAR 2005 
Family planning services are funded by the country itself and by outside donors. The United States contributes 
approximately one-half of the outside assistance to public and private family planning programs in developing countries 
directly or through international organizations. Approximately $39 million will be spent on population matters in Central 
America in FY 1984. About two-thirds of this, $25 million, will be provided by the Central American countries. The 
United States and international donors will provide about one-third of the costs, or $14 million. The $43 million covers 
mainly the provision of services and commodities, but also includes amounts for training, education and policy. This 
expenditure in FY 1984 is projected for a family planning prevalence rate of 32%. That is, it will provide the family 
planning needs of 32% of married women at about $34 per woman. 
To attain a 3-child goal by 2005, it will be necessary to provide family planning services to 60% of women in union 
in that year. 
At the midpoint of a 20 year program (1995), the annual cost will be approximately $70 million. It can be 
reasonably assumed that Central American countries can provide 50% of the costs, or about $35 million yearly. The 
other $35 million will have to come from outside sources. 
By the year 2005 the annual cost to provide services to 3.7 million women will be $128 million. Local expenditures 
will amount to about 40%, of the total or $51 million. Outside sources will have to provide approximately $77 million 
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: 
On behalf of the Catholic Bishops of the United States and 
our President, Archbishop John R. Roach, I thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before this National Commission on U.S. 
Policy in Central America. 
I. Our Perspective 
As you know, the American Catholic Bishops are not new to 
this discussion. For more than four years the Bishops' Conference 
has been consistently raising questions about U.S. policy in Central 
America. I include for the record the Statement on Central America 
overwhelmingly adopted by the U.S. Bishops in November of 1981, 
which is the foundation of our frequent testimony. Speaking per-
sonally, I have been visiting and observing Central America for 
more than eight years as I sought to support our missionary efforts 
there and understand the forces at work in the region. 
The American Catholic Bishops come to this discussion with 
several perspectives. As Americahs, we want to see our vital· 
national interests protected and our government's policies reflect 
our national values and ideals. As citizens we want U.S. policies 
to help bring about greater justice, democracy, and stability in 
this hemisphere and to limit communist influence in the region. 
As Catholics we start with the social teaching of our Church 
which calls us to defend human dignity and human rights and to work 
for social justice and peace as an integral part of our faith. Our 
views have been shaped and our hearts moved by the inspiring wit-
ness of the Church in Central America as it seeks to defend the 
poor, work for justice and search for peace and reconciliation in 
the face of brutal violence, continuing conflict and frequent 
repression from regimes of both right and left. As Catholics we 
are not naive about Marxist influence or activity. We emphatically 
reject any innuendo that the Church's defense of the poor and 
advocacy of social justice serves Marxist interests. The Church's 
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mission requires it to defend human rights whenever they are 
threatened whether by dehumanizing ideologies or economic ex-
ploitation. Let me cite the activities of the Church in both 
El Salvador and Nicaragua, in both Poland and the Philippines 
as examples of this consistency. 
As Bishops in the U.S. we are not experts or specialists, 
but as pastors and religious leaders we have the right and 
responsibility to judge the policies of our government by the 
values articulated in our teaching. We have developed our posi-
tion in dialogue with our brother Bishops in Central America, 
but we speak as U.S. pastors to the U.S. government about U.S. 
policies in the region. 
II. Our Concerns 
For that reason and on that basis, we welcome this opportunity 
to share our deep concerns about the future course of U.S. policy 
and activity. We fear that future U.S. policy may be based on a 
number of misconceptions regarding the basic issues and choices 
in Central America. 
The Roots of the Conflict 
One concern is that the conflict in Central America is too 
often seen as primarily a geo-political battle -- a struggle 
between East and West, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
We have repeatedly pointed out that long before there was outside 
intervention there was a legitimate struggle in El Salvador and 
other parts of the region for social, political and economic 
justice. The conflict has been over land, wages, the right to 
organize and the issue of political participation. To ignore this 
long struggle of people for justice, dignity and freedom is funda-
mentally to misunderstand the nature of the conflict today in 
Central America. 
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Because the conflicts in Central America are fundamentally 
rooted in questions of social injustice and the persistent denial 
of basic human rights for large sectors of the population, 
the USCC has always opposed interpretations of the Salvadoran 
and Central American conflict which place primary emphasis on 
the superpower or East-West rivalry. This is not to ignore the 
international implications and dimensions of the conflict. Nor 
to deny the willingness of outside actors such as the Soviet 
Union to take full advantage of the crisis. But we urge the 
Commission to reject the notion that the geo-political struggle 
is at the core of the problem in Central America. 
The Search for a Military Solution 
A second concern is the continuing pursuit of a military 
solution for Central America. U.S. statements move back and 
forth on this question, but our actions speak more clearly -- U.S. 
policy still has hopes that military force can solve the problems. 
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In El Salvador victory by either side, which could only mean abject 
surrender and bitter defeat for a large number of Salvadorans on 
one side or the other, would not serve the interest of either 
El Salvador or the United States. A society divided into victors 
and vanquished is unlikely to result in either stable peace or 
justice. Likewise, if the U.S. backed "contras" were to somehow 
topple the government of the Sandinistas, do U.S. policymakers 
really believe that would br·ing peace and stability to Nicaragua 
or the region? We hope the Commission will make clear that a 
continuing military struggle in an already devastated region is 
not in our interests or Central America's. 
A Wider War 
A major concern of ours and of the Bishops of Latin America 
is the imminent possibility of a wider war which will plunge the 
entire region into armed conflict. The heightened tensions, strident 
language and increased military activity make this threat a real 
danger. Last August the Bishops of Latin America spoke of: 
"the possibility of unleashing an open war covering the 
whole subregion with sorrow and destruction. Militariza~ 
tion is increasing; nations are feverishly readying for 
war, leading to serious deterioration of productive 
activities; tensions grow, accusations are hurled back 
and forth, border incidents multiply while, as a result, 
misery grows and with it the risk of outside interventions." 
(CELAM, August, 1983) 
We hope the Commission will seek a way to help Central 
America step back from the brink of regional war. We need to 
find ways to reduce the tensions in the region which are turning 
nations into armed camps with unfortunate consequences for their 
domestic life as well as the region. 
Intervention 
When U.S. policymakers talk about the dangers of outside 
interference in Central America -- they refer to the Soviet Union 
and its proxies. When Central Americans talk about outside 
interference they are talking about ~he Soviets to be sure, but 
they are also talking about the United States. There is no need 
to recite the sad history of U.S. intervention in the region, a 
living memory for the people and leaders of Central America. The 
present and past experience of intervention has led to the unified 
opposition by the Latin American hierarchies to all outside inter-
vention without exception. By outside intervention they do not 
refer to the efforts of other Latin American states to facilitate 
political dialogue; such efforts the bishops specifically endorse. 
Rather, the unacceptable interference is that of the "foreign 
powers," essentially the Soviet Union and the United States. 
603. 
Latin America does not expect, nor desire, the United States simply 
to forfeit any active role in the Latin American quest for peace 
and development. Still less do they welcome expanded Soviet 
influence in any area of the hemisphere. What they oppose now 
more strongly than ever in the past, is in the words of the 
Central American Bishops, "the meddling of foreign powers who 
come to support those in the countries who fit their own interests 
which are generally far from, even opposed to, those of the great 
majority." 
To give a clearer sense of this nearly universal Latin 
American episcopal concern, let me cite the relevant paragraphs 
from the recent statements of the Bishops of Central and Latin 
America. 
The Bishops of Latin America stated in July: 
"We desire that neither the governments nor opposition 
groups invite foreign powers to intervene in this conflict, 
and that those foreign powers, if already present, leave; 
and if not present refrain from planning to do so. 
In this way both will avoid the repeated calamity of other 
historical experiences that have demonstrated the futility 
of such interventions." 
(CELAM, July, 1983) 
Even more strongly the Central American Bishops wrote in 
August: 
"To the outside powers and ideological forces that are 
interfering politically and militarily in Central America 
contrary.to our cultural values, we demand that they do 
not do so, so that our people and only they can end their 
conflicts, overcome their differences and plot their course 
toward the longed-for goal of peace." 
"There must be absolute guarantees, now and for the future 
that all of them leave. If not, the intervention of one 
will automatically guarantee the intervention of the other 
and thus the establishment of peace will become progressively 
more difficult." 
(SEDAC, August, 1983 
full texts attached) 
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The Commission must take into account the long history of 
outside interference in Central America and our role in it. 
Human Rights 
One inconsistent aspect of the debate over Central America 
is the use of human rights criteria for tactical advantage or 
propaganda points rather than as a steady and consistent bench-
mark for governments in the region and our relationships with 
them. Selective application of human rights standards depending 
on our ideological preferences erodes our credibility both at 
home and abroad. Human rights are being violated throughout the 
region. The people of Central America are assaulted by death 
squads, arbitrary imprisonment, uninvestigated murders, harass-
ment of land reform efforts, restrictions on free union activity, 
interference in education and journalism and other threats to 
life and freedom. While life itself is threatened in some parts 
of the region, human freedom and social justice are too often 
violated by powerful interests and governments across Central 
America. We need a consistent policy which sees human 
rights as a principal focus of U.S. concern, not as debater's 
points in our policy discussions. We hope this Commission will 
make respect for human rights a fundamental criteria for U.S. 
policy for all nations in the region. 
III. Criteria 
In dealing with these concerns, we need a clear vision of our 
goals and a way to judge which policies hold the best chance of 
achieving them. Permit me to suggest some basic criteria for 
evaluating both present and future policies: 
Do they move the parties toward diplomatic rather than 
military options, toward ceasefire, dialogue and nego-
tiations? Toward free and open elections where all can 
participate without the threat of violence or coercion? 
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Do they increase respect for human rights and basic free-
doms? Do they make respect for human rights a consistent 
standard for governments in the region? 
Do they address basic issues of social justice, genuine 
land reform, broad participation in development and econo-
mic justice? Do they in fact offer hope of a better life 
for the poor and dispossessed in the region? 
Do they build the capacity of people and their govern-
ments in the region to deal wih their own problems? Do 
they promote self-determination and self-sufficiency? 
Do they respect and respond to the cultural, ethical and 
religious values of the people of Central America or im-
pose answers from a distance? 
Do they respect and support the positive role of non-
governmental and local institutions (churches, small 
business, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.)? 
Do they strengthen the hand of moderate and democratic 
forces or, by further polarization, help the extremes of 
both right and left? Do they combat communism by offering 
alternatives to Marxism as vehicles for needed reform? 
Do they support effective civilian control of the military, 
the rule of law and an effective criminal justice system? 
IV. Critique of Current Policy 
In applying these criteria, we remain deeply disturbed by 
the direction of current U.S. policy in Central America. Let me 
cite policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua as the two examples 
I am most familiar with. This is not to minimize the serious 
problems in Guatemala and Honduras. 
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El Salvador 
The United States should use its influence to help bring 
about a ceasefire and dialogue among the relevant parties lead-
ing to serious negotiations aimed at elections and a stable 
government in El Salvador, as well as to begin the political, 
social and economic reconstruction of the country. These three 
elements have been stressed by the Salvadoran bishops and by 
John Paul II in his visit to El Salvador. 
These steps are, if anything more necessary today than ever 
before. The violence has already taken the lives of 30,000-40,000 
civilians, the majority killed by death squads or the security 
forces. Thousands of Salvadorans have been driven into exile. 
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The tactics of the leftist opposition become more and more destruc-
tive as the war drags on. The U.S. role in El Salvador continues 
primarily in a military direction. A continuation of the pre-
sent course is exceedingly dangerous for both the United States 
and for El Salvador. Archbishop Rivera Damas has described the 
conflict as a war which cannot and should not be won. The polit-
ical option, a negotiated settlement, is the humane and wise way 
to-end this brutal conflict. 
It is not clear to me, however, either from the content of 
U.S. policy or from recent statements explaining it, that there 
is a real determination in the U.S. policy process to pursue the 
road of military force with a diplomatic facade, rather than a 
political policy with a military component. 
Nicaragua 
U.S. policy gives the appearance of encouraging war in 
Nicaragua. It seems clear that intensified military pressure, 
through both overt measures and covert support of the "contras," 
is the principal element of U.S. policy. 
Let me make clear that I am deeply disturbed by the trends 
inside Nicaragua. During my Nicaraguan visit last February 
much in the direction of the country disturbed me and the two 
other Archbishops accompanying me. I have shared my concerns 
before the Congress: the expanding control of key sectors of 
social life by the Nicaraguan government; the visits we had with 
journalists, labor leaders and businessmen who described restric-
tions on their activities and the imprisonment of some colleagues; 
and the harassment of Church leaders, including even the Holy 
Father during his visit there. My concerns also include the 
lack of positive commitment on the part of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment to the promises for early and free elections together with 
genuine political and economic pluralism. I still have these 
same concerns; nothing in the intervening months has alleviated 
them. Violations of human rights must be brought to light and 
opposed. We have and are doing that. 
I fear, U.S. policy is contributing to the deteriorating 
internal situation in Nicaragua. It provides precisely the pre-
text for increased government control and surveillance. The 
public rhetoric of our government toward Nicaragua, the cutoff 
of bilatRral economic aid, U.S. support for a military buildup 
on the Honduran border, and covert efforts to destabilize the 
government employing even members of discredited Somosista ele-
ments, all contribute to a state-of-siege mentality which 
reinforces misguided polices. U.S. Actions do not determine 
internal Nicaraguan policy, but they exaggerate some of its 
most troubling aspects. The forces of political moderation in 
Nicaragua are being diminished by counterproductive U.S. policy. 
Instead of a policy which isolates and provides an excuse for 
the Sandinistas to consolidate their power, the USCC has advocated 
that U.S. policy engage Nicaragua diplomatically. Our policy 
should include the provision of economic assistance under the same 
conditions we give aid to other countries, I refer especially to 
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their human rights performance. We see no reason to change this advice 
nor do we see reason to change our opposition to further funding 
of covert activity against Nicaragua. Let me state personally 
that as an American citizen and as a Catholic bishop, I find 
use of U.S. tax dollars for the purpose of covert destabilization 
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of a recognized government to be unwise, unjustified and destructive 
of the very values that a democratic nation should support in 
the world. Such actions seem to be in violation of our treaty 
pledges and our commitments under the U.N. Charter. 
In these two cases and other parts of the region, U.S. policy 
fails to respond to the criteria which we have laid out. It ne-
glects the root causes of the problems, strengthens the extremists 
of both right and left, relies on military force rather than 
diplomatic creativity and applies human rights standards only 
selectively. In ignoring these criteria I fear our policies isolate 
us from our allies in the region and around the world, erode our 
credibility at home and undermine our future role and influence 
in the region. 
V. Choices for the Future 
Peace: The Primary Goal 
The first requirement for future U.S. policy in Central 
America is to change the basic thrust of present policy and stop 
the drift toward a regional war in Central America. Among our 
goals in Central America should be a group of states developing 
and maturing under viable political systems, enjoying good rela-
tions with one another and with us. Therefore, our policy should 
foster regional stability through efforts which encourage the indi-
vidual nations to reach an accommodation with one another and 
settle their differences without outside intervention or arms. 
In Central America there are some tasks the United States is 
well suited to fulfill and other tasks which we should leave to 
other actors. I believe the United States can set a tone and an 
atmosphere in Central America which is conducive to diminishing 
the military elements of the struggle and encouraging the 
opportunity for diplomatic dialogue. There are three dimensions 
to this role for U.S. policy 
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First, there is a superpower or geo-political dimension. I 
have argued throughout this testimony that this is not the way the 
problem in Central America should be defined, nor is it the 
principal aspect of the diplomatic agenda. But there is need for 
a direct approach by the United States to the Soviet Union to address 
Soviet intervention directly or by proxy in the Central American re-
gion. This aspect of U.S. policy has its greatest relevance in 
terms of Nicaragua, but it is a mistake to focus U.S. pressure 
only on Nicaragua. This puts us in the position of a superpower 
squaring off against a small state, 
it raises all the old memories of U.S. intervention 
and it fails to address the key issue -- the Soviet Union's 
conception of where its primary interests are in its relationship 
with the United States. The overall state of U.S. - Soviet rela-
tions has deterioriated in recent months, but it is still 
possible to recognize different levels of the relationship. Direct 
Soviet intervention in Central America is no more welcome, legiti-
mate or tolerable than direct U.S. intervention in Eastern 
Europe. The point should be made clearly to the Soviets. Save 
for this direct approach on a superpower basis to the Soviets, 
the geo-political dimension of the problem should not be given 
a more expansive role in our policy. 
Second, the principal focus of U.S. efforts fo achieve 
peace in the region should be a regional approach. U.S. efforts 
should be primarily aimed at supporting the activity of the Con-
tadora Group or a similar regional effort. The United States is 
not in a position to play a mediator's role in Central America. 
We are looked upon as partisans. The Contadora Group is a Latin 
American initiative aimed at solving the Central American crisis 
precisely because it has grave·consequences for all of Latin 
America. The Contadora formula is aimed at disengaging the super-
powers from the conflict, withdrawing all foreign military forces 
and assistance and then proceeding to a multi-dimensional 
diplomatic dialogue. 
Contadora nations can say and do things that the United 
States would be either unable or unwilling to say or do. But the 
Contadora initiative cannot succeed without strong, explicit, 
consistent U.S. support. I realize that the U.S. government has 
often said that it supports the Contadora activity, but U.S. war-
ships in Central America and support for the "contras" do not 
provide a convincing picture of support to anyone. 
Present U.S. policy follows an independent course in El 
Salvador, toward Nicaragua and in the region as a whole, while 
still giving verbal support to Contadora. The recommendation of 
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this testimony is that the United States endorse the Contadora effort, 
subscribe to its component elements and then shape U.S. policy so 
that it supports at each stage the Contadora effort. Real progress 
requires a belief in Central America that the U.S. is truly support-
ing Contadora, not just tolerating it. 
Third, if the United States did move fully in support of the 
Contadora process our policy toward individual countries in the 
region would have to shift. As I have argued above, we should 
seek genuine dialogue, ceasefire and negotiations in El Salvador 
a3 part of our support for Contadora. Such an approach would 
require pressure by the United States on the Salvadoran military 
and pressure by the Contadora countries on the FDR-FMLN. In rela-
tion to NicaFagua, genuine U.S. support for Contadora would mean 
first the stopping of covert support for the "contras" and, second, 
the willingness to open serious high level diplomatic dialogue 
designed to recast the U.S.-Nicaragua relationship. Such a re-
orientation would not signify U.S. support for Nicaraguan policy, 
but it would be aimed at conducting diplomatic relations based on 
the recognition of the right of self-determination and respect for 
the principle of non-intervention by the Nicaraguans toward their 
neighbors, and by us toward the Nicaraguans. 
A halt in the drift toward a regional war should 
be the first priority for U.S. policy. It must be clearly under-
stood that no significant economic program for the region can 
be implemented when war rages in some countries and threatens 
others. A political solution must precede large-scale and last-
ing economic programs. Likewise, a proposed economic effort 
should not be used to justify more military aid for the region. 
The need is not for a military policy to protect economic devel-
opment, but for a comprehensive policy which brings peace to 
Central America and with it a real chance for economic reconstruc-
tion and development. 
Social Justice and Democracy 
A second essential choice for the future is the acceptance, 
and more than that, the welcoming of dramatic social change to 
achieve social justice and human rights in the region. We need 
to define U.S. interest in a way which recognizes and supports 
substantial political and economic change in countries needing 
both. If we fail to define our interests to accommodate change, 
we are fated to oppose it. This will place the United States in 
opposition to the majority of the people in a region which cries 
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out for change, and in opposition to the Catholic Church there which 
supports change. We must support genuine land reform and other 
efforts to eliminate the enormous inequities in the region. 
In addition, our long term choices should reflect the best 
of our own political tradition. Not that we seek to impose it on 
others but that we are committed to abide by our deepest values 
in our policy toward others. We should strive to be seen as a 
mature, democratic, stabilizing force in the region, not a 
destabilizing bully. We should be confident enough of democratic 
values and virtues that we support moderate democratic regimes and 
that we use only democratic means in our support. Let us be known 
in Central America by the finest line of our heritage: liberty and 
justice for all. 
Fund for Central American Development: A Long-Term Policy 
I realize the Bipartisan Commission is examining ideas for 
a long-term approach to economic development in the Central 
American region. I am convinced that such an approach is abso-
lutely necessary, and I am equally convinced that it cannot 
succeed unless it is linked to peace in the region. The United 
States should not repeat the mistake of the Mekong Delta proposal 
during the Vietnam era; it is not possible to carry out a large-
scale, well planned development effort while a war is going on. 
I am sure that a serious long-term development effort on the 
part of the United States would receive the support of the Church 
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in our country, if it were shaped in accord with some key principles. 
My concern here is not to design a development program but to 
specify the importance of these principles. 
The first principle is that the short-range objective of such 
economic assistance should be targeted to meet basic human needs. 
Existing U.S. law as well as the approach of multilateral 
agencies are presently geared toward a basic human needs approach. 
The people throughout Central America are in dire need of help in 
areas such as food, nutrition, health and housing. Given the 
historic problem of institutionalized structures of inequity in 
many countries of the region, a second principle for a development 
effort should be a system of monitoring how both short-term and 
long-term economic assistance are being used. Such a system of 
monitoring would have to be carefully and cooperatively designed 
with each country to protect both cultural antonomy and political 
self-determination, but some oversight is needed to assure that 
funds go to those most in need. 
Third, a long-term effort should seek to build and preserve 
the human capital of the region through support for education, 
training, cultural development as well as much needed assistance 
for the reform of legal and justice systems. These efforts should 
make extensive use of multilateral agencies like the Inter-
American Development Bank, The World Bank or other regional efforts. 
No one expects an enlargement of the activities of these insti-
tutions without significant new U.S. support, but they can act as 
mediating institutions which do not carry all the historic baggage 
the United States brings to any Central American policy. 
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Fourth, a long-term economic strategy should be aimed at com-
plementing our support for political self-determination with effective 
action to enhance economic self-determination for the countries of 
Central America. In an interdependent world, nations do not 
achieve total independence, but they should not be forced to face a 
permanent state of dependence, a condition which epitomizes exploita-
tion for Latin Americans. It is crucial that the economic recon-
struction and development of the region be controlled by the Central 
Americans themselves, not by powerful outside interests or by the 
remnants of an oligarchy. 
Fifth, long-term economic planning should be respectful and 
supportive of local institutions in Central America. These insti-
tutions which are social, educational, economic and religious often 
embody key cultural and ethical values which must be preserved. 
I know from my contact with El Salvador that key institutions of 
higher education, for example, are already in place and should be 
supported and not displaced. These efforts should involve and build 
upon the strengths of local instituions, cooperatives, trade unions, 
churches and non-governmental organizations. North American models 
and structures cannot substitute for the development of local efforts 
respectful of the values and beliefs of the people of the region. 
Refugees and Displaced Persons: A Special Crisis 
An urgent concern for both the Church in Central America 
and the Church in the United States is the question of refugees . 
and displaced persons. 
A first recommendation applies to the United States. The USCC 
has long advocated a policy of Extended Voluntary Departure for 
Salvadoran refugees in the United States. We find no good reason 
why this status is applied to other groups in similar situations 
and denied to Salvadorans. We hope the Commission will add its 
weight to this just and humane proposal in your final report. 
A second tremenaous tragedy and need is the situation 
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of the more than one million displaced persons and refugees. These 
victims of the Central American crisis are throughout the region, but 
concentrated in Southern Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras. A major 
commitment is needed to meet the immediate human needs of these 
people and offer training and relocation to them as they seek 
to cope with the enormous trauma of displacement. Our own 
Catholic Relief Services is already working to develop effective 
assistance for these people. But our private efforts are not 
enough. Refugees are at least theoretically eligible for some 
assistance through the United Nations, but there is virtually no 
adequate help for people displaced within their own country. 
In short, for a seed to grow and develop one needs to 
prepare the soil. The weeds and stones of past neglect, 
injustice and violence in Central America must be removed so 
as to permit the growth of those spiritual and social values 
on which true democracy thrives. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this testimony, we have outlined our concerns about current 
policy, criteria for future choices and our own proposals for 
peace and development in Central America. We are convinced they 
lay the foundation for a new relationship between the United States 
and Central America which will protect our national interests, help 
meet the needs of this troubled region and serve also to curb Soviet 
and Marxist inroads in this hemisphere. 
In the past, U.S. policy toward Central America has too 
often been seen as defending the status quo and authoritarian 
regimes. Future policies cannot ask people to choose between 
the status quo and revolutionary violence, between continued 
injustice and Marxism. U.S. policy, given our history and 
traditional values, should stand as a beacon of hope, a force 
for justice and a defender of human rights. 
Years ago the Catholic Church was perceived by some as 
distant from the struggles of ordinary people for justice, too 
closely linked to the status quo and authoritarian regimes. By 
reflecting on the Gospel and the situation in Latin America and 
by applying the Church's teaching on justice and peace to their 
own lands, the Church has renewed itself and become a leading 
advocate for nonviolent social change, a defender of human rights. 
The Church and its leaders are a powerful force for justice and 
reconciliation in Central America. As a Catholic, I am proud 
and deeply impressed by the witness of my Church. As an American, 
I want to be equally proud of my country's contributions to 
justice and peace in that region and in all the world. 
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TO: The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 
FROI~: Irving Louis Horowitz 
RE: THE ROLE OF CUBA IN THE PACIFICATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
Chairman Kissinger and members of the commission, my charge is 
to discuss how Cuba can be involved in the Caribbean peacemaking process. 
This is certainly not a topic of recent vintage. Since Fidel Castro came 
to power nearly a quarter century ago, diplomats from Latin America, politi-
cians from North America,and academics from both hemispheres have been 
asking this question. More often than may be warranted by evidence, they 
have assumed that Cuban interests are consonant with those of the other 
member states of the Caribbean region. To those for whom the word interests 
is too strong, has come a rhetorical barraqe of arguments that at 
least a modus vivendi is possible. Cuban communism is a sore thumb not 
easily disposed of by appeals to use the opposite hand. To skirt the issue 
of Cuba is to insure either clumsy ad hoc arrangements or to avoid resolution 
of the very tasks with which the commission is charged. 
From the outset of its revolution, Cuba viewed itself not 
only as bringing a message of truth and hope to the hemisphere, but as a 
revolutionary vanguard to be emulated and imitated. In the post-revolutionary 
phuse of the early 19G0s, Venezuela and Guatemala were rocked by Cuban 
*Statement prepared and presented on October 1, 1983. Not for release 
prior to this date and not for publication in this form without permission 
from the author and the National Bipartisan Commission. Portions of this 
testimony are derived from my introduction to the fifth edition of Cuban 
Comrnun ism (New 8 runswi ck and London, 1984). 
11Warrior-proletarian 11 insurgency movements. Even giants like Brazil found 
themselves warmly embracing the causes and purposes of the Cuban Revolution 
during the final gasp of the Goulart regime. For nations as remote as 
Chile and Bolivia, the Cuban model of revolution reared its head, weakly 
in some instances and intimately in others. But for all the contagion of 
the Cuban Revolution and the charisma of Fidel, the successes during the 
first twenty years of the Cuban Revolution were rather meager: promissory 
notes were issued without fulfillment, elites led without mass support, 
foco groups existed without grounded support. In the aftermath of the 
Bolivian adventure of the mid-1960s, the model itself was finally called 
into question with the shattering defeat and death of Ernesto 1'Che 11 Guevara 
in the Bolivian interior. 
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The second phase, which occupied most of the 1970s, witnessed 
the internationalization of Cuban foreign policy. Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, referring to Cuba's willingness to fight in far away places of 
Africa and the Middle East, called its troops the 11 Gurkhas of the Russi an 
Empire. 11 At the diplomatic level, Cuba took a central role in the various 
summit meetings of the nonaligned nations. On the economic front, Cuba 
focused demands for a New International Economic Order, pushing the argument 
that there is a natural alliance between the Third World and the communist 
camp, and an equally natural antagonism between the Third World and the 
West. But this strategy found its limits with the Cuban stalking horse 
isolating itself from Third World condemnation of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, which was crystallized by Cuba's failure to win support in 
its bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
This set the stage, in turn, for a third phase in the 1980s, 
one in which the Cuban praetorian guard shifted its goegraphical focus away 
from Africa and the Middle East and toward the Caribbean Basin. Military 
adventurism was replaced by Cuban developmental aid pro0rams; and concern 
for Latin America as a whole became much more highly focused on critical 
events in Central America. The Cuban vanguard has begun to develop a 
serpentine tail: the Sandinista uprising in Nicaragua, however indigenous 
in origin, soon took on Cuban features--from the organization of the mili-
tary to the foreign policy of its leaders. This was also true on the 
small island of Grenada where an indigenous change of regimes rapidly 
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evolved into a powerful identification with Cuba as the center. The scenario 
was expected to be similar in El Salvador. However, its people and politi-
cians foiled the designs of history and, albeit imperfectly, chose a path 
of democratic realignment. 1 
What w~ have witnessed is the evolution of a grand strategy 
carried forth by a satellite, Cuba, on behalf of its major supporter and 
supplier, the Soviet Union. Revolution has forced us not simply to changes 
in our foreign policy but to a profound alteration in our strategic con-
clusions for what the hemisphere, and more specifically the Caribbean 
region, might become if Soviet grand strategy were allowed to play 
out its hand unimpeded. 
Cuba is the willing, enthusiastic executor of Soviet designs. 
The wide level of tactical maneuverability granted Cuba by the Soviet 
Union has given it a latitude of operations which can be easily misinter-
preted as autonomy. Cuban latitude, its seeming indifference to the 
tactical styles of the Soviet Union, is what diplomats, politicians, and 
academics are responcing to when they speak so casually of bringing Cuba 
into the Caribbean peacemaking process. Such figures often confuse 
tactical maneuverability with overall strategic conclusions. Cuban 
tactics are often pragmatic and home grown, but Cuban strategies are very 
definitely imported from the Soviets. It is the special mission of Raul 
Castro in Cuba to insure a clear distinction between tactical maneuverabil-
ity and strategic coordination. 
The idea of a peace process implies an ability on the part of 
each national actor to act autonomously. But the history of Cuba over the 
past quarter century demonstrates that such independent behavior is no 
longer feasible when Cuba has become, to all intents and purposes, a 
satellite, surrogate, and sponsor of Soviet activities from Afghanistan 
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to Angola. The revolution of 1959 was authentic; but the breakdown of 
autonomy in Cuban actions in 1983 is a reality. Cuba is simply not an 
independent actor. Hence determining how it can fit into a peace process 
depends heavily on the Soviet Union 1 S immediate sense of its limits. Cuba 
is the weathervane for the long-range potential which the Soviet Union 
envisions for the Caribbean region. Although the latter is geographically 
remote, one must not think that the Soviet Union has no interest in the area 
or in the expansion of Cuban power. It would be as correct to suggest that 
because the Philippines are geographically remote from the United States, 
the United States has a flagging interest in Asian affairs. The world is 
too small to divide in neat geographic terms. Spheres of influence have 
become enlarged to the point where national concerns have become global 
in character. Nor is this particular question of autonomy and authenticity 
simply a function of Cuban foreign policy commitments toward the Soviet 
Union. The internal structure of Cuban national life conspires to sharply 
limit its Caribbean initiatives. 
As one informed figure, Carlos Alberto Montaner, has pointed 
out, the dorsal spine of Cuban society is its armed forces. He speaks of 
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the Cuban military as highly Prussianized. 2 I would modify this somewhat 
by pointing out that while the Paraguayan military is highly Prussianized, 
the Cuban military is highly Russianized by virtue of its elite training 
at Soviet military academies. The near-shuttlelike trips of Raul Castro 
between Havana and Moscow, along with the deepening sophistication and 
strength of Cuban hardware, consrire to make Cuba one of the most powerful 
armed forces in the hemisphere. In Caribbean terms its military might is 
greater than that of all other nations in Central America combined. 
Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba intervened in Angola on a large 
scale and the Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's armed forces, the 
Cuban military has evolved from a predominantly home defense force into a 
formidable power relative to its Latin American neighbors. The cost of 
Soviet arms delivered to Castro since 1960 exceeds $2.5 billion. These arms 
deliveries, plus the annual $3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to Cuba's 
ongoing military and political role abroad in support of Soviet objectives. 
Cuba's armed forces total more than 225,000 personnel--200,000 army, 15,000 
air force and air defense, and 10,000 navy--including those on active duty 
either in Cuba or overseas and those belonging to the reserves, subject to 
immediate mobilization. With a population of just under 10 million, Cuba 
has the largest military force in the Caribbean Basin and the second largest 
in Latin America after Brazil, with a population of more than 120 million. 
More than 2 percent of the Cuban population belongs to the active-duty 
military and ready reserves, compared with an average of less than 0.4 
percent in other countries in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, Cuba's 
large paramilitary organizations and reserves can provide internal support 
t th ., . t 3 o e m1 1 ary. 
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The structure of the Cuban economy, again, does not suggest 
easy participation in Caribbean regional planning. The Cuban economy has 
extremely high dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Roughly 
85-90 percent of its economic trade is with that region. Cuba does indeed• 
share similar problems with the Caribbean region, a single-crop economy, 
relatively low levels of agrarian production, and the absence of accumulated 
savings and wealth. But while the problems of Cuba and the region may be 
similar in the sense of being outside the market economy and inside the 
planning economy, this places it in a unique position, one that not even 
Nicaragua comes close to emulating. 
The Cuban economy remains heavily determined by outside forces 
over which its national leaders do not have significant control. The Soviet 
Union basically has the power to set prices, grant subsidies, and extend 
credit. A small part of Cuba 1 s trade is still with market economies and 
hence the island is not totally removed from the international market in 
terms of price fluctuations and need of credit. Cuba remains a single-
crop economy which exports a few raw materials to the Soviets and buys 
from them most of the needed intermediate and capital goods. The island 
has been unable to accumulate enough capital from domestic resources, has 
shown little progress in the expansion of the capital goods sector, and 
has been incapable of self-sustained economic growth. To keep its economy 
running, Cuba has had to borrow heavily and increasingly from the Soviets 
and from other socialist and market economies, thus dramatically increasing 
its foreign debt. 4 
The structure of Cubals polity shows wide variances with the 
rest of the Caribbean region. It boasts a single Communist Party apparatus, 
lacks voluntary associations, its social life is depoliticized, its ideology 
is routinized and ritualized, and the same family has been in power since 
the onset of the revolution. Cuba has a great deal in common with some of 
the worst features of authoritarian regimes past and present in the 
Caribbean. One finds in Cuba the routinization of a revolution without 
its institutionalization. Events become regularized, expectations 
leveled, and any hope of dramatic changes in the system virtually elimi-
nated. While a great show was made several years ago that this signifies 
the institutionalization of the revolution, it is evident that devices 
ensuring legitimacy (such as elections, oppositional parties, or a free 
press) are absent. What has been institutionalized is single-party 
rule and vanguard political domination. What has been routinized is 
professions of faith and loyalty to the revolution. Neither friends nor 
foes of the regime deny this. Explanations are another matter. At this 
level, cleavages show: Cuba is a country small in size and large in 
pretenses. It plays a considerable role in hemispheric affairs, Caribbean 
affairs, and even Third World activities. Cuba considers itself the leader 
of a hemispheric revolt against 11 Yankee imperialism 11 --a never-ending holy 
war of an island David with the Goliath of the north--while it has 
tremendous difficulty in coping with its own internal mundan~ problems. 
What intensifies this sense of routinization, this depolitici-
zation of Cuban life, is the continued existence in power of the original 
leadership. The same figures who made the revolution, at least some of 
them, retain power in that revolution. Although many original revolution-
aries were purged, others are in exile, and still others died spuriously 
heroic deaths in foreign guerrilla insurgency activities, 
Cuba's leadership has endured over a quarter century--unbroken and intact. 
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The routinization of the Cuban Revolution is thus scarcely the 
same as asserting its normalization. What has been sadly routinized is not 
only an authoritarian substance but also a paranoid style. Nor is this 
meant invidiously: Richard Hofstadter was able to write one of his most 
brilliant essays on The Paranoid Style in American Politics. Still, a 
sense of frenetic, ceremonial mobilization, combined with a peculiar 
inability to act on the presumption that Cuba may not always be at the 
center of world events (a malady suffered by other small nations also 
on a permanent war footing) is easily fed by random remarks. When Senator 
Barry GoldvJater announced that Cuba would be best off as the fifty-first 
state in the Union, the response of the Cuban Communis~ Party was emblazoned 
across the banner of Granma: "Whoever tries to conquer Cuba will gain 
nothing but the dust of her bloodsoaked soil--if he doesn 1 t perish in the 
struggle first! 11 It is not that threats are unreal, but that their quality 
is uniformly misread and misunderstood. Subtlety, humor, discounting 
rhetorical claims, has like so much else, fallen victim to a revolution that 
feeds on its own slogans; one in which complexity has become suspect and 
simplicity the essential tool of political analysis and social living. 
The political functions of the paranoid style are numerous and 
complex, but above all can best be viewed as the essential mechanism of mass 
mobilization. Quite like the Stalinist doctrine of capitalist encirclement, 
Castro is able to present Cuba as an island of socialist probity in a 
hemisphere of imperialist aggression. Whatever the exactitude of such a 
definition, it has the effect of maintaining the Cuban people in a state 
of high military and paramilitary alert; providing a practical role for 
vanguard groups and a touchstone of regime loyalty. The danger with the 
constant pumping of the external threat syndrome is similar to the problem 
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of apocalyptic religious cults: when the cataclysmic event fails to mater-
ialize, questions of the soundness of the leadership are raised among some 
(while others band even more tightly about their leader), followed by a 
cynical withdrawal from the political process. In the absence of market 
incentives based on consumption rewards, the regime is compelled to manu-
facture escalated threats of disaster and destruction. 
While continuity seems to best characterize the most recent 
phase of the Cuban Revolution, this does not mean that stasis has set in. 
Tendencies have hardened into trends. As dialecticians would have it: 
quantitative changes have resulted in a qualitatively new situation. 
The most decisive development is intensified Cuban dependency on the Soviet 
Union. Single-crop socialism has had to confront a weak world sugar market 
and a series of natural disasters. To overcome this dual situation without 
disturbing current, relatively high, consumer levels, Cuba's trade with the 
Soviet bloc is fast approaching 90 percent. Soviet aid to Cuba is now at 
$4 billion annually, roughly 25 percent of the Cuban gross national product. 
The weakness of the Cuban export economy has driven up Cuba's debt to the 
hard currency nations of the West and Japan to such a degree that it can no 
longer pay the interest (much less the principal) due. It would take an 
extraordinarily naive view not to appreciate the extent to which Cuban 
communism in order to survive must become increasingly communist (in the 
sense of adherence to Soviet bloc politics and policies) and decreasingly 
Cuban (in the sense of developing a nationalist standpoint). The conse-
quences for the Castro regime of such a transformation in its overseas 
patterns deserves close scrutiny. 
Cuba is not China. It does not have a ranqe of autonomous 
behavior which would permit the evolution of an independent foreign policy. 
This is not simply a consequence of Castro's wishes but of deep social 
structures. Its demands while quite real, are developed within a larger 
context of Soviet policy requirements. On the basis of Cuban policy 
materials, five policy pivots emerge: 
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(1) Complete acceptance by the Caribbean regions, and above all 
by the United States, of the Sandinistas as the rightful, exclusive rulers 
of Nicaragua and that no support be provided for the opponents of the 
Sandinistas for such people as Eden Pastora, by Honduran authorities. 
(2) Complete acceptance of the demands of the Farabundo group 
in El Salvador and the disposition and dismantling of the present regime. 
In other words, an El Salvador which would put the guerrillas in power and 
provide them with a monopoly of military and political control. 
(3) Cuban authorities would demand removal of any and all U.S. 
military presence in the area, starting with its Guantanamo Naval Base in 
Cuba and not ending until all U.S. troops, advisors, and other para-
military elements were removed from the region. 
(4) Free and unimpeded passage of weapons and hardware from the 
Soviet Union to Cuba, and if necessary from Cuba to other parts of the 
Caribbean region in the midst of insurgent struggles. 
(5) Acceptance of guerrilla movements and Communist Party 
groups as legitimate heirs to Caribbean rule especially in Guatemala, 
which the Cubans perceive as the more immediately vulnerable Central American 
nation. 
If the United States is willing to pay the price outlined above, 
or is able to coexist with such Cuban demands with respect to the political 
process in the rest of the Caribbean, Cuba could be brou~ht into the peace 
process. But at that point, one is not examining a multilateral peace 
process with the region, but a bilateral process with the Soviet Union for 
the capitulation and surrender of any and all vital interests which the 
United States might deem important in the rest of the Caribbean region. On 
the presumtion that such Cuban policy demands are an acceptance by the 
United States of h~miliating defeat and are thus unacceptable, one must 
turn to other ways of discussing Cuba and the Caribbean. 
The key issue in Central America is not war or peace, but 
rather varieties of political systems. The issue is between forms and 
varieties of democratic rule versus the singular form and absence of 
variety of totalitarian communism. The vulgar economic determinisms we 
inherited from the late nineteenth century have come to a crashing halt. 
The issue before American society is not the struggle between free market 
systems on one hand and planning systems on the other, but between free 
peoples and enslaved ones. We know enough to realize that nearly every 
nation, large and small, nominally communist or capitalist,has a whole 
range of mixes within its economic grasp, and that these are constantly 
shifted about: strong capitalist trends in China, worker-management trends 
in Yugoslavia, village handicraft socialism in India, high levels of public 
sector involvement in Mexico. The economic mix within which political 
systems operate is no longer novel and should no longer be fearsome. The 
United States should be capable of living with a whole variety of economic 
systems.· But thus far it has found itself less able to deal with a declin-
ing variety of political systems. 
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Public opinion data on American attitudes toward Central America 
reveal an ambivalent pattern: fear of greater military involvement, a 
striking lack of information on the region, coupled with deep-seated beliefs 
that Cuba and Nicaragua are sources of regional destabilization and 
b 
. 5 su vers 10n. Policy options must be framed in a flexible manner which 
both respects the tolerance of hemispheric differences and also recognizes 
the firm commitments of this people to democratic values and sovereign 
rights. The policy sector of the United States would be well advised to 
support popular movements for democracy wherever and whenever possible in 
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the Caribbean. The touchstone of these regimes ought not be the specifics 
of the economic production cycle but rather the specifics of commitments to 
democratic shift on one hand and a totalitarian effort on the other. The 
smoke screen of north/south-east/west all comes to the simple fact that 
the grave danger posed to peace by the Cuban regime is not a function 
of economic modes but rather of its political decisions. The political 
decisions made by the nations of the Caribbean--and not individual nuances 
and varieties of economics--must be the touchstone by which an American 
foreign policy for the region is measured. We are in a period of breakup 
not only of ideologies and systems, but also of the paradigm of what we 
consider base and what we consider superstructure. 
Given the intricate network of foreign policy considerations 
it is naive to presume that Cuba can be dealt with by the United States 
strictly within the context of multilateral regional negotiations. While 
such an approach is abstractly preferable to the big stick of a big brother, 
the presence of a Soviet surrogate introduces big-power bilateral considera-
tions through the proverbial back door. Any solution to United States 
participation in the stabilization of El Salvador or the destabilization 
of Nicaragua for that matter, must entail the resolution of a longstanding 
Soviet presence, in both large-scale military manpov1er and military hard-
ware terms, in Cuban life. The search for future autonomous forms of 
political organization and social systems should not be confused with present 
dependencies. Big-power interests are real and will not vanish as long 
as the threat persists that every new guerrilla insurgency entails the 
prospect of adding to Soviet power in the Caribbean. 
There are two uncomfortable and quite risky policy conclusions that 
emanate from my remarks: first, that the Soviet Union, since it is 
evidently part of the problem must become part of any Caribbean peace 
process; and second, that the United States must avoid mechanistic 
parallels with post-world-war two Europe and thus overcome the notion 
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that a Marshall Plan for Central America is a politica1 cure-all; it may 
not even be an appropriate band-aid. Let us probe such a paired conclusion 
in greater depth. 
There is a widespread feeling that if the Soviet Union joins a 
Caribbean peace pro~ess, the United States will thus be legitimating a 
role for the Russians in the region, and by so doing give them an easy 
victory. While this argument has some merit, it pales when confronted by 
the obvious, empirical fact that the Soviets already have made a signifi-
cant penetration of the region through Cuba and Nicaragua (especially the 
former). To think that bilateral discussions are feasible in the Middle 
East or in Southeast Asia but not in Latin America is a dangerous illusion. 
One cannot isolate Soviet power by evasive diplomatic techniques. 
The Contadora position is that it is "undesirable for Caribbean con-
flicts to be incorporated into the context of the East-West confrontation." 
However, since a key source of the present structures and processes in the 
region derive from that conflict, Contadora has been unable to extract 
anything but a general commitment to peace. Since Cuba is laundered out 
of consideration, what Contadora can effectively negotiate is solely a 
dimunition of United States influence in the region; the Soviet role 
remains conspicuously unexamined or unexplained. Thus, by a sheer act of 
omission, the Contadora Group would conduct negotiations as if Cuba has 
neither a role to play, nor losses to suffer in the event of an overall 
settlement. To bring the Russians into the negotiating process is to 
permit a serious policy discussion between the contending parties, i.e., 
it is to make clear that the massive Soviet presence in Cuba is at least 
as much an agenda item as the modest American presence in El Salvador. 
In so doing, the education of American public opinion can dovetail with 
the resolution of Central American issues of vital collective concern. 
Large-scale economic aid to the region is a serious necessity. For 
example, Honduras has taken highly risky steps to inhibit an extension 
or even consolidation of the Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. Not to 
support their repeated, and thus far unanswered, pleas for fiscal aid, is 
certainly to destabilize a crucial American ally in the region. But such 
supports are essentially bilateral in character, given quite bluntly, for 
real support rendered rather than the blackmail and threat that 1f such 
aid is not rendered, revolutionary upheaval is inevitable. 
The economic needs of Central America are real and great: crop 
diversification, rational urbanization and industrialization, reduction 
of extremities in sectoral inequality and maldistribution of wealth. But 
to think that a Marshall Plan for Latin America, created in a political 
vacuum will have more than very short term palliative results is not to 
take the chronic history of the region seriously. It is better to 
accept systemic diversity in the economies of the region thatn attempt 
an integration based on presumed free-market ideologies. Again, American 
public opinion will be happier to have such economic indigenization than 
economic rationalization from the top down. 
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Whatever specific policy options emerge from current United States 
reconsiderations of Central America, they will be wiser, more produent, and 
above all, more successful if the Soviet master and the Cuban proxy are 
factored in at all levels of analysis. Caribbean pacification clearly 
rests first on a cease and desist in the export of armed revolution or 
counterrevolution; second, the elimination of barriers to the free flow 
of peoples and ideas in the region; and third, respect for the autonomy 
and territorical integrity of all nations in the region. The limits of 
such premises, and of policy itself, is that these cornerstones do not 
necessarily comprise a tight fit. Hence building upon them becomes either 
an exercise in futility or an excruciatingly painful series of choices 
among worthy alternatives involving, more often than not, Draconian 
consequences. Yet the goal of Caribbean pacification is not of such 
significance that, contradictory elements notwithstanding, the struggle 
for a policy consensus within the context of new regional realities must 
go forward. 
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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONJ THE AMERICAN LEGION 
WELCOMES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS ON U.S, POLICY TOWARD 
CENTRAL AMERICA TO THIS BIPARTISAN BODY, AS THE NATION'S LARGEST 
VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONJ WE HAVE A DEEP AND ABIDING INTEREST IN 
PROTECTING AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY,, .DEFENDING AND PROPAGATING 
WESTERN IDEALS,, .AND ACHIEVING PEACE WITH FREEDOM, 
IN PRESENTING OUR VIEWS THIS MORNINGJ AFTER DISCUSSING U.S, 
INTERESTS AND A STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF THE AREAJ I SHALL GIVE YOU 
OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT U,S, POLICIES AND CLOSE WITH PROPOSED 
LONG-TERM POLICIES AND THOUGHTS ON BUILDING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. 
CENTRAL AMERICA IS IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR 
PSYCHOLOGICAL,,,POLITICAL.,,ECONOMIC.,,AND SECURITY REASONS, U.S, 
INABILITY TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF UNFRIENDLY REGIMES IN AN AREA 
CLOSE TO OUR SHORES WOULD BE A SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK. COUPLED 
WITH A LONG SERIES OF U,S, FAILURES IN VIETNAM,, .CAMBODIA,, .LAOS,,, 
ANGOLA,,, IRAN,, ,AND AFGHANISTANJ UNSUCCESSFUL U,S, EFFORTS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA WOULD SERIOUSLY CALL INTO QUESTION OUR RELIABILITY AS AN ALLY, 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IS INTENSIFIED BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION 
HAS REPEATEDLY "DRAWN A LINE" IN EL SALVADOR AGAINST COMMUNIST 
IMPERIALTSM. 
SINCE ABOUT 1972) THE KREMLIN LEADERS HAVE EVALUATED THE 
"CORRELAT10N OF FORCES" AS MOVING DECISIVELY IN THEIR DIRECTION. 
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THE SOVIETS' MASSIVE MILITARY-BUILDUP GAVE THEM AT LEAST EQUIVALENCE 
IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,, ,A DEFINITE SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL 
FORCES,, .AND VASTLY IMPROVED CAPABILITIES TO PROJECT POWER, 
SIMULTANEOUSLY) THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED A DRASTIC DECLINE IN U.S, 
POLITICAL WILL. THIS PERCEPTION STEMMED FROM: 
I U,S, FOREIGN POLICY SETBACKS 
I U,S, SELF-DOUBT AND SELF-EMASCULATION 
I INCREASING DISTRUST OF ALL GOVERNMENT 
I GROWING STRAINS IN OUR ALLIANCES 
I SEVERE CUTBACKS IN U,S, FUNDS ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE 
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE, 
WITH THE BALANCE OF POWER MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION) THE SOVIETS 
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE SANDINISTA 
REVOLUTION TO EXPLOIT THE SOCIAL) POLITICAL) AND ECONOMIC TENSIONS 
THAT HAD BEEN INTENSIFYING IN CENTRAL AMERICA FOR SEVERAL DECADES, 
IN DOING SOJ THE SOVIETS HAD THE OBJECTIVES OF: 
I CAUSING THE UNITED STATES TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM 
AREAS OF PRIME STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN EUROPE) THE MIDDLE 
EASTJ AND EAST ASIA 
I DEMONSTRATING U.S, IMPOTENCE 
I ACQUIRING A MILITARY BASING INFRASTRUCTURE ENABLING THE 
SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO THREATEN OR EFFECT AT LEAST 
SHORT-TERM INTERDICTION OF U.S, SEA LINES OF 
COMMUNICATION TO THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONTENTION, 
UNITED STATES POLICY OVER THE PAST 2~ YEARS HAS BEEN MOVING 
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION) BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ADEQUATE, 
ALTHOUGH ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT TH~EE-FOURTHS OF ALL U,S, AID TO 
CENTRAL AMERICAJ OUR ECONOMIC AID HAS NOT BEEN UP TO THE LEVELS 
NEEDED TO ALLEVIATE THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN CAUSED BY GUERRILLA 
DEPREDATIONS AND THE WORLDWIDE RECESSION, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 
INITIATIVE WAS AN EXCELLENT START IN DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE) 
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS) BUT 
MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE, 
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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INDISPENSABLE; 
HOWEVER) IT APPEARS TO BE LIMITED BY ARBITRARY CEILINGS UNRELATED TO 
THE SITUATION, A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THAT IS THE LIMIT OF 55 U,S, 
TRAINERS IN EL SALVADOR, 
IT IS ALSO VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY ECONOMIC AID TO 
GUATEMALA CONTINUES AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING, THOSE RESTRICTIONS DO NOT SEEM LOGICAL IN 
VIEW OF GUATEMALA'S STRATEGIC LOCATION ON MEXICO'S SOUTHERN BORDER 
AND THE PROGRESS GUATEMALA HAS MADE IN THE PAST 1~ YEARS, 
IN SUM) WE SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO 
EXPLAIN THE THREAT TO U.S, INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND TO PROVIDE 
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO OUR FRIENDS, HOWEVER) WE BELIEVE 
THE CURRENT LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING AT BEST WILL 
MAINTAIN A STALEMATE) WHICH IN THE LONG RUN MEANS DEFEAT FOR OUR 
FRIENDS AND FOR OURSELVES. 
IN LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE) THE KEYSTONE OF U,S, POLICY FOR 
CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD BE A LONG-TERM "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" 
APPLICABLE TO THE ENTIRE CARIBBEAN BASIN, SINCE WORLD WAR IIJ 
U,S, POLICY TOWARD THE AREA HAS BEEN MARKED BY SHORT-LIVED) INTENSE 
PERIODS OF ACTIVITY (SUCH AS THE BAY OF PIGSJ CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS) 
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DOMINICAN INTERVENTION) FOLLOWED BY NEGLECT, OUR DECLINING INTEREST 
HAS COINCIDED WITH EXPANDING SOVIET-CUBAN DIPLOMATIC) CULTURAL) 
ECONOMIC) AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES, 
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN NATIONS CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME 
LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE,, ,INFRASTRUCTURE,, .AND COMMITMENT 
TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES POSSESSED BY THE EUROPEAN NATIONS AFTER WORLD 
WAR II, NEVERTHELESS) THE MARSHALL PLAN ANALOGY IS APT--NOT FOR 
SIMILARITY OF PRECONDITIONING--BUT FOR THE NEEDS OF U.S, POLICY, 
TO HAVE A POSITIVE LONG-TERM EFFECT IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN) THE UNITED 
STATES NEEDS TO INSTITUTE A "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" BECAUSE THAT APPROACH 
WOULD BE: 
FIRST) COMPREHENSIVE: ADDRESSING ECONOMIC) SOCIAL) 
POLITICAL) AND SECURITY NEEDS IN A COORDINATED MANNER, 
SECOND) MULTILATERAL: INSTEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DICTATING) 
IMPOSING) OR DIRECTING SOLUTIONS, 
THIRD) LONG-TERM: BASED ON MULTI-YEAR FUNDING) THUS AVOIDING 
THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES OF ANNUAL FUNDING, 
FOURTH) UNDERSTANDABLE: CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
WOULD KNOWINGLY BE UNDERTAKING A SPECIFIC PROGRAM) 
BASED ON DESIGNATED PRINCIPLES) AND HAVING EXPLICIT 
GOALS, 
FIFTH) MORALE-BUILDING: OUR FRIENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
BASIN WOULD BE HEARTENED BECAUSE THE U.S. 
COMMITMENT WOULD B~ BROAD) CLEAR) AND DEFINITE, 
OF COURSE) THE "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE 
CULTURAL) POLITICAL) AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AMONG CARIBBEAN BASIN 
NATIONS. DIFFERING PROBLEMS CALL FOR NATIONAL SOLUTIONS BUT IN A 
MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. PRIORITIES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED 
BASED PRIMARILY ON U.S, NATIONAL INTERESTS, 
THE USUAL ARGUMENT AGAINST A "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" IS THAT OF 
UNDUE EXPENSE. THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT CONTENTION IS THAT WE MUST 
BE WILLING TO DEVOTE THE NECESSARY RESOURCES IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE 
OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, SOVIET SPENDING ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
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FOREIGN INFLUENCE IS CURRENTLY AT LEAST TWICE AS GREAT PROPORTIONATELY 
AS IS OURS, THEREFORE, IF WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS IN THE 
CARIBBEAN) WE MUST BE WILLING TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO PURSUE THEM, 
IT IS ABSURD FOR OUR RICH SOCIETY TO DECLINE SPENDING A FEW BILLIONS 
NOW AND RISK EITHER STRATEGIC DEFEAT OR THE NECESSITY TO SPEND 
HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS AND TO SACRIFICE THOUSANDS OF LIVES OF OUR 
SERVICE PERSONNEL LATER. 
IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO OUR FRIENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, ULTIMATE VICTORY FOR 
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA DEPENDS UPON IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS COUPLED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES, NONE OF THOSE GOALS CAN BE TRULY ACHIEVED 
WITHOUT INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL 
MILITARY FORCES TO PROVIDE A SECURITY SHIELD IS AN ABSOLUTE 
PREREQUISITE FOR ACCOMPLISHING U,S, OBJECTIVES. 
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE BASED ON A PROFESSIONAL ASSESSMENT 
OF TRUE MILITARY NEEDS AND NOT RESTRICTED BY SOME ARBITRARY CEILING, 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH PROVISION OF MILITARY 
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES AND CONDUCT OF MILITARY TRAINING, 
DEMOCRACY IS VERY DESIRABLE BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY ESSENTIAL FOR 
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U,S, OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA, NAIVE BELIEFS THAT 
"AMERICAN-STYLE" DEMOCRACY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
AND THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO 
DISAPPOINTMENT AND UNDERCUT OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA· CERTAINLY1 WE 
SHOULD STRIVE TO ENCOURAGE THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY) BUT WE MUST 
REALIZE SUCCESS IN THAT ENDEAVOR WILL REQUIRE A PATIENT) lUNG-TERM 
EFFORT. 
THE DEMOCRACY PROJECT .. ,PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION,,, 
SHOULD BE FLESHED OUT AND FULLY SUPPORTED ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS BY 
THE CONGRESS. ALTHOUGH THE PROJECT WILL BE HELPFUL) THE MAIN IMPETUS 
FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE MUST COME FROM A MYRIAD OF OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 
CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE FROM THE AREA THROUGH CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL 
EXCHANGES, 
SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD BE A KEY PART OF U.S. POLICY, ALTHOUGH 
THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES IN CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUE TO SEND 
THEIR CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES FOR SECONDARY AND COLLEGE 
EDUCATION) WE ARE OVERLOOKING THE CHILDREN OF THE POOR. ON THE OTHER 
HANDJ THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS HAVE LARGE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS FOR 
CHILDREN OF POOR FAMILIES. 
IF CURRENT TRENDS CONTINUE~ MARXIST-EDUCATED INDIVIDUALS WILL 
INCREASINGLY OCCUPY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL AND BUSINESS POSITIONS 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA, UNFORTUNATELY; U.S, SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS HAVE 
BEEN REPEATEDLY REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS, ACTUALLY; EDUCATIONAL 
EXCHANGES HAVE A VERY HIGH PAYOFF OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS FOR A 
RELATIVELY LOW EXPENDITURE. IN ADDITION TO A~QUIRING TECHNICAL 
SKILLSJ STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO LEARN DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXPERIENCE THE BENEFITS OF LIFE 
IN A FREE SOCIETY. 
A TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED A SECURITY THREAT IF IT: 
I PERMITS THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES OR 
OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ON ITS TERRITORY, 
I DEVELOPS A MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE OBVIOUSLY EXCESSIVE 
TO ITS NEEDS AND CAPABLE TO BEING RATHER QUICKLY 
OCCUPIED BY THE SOVIETS, 
I TAKES ACTION CLEARLY HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES. 
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EACH SITUATION SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELYJ PLACING EMPHASIS ON 
DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTICULAR NATION'S ACTION WILL ASSIST SOVIET 
IMPERIALISM, TO UPHOLD OUR BELIEF IN DEMOCRACYJ WE SHOULD NOT AID 
ANY TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT} UNLESS COMPELLED TO DO SO BY IMPERATIVE 
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. 
WHEREVER FEASIBLE AND CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST,, .WE SHOULD BE 
PREPARED TO ASSIST DEMOCRATICALLY-INCLINED LOCAL GROUPS OPPOSING 
TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN THEIR OWN NATIONS. FAILING THAT., .WE WOULD 
BE IMPLICITEDLY ADMITTING THAT COMMUNIST CONTROL, .. ONCE ESTABLISHED,,, 
IS IRREVERSIBLE. 
ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S.-SPECIFIED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
SHOULD NOT BE THE MAJOR DETERMINANT OF U,S, MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
LEVELS, WE SHOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE OUR FRIENDS TO OBSERVE HUMAN 
RIGHTSJ BUT PROGRESS MAY BE SLOW IN COMING, WE ARE DEALING WITH 
SOCIETIES HAVING VERY DIFFERENT CULTURES AND TRADITIONS THAN OUR 
OWN, THEREFORE, .,WE SHOULD REALIZE THAT A PERSISTENT,, ,LONG-TERM 
APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY, 
WHENEVER OUR POLICIES ARE MUTUALLY CONSISTENT) WE SHOULD 
ENCOURAGE COOPERATI9N OR INITIATIVES FROM THE CONTADORA GROUP AND 
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THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. ONE OF OUR KEY OBJECTIVES 
SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE ALL LATIN AMERICAN STATES--ESPECIALLY THE 
LARGER ONES CLOSE TO CENTRAL AMERICAN TROUBLE SPOTS--SUCH AS MEXICOJ 
VENEZUELA. AND COLOMBIA--TO REALIZE THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET-CUBAN 
IMPERIALISM AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN 
SECURITY, WHILE SEEKING COOPERATION) HOWEVERJ THE UNITED STATES MUST 
ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT IT BEARS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY AS LEADER OF 
THE FREE WORLD. 
IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE RECEIVE FULL AND ACCURATE INFORMATION 
ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICAJ THEY WILL SUPPORT A SOUND, 
LONG-TERM PROGRAM SUCH AS HAS BEEN OUTLINED ABOVE, THEIR COMMITMENT 
CERTAINLY WILL BE ENCOURAGED BY CONTINUED SOVIET IMPERIALISM AND 
BARBARIC CONDUCT1 SUCH AS THE MASSACRE OF 269 INNOCENT PEOPLEJ 
INCLUDING 61 AMERICANS) ON THE KOREAN AIRLINER, 
SOVIET IMPERIALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA IS AN IMPORTANT CHALLENGE 
TO U.S. INTERESTS) BUT POLICY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA MUST BECOME AN 
INTEGRAL PART OF AN OVERALL U.S, STRATEGY TO BE IMPLEMENTED 
CONSISTENTLY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. 
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THE UNITED STATES MUST DEVELOP A COHERENT STRATEGY) SUPPORTED 
BY OUR ALLIES AND UNDERSTOOD BY OUR ADVERSARIES, HISTORY SHOWS THAT 
IS ONLY POSSIBLE WHEN CONGRESS PROVIDES STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT 
FOR U.S, FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, THE AMERICAN 
LEGION WILL INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO HELP PROPERLY INFORM THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOUT U.S, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA) 
THE CHALLENGES TO THEMJ AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO ACHIEVE U,S, 
OBJECTIVES, 
AS THIS1COMMISSION IS CERTAINLY AWARE) DUE TO ITS BIPARTISAN 
COMPOSITION) THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE FAR TRANSCENDS THE IMPORTANCE 
OF MOST CURRENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, IN THIS BIPARTISAN 
Sf :l!-4-l"VIL 
VEINJ WE ENDORSE THE WORDS OF THE LATE SNEATOR HENRY M, JACKSON) WHO 
PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COMMISSION. SENATOR 
JACKSON SAID -- QUOTE: 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN ONE WAY 
ONLY: . IT IS A SHIELD BEHIND WHICH ENDANGERED NATIONS 
CAN PROTECT THEIR PEOPLE FROM EXTERNAL THREATS AS THEY 
WORK TO RECTIFY INJUSTICES) BUILD DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
AND INCREASE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. ,,WHAT IS NEEDED IS 
A COMMITMENT RIVALING THE MARSHALL PLAN IN ITS CREATIVITY 
AND SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY., ,OUR POLICY MUST HAVE A 
3(LTo-50 YEAR AIM: EFFECTIVE HELP IN BUILDING DEMOCRACIES} 
INCREASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND GREATER RESPECT FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS. 
-- UNQUOTE 
THE AMERICAN LEGION STANDS READY TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE 
DRIVE TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY, 
WE ARE INDEED A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION, UNIFIED BY A COMMON BOND OF 
HAVING SERVED THE COLORS IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS~ WE --
NEVERTHELESS -- COME FROM THE BROADEST SPECTRUM OF AMERICA. ALL 
ECONOMIC LEVELS~ RELIGIONS) POLITICAL PARTIES) AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
REGIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN OUR RANKS, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A NEED 
FOR UNITED ACTION AND WE STAND READY TO HELP FORM A LASTING 
CONSENSUS, 
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EL SALVADOR 
For generations the goverTJirent of El Sal vader has served as the guardian 
of the l~ed oligarchy, suppressing by force any c.'1allenge to the nation • s 
rigid social order. 'Ihe ariT!Y seized fX)~ in 1932 to crush a peasant rebellion, 
which it accarplished at the cost of sorre 30,000 lives. The military's 
rronofOlY on ,IX)litical ,IX)wer was retained for the next half century through 
alternating pericxls of rrodernization and eonservati ve retrenclirrent, but 
throughout this period, two things held constant: t:he policies of the regirre 
never t:hreatened the socio-economic privileges of t:.Jle oligarchy; and the 
military net all civilian demands for reform and de:u:x:racy with electoral 
fraud and repression. 
'Ihe origins of the current crisis trace back to the. 1960s when 
economic develornent under the auspices of t;.be Central Arrcrican Cbnnon r.ur:ket 
and the .Alliance for Progress expanded the middlecLass and the urh:m v..orking-
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class while at the same time stimulating political mobilization in the 
countryside. These changes led to the rise of reformist :POlitical parties--
especially the social dcrrocrats and the Christian Dc.rrocrats who joined 
together to win the presidential elections of 1972.. 'lhe election was 
stolen by the arrred forces, which then unleashed a reign of terror against 
its opponents lasting 'for rrost of the next decade. 
The suppression of the reformist challenge to the reg.i.rre proch.lccd a 
radical opposition conposed of several guerrilla groups and the "popular 
organizations"- militant grassl:"CX:)ts groups dedicated to pressing dcm::mds 
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for reform through mass derronstrations and civil disobedience. This radical 
opposition gained strength rapidly during the late 1970s, to the point that 
it regan to pose a serious challenge to the survival of the reg~. 
In O::tober 1979, a coup. led by reformist mili tai:y officers and 
rroderate civilians created a governrrEnt promising social reform, political 
derrocracy, and reconciliation with the radical left. Unfortunately, the 
resistance of the oligarchy and rightists within the officers corps 1ed' by 
Defense Minister Guillerrro G:rrcia paralyzed the new regi:tre. After an 
unsuccessful shovilawn with the rightist officers in De~r, the civilians 
resigned.. Many of them subsequently joined the opposition, and the spiral 
ta..vard.s civil war resurred. 
Che faction of the Christian ~rats rejoined the military goverTllrent, 
which then errU:xrrked on a policy of "reform with repression"-- a strategy of 
c;O'Tbining limited socio-econcmic refonns with an intensification of the war 
against the left. Through 1980-1981, rightist elements within the government 
successfully marginalized the rroderate elerrents so that little progress ....us 
ever rrade on agrarian reform or h1..ll1\311 rights ... 
Despite the efforts of the United States, particularly 
during the Carter Administration, real political power in El 
Salvador remained where it had been for half a century-- in the 
officers corps. Rightist officers led by General Garcia 
consolidated t&eir eontrol by removing from positions of authority 
the reformist officers who had launched the October 1979 coup. 
This process, which former U.S. Ambassador Robert White has 
described as a "rightist coup by degrees," was completed in 
late 1980 when the leader of the reformist officers, Colonel 
Majano, was removed from the governing junta, arrested, and sent 
into exile. 
The Christian Democrats who remained in the government 
were left with only nominal authority, and were unable to press 
ahead with either of their main objectives: rapid implementation 
of the agrarian reform or a reduction of human rights abuses. 
The Current Regime 
The elections of March 1982 were intended to strengthen 
the position of civilian politicians, particularly the Christian 
Democrats, relative to the armed forces. In the United States, 
it was hoped that this result would improve the prospects for 
reform, thereby increasingly the legitimacy of the Salvadoran 
government both at home and abroad. 
Nominally the result of the 1982 elections, El Salv~dor's 
Government of National Unity is actually an artificial coalition 
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produced by the intercession of the U.S. Embassy and the Salvadoran 
Armed Forces. The unexpected electoral victory of the extreme 
right, led by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson's ARENA party, threatened 
to produce a government headed by D'Aubuisson and excluding the 
Christian Democrats. Because such a regime was unacceptable to 
the United States Congress, the Reagan Administration felt 
compelled to set aside the election results by appealing to 
the armed forces, which depend upon u.s~ aid to fight the war 
against the guerrillas. The military responded by imposing 
Alvaro Magana, an apolitical banker, as President, by insisting 
that the Christian Democrats remain in the government, and by 
safeguarding the agrarian reform from efforts of the rightist-
dominated Constituent Assemby to repeal it. 
In this way, the extreme right was prevented from capturing 
control of the regime, but the dominant political role of the 
armed forces was reinforced rather than being reduced. 
Deprived of electoral victory by the military, the extreme 
right moved to strengthen its position in the officers corps. 
D'Aubuisson's immeqiate target was Defense Minister Garcia, who 
was both an astute politician and an important political ally of 
the United States. By 1982, Garcia had become vulnerable 
because of his willingness to publically back U.S. demands for 
progress on human rights and agrarian reform, even though actual 
progress was meager. This vulnerability was exacerbated by the 
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army's inability, under Garcia's leadership, to contain the 
insurgency. In early 1983, the extreme right assembled a broad 
enough coalition within the officers corps to force Garcia's 
ouster. He was replaced by General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, 
an officer more sympathetic to the extreme right than Garcia, and 
less political~y skilled at holding together the diverse 
ideological tendencies within the military. Casanova's 
succession was followed by promotions for officers long 
associated with D'Aubuisson. 
The Government of National Unity is hardly unified; 
because it includes parties with diametrically opposed policies 
(i.e., ARENA and the Christian Democrats), it has been virtually 
paralyzed since its creation. President Magana has no political 
base of his own, but serves as the de jure pleasure of the 
Constituent Assembly and the de facto pleasure of the armed forces. 
Defense Minister Casanova, himself a compromise candidate, has 
not been able to offer strong leadership within the military. 
Finally, realignments of party coalitions within the Constituent 
Assembly have left it divided almost evenly between ARENA and 
the Christian Democrats. The effort to move the next Salvadoran 
election forward to 1983 were motivated largely by the desire to 
remedy as quickly as possible the current political deadlock. 
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The Opposition 
Formed in early 1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front/ 
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FDR/FMLN) is a 
broad, ideolo.g:ically heterogeneous coalition organized under the 
political rubric of the FDR and the military command of the FMLN. 
The FDR unites-moderate political parties such as the social 
democratic National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by FDR 
President Guillermo Ungo, the Popular Social Christian Movement 
(MPSC) which split from the Christian Democrats in March 1980, 
and the "popular organizations" of peasants, workers, and middle 
class professionals formed during the late 1970s. 
The FMLN unites five armed organizations: the Forces of 
Popular Liberation (FPL), an orthodox Marxist-Leninist guerrilla 
group founded in 1970; the People's Revolutionary Army, a formerly 
Maoist group founded in 1971; the Armed Forces .of National 
Resistance (FARN), a more nationalistic and less dogmatic group 
which spl~t from the ERP in 1975; the Communist Party of El 
Salvador (PCES), a small pro-Moscow party; and the Central 
American Workers Party (PRTC), another small group founded in 1979. 
The FDR/FMLN has been plagued with ideological and personal 
divisions since its founding, though these seem to have diminished 
as its military fortunes have improved. Despite popular conception, 
the principal differences have not been between the civilians of 
the FDR and the soldiers of the FMLN, but rather among the armed 
groups themselves. 
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The political platform of the FDR/FMLN represents a compromise 
between the traditional reformist demands of the FOR's constituent 
parties and the revolutionary socialist demands of the armed 
groups. It calls for far-reaching socio-economic changes that 
would break the economic dominance of the oligarchy, but promises 
a longterm role for the private sector. It calls for a pluralist 
political system, though it is clear that political parties in a 
governing coalition would have little role if the FDR/FMLN comes 
to power by militarily defeating the armed forces. And it calls 
for a foreign policy on "nonalignment," though the precise 
meaning of this would depend essentially upon U.S. attitudes toward 
an FDR/FMLN regime. 
Short Term Prospects 
The political paralysis of the Government of National Unity 
will continue at least until the next election. Even then, the 
military will almost certainly remain the real locus of political 
power. The extreme right, which is stronger now both in the 
civilian and military sectors than it was before the 1982 elections, 
will continue to hold effective veto power over any program of 
significant reform. 
The agrarian reform, which has been severely damaged by 
ARENA's control over most of its administrative structure, will· 
either stagnate or continue to erode. The human rights situation 
will be similar; after marginal improvements in 1982, it has 
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once again been deteriorating in recent months. These conditions 
will, over time, alienate what little base of popular support 
the government has been able to assemble. The Popular Democratic 
Union (UPD), a centrist coalition of trade unions and peasant 
organizations which supported the March 1982 elections, is already 
threatening to boycott the elections of 1984. 
The military situation is the most difficult to judge 
in the short term. Since the failure of the guerrillas "final 
offensive" in January 1981, the FDR/FI>-1LN has expanded its 
military capacity considerably. Its annual fall offensives in 
1981 and 1982 produced substantial gains, far in excess of what 
either the United States or the Salvadoran government expected. 
Moreover, these gains were achieved despite substantial improvements 
in both the equipment and training of the Salvadoran army. 
The success which the army has had in San Vicente department 
since June 1983 has produced considerable optimism about the 
military si~uation, but prudence dictates that such optimism be 
circumscribed by the fact that the FDR/FMLN has not yet launched 
a response to the pacification plan. Until the army demonstrates 
its ability to hold newly won territory in the face of a counter-
offensive, short term military prospects cannot be accurately 
assessed. 
Despite recent meetings between representatives of the 
FDR/FMLN and the Salvadoran government's Peace Commission, the 
650. 
prospects for a negotiated end to the war are not noticeably 
brighter. The government continues to insist that the guerrillas 
lay down their arms to participate in elections organized 
and overseen by the existing regime and its military forces. 
The FDR/FMLN refuses bn the grounds that such a demand amounts 
to surrender. It has no faith that the military would respect 
the physical security of FDR/FMLN candidates or supporters, or 
that it would be allowed to ''share power" if it did well in a 
free election. There are good reasons for skepticism. The 
history of Salvadoran elections and of the military's human 
rights abuses do not inspire confidence. In fact, it is at 
present unclear whether the military would allow even Christian 
Democratic candidate Napolean Duarte to assume the Presidency 
again. 
The negotiating position of the FDR/FMLN calls for an 
interim regime to restructure the military and prepare for 
elections. The government refuses to consider any FDR/FMLN 
participation in the government. It will continue to do so 
as long as the ext+eme right maintains its current positions 
of influence in the Assembly and the armed forces. Consequently, 
the prospects for a negotiated settlement are dim, especially 
so long as the United States lends its weight in opposition 
to a "powersharing" solution. 
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The most probable scenario in El Salvador over the course 
of the next year is as follows: The guerrillas will launch a 
military challenge to the pacification plan with moderate success, 
thereby demonstrating that the war is still stalemated and will 
remain so for the indefinite future. The Salvadoran government 
will remain deadlocked between the extreme right and the center 
right Christian Democrats, with no leader emerging who has the 
capacity to mobilize broad support. The agrarian reform and the 
human rights situation will continue to go through cyclical 
patterns of marginal improvement and marginal decline. The 
Salvadoran economy will continue to deteriorate under the dual 
blows of war damage and decapitalization, forcing the United States 
to continue to increase the level of its assistance in order to 
simply maintain the status quo. 
U.S. Policy Options 
The ~entral question which must be answered before alternative 
options can be assessed is whether or not it is possible for the 
United States to successfully stabilize the Salvadoran regime 
in the face of insurgency and, at the same time, bring about 
domestic changes that will produce long term stability. There is 
little doubt that the United States has the military capacity to 
prevent an FMLN military victory indefinitely. However, unless 
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military assistance is provided in a context that includes 
significant domestic reform, the socioeconomic grievances which 
gave rise to the insurgency in the first place will continue to 
fuel it. The United States could then find itself caught in an 
endless cycle.of violence. The principal dilemma faced by 
both of the last two U.S. administrations is that the political 
forces upon which the United States is depending to defeat 
the insurgency are the very forces that have historically 
blocked reform in El Salvador, and continue to block it today. 
Hence a military victory, even if possible, would inevitably 
be short-lived. 
The best hope for long term stability in El Salvador is 
offered by negotiations that would close the chasm now dividing 
the Salvadoran political community. For such negotiations to 
succeed, however, the United States would have to be prepared 
to accept some FDR/FMLN role in government and ultimately, 
the political defeat of rightist forces that have done their 
best for aecades to prevent even the moderate left from playing 




The National Government of Reconstruction which took power 
in July 1979 after the fall of Anastasio Somoza represented an 
unlikely alliance of conservative businessmen and Marxist 
guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). 
The partnership_ was fragile from the outset, resisted by people 
on both sides, but consummated by circumstances. The guerrillas 
needed the private sector's prestige and influence to legitimate 
their revolution both at home and abroad; the businessmen needed 
the guerrillas' guns to defeat the dictatorship. 
In the euphoria of a victory in which the entire nation 
rose up against Somoza, guerrillas and businessmen alike pledged 
to sustain their partnership, dedicating themselves to the task 
of rebuilding an economy devastated by war. Both the program 
and the composition of the new government were painstakingly 
negotiated and delicately balanced between the two partners. 
An essentially social democratic program promised a mixed economy, 
political pluralism, and a foreign policy of nonalignment, but 
it remained purposefully vague on what these would mean in 
practice. The platform's ambiguity reflected its origins as a 
compromise between the radicalism of the FSLN and the conservatism 
of the private sector. It was not the product of a consensus for 
social democracy. 
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As in every post-revolutionary regime, the anti-Somoza 
coalition began to show signs of strain almost immediately. While 
formal power was shared-- representatives of the private sector 
sat on the executive Junta and predominated in the cabinet--
it soon became clear· that real power lay in the nine-member 
National Directorate of the FSLN. The businessmen, who had 
opposed Somoza because he froze them out of the government and 
encroached upon their business ventures, began to wonder if they 
had gained much. The Sandinistas seemed no more willing to 
share political power, and their commitment to improving the 
living conditions of the poor posed a serious threat to the 
private sector's wealth and income. Before the revolution had 
reached its first anniversary, most of the private sector had 
gone into opposition. 
Through 1980 and 1981, the central dynamic of Nicaraguan 
politics was the struggle between the FSLN-dominated government 
and the private sector opposition for the right to define the 
nature of post-Somoza Nicaragua. 
The FSLN's ''popular project" is socialist. At a minimum, 
it entails a radical redistribution of wealth and income, and 
the creation of an extensive social welfare system. To this 
end, the government has conducted a national literacy camp~ign, 
made basic health care and education free, and begun an agrarian 
reform. Beyond this basic program, however, the FSLN is 
divided over the shape of things to come. Pragmatists in the 
National Directorate hope to reach a lasting accommodation with 
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the private sector in which it will contribute to economic 
development in exchange for the right to make a limited profit 
and the right to limited participation in politics. The 
pragmatists are motivated by necessity; they doubt the government 
has the technical capacity to run a nationalized economy, and 
they doubt that they can obtain needed financial aid from 
Latin America or Western Europe if they adopt a Cuban model of 
development. 
Hardliners in the Directorate, who were in the minority 
during 1980 and 1981, don't believe an accommodation with the 
private sector is possible or desirable. They would resolve 
the conflict by doing away with the private sector and building 
Nicaragua in the image of Cuba. Ironically, it was the Cubans 
who cautioned against such a strategy in the early years of 
the revolution. 
The private sector, for its part, is searching for a way to 
regain enou~h political power to safeguard its basic economic 
interests. It, too, is divided into pragmatists who would settle 
for some form of accommodation with the FSLt1 based on democratic 
socialism, and hardliners who hope to see the Sandinistas overthrown. 
In their battle with the opposition, the Sandinistas hold 
a near monopoly on political power. They control the state 
apparatus, including the armed forces; they command a broad 
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network of organized supporters in the "mass organizations;" 
and perhaps most importantly, they enjoy the legitimacy that 
springs from having defeated a hated dictator. While the private 
sector contributed to the insurrection politically and financially, 
the FSLN contr1buted· in blood, fighting and dying at the 
barricades. Four years of economic hardship and increasing 
authoritarianism have been a substantial drain on this reservoir 
of legitimacy, but they have by no means dried it up. 
The opposition to the FSLN has little political organization. 
It must rely on the same weapons it used to good effect against 
Somoza: control over 60% of the economy and enough foreign 
contacts to make or break the international reputation of the 
regime. 
The Sandinistas have used their control of the state to 
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try to bend the private sector into cooperating with the government's 
economic plans, offering tax incentives and cheap credit for 
compliance, while threatening expropriation as the penalty for 
decapitalization. The private sector has tried to use its 
economic muscle tQ extract political concessions from the regime, 
warning that the "rules of the game," both economically and 
politically, must be codified in law before business confidence 
will improve enough to spur production. 
Through 1980 and 1981, this political tug-of-war erupted 
every six months or so into crisis as one side or the other 
sought to test the political will of its adversary. Yet neither 
side was willing to leap into the abyss by pushing one of these 
crises to the breaking point, since both had too much to lose. 
Each crisis subsided with the initiation of dialogue followed 
by limited concessions aimed at keeping alive the hope of 
eventual accommodation. But each crisis left in its wake the 
residue of higher tension and deeper polarization. 
The Current Regime 
This pattern of confrontation followed by conciliation was 
ruptured in 1982 with the g-rowth of a serious military 
from counterrevolutionary forces based in Honduras. In March 
1982, the FSLN declared a state of emergency which included 
severe limitations on the right of opposition political parties 
to organize, and provided for prior censorship of the 
press (the newspaper La Prensa in particular) . 
As the•attacks from counterrevolutionaries in both the north 
and south have escalated, the internal political situation has 
hardened considerably. Opposition political parties continue to 
exist, as does the private sector opposition group, the Supreme 
Council of Private Enterprise, but the scope of allowable activities 
has narrowed. Opposition leaders who once held out hope for 
internal accommodation now look to the counterrevolution as their 
salvation. 
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The Sandinistas' tolerance for internal opposition has 
declined as well; it appears too much like a fifth column willing 
to ally with the government's armed opponents. As the war has 
gone on, the pragmatists in both the FSLN and in the opposition 
have lost ground politically to those who seek the eradication 
of their adversaries. 
But the counterrevolutionary forces of the quasi-Somocista 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force {FDN) and of Eden Pastora's 
Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) have not been able to 
pose a serious military threat to the regime. They are no match 
for the Sandinista army, and have been unable to mount any 
significant political appeal. On the contrary, the FSLN has 
been able to improve its own political standing by rallying the 
population around a nationalist appeal to defend the homeland 
against a return of Somocistas backed by Gringos. The existence 
of the counterrevolutionaries has allowed the FSLN to rationalize 
both its tougher stance towards domestic opponents, and the 
deteriorating economic situation. 
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Nicaraguan Foreign Policy 
While both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have voiced 
concern over the issues of political freedom and human rights in 
Nicaragua since·the revolution, the fundamental concern of the 
United States has been the FSLN's foreign policy. President 
Carter's policy of constructive engagement with the Sandinistas 
was designed in large measure to ~void forcing the FSLN into 
an alliance with the Soviet Union. It was hoped that if the 
United States did not react to Nicaragua with reflexive hostility, 
the Sandinistas might limit their military relationship with 
the Soviet bloc and their active support of revolutionary 
movements elsewhere in Central America. Within limits, this 
seemed to work reasonably well until late 1980. 
In the wake of Ronald Reagan's election, the Salvadoran 
guerrillas began planning their "final offensive'' to present 
the incoming Administration with a fait accompli in El Salvador . 
• 
The Sandinistas, perhaps believing that the Reagan Administration 
would be hostile to them in any event, abandoned the policy of 
limited support for the Salvadoran insurrection and allowed 
Nicaragua to be used as a major channel for arms smuggling to the 
FMLN. 
For a brief period at the outset of the Reagan Administration, 
it appeared that the earlier understandings might be reestablished--
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that the FSLN would refrain from playing any significant role in 
aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas in return for the maintenance of 
constructive relations with the United States. This effort, 
however, failed; by the end of 1981, the United States had 
adopted a policy of pressures against Nicaragua designed to 
coerce the FSLN into halting aid to the Salvadoran left. 
The public record regarding the extent of Nicaraguan aid 
is difficult to read. There is general agreement that Nicaraguan 
assistance was limited prior to November 1980, that it was 
substantial from November 1980 to February 1981, and that it 
was halted between February and 'April. From that point onward, 
there is disagreement. The Reagan Administration has contended 
that substantial aid has continued. Some members of Congress 
and former government officials who have seen the classified 
evidence find it persuasive, others do not. In addition, there 
have been repeated stories in the press quoting U.S. officials 
in Centra~ America and in Washington to the effect that the flow 
of arms from Nicaragua is minimal. 
There is no doubt, however, that Nicaraguan reliance on 
military assistance from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other 
allied nations has increased as the armed attacks from Honduras 
have escalated. The Nicaraguan military buildup, which began 
during 1980, has increased sharply s1nce the U.S. covert action 
program was put in place in 1982. 
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Short Term Prospects 
Internally, the conflict between the FSLN and its opponents 
has become severely polarized over the past two years. That 
trend is likely to continue, though it is unlikely that the FSLN 
will take the radical step of nationalizing the private sector 
or closing down·the internal political opposition entirely. 
Instead, the Sandinistas will continue their efforts to mobilize 
support by appealing to nationalism, characterizing their opponents 
as tools of the United States, and building their military forces. 
The elections scheduled for 1985 will probably take place, with 
the FSLN winning a signifieant victory, since none of the 
opposition parties have any real political infrastructure. 
The Nicaraguan economy, now in serious difficulty due to 
shortages of foreign exchange, will at best achieve zero growth. 
One crucial political variable is whether economic austerity is 
translated into popular disaffection with the regime or whether 
the Sandin~stas can successfully place the blame on the United 
States. 
Internationaily, the Sandinistas will continue to allow the 
Salvadoran guerrillas to use Managua as a meeting place. They 
may or may not escalate their material aid to the FMLN, depending 
upon the situation in El Salvador itself and upon the course 
of international negotiations such as Contadora. 
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The Sandinistas are following a two-track strategy for 
dealing with U.S. hostility. Militarily, they are creating a 
force which, they hope, will be so formidable that neither 
Honduras nor the United States will be willing to pay the cost 
of attacking them. 'This requires closer relations with their 
principle arms suppliers. Diplomatically, they have tried to 
cooperate as much as possible with the Contadora countries, since 
they see that initiative as a diplomatic obstacle to an escalation 
of U.S. military action against them. The recent Nicaraguan 
offers to negotiate such issues as arms buildup, foreign military 
advisors, and support for insurrections against neighboring 
countries, must be seen as a response to the Contadora agenda 
rather than a direct response to U.S. pressures. In fact, 
the Nicaraguans do not believe that any concession will produce 
an end to U.S. hostility; they are convinced that U.S. policy 
is aimed at their overthrow. 
U.S. Policy Options 
Medium and long-term U.S. policy towards Nicaragua must be 
based upon a clearer notion of what, exactly, the United States 
hopes to achieve. If the central objective of U.S. policy is, 
in fact, to overthrow the Sandinista regime, the cost and 
feasibility of such a policy must be carefully examined. The 
counterrevolutionary forces do not have the military capacity 
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to achieve such a goal, and the. FSLN can expand its own military 
capacity faster than the contras can expand theirs. The Honduran 
military could inflict serious damage upon the Nicaraguan economy,. 
but it does not have the capacity to oust the FSLN either. 
Moreover, a Nicaraguan-Honduran war would probably prove more 
destabilizing for Honduras than for Nicaragua. The only serious 
prospect for overthrowing the Nicaraguan regime would be for the 
United States itself to intervene directly and massively. Even 
then, we would have to be prepared to weather a long and bloody 
occupation, since the Sandinistas would wage a protracted guerrilla 
war against U.S. forces. Internationally, such an action would 
be regarded as naked aggression, and the diplomatic costs, 
especially in western Europe and the Third World, would be high. 
Given the already significant domestic opposition to current 
u.s. policy in Central America, one has to assume that the 
domestic debate over an invasion of Nicaragua would be heated 
and divisive. 
If the objective of u.s. policy is to force the FSLN to 
cease its support for other revolutionary movements in Central 
America, such an objective can best be achieved through a 
diplomatic process such as Contadora. The Nicaraguans seem 
prepared to accept the idea that the United States has certain 
legitimate security concerns in the region that must not be 
transgressed. 
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It can be argued that a policy of pressures against Nicaragua 
makes the Sandinistas more willing to behave internationally, 
but such a policy carries costs as well. The military buildup 
in Nicaragua, which has accelerated in response to U.S. pressures, 
ties Nicaragua closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union-- an outcome 
which is not in the interests of the United States. It also 
produces deeper internal polarization with a consequent reduction 
of political liberties. Moreover, if a policy of pressures is to 
have any benefit, it must be "cashed in" at some point in return 
for concessions from the Sandinistas. Whether because of U.S. 
pressure or because of Contadora, the Nicaraguans now appear 
willing to seriously address the issues which the United States 
is concerned about. If the United States is willing to coexist 
with Nicaragua on the basis of understandings about Nicaraguan 
foreign policy, agreement can be reached. If, however, the 
United States insists upon hegotiating about the internal 
character of the Nicaraguan political system, the drift towards 
war in Central America will continue. 
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Statement by 
Sol M. Linowitz 
before 
President's Commission on Central America 
September 1, 1983 
I am very pleased to have been invited to meet with your 
Commission in order to talk about some of the critical problems we 
face in Central America. Let me say at the outset that I believe 
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the only way to understand the problems of Central America and \>lhat 
lies behind them is to view them against the backdrop of United 
States-Latin American relations over the years. For I submit to you 
that it will not be possible to deal effectively and thoughtfully 
with the challenges we confront in Central America today unless we 
have some sense of what has gone before in our Hemispheric 
relationships: 
Unhappily, Latin America is an area of the world which has been 
largely overlooked, ignored or disregarded in the United States. 
James Reston once said that Americans will do anything for Latin 
America except read about it, and I am afraid that he is all too 
accurate. No responsible American leader since the days of President 
Monroe has dared to tell the American people that we can neglect or 
ignore Latin America, yet we have consistently relegated Latin America 
to the backwash of history - focusing on it only in moments of crisis. 
Over the years we have tended to take Latin America for granted or to 
use the region to score points and teach lessons rather than to build 
constructive relationships. 
Ask most ~~ericans about Latin ~~erica and you get a glazed look. 
?ew can r.ame as many c.s ter. .Lati:-1 ;. ... :Tteric.J.n countries. 
i::'.mense di:::: erences - cul tura.l, ;:hysical, political, sociological 
667. 
that separate the countries and permit you to change five centuries 
by crossing a border. Relatively few recognize that Latin America 
consists of individual nations at critical points in their history 
determined to fulfill their destiny in their own way. 
Now we have suddenly rediscovered Latin America and its 
significance to the United States. The strife in Central America; 
the aftermath of the war in the South Atlantic; the financial 
upheavals in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and elsewhere; 
the dramatic flow of migrants from Mexico, Haiti, Cuba and other 
countries - reveal all too clearly that what happens in Latin 
America deeply affects the security, welfare, culture and politics 
of the United States. And by the same token, what happens in the 
United States has a great impact on Latin America. 
Because of my own concern about these problems and my own 
involvement in Latin American relations over the years, some months 
ago I talked to a number of men and women both in the United States 
and in Latin America - people of different parties from different 
professional perspectives and different generations - about the 
need to come together in order to exchange ideas on how we might 
approach the problems in inter-American relations today. 
I was struck by how much had changed in Hemispheric relation-
ships since the 1970's when I had served as Chairman of the Co~.ission 
on United States-Latin American relations. 
In the mid-1970's we thought that r~visinc the Panama Canal 
Treaty was the most ~rsent issue in United States-Latin 
~elatio~s. Today that pyoblem is largely behind us. 
In the mid-1970's because of Latin America's dynamic grmvth 
and prospects, we viewed Latin America's economic future with 
great optimism. Today we know all too well that Latin America 
faces a severe economic downturn and an acute crisis of overwhelm-
ing debts and high unemployment. 
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In the mid-1970's, territorial conflicts were not regarded as 
particularly significant. Today these questions are hard to avoid, 
and they in turn raise other issues such as the arms races, peace-
keeping capabilities and the like. 
In the mid-1970's, we were disturbed by what we called a 
"plague of repression" sweeping the Americas. Today we are aware 
of deep stirrings for a return to democracy in many countries, and 
the struggle in many nations to achieve progress toward a fuller 
respect for human rights. 
In the 1970's, we paid little attention to Central America 
which we regarded as a reiatively tranquil corner of the Hemisphere. 
Today we know all too well that we did not have enough understanding 
to anticipate the fierce struggles now being waged in that region. 
And in the 1970's, while we were aware that the so-called 
"special relationship" in the Hemisphere was declining, we could 
not have imagined that the United States and major Latin American 
countries would actually line up on opposite sides of a war. 
All these developments made unmistakably clear that there had 
been drastic changes in inter-American relations in a rela~i~ely 
:ew years, and what was :--,eeded ,_·as a new look, :ree of :;:reconcep::::..cns 
anC. prejudices. 
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Dr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador and former Sec::-etary 
General of the Organization of American States, joined me in convening 
a group of distinguished opinion leaders from all over the Hemis?here 
in order to examine the issues in an Inter-American Dialogue. T\venty-
four leaders from 15 countries of Latin America, one Canadian and 23 
from the United States responded to our invitation. Our group 
included two former Latin American Presidents, four former Foreign 
Ministers, six former Finance Ministers, and such distinguished North 
&~ericans - Republicans and Democrats alike - as David Rockefeller; 
General David Jones; Father Theodore Hesburgh; Cyrus Vance; Edmund 
Muskie; Elliot Richardson; Robert McNamara; Ralph Davidson, Chai~an 
of Time, Inc.; Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of the Heritage Foundation; 
and Mayor Henry Cisneros, a member of this Commission. 
Our studies and deliberations went on for a period of six 
months, and during that time we consulted extensively with high 
officials in a number of countries. In the United States, for example, 
-
we met with Secretary of State Shultz, Vice President Bush, Assistant 
Secretary of State Enders and others. Working together in the 
Dialogue, we had a chance to look beyond today's headlines and to 
think hard and carefully about the kind of tomorrow we wanted in the 
Americas, and how to help achieve it. 
The opening words of our Report were these: "The 'ives"'C.e::-n 
Hemisphere today faces challenges more serlous than an~· since Ko::-ld 
War II, or perhaps even the Great Depression''. And w~ undert==~ to 
~xarnine some of the rnos"'C. i~pcr"'C.ant economic, political, . " " soc.:..::...;.. a::.c 
sec'-'.ri":.y problems cor::ro::ting "'C.he A..~eric2s. 
We started with the grave economic and financial crisis in 
Latin America today - a crisis which, in my judgment, is no less 
serious and threatening to the security and stability of the 
Americas than the wars being fought in Central America. 
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To put it briefly, the debt crisis in Latin America which has 
plunged Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica, 
among others, into deep trouble is also a serious problem for the 
United States; and our entire closely interlinked financial system 
is under challenge. To address these problems, we suggested 
measures to deal with the immediate liquidity crisis and also 
offered recommendations for resuming the sustained economic gro>vth 
and development which will be required for a longer term solution. 
Let me just mention some of the specific recommendations on which 
we focused attention in our Report. 
The strengthening of the International Monetary Fund; the 
expansion of the role of the multi-lateral ~evelopment banks; 
extension of the maturities of existing debt in various Latin 
American countries; an increase in flows of private, direct invest-
ment; resistance to protectionist sentiment both in the Hemisphere 
and worldwide; the stabilization of commodity export earninc;s; and 
the speedy approval of the Administration's Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. 
I suggest that all of these are relevant to your own cnarce 
as a Commission to re"~:iev-; the econowic problems af:ecti::c; Ce:-.-:r::.l 
,?olicies. 
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development. And economic austerity programs imposed insensitively 
can have drastic social and political effects. 
In recent weeks we have heard much about a possible Marshall 
Plan for Central America. 
The term is appealing, but I submit that it is very important 
to be clear as to exactly what it means and what it does not mean. 
The simple fact is that the problems of Central America and 
of Latin America are not like those of Europe a generation ago 
when we evolved the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction o= Europe. 
There is too little to reconstruct, recover or rebuild in Central 
America. What can be borrowed from the Marshall Plan is the over-
riding objective - a multi-lateral undertaking not directed 
against any countrv or ideology, but against povertv, chaos and 
distress. This is essentially the goal set forth in the OAS Charter 
which enunciates our joint objectives in the Americas in these Hords: 
"A united effort to insure social justice in the Hemisphere and 
dynamic and balanced economic development for their peoples, as 
conditions essential for peace and security". 
In that connection, we must recognize that Latin America is 
today at a political crossroads. During the last several years, 
much of Latin America has moved toward more open and rePrese~ta~ive 
policies, and the bases are being laid for a renewal of cemocracv 
ir. much of the Western Hemisphere. 
If these democratic openings are to take held, gcvern~en~s 
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majority of Latin Americans by responding to their desire for 
improved conditions of life. Latin American countries have mace 
substantial gains in recent years in such areas as health and 
education. But World Bank estimates still show that 1/2 of Lati~ 
America's rural population and 1/4 of its city dwellers remain in 
"absolute poverty''. At least another 1/3 of the region's popula-
tion is poor by contemporary standards. 
The persistent poverty of 2/3 of the people of Latin America 
is the major cause of the H~uisphere's social unrest, Poverty, 
inequality and injustice lead to political protest and polarization. 
Polarization, in turn, frequently leads to repression, followed by 
cycles of violent opposition, widespread violations of human rights, 
and greater social injustice. To break this cycle, to increase 
the opportunities for human fulfillment, and to build more stable 
societies, sustained commitments to alleviate poverty will have to 
be made throughout the Americas. 
The renewal and expansion of democratic procedures offer the 
best hope of progress toward greater social justice. But 
democratization is by its nature a national process for which 
individuals and institutions within each country must be respo~sible. 
Democracy is not a set of formal mechanisms and procedures tha~ 
can be sent abroad. It is a process, a set of co;.~it~ents ~ooted 
in the history and culture of a nation, a process that can be 
nu~tured and encouraged but not transplanted or i~posed. Whi:e 
outside countries can and sho~ld encourage the g~o~~h of 
i::sti -:.u tio~s, 
all tha~ of the ~as~ ~owe~~~l ·---~ ......... -_ ..... '-'-'-·•--:.· 
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direct way undertake to build democratic political institu~ions in 
other countries. 
Accordingly, the reco~~endations in our Report for " . aava::1c:.::.g 
democracy in the Hemisphere were quite modest. 
First, we oppose any activities - covert or overt - by 
government and other institutions which undermine the poli~ical 
autonomy or integrity of any country. We believe that the 
principle of non-intervention is vital for safeguarding 
democratization. 
Second, we believe that foreign governments, internatio::1al 
organizations and private institutions can contribute impo~tan~ly 
but indirectly to democratization through support of equitable 
economic and social development. 
Third, we believe that-governments can help create a climate 
favorable to democracy through the tone and~uality of thei~ 
diplomatic relations. We hope that d~mocratic countries i::1 
Americas will maintain warmer and more supportive relations wit~ 
other democracies. But we would counsel against breaking dipl~~atic 
relations with authoritarian governments, since this tends ~o 
rally nationalist support for a regime and to rei::1for~e rigidi~y. 
On the issue of human rights, clearly the protec~io::. ~::.d 
advancement of human rights 
0 : ~he n-t~'o· nal q~ve~~Men~ B!l~ it is also~ lec~ti-... ~r~ -~-.. ~------.-~---~~-...... ~_, - -.. • a - • _ v - '.... • - • -- - - - - - - _ - -- --- - - - -
cc~cerr:. And this should ~e re~lec~cd in the 
and ~ ..... .: !"' g a::.:.:.::.-: . .:::: s . 
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For carefully considered multi-lateral action to protect f~~da~ental 
human rights is not intervention, but an international obligat~on. 
Direct unilateral intervention of any government in the domestic 
affairs of others, even on behalf of human rights, can have unfortunate 
consequences. But silence and inaction in the face of clear ab~ses 
are inexcusable. For these can threaten both the security and the 
stability of the Hemisphere. 
In focusing on the issue of security, we agreed on two important 
points: First, that the basic roots of insecurity - and the basic 
problems of security - in the Hemisphere are primarily economic, 
social and political, not military. Second, that sources of insecurity 
are mainly internal to each nation, and external influences are 
secondary. 
It was also our firm conviction that even when there is a 
military dimension to conflict as in Central America, the solutions 
ultimately lie in economic and social development and political 
dialogue and not in weapons or military advisors. Even when external 
support for insurrection clearly is present, as in El Salvador, the 
underlying problems remain domestic. 
There are significant differences in the way security is 
conceived and defined in the United States as against the way ~- is 
understood in Latin America. hTien Latin Americans think 
most of them tend to think of the internal challenges of ~a~ional 
unity, of border issues wi~h neighboring sta~es, ::_ :1. s o:7. e c 2. s e s, 
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In the United States, the focus on security is external, 
global and strategic. Because of its worldwide interest and rcle, 
the United States generally seeks to assure political stability by 
supporting the status quo under sharp internal or regional challenge. 
Many Latin Americans, on the other hand, feel that profound cha:::ge 
in the region is inevitable and that an emphasis on i~~ediate 
stability is, therefore, misguided. 
These differences are reconcilable. For both North Arnerica:::s 
and Latin Americans stress self-determination and non-intervent~on 
as norms. Both favor keeping Latin America and the Caribbean o~t 
of the East-West conflict to the greatest extent possible. Both 
understand that social and economic progress is vital for achie\·ing 
political stability and protecting national and international security. 
Our approach .toward the Central American conflict \vas baseC: on 
two major premises. First, that most citizens and governments 
throughout the Hemisphere oppose an expansion of Soviet and Cuban 
military presence in.the Americas. Second, that the United States 
could do much to foster a climate of security in the region by 
making unequivocally clear its commitment to respect national 
sovereignty. 
Accordingly, we strongly endorsed the initiative taken bv 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in the Ccnt2dora Declara~~on, 
offering their good offices in seeking peaceful solu~icns tc Cen~ral 
~~erica's problems. We urced the United States " " . ::.~ ce--c J..a::e .:.. :.s 
supper~ ~or the ContcCo~2 c~oup's effor~s a~d i~s r22d~~ess ~~ 
- -c ·-.2 e2ec: ~ ........ ,_,....,....,~_ .. -::::-.::::::. .......... :::-':::-" .... "-'!:""' ..... -- ......... ._-· 
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Such an American commitment must make unmistakably clear by 
word and deed that this regional approach is central to our pla~~ing 
for the resolution of the conflicts - and not just peripheral to it; 
and that we stand resolutely with the Contadora countries as 
partners in this common effort. I am afraid that such a commi~~ent 
is still lacking. 
We also made a further recommendation, suggesting that it rr.ight 
be worth exploring the possibility that the United States-Soviet 
understandings of 1962, 1970 and 1979 with respect to Cuba might 
provide a basis for a wider accord that could enhance the 
collective security of the entire region. We proposed that this 
could be explored informally and quietly with both the Soviet Un~on 
and Cuba in order to determine the possibility of arriving at 
understandings. 
Recent statements by Fidel Castro appear to encourage such an 
approach and suggest that we should indeed, jn the President's 
words, give Castro "the benefit of the doubt" and ask our Contadora 
friends to explore the seriousness of his own proposal along this line. 
Of course, we cannot be sure that such discussions would succeed. 
But we are sure that the perils and costs of allowing the Cen~~2l 
American conflicts to grow are grave and raise the specter of \\ider 
conflicts. And the dangers are growing - for time is not on ~~e side 
of peace. Accordingly, we firDly believe - all of us fro~ Nor~~ and 
South ."-.. Inerica and coveri:1g - wide spectn:m of vieHs 
. . 
a:1c ex;;e~:-2:-:ce -
tha~ ~egotiations shc~ld a~= ~us~ ~e tried - en all l~vels. 
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In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, negotiations should be 
pursued with the help of the Contadora countries to ar~ange fo~ 
free internationally supervised elections on the basis of secu~~~y 
guarantees for all parties and participants. And in the region as 
a whole, a major effort should be undertaken in conjunction wit~ 
our Latin American friends to find a way to settle the conflicts. 
All of this suggests a few basic principles which I believe 
should guide us in dealing with the Central American situation today. 
First, we must recognize that the problems of Central a~erica 
are primarily regional ones, affecting all of the countries in the 
area and not just the United States. Accordingly, we cannot and 
must not undertake unilaterally to deal with the issue as if ".j.. ~ ... 
were ours alone to solve. 
Second, as a regional issue it is a problem which must and can 
be dealt with only on a regibnal and cooperative basis. The 
Contadora countries have taken leadership in-exploring avenues for 
peaceful negotiation of the conflicts and we should make unequi~ocally 
clear our full commitment to their efforts. 
Third, we must understand that the basic problem of Ce~tra~ 
America today is essentially a political problem with a mili 'ta:::::-\· 
dimension rather than - as our present policy seems to sugges~ - _ 
military problem with a political dimension. Acccrdi~gly, we ~~s~ 
recognize that a mili'ta~y respo~se 
itself achi8ve a solut:ion. 
in Central Ame~ica will ...... ": .. -' 
Fourth, we must be clear about what we seek to achieve in 
Central America and consistent in our words and actions moving 
toward that objective. We cannot, for example, assert that we are 
committed to regional cooperation and, at the same time, pursue 
our own course without regard to the views of our friends and 
allies. We cannot maintain that we are committed to self-
determination and freedom of choice for the people of Central 
A.;11erica, yet as Sllille we can undertake to prescribe \vhat that choice 
must be. 
In short, the United States of America must stand for the 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts through negotiation, making 
unmistakably clear our commitment to non-intervention and self-
determination as fundamental principles. 
I believe that Central America is less a test of our resolve 
678. 
to stand up to the Soviet Union than of our capacity fo~ farsighted 
leadershiP and cooPeration within our hernisohere - \\rhether \ve can 
conduct ourselves with requisite vision, restraint, flexibility and 
self-confidence, not just as a great power - but as a great democ~acv. 
It may be significant that all who participated in our Report 
agreed that the security of the Americas had probably been advanced 
more in recent years by the Panama Canal Treaties than by any o~her 
single development. 
For the Treaties did much to enhance the spi~it o: coope~a~~~n 
between the two halves o: Arne~ic2.; and they ~ein:o~ced tr.e s~a~es 
cc,~ . ::tensur-3.:.~ Wl-:.n ::.hei~ stc.~~es. 
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That was the essence of the approach in our Report - not to 
deny differences in interest and perspective between the United 
States and Latin America, but to emphasize the impo~tant interests 
we share, and the importance of mutual respect for vital concerns. 
For as the Mexican patriot Be~ito Juarez once said: 
the rights of others is peace". 
"Resnect. for 
Today we are at a moment of crisis in Central .~erica a~d in 
the Hemisphere at large. When conditions of crisis are faced 
imaginatively, opportunities for progress exist. Such opportunities 
do exist - especially for the United States. The question is how 
we will respond to them. 
Many years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt described those 
opporturiities in some words singularly applicable to our role in 
Latin America today and to your role as members of this Co~~ission. 
"The United States does not have the option as to whether it 
will or will not play a great part. It m~st play a great part. The 
only question is whether it will play that part well or badly." 
STATEMENT OF THOMAS CLIFTON MANN 
August 31, 1983 
I. 
1. United States policy of opposition to attempts by 
states hostile to our form of government to impose their 
systems on independent American states is as valid today as 
it ever was. The basis of that policy was that such attempts 
to gain footholds in this hemisphere would constitute a threat 
to the security of the United States. 
2. This policy was first announced by Monroe in 1823 when 
certain European states were rumored to be considering the 
reimposition of monarchical systems on American republics. It 
was followed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1940-1941 when Nazi Fifth 
Columns were operating in American states with the purpose of 
diminishing the will of those states to resist Nazi aggressions. 
It was followed by John Kennedy during the October, 1962 missile 
crisis. It was followed by Johnson during the 1955 Dominican 
crisis. 
3. On only two occasions has the US failed to follow this 
policy. One was in 1961 when a division of opinion amongst the 
leaders of our Democratic party caused a paralysis in the White 
House decision-making process. The result was the Bay of~igs 
fiasco, the consolidation of Marxists-Leninists in power in 
Cuba, and the formation of military ties between Cuba and the 
680. 
USSR. The other was the support of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries 
in Nicaragua and El Salvador with the result that Marxists-Leninists 
were able to gain control of a second American state (Nicaragua) 
and to launch a class war against the Salvadoran middle class -
against all those who owned property which produced goods or 
services or employed labor. 
4. These two failures to follow traditional US policy created 
the conditions which presumably made it necessary for these hearings 
to be conducted. 
II. 
1. During the two decades 1945-1965 other American states 
essentially declared that the activities of revolutionary groups, 
particularily guerrillas and terrorists, which were in the service 
of a Communist state, constituted intervention and aggression; and 
that an act of aggression against one American state would be con-
sidered an act of aggression against all American states. 
2. During the same period, a majority of American states 
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often recognized that collective action by the OAS did not impair 
any state's individual right of self-defense which is inherent in 
sovereignty. Thus the right of the US to defend itself against 
an act of aggression does not depend upon affirmative action 
by any international body. 
3. Nor does the US have to wait until its own territory 
is attacked by a hostile power. In the words of Elihu Root every 
state has a right to protect itself ·"by preventing a condition 
of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself." In 
the words of Franklin Roosevelt, it would be suicide to wait 
until the enemy is in our front yard. "Anyone with an atlas and 
a reasonable knowledge of modern war, knows that it would be 
stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold 
from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the 
use of a strategy which will prevent such an enemy from gaining 
a foothold in the first place." 
III. 
1. The USSR represents a threat to the security of the 
US because its leaders have consistently affirmed that their 
country has a mission to promote class wars for the purpose 
of gradually creating a one-world socialist state and, in the 
process, destroy the governments and political, economic and 
social systems of all states which are not Marxist-Leninist 
in character. This sense of mission has become, for those 
leaders, a kind of secular religion. 
2. There is no cogent evidence that Soviet leaders have 
abandoned Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, strategy or 
tactics. On the contrary, the evidence that Soviet leaders 
are pursuing their goal with undiminished zeal is overwhelmning. 
3. All rational Americans prefer peace to the horrors of 
war, particularily those who have lived through wartime periods 
and have learned that even victory has its price. But it takes 
two to keep the peace - the aggressor and the victim. Targets 
of aggressor states who are strong and able to defend themselves 
have a much better chance of surviving than those who are weak 
or who have lost their will to defend themselves. 
4. More particularily, those who lived through the long, 
dark months following Pearl Harbor when the US lost control of 
the sea and air in the Caribbean do not need to be convinced 
of the importance of the area to our survival. Those who did not 
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would do well to read accurate historical accounts of the ships 
and lives lost in those dark days when the US was trying to keep 
open sea lanes vital to the US and other American states. 
5. During the Second World War, we learned, or should have 
learned,that the power that controls the seas adjacent to our 
coasts, and the skies above them, controls access to many of 
our ports, the Panama Canal, and to our ability to buy materials 
in the hemisphere which are in short supply here at home and 
essential to our ability to mobilize our military strength. 
IV. 
1. Not being privy to such plans that may exist for re-
sisting Communist penetration in Central America, no opinion 
is expressed concerning any plan that may exist on a contingency 
or other basis. 
2. Subject to conditions described later, the following 
general opinions are, however, expressed: 
3. In respect of El Salvador, we should (a) try to persuade 
all anti-communist factions to unite under leadership chosen by 
themselves; (b) refrain from additional interventions in the 
domesti~ affairs of that country; (c) lend the Salvadoran govern-
ment !'·the military and economic assistance it wants and needs 
to defeat and expel Communist guerrillas and terrorists; (d) 
if the Salvadorans are unable to accomplish this end, land 
US armed forces in strength to assist them; (e) try to persuade 
the Salvadoran government that it should hold elections as soon 
as feasible.after order has been restored; (f) ask that govern-
ment to permit foreigners to observe whether the elections are 
free and without coercion; (g) leave the fate of the so-called 
"reforms" imposed by Washington to the decisions of the elected 
representatives of the Salvadoran people. 
4. In respect of Nicaragua, the US should support counter-
revolutionary groups which seek to restore the sovereignty and 
independence of that state until (a) positive steps are taken 
to hold free elections ~4 (b) the government of that state . 
demonstrates that it isNfonger supporting guerrillas in neighboring 
states, including El Saivador. 
5. In a Marxist-Leninist society such as Nicaragua, in order 
to eliminate the fear of reprisals it would be necessary for the 
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following steps (or their equivalent) to be taken: (a) elections 
should be controlled by an international group or organization 
which is impartial in the sense it does not favor or oppose the 
candidate of any particular faction or party; (b) such group or 
organization should be supported by a military force, preferably 
international in character, capable of maintaining order and 
preventing coercion of any faction or individual; (c) the military 
power of the present government of Nicaragua would be neutralized 
during the electoral process in a manner to be agreed upon; (d) 
ballots would be secret; (e) foreign observers of the electoral 
process would be welcomed; (f) all Nicaraguan political parties 
and factions (including Marxists-Leninists using whatever name or 
names they wished) would be allowed to participate in the electoral 
process but popular fronts which include Marxists-Leninists would 
be prohibited; (g) political parties and factions, and the candidates 
of their choice, would be free to advocate, and the Nicaraguan 
people free to choose, whatever kind of political, economic or social 
system they~wish __ but candidates - would be required to pledge they 
would be nationalists and would not associate themselves in any 
way with the international Communist movement; (h) all Nicaraguan 
citizens, including civilians in the Nicaraguan bureaucracy, would 
have the right to vote - except members of the Nicaraguan police, 
military and militia which, being under discipline, may be expected 
to vote as directed. 
6. As it has been demonstrated that promises of the present 
government of Nicaragua have little value, it would be necessary 
for that government to take positive steps adequate to convince 
a prudent person that elections will be held promptly under the 
conditions described (or their equivalent) - and to demonstrate 
that it has ceased to supply arms to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas 
in neighboring states or to give them other kinds of assistance. 
7. If the Nicaraguan government should refuse to hold 
elections in the near future, and if the counterrevolutionaries 
should fail to achieve their goals, then, depending upon cir-
cumstances, the government of the United States should give con-
sideration to invading Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring that 
country to full independence and sovereignty, and on the pledge 
that United States troops would be withdrawn as soon as this 
is accomplished. 
8. In respect of the governments of other Central American 
states, the US should lend them such military and economic 
assistance as they may request, and which we think they require, 
for the purpose of defending themselves against Communist aggression. 
9. In my opinion, all of the measures proposed would be 
legally permitted under rules of traditional law because they 
would be taken in the legitimate exercise of the right which all 
states have to defend themselves against aggressions. The basis 
of this opinion are described in two draft chapters of a book 
which I am writing6copies of ~hich will be made available to Commission staff. ne of the chapters deals with the noninter-
vention rule. And the other deals with the individual right of 
self-defense. 
v. 
1. The suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV of 
this statement rest .on two assumptions: (a) The US currently 
has nuclear weapons capable of wrecking great destruction on 
the USSR if that state should launch a nuclear strike on the 
US itself with long-range missiles based in Russian territory; 
(b) the USSR does not have, and will not have, shorter range 
nuclear missiles which could be launched from land bases in 
this hemisphere. I do not know whether these assumptions are 
correct. 
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2. If they are incorrect, then the US is already in great 
peril and our ability to prevent additional ·communist penetrations 
in this hemisphere ought to be considered in light of this fact. 
I would then wish to reconsider the suggestions made in the 
paragraphs of part IV. 
3. If the two assu~ptions are correct, then it seems prudent 
to assume that Soviet military reaction to US defensive actions 
in this hemisphere, if any, would come in the form of the use of 
conventional weapons. In this case, geography would give the US 
an important advantage. 
4. Whether or not these assumptions are correct, before 
additional measures are taken in this hemisphere by the US 
an effort should be made by the US to reach an agreement with 
the USSR that both powers will refrain from intruding into 
areas that threaten the security of the other. Particular actions 
the US could take are described iri. the paragraphs that follow. 
5. Even in the unlikely event that it would be possible to 
reach such an agreement, it would mean a temporary truce rather 
than an abandonment by the USSR of its doctrines, strategies and 
goals of world domination. 
VI. 
1. At the end of the Second World War, the US was the most 
powerful state in the world both militarily and economically. 
This condition. created what a perceptive English writer called 
"an illusion of omnipotence" - a belief there was literally 
nothing the US could not do. This misconception was gradually 
replaced by a feeling of complacency concerning our own security 
which is reminiscent of the popular mood preceding the months 
before Pearl Harbor. 
2. It would be tedious to list the failures of our foreign 
policy even at the height of-our power which were related to 
these popular attitudes. Illustrative of them are two mis-
conceptions in a single year. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, 
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an imperfect understanding by the US of Soviet doctrines, strategy 
and tactics led to the loss of the independence of a number of 
Eastern European states, and to an extension of Russian territory 
or control of territory that extended some six or seven hundred 
miles westward in Europe. In the same year, the same misconceptions 
led to the creation of the UN in the belief that the new world 
organization would usher in a long period of universal peace 
enforced by an international military force under the direction 
of the Security Council - a force which never came into being. 
3. The failure of the UN to accomplish the primary purpose 
for which it was created was followed by a confident feeling on 
the part of Americans that the US should use its power to 
prevent aggressions which twice in a single generation had 
caused two world wars. 
4. In the period 1947-1959, the US therefore entered into 
a number of defense treaties which were one-sided in the sense 
they committed the US to defend other states against aggression 
but did not contemplate that the other signatory states would 
help defend the US if it were attacked. 
5. With minimal aid from other states, the US also defended 
states which were not signatory to the treaties mentioned and 
which were not demonstrably related to our own security. The 
wars in South Korea and South Vietnam are examples. 
6. In addition, the US acquired military bases in far-away 
places, and attempted to act as world peacekeeper in places such 
as the Lebanon where violence was endemic and there was little 
or no prospect of a pacific settlement of the complex issues 
that separated warring factions arid states. 
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7. Meanwhile, the balance of military power gradually tilted 
in favor of the USSR. After 1945, the Soviet Union continued to 
give priority to the production of military equipment at the 
expense of consumer production; US industry was quickly reconverted 
to the production of consumer goods. The USSR maintained a large 
standing army by conscription and armed it with new conventional 
weapons of all kinds; the US demobilized its army and, having· 
abandoned the draft, replaced it with a small volunteer army 
attracted by material rewards the quality of whi~b has not been 
tested. The USSR enlarged and modernized its navy .and air force; 
the US neglected both. The USSR developed sophist[cated nuclear 
weapons systems and space technology; the US neglected its 
nuclear weapons systems. The USSR launched an extensive and 
prolongued propaganda campaign designed to create fear in 
non-Communist countries and to weaken their will to resist 
Communist expansion and aggression; the US did little to 
counter this propaganda and, at times, appeared to promote it. 
8. In relative terms, the US economy declined in strength. 
For many reasons which space does not permit to be listed here, 
the Soviet economy is inefficient and noncompetitive. But the 
total power which the Soviet government exercises over the 
minds and bodies of its people enables it 'to pursue its goals 
by reducing the living standards of the masses of its people to 
a subsistence level. By contrast, the American people have for 
decades been unwilling to exercise self-restraint in terms of 
living within their means. As a result of borrowing to cover 
budgetary deficits, the debt of the national government, and 
the percentage of the national budget required to service the 
debt, are now excessive and constantly growing. This is the greatest 
single internal threat to the viability of our economy in the 
future - a danger which our founding fathers, liberals and con-
servatives alike, warned against. 
9. In sum, conditions in 1983 are not comparable to those 
which existed in 1945. The US is no longer a superpower able to 
act as the policeman of the world. Indeed, the US is today already 
overextended- in both a military and economic sense. Conditions 
have changed. But foreign policies remain largely the same. 
VII. 
1. Consideration should be given to withdrawing from all 
of the defense treaties negotiated in the period 1947-1959, in-
cluding NATO and the Rio Treaty. The basic purpose of those 
treaties was to defend states against Communist aggression. 
Some of the states which are signatory to those treaties are 
now members of the Third World which initially expressed its 
neutrality in what was apparently viewed not as a struggle for 
individual liberties and national independence but as a power 
struggle between the US and the USSR. Others have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the defense treaties. 
Other governments have supported guerrillas in the service of 
a Communist state. In other signatory states there appears to 
be significant opposition to the introduction of US missiles 
which are designed to deter the use of Soviet missiles already 
in place. These and other changes suggest that the treaties in 
question have been overtaken by events. Why should the·us seek 
to convince other states they should defend themselves in the 
way we think best? 
2. At the same time, the US should consider offering new 
mutual defense arrangements with governments that desire them 
and who have something of defense value to offer (e.g., the 
will and ability to defend themselves against the aggressions 
of their neighbors, materials which are in short supply in the 
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US, a strategic location.'which is defensible). Generally speaking, 
the purpose would be to shift policy away from defending the 
weak and helpless to building positions of-strength. 
3. Consideration should also be given to withdrawing as 
many US troops currently assigned abroad as feasible and returning therr 
to help defend the homeland. For example, if Indochina is not 
deemed vital to the defense of the US why should US troops be 
posted in South Korea? Another example: If Russian troops have 
the ability to march to the English cha~nel using only conventional 
weapons, should not our troops be withdrawn from West Germany? 
- and sliould not the West Germans themselves have the exclusive 
right to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons to defend 
themselves? 
4. Each time the USSR extends the area which it controls 
it collides with nationalism and increases the drain on the 
Russian economy. The ability of the Soviet Empire to expand is 
not infinite. 
5. A reorientation of US defense policy along these lines 
could be used' as the-basis of an approach to the Soviet Union to 
discover whether or not they would be willing to refrain from 
intruding (either directly or through surrogate states) militarily 
into the Western hemisphere, which is vital to the security of 
the United States, in exchange for our undertaking to refrain 
from intruding militarily into territory currently controlled 
by the Soviet Union or intervening in the internal affairs of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., which the USSR obviously 
considers vital to its security. Other possible concessions which 
might be considered would be to withdraw the US military presence 
from Greece and Turkey, including US bases in those two countries 
and any US -controlled missiles that we currently might have 
there or which we could introduce if those stateAso desired. Still 
another inducement could be to refrain from introducing US-con-
trolled missiles into West Germany without prejudice to the right 
of the US to sell such missiles to that or other responsible 
democracies--provided the USSR made it clear that such an agree-
ment was· considered by it essential to its security. Presumably 
France has its own weapons and would not desire US assistance. 
No other Western European state can reasonably be considered a 
threat to the security of the USSR; all of them, including 
West Germany, are, in any case, independent,sovereign states 
which is all that we desire in the Western Hemisphere. 
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6. Whether or not proposals along these general lines (with 
details to be determined) would be acceptable to the USSR is 
questionable. If they were accepted, we should not deceive our-
selves that this would imply any change in Soviet doctrine, 
strategy or tactics; all we could hope for is to decrease the 
risk of dealing with the Central American and Caribbean problems 
(except Cuba which would only be expected to discontinue its 
support of subversion in the area). If it is rejected, the 
Soviet Union would be put at a propaganda disadvantage. Neither 
the US nor the USSR would lose a great deal by agreeing to 
refrain from conducting military operations in areas geographically 
adjacent to the other which would be folly in any case. 
7. By agreeing to refrain from intervening in the domestic 
affairs of other countries, neither side would agree to abandon 
support of its basic principles. In our case, it would simply 
mean returning to the policy which was followed for the first 
hundred years after our independence: we stand for individual 
freedom and national independence and sympathize with those 
struggling to achieve them but, in the words of John Quincy 
Adams, we would not go in search of monsters to destroy. We would 
not expect the USSR to cease to be Marxists-Leninists but only 
cease to commit interventions and aggressions in areas vital 
to our national security. 
8. Consideration should be given to warning the USSR not 
to miscalculate the determination of the US to defend itself 
against aggressions in this hemisphere which threaten its 
security - or be misled by those Americans who appear to 
favor unilateral disarmament or believe that peace can be 
secured by being militarily and economically weak and indecisive. 
VIII. 
1. Only a brief comment need be made about the various 
claims that have been made concerning the economic and social 
problems of Latin America. 
2. Every sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction within 
its own territory. This means it has the right to choose its 
own government, its political, economic and social systems and 
policies and manage its own domestic and foreign affairs free 
of the coercion of other states. It follows automatically that, 
having the exclusive right to manage its own affairs, no state, 
including the United States, can escape primary responsibility 
for the way it manages those affairs. 
3. One of the malaises that affect some Latin American 
economies at the present time is identical with our own -
mismanagement of our fiscal affairs with all the economic 
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ills that follow in the train of an individual or a government 
living beyond its means .. and accumulating debts that it cannot 
service. It is an exercise in futility for the United States or 
any other country to attempt to pass the blame to some mysterious 
force operating in the markets of the world, or to try to place 
the blame on other states. In the words of the comic strip 
character, Pogo, "I have met the enemy and he is us." It is 
nonsense to claim that when the US, or US private banks, do not 
lend money in the amounts other states may desire, they are 
Shylocks demanding their pound of flesh; and, on the other hand, 
when they lend large amounts to claim they are responsible for 
the size of the debts accumulated. One cannot have it both ways. 
4. Dean Acheson correctly observed that the United States 
can, within the limits permitted by its resources, supply missing 
.components (principally foreign exchange) in a situation otherwise 
favorable to rapid economic and social progress. But it cannot 
create in another sovereign state the conditions that are essential 
to rapid economic and social progress. 
5. The countries, again including the United States, which 
have the largest debts are not, generally speaking, the poorer 
countries in the hemisphere. They are the richer ones. The way 
they choose to distribute the national wealth is for them to · 
decide. 
6. The United States is not responsible for the rate of 
population growth in other states, or for graft and corruption 
in official circles when it exists, or for any of the other 
vices inherent in human nature. Nor can it force people in 
other lands to practice the cardinal virtues; if it could it 
would presumably begin at home. 
7. No state in history has been as generous with its 
neighbors as the United States.or tried harder to be a good 
neighbor. All of the international lending institutions were 
formed at the initiative of the US. No American state has 
trade policies which are more liberal; many have trade policies 
which are protectionist. No other American state has tried 
harder, or as long, to give technical assistance or financial 
assistance on such favorable terms. No other state has made 
greater efforts to stabilize the prices of raw materials at 
a level fair to producer and consumer alike. 
LEGAL REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Statement of James H. Michel, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, 
before the National Bipartisan 
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washington, D.C. 
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This Commission has now spent considerable time 
familiarizing itself with the root causes of the turmoil that 
Central America finds itself in today. These are large and at 
times seemingly intractable issues. They are issues of war and 
peace, the willingness of neighbors to overcome historical 
animosities and lingering disputes and to pursue paths of 
regional cooperation. They are issues of ideology, and the 
willingness of proponents of radically conflicting theories of 
history and development to tolerate each other. They are 
issues of traditional political strife, and the exploitation of 
this strife by neighboring countries which, contrary to 
inter-American agreements over 50 years old, assist 
international subversion and terrorism. They are issues of 
cold economic reality, grossly unequal distribution of incomes 
and land, limited social mobility and opportunity, 
long-standing regional problems on top of which the 
contemporary period has added the burdens of debt service, 
depressed export markets, and the high cost of energy. They 
are issues of still unsilenced resistance to the political and 
economic changes that must come to the region if democratic 
institutions and greater economic opportunities are to 
flourish, and if the exploitation of misery and strife by 
external forces and extreme i9eologies is to cease. 
I come before you today to focus on one small aspect 
of this interlocking set of complicated issues, which is at the 
same time a part of the problem and a concrete part of any 
solution. 
No society will be free of lawlessness or secure in 
its democratic vocation, nor can the fruits of labor and 
enterprise be protected, unless there is a fair and effective 
system for the administration of justice. What we Americans so 
easily take for granted is but a vision for legal reformers in 
many countries in Latin America. 
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This results not from any inherent failure of the 
system of civil law, which has followed the Spanish heritage of 
most of the hemisphere. One need only to have some familiarity 
with our continental European allies to see that, whatever 
parochial view a common law lawyer may have about the virtues 
of his own system of law and practice, the civil law system can 
be a vigorous basis for a modern and progressive society. What 
has happened in Latin America? 
The answer is in part historical. A system of justice 
is seldom likely to produce better results than the political, 
social and economic context in which it finds itself. Where 
power has traditionally been concentrated in few hands, where 
violence has often been resorted to in order to maintain the 
dominance of elites, one expects that the legal system will be 
supportive of that dominance. Access to justice remains 
difficult for the many without means or power. Legal theory is 
also at work. In such a context, where judicial institutions 
will be in the shadow of power and influence, there are 
features of the civil law system that tend to compound their 
lack of effectiveness. The civil law system accentuates the 
role of the legislator, after all, and not the judiciary. 
There is no reliance on judicial precedent as a separate source 
of law apart from the code book. Judicial inventiveness 
normally does not go beyond the confines of a specific case. 
From the perspective of an American, used to judge-made law and 
judicial activism, the civil law system seems comparatively 
passive in any event. In these circumstances, passivity shades 
into irrelevance in politically or otherwise sensitive cases. 
These root problems are further compounded by practical 
problems facing the judiciary, in terms of its budget, 
resources, training and competence, outmoded procedures and 
investigative tools, and dependent relationships with the 
political arms of government and the security forces. 
In Central America today, these historical and 
continuing problems, which are shared by many other countries 
in the hemisphere, are exacerbated by levels of terrorism and 
political violence that would challenge any legal system, and 
by the current acute economic constraints faced by the 
governments of the region. Most observers would probably range 
the legal systems of Central America along a continuum with 
Costa Rica as the model, a committed democracy whose legal 
system is both reasonably efficient and politically 
independent, and, at the other extreme, perhaps, Guatemala, a 
country where political violence has been particularly acute in 
recent periods. The other countries in the region would fall 
somewhere in between. (I intentionally omit Belize, as the 
sole common law country in the region, which is really a 
special case; so, for that matter, is Nicaragua, where legal 
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"reform" is geared to the expansion of Sandinista control over 
the legal system and a lessening of judicial independence.) 
But all share budgetary problems, and most have common problems 
that seem to receive surprisingly little coordinated regional 
attention. 
This is where I believe there is more to be done, and 
where discreet u.s. assistance may be able to make a positive 
contribution to helping these countries to build over the 
long-term strong democratic institutions. 
Let us look at some of these common problems which may 
be susceptible of practical solutions: 
Judicial independence must be enhanced, by such 
concrete changes as adequately long tenure of senior judges; a 
non·~partisan process of selection based on merit, drawing fully 
on the resources of the bar, the law faculties and the 
judiciary to identify the best candidates; salary levels that 
deter conflicts of interest arising from having to maintain a 
separate private law practice to survive; and by changes in the 
law designed to enhance the judicial career and to provide the 
courts with expanded investigative and review authority, in 
particular powers of constitutional review beyond specific 
cases, and clearer lines of authority over the security forces. 
All these judicial systems lack resources; they 
cannot afford needed office equipment and supplies, staff, 
research materials, training programs, or even--in many 
cases--full time operation. Modern means of case and courtroom 
management are largely unknown. In El Salvador, for example, 
the courts operate only half days for budgetary reasons, and at 
that local court judges are forced to subsidize their 
operational budget--maybe $5 a month--in order to pay utilities 
and basic expenses; 
In criminal cases, the failure of most Central 
American legal systems is most acute. In part this is a 
reflection of the political nature of much of the violence, or 
of carefully observed limits of judicial intrusion into the 
activities of powerful persons. In part, it reflects the fact 
that there is little prestige or money in the practice of 
criminal law or criminal trial practice. In part, it reflects 
the inability of many security forces to prepare a cogent case 
for trial because of inadequate training, unfamiliarity with 
professional investigative techniques, and a lack of modern 
laboratory facilities. In the classic civil law tradition, the 
judiciary itself conducts the investigation, traditionally 
through heavy dependence on testimonial and documentary 
evidence. Times have changed, and means of criminal 
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investigation have outdistanced the ability of a sitting judge 
to manage the process. There are solut~ons to this compatible 
with civil law theory, notably the Judicial Police under the 
jurisdiction of the courts in Costa Rica, or the special 
technical police of Venezuela under the authority of the 
Attorney General. But in most countries of Central America, 
the judiciary cannot call on the security forces as an arm of 
the court in case preparation and investigation, and no part of 
the system--police, fiscalia (prosecutors), or the courts--has 
the requisite technical capability. The acquisition of needed 
training and technical means, preferably under judicial, 
fiscalia or independent auspices, is a high priority. 
Judicial training is a key deficiency. There is 
no law school or in-house judicial training program in any 
Central American country other than Costa Rica, where it is 
just starting. Standards for judicial appointment are 
minimal. The greatest weakness of the system lies at its 
heart--local judges and justices of the peace who too 
frequently in Central America lack legal training, and 
sometimes even an elementary education. 
The prosecutorial function of the attorney general 
or fiscalia is also a source of concern, for many of the same 
reasons that affect the judiciary: low wages, lack of budgetary 
and other resources, inadequate training and career 
development, lack of authority, and a lack of modern means of 
criminal investigation. 
Law code revisions are also required in many 
countries. Code modernization is particularly important in 
civil law systems. Some have already taken the initiative, 
costa Rica some years ago, Honduras very recently in a major 
revision of its 70 year old criminal code. El Salvador's 
comparatively modern codes are to be reviewed by a new Supreme 
Court commission. There are areas of deficiencies, even in 
newer codes, particularly in terms of means of proof and 
admissible evidence, often very antiquated; criminalization and 
definition of modern crimes; and procedures to deal with the 
unique challenges of political violence, including provision 
for secure trials, and the protection for judges, jurors, 
witnesses and other participants. 
Bar associations tend to play no major role in the 
legal system, except in Costa Rica. In other countries, they 
range from mere social clubs to organizations with minimal 
services for members. In all cases, they are a potentially 
potent factor for legal reform. While admission standards may 
be loose or non-existent, lawyers and jurists are far better 
educated as a group and more aware of the latent power of the 
judicial system than is the general public. Largely for 
financial reasons, membership services such as publications, 
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continuing legal education programs, and the like are scarce. 
The Bar plays little role in such issues as legal reform, 
enforcement of professional standards and judicial selection. 
There are, however, changes at work. In El Salvador, for 
example, a legal reform commission has been appointed by 
President Magana with ample private sector leadership and 
representation, which may help serve to reinvigorate the bar 
there. 
Law schools have suffered from lax standards and 
financial difficulties, and as a consequence law school 
graduates are uneven in competence. In El Salvador, for 
instance, the term of legal study has been cut back, and 
graduation criteria are loose. There are few programs of 
graduate legal study in the region, and nothing adequate in the 
way of training for a judicial career. Schools lack adequate 
libraries and facilities, and normally do not have full-time 
professors. Scholarships are scarce. 
The legal systems of many countries in the region 
function with inadequate availablity of basic legal materials. 
Frequently, it can be a frustrating problem to find an up to 
date code, let alone key judicial decisions (which of course, 
play a lesser role in civil law countries but are still 
valuable). The American lawyer, who enjoys many private 
constantly updated legal research publications , and computer 
research capability, would be shocked at the very basic level 
of legal information available in most Central American legal 
systems. 
Penal reform is an urgent problem. The vast 
majority of persons incarcerated in Central America have not 
been tried. Prison conditions, with such surprising exceptions 
as Mariona and Ilopango in El Salvador, are generally grim. We 
are aware of concern in many countries, such as Honduras and 
Costa Rica, for greater attention to alternatives to 
incarceration in lesser crimes, and prison modernization. 
I have catalogued a range of problems, some nuts and 
bolts, some not. Some systems are in need of little more than 
financial assistance, such as Costa Rica's; but others, for 
example, El Salvador, raise the question of whether any 
assistance program can do any good whatsoever unless and until 
there is political receptivity. I know that this has been the 
attitude of those in the Bar Association of the City of New 
York who have interested themselves in and published on the 
conditions of the administration of justice in that country. 
My answer to such skepticism is that we must start 
somewhere. Changes can accumulate. The organized bar and the 
judiciary, reinforced by some self-confidence, better 
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organization and greater material means, can asssume a much 
greater role and bolster processes of democratization. To 
stand aside is to ensure that neither legal reform, nor any 
meaningful and lasting democratic change, will occur. Periodic 
elections will mean little in themselves if the administration 
of justice is a failure. 
I would like to urge upon you the proposition that 
assistance to judicial and other legal institutions should be a 
component of u.s. assistance programs in Central America--and 
indeed in other regions. It is fundamental to democratic 
institution-building and defense of human rights. It is 
inherently a long-range investment, but the dividends may prove 
to be even longer-range. When a country is buffeted by serious 
political disturbance, the legal system can serve as an 
essential ballast. For example, the Chilean judiciary has 
asserted its independence as the will grows for a transition to 
democratic institutions after years of military rule. We have 
seen a reassertion of judicial institutions prior to democratic 
governmental changes in Argentina. 
But any u.s. assistance must be undertaken with a 
sense of prudence and clear objectives. We must recognize that 
any country will be understandably cautious about foreign 
involvement in matters affecting its legal system and sovereign 
institutions. We, as a common law country, with very different 
socio-economic and historical circumstances, must recognize the 
limits on direct transference of our experience. Our role, I 
believe, must be as a catalyst of regional cooperative efforts 
to address what are, in most cases, common problems. Where 
financial support is a key to progress, we can seek to assist. 
But we must work with existing and new regional institutions, 
and rely on the involvement of Latin Americans who themselves 
have the required expertise in the areas to be addressed. 
With these considerations in mind, the united States, 
in close consultation with the governments and leading legal 
figures of El Salvador, Honduras and costa Rica, has embarked 
on a number of pilot projects and activities: 
An interagency assessment team visited these three 
countries in April to better enable us to understand the 
problems and possible solutions. We have been implementing 
their general recommendations. Attorney General William French 
Smith visited san Salvador also in April to underline the u.s. 
commitment to support of legal reform. 
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We have contracted with the United Nations Latin 
American Institute for the Prevention of Crime ~nd the 
Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), based in San Jose, Costa Rica, 
to perform detailed evaluations of possible projects in the 
initial three target countries. ILANUD is the regional body 
most heavily engaged in legal reform activity at the present 
time, primarily in the criminal law area, and has already 
conducted similar project assessment studies. The team 
assembled by ILANUD from Latin America will focus on the court 
system; legal information; bar associations; attorneys general 
offices; and legal education. In consultation with government 
and private sector legal figures, and legal reform commissions, 
they will seek to elicit suggestions and work with them to 
define "home-grown" proposals which they and ILANUD can follow 
up, with u.s. assistance as appropriate. 
The Colegio de Abogados of Costa Rica is hosting a 
conference of central American bar associations early next year 
in San Jose. Bar groups from Panama, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Guatemala will participate. The theme is the role, actual and 
potential, of the organized bar in each country. Observers 
have been invited from the Bar Association of the City of New 
York, the American Bar Association, the Inter-American Bar 
Association, and the OAS. 
We have begun to provide grants for international 
visitors to undertake legal programs, including a visit to the 
u.s. this summer by several Salvadoran judges, fiscales, and 
lawyers, and a Salvadoran participant at a recent Montreal 
conference of the Canadian Bar Association on the independence 
of the judiciary (that participant, by the way, has since been 
asked to serve as Executive Secretary of the Salvadoran legal 
reform commission) • 
We are discussing funding of graduate legal 
scholarships with the University of Costa Rica law school, to 
be available to students from the three initial target 
countries of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. These would 
be initially in the areas of criminal and agrarian law. We are 
discussing other projects with the law school, including law 
library assistance and funding of travel of Jessup 
International Law Moot court teams from that school and others 
in the region, in a program long sponsored by the American 
Society of International Law. 
ILANUD is developing, in concert with the Costa 
Rican Supreme Court's Judicial Scool, a trial program for 
training of judges on a regional basis. We hope to fund a 
proposal in the very near future. 
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we have offered positions in several United States 
government training courses to eligible candidates from the 
region, where despite differences in the legal systems, 
technical skills might usefully be transferred. 
We have encouraged greater OAS activity in the 
area of legal services, and supported a resolution at the 
XIIIth OAS General Assembly creating an OAS legal development 
program. We have received a proposal from the American Society 
of International Law to convene a panel of regional academic 
experts to work with regional institutions and ourselves in 
advancing legal reform assistance efforts. We have also been 
in contact with the Inter-American Bar Association in planning 
for legal reform items on the agenda of their forthcoming 
annual meeting in Panama. 
These are, I stress, still only the outlines of a 
program with united States government support, preliminary 
steps to begin to respond to urgent problems and to identify 
worthwhile concrete projects of national and regional 
institutions. We hope to have an even more vigorous program in 
place by this time next year, and intend to expand activities 
to additional countries as soon as our experience with this 
program and our resources permit. We are not without 
difficulties, including identification of sources of funding 
for more ambitious regional programs, and possible legislative 
constraints, including Section 660 ot the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, prohibiting aid to "law enforcement 
forces". 
More work is entailed to make of this a truly 
effective program. But we have made a start. I am certain 
that the members of this Commission have now heard a great deal 
about the problems of the region, and I know you are not 
unfamiliar with the challenges facing the legal systems of 
Central America which I have described. But I also suspect 
that you have found answers and concrete suggestions, even 
small ones,. harder to come by. I offer this proposal, active 
u.s. assistance to judicial and other legal institutions, 
within the constraints I have suggested, as a perhaps small, 
but nonetheless essential element of a coherent u.s. policy 
towards the Central American region. 
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Europe and the Crisis in Central America 
Eusebio Mujal-Leon 
I should like to thank the Commission for this opportunity to speak 
before it and to express my views on the subject of West European attitudes 
and policies toward the conflict in Central America. I am an Assistant 
Prcfessor of Government at Georgetown University and a specialist in European 
politics. As a Cuban-American, however, I have a particular interest in 
Latin American politics and I have recently completed a study of European 
Socialist and Social Democratic efforts to influence the course of events 
in Central America. My intention today is to present a general analysis 
of the l~est European role in Central America and to assess the implications 
these might have for European-American relations. 
European involvement in Central America (and, more generally, in Latin 
America) is the consequence of a decades-long evolution in the self-percep-
tion and role of the United States, Latin America and West Europe in the 
international system. The most important and mutually reinforcing charac-
teristics of this process have been the erosion of American leadership, the 
growth of nationalism and the search for greater economic and political inde-
pendence from the United States in Latin America, and growing European 
political assertiveness as manifested by the activities of individual coun-
tries and the European Economic Community as well as by those of Socialis~ 
and Christian Democratic parties and foundations. 
European involvement in the l.Jestern Hemisphere should be viewed in its 
economic and political dimensions. The former is less important than the 
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latter. Specifically with respect to Central America, there is not much European 
economic investment in that region. To the degree that the Europeans have 
developed substantive economic ties, these have been vdth South America. 
Nevertheless, although European banks provided nearly $18 billion in funds 
to Latin America between 1978 and 1980, European economic ties with Latin 
American countries have not grown as impressively as many expected. Indeed, 
while the value of Latin America's exports to the European Community increased 
in nominal terms between 1958 and 1976, its share of that market dropped 
from 11 to 5.5 percent in those years. This trend has been reinforced by 
a European desire to maintain close ties with their former colonies (parti-
cularly in Africa), the growing protectionism of the EEC, and the contined 
importance of the United States as a market and source of imports for 
Latin America and particularly for Central America. 
The political dimension of the European-Latin American relationship 
has been much more important during this period. On the one hand, there 
is the sense that Latin America is perhaps the most "European" area in 
the Third World, with institutions and values that resemble in many respects 
those found in Southern European countries. The problem of how to build 
a liberal democratic state (of how to render the military and bureaucracy 
responsive to civilian power and of how to weaken extremist elements on 
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both P~ght and Left) is similar to the one experienced by many Southern European 
countries in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Europeans also generally 
view the establishment of closer relations with Latin America as a way of 
modifying the bipolar logic of the international system and of increasing 
the autonomy of both regions. 
European political activity in Central America has manifested itself 
most clearly with the involvement of Socialist and Christian Democratic groups. 
They have made substantial funds available (directly and through foundations) 
to their co-religionists in the region and have provided a number of parties 
and trade unions there with important international contacts as well as legiti-
macy. This has been particularly evident in the case of the Socialist Inter-
national and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the }lli~ in El Salvador. 
For their part, the European Socialists (and allowances must be made 
here since not all parties hold these views with the same intensity and 
they do not approach relations with the United States and Latin America in 
the same way) share certain attitudes that have special relevance in 
the context of Central America. They believe (1) that the United States does 
not understand (and in its more extreme form cannot or will not understand) 
what is happening in the Third World; (2) that the conflict in Central America 
is for the most part locally generated and results from profound social and 
economic disparities; (3) that the Soviet Union and Cuba play a secondary 
role in maintaining the insurgencies in El Salvador and elsewhere; (4) that 
the United States is eager to bring the East-West conflict into Third World 
areas in part because it is eager to reassert its faltering hegemony over the 
western alliance; and (5) that East-West confrontation over Central America 
and elsewhere in the Third World will torpedo negotiations over arms control 
(not to say trade), ultimately therefore weakening Western Europe's capac'ity 
to maintain both an effective security tie to the United States and a 
fruitful commercial relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
These views find the greatest support in the Dutch, Swedish and German 
Social Democratic parties, but are also visible to a lesser or greater extent 
in the French, Italian, and Spanish Socialist parties. Among the latter, 
how'ever, the party leaderships (specifically, Hi tterr.:ud, Craxi and Gonzalez) 
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have moderated the rhetoric of their parties. Of the parties we have mentioned, 
the most active in Central America have been the French, the. German and Spanish 
parties. After an initial burst of activism which included an almost incendiary 
speech in Mexico City in October 1981, the signing of a joint statement with 
Mexico that recognized a state of belligerence in El Salvador and the sale 
of various arms and equipment to Nicaragua, however, the French Socialists 
and government have assumed a less public posture. The reasons for this 
are many. Suffice it to point out here the French desire not to antagonize 
the United States over an area where they have very little direct concern 
(by contrast, they have a keen interest in Africa and the Middle East) and 
the fact that ~litterrand shares many of the Reagan Administration's concerns 
about Soviet expansionism in the Third World. Caution has also been the 
hallmark of Spanish Socialist foreign policy, especially after the PSOE 
assumed power in November 1982. The Spanish government lacks instruments 
to influence events in Central America. Moreover, given the fragility of 
Spanish democracy and the sensitive foreign policy issues (participation 
in NATO, the Gibraltar question, and the defense of Ceuta and Melilla on 
the North African coast) that Spain must address in the next few years, 
it is not interested in direct confrontation with the United States. 
The most active Social Democratic party on Central American issues has been 
the West German SPD. It spurred the Socialist International's involvement 
in Latin America in the mid-1970s and, through its Ebert Foundation, has played 
a major role in training and providing organizational infrastructure for 
left-wing movements in Central ~uerica. Since leaving the government in 
October 1982, the SPD has stepped up its criticism of Reagan Administration 
foreign policies. Linking up forces with the Evangelical churches (with 
whom they have been allied on the nuclear deployment issue), the SPD has 
vigorously criticized United States policies in Central America, with some 
important party federations sponsoring solidarity campaigns and collecting 
funds for Nicaragua. 
The enthusiasm that accompanied the first European Socialist efforts 
in Central America in the late 1970s has largely dissipated. Toward El 
Salvador, it has been replaced by frustration with the failure of negotia-
tions to materialize. No European Socialist leader has recently called for 
an outright guerrilla victory; most of them pointedly couple calls for 
negotiations with an explicit endorsement of future elections to lay the 
foundations for a representative democracy there. With respect to Nicaragua, 
the Socialists cling to the hope that the Sandinistas can be persuaded 
or at least moved to adhere to their original statement of principles. But 
even as their skepticism of the Sandinistas has increased, European Socialist 
leaders have refused to support American policy toward Nicaragua. Their 
objections are two-fold. On the one hand, they believe that United States 
policies will encourage the Sandinistas to adopt more radical policies. 
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(Even so, many European Socialists see such a development as almost inevitable.) 
What really impels their opposition is the fear that, confronted by such a 
radicalization, the United States would respond by sending in troops. 
European Christian Democratic parties have been generally more supportive 
of American policy in Central America. The two most important parties --
the DC in Italy and the CDU/CSU in West Germany -- have sought to elaborate 
a strategy of collaboration with the United States and what they have inter-
preted as its policy of "support(ing) forces of democracy." Although calling 
for structural economic and social reforms and regarding them as vital to the 
building of democracy, the Christian Democratics in Europe have not hesitated 
(in contrast to the Socialist International) to criticize Cuba and Nicaragua 
for their alignment with the Soviet Union and their efforts to encourage 
de-stabilization in Central America. Both European and Latin American Chris-
tian Democrats have become more cautious in their support for American 
policy in El Salvador after March 1982, when Jose Napoleon Duarte and the 
PDC were displaced from the center of power. The limits of disagreement 
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are also apparent, however. As Peter Bazing, Vice-Chairman of the Planning 
Committee in the German Foreign Office, vnote recently: "If a particular 
policy toward Latin America were only possible at the pri~e of major differences 
with the United States, {~ppositio~7 would not be a realistic option for 
German foreign policy. The price would be too high." 
Because Central American issues are developing a domestic momentum in 
Western Europe (as is demonstrated by a number of surveys taken in the last 
few months), most European governments, even when led by parties that are 
broadly S}~pathetic to American security needs and interests, have marked 
their distance from Reagan Administration policies. }fest European governments, 
for example, voted against the United States in the United Nations' Third 
Committee when resolutions criticizing the Salvadoran government's handling 
of human rights were put forward; and only the United Kingdom voted with the 
United States against a January 1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution that 
called for the suspension of aid to El Salvador. A similar pattern was 
evident in international lending agencies where European governments have 
supported the granting of loahs and credits to Nicaragua. Notably, through 
mid-1983 no European country cut off economic assistance to Nicaragua (or 
started it to El Salvador) in response to American requests. Not even the 
Christian Democratic party in West Germany resumed development aid to El 
Salvador after it won the March 1983 Bundestag election. 
The European presence in Central America has generated much publicity 
and controversy, but the impact that these parties have had on events has 
been limited. West Europe has no significant military presence or projection 
in the region and, given the present structure of international trade and 
commerce, individual European countries and even the European Economic 
Community are in position to direct substantial economic assistance or 
benefits to Central American nations. These constraints limit activism. 
So does the fact that Central America is an area where the United States 
has been traditionally strong and in which vital American security interests 
are at stake. For the Europeans, of course, Central American issues have 
a preeminently symbolic value. Needing to collaborate with the Reagan 
Administration on other, more pressing foreign policy concerns and being 
ultimately dependent on the American security umbrella, many European parties 
and governments wish to avoid overly sharp criticisms of the United States. 
For those parties in power, moreover, there is a concern that, if the debate 
over American policy in Central America becomes a major bone of domestic 
contention, it will limit their room for naneuver on other domestic and 
foreign policy questions. 
The call for negotiations in Central P~erica (and endorsement of initia-
tives like the one associated with the Contadora group) is likely to remain at 
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the core of European policies toward the region. Moreover, if negotiations 
between various groups are begun, some European governments (perhaps the 
Spanish) might be used either as mediators or as participants in a possible 
multinational peacekeeping force. Unless there is an unprovoked and massive 
American intervention, however, caution and restraint will continue to 
characterize European efforts there. 
The United States should consider European concerns and views when 
elaborating its policy with respect to Central America, but in the final 
analysis, complete agreement between this country and West European nations 
on Central American issues is an impractical goal. Our interests converge 
but they do not coincide. Nevertheless, European countries can and should 
play a role in the formulation and execution of development projects for 
the region and in opening up otherwise difficult channels of communication 
for the United States. Socialist and Christian Democratic parties can 
strengthen democratic traditions and values by continuing to support and 
provide assistance to their homologues in the region. Whatever the 
specific policy choices it makes with respect to Central America, the United 
States should strive to maintain open lines of communication with the 
Europeans. In the end, the best this Administration or any other can do 
is to adopt a coherent, consistent and predictable policy toward Central 
America; a tempered policy that, while not rejecting the use of military 
instruments to defend vital security interests, nevertheless relies more on 
political and economic forms of assistance. Such a policy would rally a 
national consensus and strengthen as well the bonds of the Alliance. 
705. 




Brian Michael Jenkins 
Caesar Sereseres 
The conclusions and judgments offered in this briefing paper are 
based on several years of Rand research. In 1980, The Rand Corporation 
initiated research on several security issues in the Caribbean Basin, 
including Central America. This research effort was later supported by 
the Air Force, and has continued this year with corporate funding. 
The individual studies produced under the Caribbean Basin security 
issues project were sent to The National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, chaired by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, in late summer 
1983. 1 Responding to the interests expressed by the Commission, a 
preliminary version of this briefing paper was then prepared. It was 
presented orally·to the Commission on October 21, 1983. 
1 The other Caribbean Basin studies are: A Strategy for Dealing 
with Cuba in the 1980s (R-2954-DOS/AF), Ed~ard Gonzalez, September 1982; 
Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin David F. 
Ronfeldt, (R-2997-AF), forthcoming, fall 1983. Venezuela's Pursuit of 
Caribbean Basin Interests: Implications for United States National 
Security (R-2994-AF), David J. ~yers, forthcoming, fall 1983; Profiles 
of the Caribbean Basin 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and 
Geostrategic Dimensions (~-2058-AF), Joseph H. Stodder and Kevin F. 
McCarthy, forthcoming, fall 1983. nilitary Politics, Internal Warfare, 
and U.S. Policy in Guatemala (R-2996-AF), Caesar D. Sereseres, 
forthcoming, winter 1983; and Nicaragua: The Internationalization bt 
Conflict and Polit1.'cs in Central America (R-2998-AF), Adriana Bosch, 
forthcoming, winter 1983. 
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SUMMARY 
U.S. INTERESTS AND VALUES AT STAKE 
Just how important are U.S. security interests in Central America? 
Viewed in isolation, they seem to be modest. From a strategic 
viewpoint, however, they assume importance because Central America is 
part of our strategic rear area, the Caribbean Basin, because the Soviet 
Union is seeking targets of opportunity there, and because adverse 
regional trends may ultimately erode the strategic position of the 
United States. This does not mean that U.S. global credibility ought to 
be seen as a key stake in what promises to be a long struggle in the 
region. But it does mean that U.S. security depends heavily on 
preventing the consolidation of hostile regimes in Central America; 
maintaining secure lines of communication throughout the Basin; and 
ensuring continued access to strategic raw materials, primarily oil and 
natural gas in Venezuela and Nexico. 
A relatively secure Southern perimeter has greatly facilit1ted U.S. 
roles as a world power, enabling us to focus attention on Europe and 
Asia. It is strategically imperative that we prevent threats from 
arising in Central America which would require us to divert military and 
other resources to the detriment of our strength and flexibility 
elsewhere. 
U.S. security is not the only issue. The United States also seeks 
to promote a set of political and economic values: respect for human 
rights, the development of democratic societies, and economic progress 
and social justice. Hence, the United States has a moral obligation to 
protect and support those moderate forces who share our basic commitment 
to human rights and other democratic values--our natural allies. 
There is no ,easy way to achieve public consensus on how to 
reconcile this strategic imperative and moral obligation in U.S. 
dealings with Central America's governments and peoples. Yet there 
should be public consensus at least that the United States has important 
interests and values at stake--and that these merit U.S. involvement, 
not disengagement, in Central America. 
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EMERGING THREATS AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Three adverse security trends affect U.S. interests in Central 
America: 
• a growth in low-intensity conficts including terrorism, 
guerrilla wars, and government repression; 
• the development of a militarized hostile axis between Cuba and 
Nicaragua, supported by the Soviets; 
• and an increasing capacity by the Soviet Union and Cuba to 
project power into the region through conventional military 
force and revolutionary guerrilla warfare. 
Two scenarios show how these trends might materialize in the near future 
and jeopardize U.S. interests. 
The first scenario examines the implications if MiGs and Cuban 
combat forces are deployed to Nicaragua. This would escalate the threat 
to Nicaragua's neighbors and potentially to the PanAma Canal and 
adjoining sea lanes. It would provide Cuba with a precedent for a Cuban 
combat presence in Nicaragua. And, depending on the U.S. response, it 
could affect world- wide perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet 
politico-military balance . 
. If the U.S. government were to ignore these developments, it would 
probably risk a further militarization of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan 
axis. If the U.S. government were to threaten air strikes unless the 
MiGs and Cuban combat presence are removed, it would probably face heavy 
domestic and international opposition. If the U.S. government instead 
were just to take defensive measures, U.S. defense planners would 
probably have deploy additional U.S forces to the area to ensure 
regional security in the event of an international crisis. This, 
however, would divert military assets from high priority areas beyond 
the Hemisphere. 
The second scenario examines the fall of El Salvador, a possibility 
that would represent a momentous defeat for the United States. Tens of 
thousands of Salvadorans would likely flee. The victorious 
revolutionaries would probably call for a protracted war to "liberate" 
.all of Central America. Guatemala would probably redouble its efforts 
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to destroy the guerrilla threat by military means, but Honduras, Costa 
Rica, and Panama would probably respond by adopting neutralist or 
accommodationist postures. The Salvadoran collapse would probably 
encourage the expansionist tendencies in both Cuban and Soviet policies. 
The fall of El Salvador would narrow the range and raise the cost 
of U.S. policy choices. Because political and economic instruments 
would probably become increasingly ineffective at stemming the 
revolutionary tide, a large U.S. military presence may be required to 
restore security and stability in the region. Yet a large military 
deployment to Central Amerfca could provoke widespread hostility 
throughout Latin America, and reduce U.S. ability to respond to crises 
in other priority areas. 
As the scenarios demonstrate, current adverse trends, if unchecked, 
could lead to a later situation where critical U.S. interests are 
jeopardized, and the means for protecting those interests become 
increasingly constrained. 
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA 
The current crisis is neither so acute nor uniform in character, 
however, that the United States must automatically accept the security 
and economic agenda presented by Central American governments, and the 
bill that goes with it. Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama are not 
presently threatened by insurgent movements; and Guatemala has thus far 
successfully contained the guerrilla struggle there. 
What guidelines should U.S. policy follow in order to head off a 
further deterioration of Central America, and to build constructive long-
term relationships with our neighbors there? Our proposals are divided 
into two parts: one for Central America in general, the other for 
Nicaragua. The proposals on Central America aim at strengthening the 
capacity of local governments and societies not only to cope with 
Marxist-Leninist forces, but also to bring about needed social change. 
In order for U.S. policy to become effective and sustainable over 
the long-term, it should adhere to three broad guidelines: 
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• First, the United States should restore its presence and 
participation in Central America to traditional levels. This 




Second, the United States should promote collective 
responsibiity for regional security and development. U.S. 
leadership is necessary in the area, but the United States 
cannot resort to unilateral hegemony. 
Third, U.S. policy should set aside the debate about which 
sources are primary. Local elites have traditionally sought to 
augment their power bv enlisting the support of external 
actors, only more so in recent years. The current 
revolutionary violence stems from both local and external 
factors; attempts that seek to single out and weigh them are a 
waste of time. 
What specific policy instruments can we employ? 
Engage Latin American nationalism: As first steps, U.S. policy 
should recognize that developing the State often takes priority ovAr the 
private sector. Also, the United States needs to make clear that it can 
accept and even cooperate with nationalist revolutionary regimes if they 
do not promote revolutionary upheavals in the region and align 
themselves militarily with our global adversaries. 
Support the moderates: United States policy needs to strengthen 
civilian and military elites that share our values and support moderate, 
democratic solutions. Technical and financial assistance for the 
development of political parties, labor unions, community groups, and 
agricultural cooperatives needs to be increased through the auspices of 
AID, AFL-CIO, the Inter-American Foundation, and other organizations. 
Training opportunities and fellowships in the United States should be 
offered to military and civilian leaders. Above all, the United States 
needs to actively shield moderate forces: If right-wing extremists will 
not stop murdering their more moderate political opponents, the United 
States may have to employ punitive measures directed against the 
personal interests of their leaders. 
Foster economic development: Because the region's long-term 
problems are largely socio-economic, a large-scale U.S. assistance 
program is needed to generate economic growth and satisfy the 
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aspirations of the lower and middle classes, particularly the basic 
human needs of the rural population. Increased support should be given 
to agrarian reform measures throughout the region by providing technical 
and financial assistance, including supplying funds for compensation to 
expropriated property-owners. Private sector development also needs to 
be stimulated in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, commerce, and 
service industries through AID, and by enlisting the assistance of the 
U.S. private sector. 
Bu~ld constructive military ties. Over the long-run, the United 
States should seek coalitional arrangements that enlist the 
participation of Basin states in multilateral security activities. In 
the meantime, U.S. security programs should aim at increasing the 
capabilities and professionalism of the local armed forces. 
• Continue economic and security assistance to defeat leftwing 
guerrillas, keep rightwing political extemists in check, and 
instill greater respect for civilian institutions by local 
military officers. 
• Military leadership and professional and organizational skills 
need to be strengthened through expanded U.S. military training 
programs in the United States, School of the Americas, and 
individual Central American countries. 
.. Restrain the introduction of advanced weapons systems into the 
region, improve intelligence gathering and analysis by both the 
local armed forces and U.S. intelligence personnel, and provide 
professional police training (presently prohibited by U.S. 
legislation). 
These and other security assistance efforts should be undertaken 
with care so as to strengthen rather than weaken fragile civilian 
political institutions and forces in Central America. 
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NICARAGUA 
Two separate issues are involved with respect to Nicaragua: Can we 
learn to live with radical nationalist regimes in our "backyard" if they 
learn to live with us? And, how do we prevent hostile extra-hemispheric 
powers like the Soviet Union from gaining military position in Central 
America? These two issues, and their respective U.S. policy options, 
are addressed separatively. 
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Several options are available for dealing with the Sandinistas: 
1. Seek accommodation. This would require that Nicaragua halt its 
assistance to Marxist guerrillas and not become a platform for Soviet or 
Cuban military expansion. In return, the United States would cease its 
diplomatic, political, and economic campaign against the Sandinista 
regime. The advantage of this approach is that it is cheap, and would 
elicit widespread public support. The principal problem with this 
approach is that the Sandinistas do not have sufficient incentives for 
curtailing their oojectives. Having won in Nicaragua, they are 
convinced that they can exploit divisions in the United States to 
undermine any U.S. effort against them, while securing sufficient 
assistance from Europe and the Soviet bloc to ensure regime survival. 
2. Oppose the Sandinistas with primarily non-military measures. 
Here, the United States would employ diplomatic efforts to isolate the 
regime both politically and economically, while providing some continued 
financial support for anti-Sandinista elements. It is a low-cost 
approach that does not directly involve the U.S. in any military 
a.;tivities, but by itself, it may not be very effective. It guarantees 
continued hostility without providing sufficient incentives for the 
Sandinistas to modify their behavior. 
3. Support the rebels in concentrated attacks on economic targets. 
This approach would exact an economic penalty on the Sandinista regime 
as a price for its alignment with Cuba and its support for guerrillas 
elsewhere. It is a feasible strategy but it could provoke a backlash in 
Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America, and it only makes the 
Sandinistas more dependent on Cuban and Soviet aid. 
4. Support the rebels in an all-out effort to overthrow the regime. 
If successful, this option would eliminate a major source of subversion 
in Central America and alleviate U.S. security concerns. But it is not 
clear that domestic discontent in Nicaragua is so widespread that latent 
guerrillas lack only guns. Nor is it clear that with or without 
discontent a force capable of toppling the Sandinistas can be created. 
The attempt could drag us into an open-ended conflict that might 
ultimately fail. Or American impatience with long struggles could 
ultimately force the United States to abandon the rebels. 
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5. Intervene with U.S. Forces. This is the surest way of 
eliminating Nicaragua as a threat to U.S. security interests, but it 
could be an enormously costly undertaking, diverting upwards of 100,000 
combat troops or more, and causing heavy casualties on both sides. 
Continued Sandinista resistance in the countryside could bog down the 
United States in a military occupation and counterinsurgency campaign 
taking years with all the attendant political fallout that this would 
bring at home and abroad. 
Nicaragua is not a military threat now anymore than Cuba was in the 
early 1960s, but like Cuba, it could become one as Cubans and the 
Soviets gradually and ambiguously supply the Sandinistas with advanced 
weapons and increase their own presence. Ultimately the United States 
would have to deploy more forces to the area thus diverting them from 
other missions. Several options for preventing a Cuban-Soviet military 
buldup in Nicaragua may be considered: 
1. Negotiate or declare a weapons ceiling. Under this approach, 
limitations on the origin, amount and kind of military equipment 
Nicaragua would receive would be negotiated, or, in the absence of 
agreement, the United States would unilaterally declare certain 
prohibitions. Such an approach addresses our principal security 
concerns and later could become part of a broader arms limitation 
agreement for Central America. However, as has occurred with Cuba, arms 
that are not expressly prohibited become permissible, and those that are 
permissible will be deployed. Also, a declaratory policy would commit 
the United States to action in every violation. 
2. Impose a quarantine. A land and sea cordon around Nicaragua 
could reduce the amount of arms delivered to Nicaragua, particularly 
heavy weapons. But a quarantine may be difficult to enforce, it would 
be a long-term operation lasting years, and would be a large-scale 
deployment of U.S, military units. 
3. Selectively attack Cuban or Soviet military material in 
Nicaragua. This approach would utilize indigenous paramilitary forces 
under U.S. control, or regular U.S. forces or special operations, to 
destroy select weapon systems. This action would demonstrate U.S. 
determination without committing the United States to action in every 
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case and would minimize the danger to civilians. But it may involve 
U.S. forces, thereby risking casualties and POW problems. Also, it 
invites retaliation--possibly sabotage of military or civilian targets 
in the United States. 
4. Intervene with U.S. forces. The pros and cons of this option 
have already been discussed. 
On the basis of our review of the current situation, we suggest 
maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas through primarily non-military 
means, continuing to provide some financial support to anti-Sandinista 
elements, while selectively targeting Cuban or Soviet weapon systems 
introduced into Nicaragua. This combination should be coupled with our 
proposals for strengthening the other Central American countries. Such 
a strategy provides some flexibility in that other options can be 
adopted later; it is low cost; it can be sustained for the long run; 
and it is most likely to gain widespread support in this country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Because a well-armed Narxist government has emerged in Nicaragua 
and guerrilla warfare is escalating in El Salvador, the 1980s seem to be 
repeating the 1960s when Castro aligned Cuba with Noscow and promoted 
guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America. At that time the United 
States responded with a host of military, economic, and symbolic 
measures: the Green Berets, the Peace Corps, military assistance, and 
economic aid under the Alliance for Progress. These programs helped 
keep Castro's revolution from spreading. But as the guerrilla movements 
waned and U.S. attention shifted to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 
Central America was increasingly ignored. 
This neglect permitted adverse developments to take root. If these 
remain unchecked, the United States may face additional crises in which 
the stakes will be higher, the options will be fewer, and the cost of 
any sort of intervention will be greater. What should the United States 
do this time? 
In this briefing we analyze changes in the policy environment, 
examine U.S. interests in Central America, and describe some scenarios 
to illustrate the possible consequences of existing threats. We then 
outline what we believe are realistic long-term policy directions to 
arrest these adverse trends and advance U.S. interests under a two-
part approach: 
1. For countries friendly to the United States, we propose a 
number of measures to strengthen their capacity to cope with 
guerrilla warfare, and to promote needed social change. 
2. We address Nicaragua separately, and analyze options for 
containing its subversive influence and preventing its 
conversion into a platform for Cuban and Soviet military 
expansion. 
The conclusions and judgments we offer are based on several years 
of Rand research. In 1980, using corporate funds, The Rand Corporation 
initiated research on security issues in Central America and the 
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Caribbean Basin. This research was supported for awhile by the Air 
Force, and has continued this year with corporate funding. 
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II. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF THE 19805 
In the years since Castro's rise to power, crucial changes have 
occurred in the global, regional, and domestic environments affecting 
U.S. interests and policies. The sum of these environmental changes is 
that: 
Our Adversaries Have Become More Powerful 
• In 1960, the Soviet Union did not have a global military 
presence. Today it does, including in the Caribbean. 
• In 1960, Cuba had a small, poorly equipped army. Today, Cuba 
possesses a modernized force--more tha 225,000 strong, with 
over 200 MiG fighters, including MiG-23s--that has engaged in 
large-scale combat operations overseas. 
• In 1960, Castro espoused a guerrilla warfare theory that the 
Soviets opposed and that ultimately failed. Today, Marxist 
guerrillas employ a sophisticated revolutionary warfare 
strategy that has Soviet as well as Cuban backing, combines 
military and civilian fronts, and enlists broad international 
support. 




In 1960, the Catholic Church was a unified, essentially 
conservative force in the area's politics. Today, the Church 
is divided. Radical priests, some committed to Marxist ideals 
and the theology of liberation, actively support revolutionary 
violence in Central America. 
In 1960, the European nations had little influence in the 
Today, they back Christian and Social Democratic parties. 
provide economic assistance. Sometimes they oppose U.S. 
policies in the area. 
area. 
They 
In 1960, Mexico and Venezuela either supported U.S. policy or 
did not actively contest it. Today, they have become assertive 
regional actors whose policies are sometimes at variance with 
those of the United States. 
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Our Ability to Influence Events in the Region has Diminished 
• In 1960, the United States was confident of its role as the 
leading world power. Today, the American public remains shaken 
and divided by the Vietnam experience, less willing to support 
the application of U.S. power abroad. 
• In 1960, the American economy was largely self-sufficient and 
expanding. Today, it has become dependent on foreign economic 
relations and energy imports. 
• In 1960, Americans rem~ined essentially insulated from 
conditions in Central America and the Caribbean. Today, the 
area's conflicts intrude into our domestic scene, mainly 
through large immigration flows. 
What do these changes mean for the United States? 
1. U.S. stakes in the region are rising: In particular, there are 
greater interests in containing hostile force expansion, sustaining 
petroleum supplies, and constraining the flows of people from the 
region. 
2. Potential threats to U.S. interests are growing: Soviet and 
Cuban military capabilities have expanded dramatically. A hostile 
military axis, backed by the Soviets, may be developing between Cuba and 
Nicaragua. And Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other 
non-Communist actors, such as Libya are supporting revolutionary 
conflict in Central America. 
3. U.S. ability to respond to threats and problems has diminished: 
While Cuban and Soviet influence has been increasing, U.S. policies have 
been constrained and the U.S. presence has correspondingly declined in 
the area. For example, the number of U.S. military personnel assigned 
to the Caribbean Basin declined sharply between 1960 and 1980: 22,000 
personnel were stationed in the Basin in 1960, rising to over 25,000 in 
1968, with the number then dropping to under 16,000 by 1981. 
The United States has only recently begun to reverse this trend by 
authorizing higher levels of military and economic assistance, and 
intelligence activities. In order to restore U.S. involvement in the 
area to traditional levels, however, the U.S. government will need 
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greater public consensus on the importance of U.S. interests and the 
nature of the emerging threats. 
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Ill. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Many Americans, across the political spectrum, remain unconvinced 
that important U.S. interests are at stake in the region. Their reasons 





Since being persuaded to support the Panama Canal Treaties, 
many Americans no longer regard the Canal and the surrounding 
region as vital to U.S. security interests. 
Central America is not viewed as possessing strategic raw 
materials or economic investments that are critical to the 
United States. 
The Central American states are not perceived as posing a 
credible threat to the sea lanes of communication in the 
Caribbean, much less to the physical security of the United 
States. 
Many believe that the United States could overwhelm any 
conventional military threat that may arise in Central America. 
Indeed, U.S. interests in Central America itself are currently 
modest. The region assumes critical importance, however, when viewed 
from a dynamic strategic perspective which takes into account: 
• That Central America forms an integral part of the larger 
Caribbean Basin; 
• That the Soviet Union seeks to exploit new targets of 
opportunity in the U.S. "strategic backyard" and 
• That over time, adverse regional trends will erode the 
strategic position of the United States. 
In taking this broad perspective, however, it is essential to guard 
against treating Central America as though U.S. credibility in the 
global strategic struggle is the central stake. The rhetoric that has 
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been necessary to mobilize Congressional and public support for U.S. 
involvement in Central America has made U.S. credibility an issue. That 
provides an incentive for not failing; but it also sets a trap. To 
prevent a loss of credibility, the U.S. may have to invest more; 
investing more puts more credibility on the line. The current turmoil 
stems primarily from local economic, social, and political problems over 
which the United States has little control, and which are likely to 
persist for may years. U.S. global credibility ought not to be at stake 
in every setback of what promises to be a long regional struggle. 
STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS 
U.S. security interests in Central America and the Caribbean Basin . 
involve the ability to defend the physical security of the United 
States, prevent expansion by any hostile power in the Basin, and project 
U.S. power abroad. These interests have often been served by 
maintaining the status quo. Four interests in particular are at stake: 
1. Prevent the consolidation of any hostile regime in Central 
America that is allied with the military foes of the United 
States. 
Nicaragua, allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and dedicated to 
revolutionary expansion, constitutes a chronic source of local conflict 
and renewed crises in the region. It could provide another base for the 
projection of Cuban-Soviet power thereby complicating U.S. global 
defense requirements much as Castro's Cuba does today. 
2. Maintain secure lines of communication, primarily the Panama 
Canal and the sea lanes in the Caribbean. 
The emplacement of offensive weapons such as MiGs or missiles, in 
Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America would represent a potential 
threat to the security of the Panama Canal and the adjoining sea lanes. 
Vast amounts of commercial trade, petroleum, minerals and other raw 
materials travel these channels, linking the U.S. coasts to South 
America, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Japan. It seems unlikely that 
Nicaragua or Cuba would attack the Canal or American shipping. But if 
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offensive weapons appear in Central America, U.S. defense planners could 
not risk the potential threat of "strategic denial" and would have to 
deploy additional U.S. forces to the area. 
3. Ensure continued access to strategic raw materials, primarily 
oil and natural gas in nearby Venezuela and Mexico. 
In 1982, the Caribbean Basin supplied the United States with 1. 7 
million barrels of petroleum per day, amounting to over 11 percent of 
total U.S. consumption. Oil 1mports from Venezuela and Hexico could 
become critical if supplies from the Persian Gulf are cut off. For the 
conflict in Central America to jeopardize these petroleum supplies, we 
have to presume that the conflict spreads either to Venezuela, which 
seems unlikely, or to southern Hexico, which is a distant possibility if 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala should all succumb to Harxist 
revolution. 
4. Prevent uncontrolled refugee flows coming to the United 
States. 
Conditions in the Basin have already produced flows of refugees 
from Cuba, Haiti, Hexico, and El Salvador. The United States could 
absorb any population flow from Central America, although it could cause 
local problems. But were civil strife also to spread to Hexico, the 
United States could ultimately confront a potential population influx of 
unmanageable proportions. 
In sum, a relatively secure Southern perimeter has facilitated our 
role as a world power, enabling us to deal with problems in Europe and 
Asia, while treating Central America and the Caribbean as a secure 
region demanding little U.S. military commitment. Hence, it is 
strategically imperative that the United States prevent 
extra-hemispheric threats from developing in the region so as to avoid 
the diversion of U.S. military and other resources that will diminish 
U.S. global strength and flexibility. 
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MORAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
The United States has also sought to promote a set of political and 
economic values in Central America. These values have led the U.S. 
government at times to attempt to transform the status quo--partly to 
bring international reality into greater conformity with our democratic 
traditions, and partly because we perceive democratic states as the 
natural allies of the United States. Consequently, u,s. policy 
generally attempts: 
1. To oblige governments to respect the human rights of their 
citizens. 
The observance of human rights is not only valued for itself, but 
also is necessary for a viable U.S. policy in Central America. Repeated 
abuses by regimes we support generate growing opposition within this 
country to assisting such governments. 
2. To promote the development of pluralist, democratic societies. 
In the long run, we believe this is the best way to build allies in 
Central America that are responsive to their people's needs, and that 
can cope with subversion and promote economic justice. The local 
commitment to democratic values, in turn, facilitates a sustainable U.S. 
involvement in the region. We also see democracy as in our immediate 
security interest: We hav~ no enemies who adhere to democratic values. 
3. To bring about economic progress and social justice with in a 
Western framework . 
This, we believe, is the best way ~o promote growth, as attested by 
the negative examples of Cuba and now Nicaragua. Economic and political 
reforms should also reduce the threat posed by Harxist guerrillas and 
may lessen emigration. 
In sum, the United States has a moral obligation to protect and 
support those forces who share a basic commitment to human rights and 
democratic values. 
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BALANCING INTERESTS AND VALUES 
How to reconcile the strategic imperative with the moral obligation 
represents a fundamental policy challenge. It is especially so in 
Central America, where the United States must deal with regimes that 
usually do not measure up to U.S. standards of behavior with regard to 
human rights, where brutal guerrilla wars continue, and where the Cuban 
and Soviet presence grows slowly, presenting creeping fait acompli.s, 
permitting no lines to be drawn. 
The United States is further hampered by its own deep-seated 
ideological divisions. In this country, Central America is a political 
battleground where partisans confirm their own prejudices and seek to 
further their own agendas. The result is too often schizophrenia rather 
than consensus. 
Yet there should be public consensus at least that the United 
States has important, if not critical interests at stake--interests that 
merit involvement, not disengagement, in Central America. To illustrate 
how Central American crises may affect U.S. interests, two scenarios 
have been developed to demonstrate the potent~al consequences costs of 
emerging threats in the region. 
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IV. EMERGING THREATS AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Adverse demographic, socio-economic, and political trends in 
Central America provide fertile ground for Marxist revolutionaries. The 
need to cope with these problems is addressed later. For now, we shall 
concentrate on three adverse security trends affecting U.S. interests in 
Central America and the broader Caribbean Basin: 
• A growth in low-intensity conflicts within states and across 
national borders, including terrorism by both the extreme right 




The development of a militarized hostile axis between Cuba and 
Nicaragua, linked to the Soviets, and that until recently would 
have included Grenada; and 
An increasing Soviet and Cuban capacity to project power into 
the region through conventional military force, revolutionary 
warfare, and trained cadr<s. 1 
We considered various possible scenarios to show how these trends 
might later materialize in new Central American crises. 2 We chose two as 
1 Although less visible, technical training and academic fellowship 
programs can help Cuba and USSR project their power more readily through 
the creation of thousands of skilled cadres who obtained their schooling 
and political formation--including intelligence training in some cases--
in communist countries. Havana has long worked to attract Caribbean, 
and Central and South American students by offering them technical 
training in such fields as education, agronomy, and public health. Less 
well known is the magnitude of the Soviet and East European bloc effort: 
although figures remain classified, their combined programs in 1981 had 
enrolled well over 3,000 students from throughout the Basin, excluding 
Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua. 
2 These include the closure of U.S. basing facilities in the Panama 
Canal Area as a result of internal and external pressures on the 
Panamanian government; the eruption of a major war between Nicaragua and 
Honduras; a border war between Mexico and Guatemala as a result of 
refugee flows and guerrilla sanctuaries in southern Mexico; and a 
conflict between Guatemala and Belize following British withdrawal from 
_the latter, with or without Cuban involvement in Belize. 
725. 
best for illustrating the ways in which U.S. interests could be 
jeopardized over the short to medium term. It must be understood, 
however, that the two scenarios are not predictive of future events. 
They are posed only as reasonable, credible contingencies that could 
confront the United States during the next five years or so. In making 
these projections, therefore, our purpose is to demonstrate (1) the 
critical importance of the region for U.S. interests, and (2) the need 
for U.S. policy to get ahead of events in the region. 




First, we assume that hardline elements dominate the Sandinista 
regime, and that they will increasingly align Nicaragua with 
Cuba to promote a "revolution without borders" in Central 
America. 
Second, we assume that Cuba will remain a close military ally 
of the Soviet Union, and a proponent of violent revolution in 
Central America. Cuba's activist policies are too important 
for Castro to forego: they provide his regime with leverage in 
dealing with Moscow; they hold out the prospect of securing new 
revolutionary allies to overcome Cuba's hemispheric isolation; 
and they further his ambitions as a global actor. 
Third, we assume that even acting cautiously, the Soviets see 
Central America as a vulnerable part of the U.S. strategic 
backyard where they can exploit opportunities to disrupt 
U.S.-hemisipheric relations, divert U.S. attention and military 
resources, and further expand the Soviet military presence in 
the Basin. 
SCENARIO 1: CUBAN COMBAT FORCES IN NICARAGUA 
Situation. Proclaiming a right of self-defense against perceived 
external threats, ~lanagua acquires a squadron of MiGs from Cuba, perhaps 
accompanied by a squadron of Cuban MiG-2ls, and units from Castro's 
elite Special Troop Batallion. For any number of reasons, the United 
States is initially prevented from responding immediately to the 
Nicaraguan-Cuban action. 3 
3 Militarily, for example, the United States might be distracted 
and tied down by an international crisis elsewwhere in the world. Or 
the U.S. Government is divided over what policy measures to adopt. Or a 
future administration is less inclined to respond to the 
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Repercussions: This development would have far-reaching 
ramifications: 
In Central America, it would escalate the conventional military 
threat, further increase the military imbalance in the region, and pose 
a potential danger to the security of the Panama Canal and adjoining 
SLOGs on both sides of the isthmus. 
In the Basin, the Sandinista government would have provided Havana 
with a legal precedent for a Cuban combat presence in Nicaragua. In the 
meantime, Nicaragua's Central American neighbors, Mexi~o, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and other local governments, would surely be alarmed by the 
Nicaraguan and Cuban action, and by the prospect of U.S. reaction. 
Globally, the military equation may be affected if it is perceived 
that: (1) Central America, the Panama Canal and other SLOGs are no 
longer secure from conventional threat in the region; (2) Cuba has 
established a combat force in Central America; and (3) only an enlarged 
U.S. military presence can assure regional security. West European 
governments may fear a weakening of U.S. military capabilities in Europe 
and the Middle East; but they may aho be unwilling to expand 
NATO-related exercises and patrols in the Caribbean. 
Policy implications: The fait acompl i of MiGs in Nicaragua, and a 
Cuban air and ground combat presence there, would thus present the 
United States with difficult policy choices. For example: 
• 
• 
The United States could ignore these developments, but only at 
the cost of accelerating and legitimizing two of the adverse 
trends: the militarization of the Cuban-Nicaraguan axis, and 
the projection of Soviet-Cuban military power into Central 
America. A "do-nothing" posture could also erode the 
confidence of Basin governments concerning U.S. resolve to 
ensure their external security concerns. 
Alternatively, the United States could threaten air strikes 
against Nicaragua unless the MiGs and Cuban combat presence are 
removed. This retaliatory option might arouse strong domestic 
and international opposition if Nicaragua seems to have a 
legitimate case for taking protective measures against external 
aggression--for example, in the event of air attacks from 
Honduras. 
Nicaraguan-Cuban action with military force. Or the Nicaraguan 
development comes on the heels of Honduran military attacks, which 
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If the United States is unable to force the removal of the MiGs and 
Cuban troops, and if the hostile axis seems likely to expand, what kinds 
of military options might U.S. defense planners consider as 
countervailing measures? 
• Have NORAD develop an additional surveillance capacity for the 
Central American and Caribbean area? 
• Send U.S. A\vACs and fighter aircraft to Honduras and/or other 
regional locations? 
• Deploy additional naval units, perhaps including a carrier for 
air cover, to stand-off the coasts of Nicaragua? 
• Strengthen the defenses of the Panama Canal Area, which are 
virtually nonexistent at present, through the emplacement of 
radar sites, surface-to-air missiles, and interceptor aircraft? 
Such measures would be expensive. Nevertheless, it may be 
necessary to undertake them particularly to ensure regional security in 
the event of an international crisis with the USSR. Yet, adopting these 
measures in an era of scarce resources and the growing global Soviet 
military presence may require diverting military assets from high 
priority areas beyond the Hemisphere. 
SCENARIO 2: THE FALL OF EL SALVADOR 
Situation: U.S. security assistance to El Salvador diminishes and 
U.S. leverage over the Salvadoran armed 1orces lessens. 4 As a 
consequence, the extreme right and hardline army commanders seize power 
and begin a second matanza to kill thousands of suspected leftists and 
guerrilla sympathizers. Popular alienation from the government grows, 
recruits flock to the guerrillas, and the Salvadoran armed forces 
disintegrate. The right-wing government collapses. The guerrillas 
assume power. 
strengthens Managua's claim to self-defense. 
4 Given the apparent inability of the Salvadoran army to turn the 
tide against the guerrillas, it is also possible for the same scenario 
to develop under current levels of U.S. security assistance. 
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Repercussions: The fall of El Salvador would represent a turning 
~oint for the region and a momentous defeat for the United States. 
In El Salvador, former government officials, military officers, and 
leaders of the centrist parties and trade unions--precisely the people 
who had aligned themselves with the United States--would be endangered. 
Tens of thousands of Salvadorans would likely flee as refugees into 
Honduras and Guatemala. Hardline revolutionaries would probably 
dominate the new government and call for a protracted revolutionary war 
to "liberate" all of Central America. 
For the rest of Central America, the politico-military balance 




But the responses of individual countries might vary: 
In Guatemala, the. military government would probably redouble 
its efforts to destroy the guerrilla threat by military means, 
dealing harshly with the civilian and especially Indian 
population of the Altiplano. 
The governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama would 
probably aiopt neutralist or accomodationist postures. 
Elsewhere in the Basin, the Salvadoran collapse would surely 
reinforce the expansionist, messianic tendency in Cuban foreign policy. 
Having gained a second ally, Fidel Castro would become irrevocably 
committed to promoting armed struggle in Central America as a new Simon 
Bolivar leading the "Second Liberation." Cuba would send military and 
security advisors and technical assistance teams to help the new 
Salvadoran regime consolidate. 
The prospect of an increasingly unstable and Communist Central 
America would alarm the governments of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, 
but domestic political constraints and divisions would probably inhibit 
them from joining regional security arrangements to contain the 
revolutionary threat. 
Globally, Moscow would surely see the Salvadoran revolution as a 
further confirmation that the correlation of international forces is 
shifting in its favor. Working through Cuba and Nicaragua~ the USSR 
tould furnish economic credits, subsidized petroleum, and arms shipments 
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to the new regime, and also join with Cuba in a new offensive to promote 
armed struggle in the Hemisphere. 
Policy Implications: For the United States, the fall of El 




Low-intensity conflict would have toppled still another pro-
U.S. regime in the region; 
The hostile axis in the Basin would en~arge to include El 
Salvador; 
Cuba and the USSR would acquire an additional site from which 
to project military and revolutionary power in the region. 
The deterioration of the U.S. position in the region would narrow 
the range and raise the cost of policy choices: 
(1) Nonmilitary policy instruments would lose effectiveness. For 
example: 
• The prospect of internal wars and Marxist revolutions would 
discourage private domestic and foreign investments and keep 
economic assistance from shoring-up beleagured governments. 
• Security assistance programs could take too long to improve the 
counterinsurgency capabilities of Central American armies 
against guerrillas that may, in the meantime, be winning on the 
battlefield. 
• Local governments, and civilian and military elites, may not 
believe that Communist expansion can be prevented without the 
commitment of U.S. combat troops. 
(2) A large U.S. military presence may be required to stabilize the 
region. 
• An attempt to roll back Marxist-Leninist gains in Nicaragua and 
El Salvador would require a large-scale commitment of U.S. 
combat forces, perhaps numbering 100,000 men--equivalent to 
five Army divisions-~to invade and pacify Nicaragua alone. 
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• Even a deterrence mission, as in Honduras, could require a 
significant U.S. contingent, while becoming a likely target of 
attacks. 
(3) A major military deployment to Central America would pose 
several security dilemmas for U.S. defense planners. 
• The traditional U.S. "economy of force" principle would be 
violated, and our ab:;_lity to respond to simultaneous crises in 
both the Caribbean Basin and other high-priority theaters might 
be constrained. 
• U.S. combat forces in Central America would certainly provoke 
widespread hostility throughout Latin America, far greater than 
has occurred wit~ the U.S. action in Grenada. Such a reaction 
could enable Harxist movements to mobilize popular support, and 
leave the United States bereft of "Good Neighbors" over the 
long-term. 
These scenarios show that the United States could face future 
crises in which (1) the stakes are higher, (2) the options fewer, and 
(3) the costs greater than at present. In sum, if not arrested soon, 
the current adverse trends could lead to situations where critical U.S. 
interests are clearly jeopardized, but the means of protecting those 
interests become increasingly constrained. Hence, it is our belief that 
U.S. policy needs to develop preventive measures to head-off a further 
deterioration of the Central American situation. 
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND GUIDELINES 




One part addresses the long-term structural problems 
confronting the Central American states. The objective, here, 
is to strengthen the capacity of local governments and 
societies not only to cope with Marxist-Leninist forces, but 
also to bring about needed social change. 
The second part focuses on the problems presented by Nicaragua 
as a subversive and military threat in the region. Here, the 
objective is to make sure that Nicaragua ceases being a 
platform for subversion and the extension of Cuban and Soviet 
power. 
Although presented separately, both parts are needed for developing 
an integrated, coordinated U.S. policy and sustaining public consensus 
for it. We shall first present general policy guidelines for dealing 
with Central America. 
SETTING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AGENDA 
If not restrained, the adverse security trends that we have 
identified point to potential Central American crises in the medium to 
long-term future. In the worst of cases, El Salvador may thus represent 




Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panana are not presently threatened 
by insurgent movements. 
Guatemala has thus far successfully contained the guerrilla 
struggle. 
Hence, the dangers in the region are neither so acute nor uniform 
in character that the United States ought to accept the security and 
economic agenda presented by Central American governments. 1 U.S. 
1 As suggested during th~ visit to Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras 
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interests must remain paramount in U.S. policies to help the region cope 
with subversion and deter further Cuban-Soviet military expansion. 
In our estimation, Central America will continue to be in turmoil 
for the remainder of the 1980s. Virtually all the countries confront 
one or more structural problems that undermine the viablity of 
governments and provide fertile ground for political violence. Among 
these are: 
• Extreme demographic pressures: in El Salvador the population 
density is on a par with that of Lndia, and the population will 
double in less than 25 years to over 10 million. 
• Large youthful populations: the under-14 year old age group 
accounts for 45 percent or more of the populations (over 22 
million) of all the Central American countries. 
• Weak export economies: Agrarian and non-petroleum producing 
economies remain critically vulnerable to world market 
conditions, as evidenced by the depressed condition of Costa 
Rica and other countries in the region. 
• Rigid and regressive socio-economic systems: land holdings are 
concentrated among a fraction of the population, especially in 
El Salvador and Guatemala, and avenues for social mobility are 
often blocked by class, ethnic and racial barriers. 
• Save for Costa Rica, governments are brittle and cannot 
accommodate to change; civilian institutions remain weak; and 
societies are too polarized to achieve consensus on the form 
and purpose of government. 
The choice facing the United States is whether it is possible to 
avoid a potential worse-case situation and deal instead with a still 
messy but manageable situation. To achieve this, the United States will 
need a long-term, well-coordinated policy to achieve this. 
by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, these 
governments will tend to seize upon the existence of a Marxist-Leninist 
regime in ~icaragua as a means of pressuring Washington for 
multi-billion dollar U.S. economic assistance programs. 
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BASIC GUIDELINES FOR A LONG-TERM POLICY 
The ability of the United States to affect the ultimate outcome of 
local struggles, and to help shape Central America's development, will 
be limited by the investments made and the priorities given to crises in 
other parts of the world. The likelihood of political and military 
setbacks along the way will have to be accepted. These considerations, 
coupled with problems inherent in the American political process, 
suggest that it will become difficult for us to perservere in any long-
term undertaking. Nevertheless, to develop both a more effective and 
sustainable policy, three broad guidelines should be followed: 
Expand U.S. Participation in Central America Affairs. To promote 
its strategic imperative and moral obligations, the United States shall 
have to restore its presence and participation in Central America to 
higher levels: 
• The disengagement of the United States from the Basin during 
the 1970s contributed to the internationalization of conflict 
in Central America as regional and global actors involved 
themselves in the Nicaraguan Revolution and today in El 
Salvador. 
• To offset these external forces, as well as to counter the 
adverse trends in the region, the United States must remain the 
paramount power in the region, while avoiding over-commitments 
and an excessive military presence. 
Engage the Cooperation of other Basin States. While exercising 
leadership, the United States can no longer rely on unilateral hegemony. 
Collective responsibility for regional security and development needs to 
be promoted and supported: 
• 
• 
The Organization of American States seems too weak and divided 
to effectively serve this purpose well. 
Sub-regional groupings, such as the Contadora Group, the 
Central American Forum for Peace and Democracy, the Central 
American Common Market, and the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States, may provide better approaches to coalition-
building in the Basin. 
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Address both the internal and the external sources of conflict. 
The debate about whether the sources of conflict in Central America are 
internal or externa needs to be set aside: 
• Local elites traditionally have sought to augment their power 
by enlisting support of external actors, only more so in recent 
years. 
• Led by the experience of the Sandinistas, today's 
revolutionaries deliberately internationalize the region's 
conflicts. 
• The current revolutionarv violence thus stems from both local 
and external factors; attempts that seek to single out and 
weight them are sterile exercises. 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS 
What are some of the specific measures that need to be adopted to 
stengthen Central American governments and societies? While the 
proposals may look conventional, they respond to four major policy 
challenges that have faced the United States in the region for decades: 
1. Engage Nationalism in Central America. It remains difficult for 
the United States to deal with Latin American nationalism. Yet that 
nationalism can provide a powerful barrier against extra-hemispheric 
intrusions. Hence, in order to engage the region's cooperation, it is 
necessary to accept the central nationalistic desire for political 
sovereignty, economic independence, and national dignity. As first 
steps, U.S. policy should 
• 
• 
Recognize that developing the State, including state 
enterprises and the military as an institution, often takes 
priority over the private sector. 
Make clear that the United States can live and even cooperate 
with nationalist revolutionary regimes in so far as they 
refrain from promoting revolutionary warfare in the region, and 
do not align themselves militarily with the global adversaries 
of the United States. 
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2. Strengthen Moderate Forces. We cannot simply oppose left- and 
right-wing extremism in Central America if our policy is to remain 
viable both in the region and within the United States itself. Hence, 
we need to strengthen those elites and institutions--both civilian and 
military--that share our values and support moderate, democratic 





Promote "Project Democracy" and efforts by regional institutes 
to provide leadership training and electoral assistance. 
Provide technical and financial assistance for the development 
of institutional infrastructures--political parties, labor 
unions, community orgaizations and agricultural cooperatives--
through the auspices of AID, AFL-CIO, the Inter-American 
Foundation, and other governmental as well as private 
organizations. 
Expand training opportunities and fellowships in the United 
States br military and civilian leaders, especially among the 
young, in order to create professional cadres that are 
favorably disposed towards the United States. 
Break the historic ties between the military and security 
forces and the oligarchy in El Salvador and elsewhere in the 
region--if not in this generation of officers, in the next--
by continuing to provide security assistance and military 
training. 
The United States is the only nation that has the influence, 
resources, and interests to shield the growth of moderate forces: that 
kind of protection cannot be offered by the European states, the 
Socialist International, or the Contadora countries. Ultimately, if 
right-wing extremists will not stop murdering moderate political 
opponents, it may become necessary to employ punitive measures directed 
2 The label "moderates" is difficult to define in the Central 
American political context. However, it could encompass not only 
centrists, but also left- and right-wing civilian and military elites 
who are committed to the existence of an open pluralisticic society, 
promote mechanisms for political participation, adhere to non-violent 
political processes, and accept constraints on the exercise of political 
power. Such "moderate" practices may fall sort of American liberalism 
and formal democratic institutions, but are a step in that direction. 
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against the personal interests of right-wing leaders. The model for 
such a policy is Santo Domingo: The United States played a key 
supportive role in the reassignment of extreme right-wing senior 
officers, along with more junior left-wing officers, in the Dominican 
military to diplomatic posts abroad in order to promote peace and a 
democratic outcome following the 1965 Dominican revolt. 
3. Foster Economic Development. The region's long-term problems 
are largely socio-economic, and so must be the solutions. The land 
reform in El Salvador and the Caribbean Basin initiative are modest 
steps in the right d:i,.rection, but programs of even greater magnitude and 
duration are needed: 
• 
• 
Support agrarian reform measures throughout the region by 
providing technical and financial assistance, including 
supplying funds for compensation to expropriated property-
owners.3 
Stimulate private sector development in agriculture, 
construction, manufacturing, commerce, and service industries 
through AID and by enlisting the assistance of the U.S. private 
sector. 
• Adopt a large-scale program like the Marshall Plan or the 
Alliance for Progress to generate economic growth and satisfy 
the aspirations of the lower and middle classes, particularly 
the basic human needs of the rural population. 
While expanding its developmental assistance, the United States 
must also ensure that its aid not become a means by which local 
governments and elites postpone hard decisions on the need for 
redistributive reforms. In addition, aid should be tailored to local 
absorptive capacities, while being aware of attempts to exaggerate 
threats in order to obtain greater amounts of U.S. aid. 
4. Foster Constructive Military Ties. The United States should 
consider new coalitional defense mechanisms that enlist the 
participation of Basin states in collective security activities. Such 
3 Congressional legislation barring such assistance needs to be 
removed. Conditions might also be attached to compensation: for 
example, property owners might be required to reinvest a specified 
portion of the money received in local industries to qualify for 
compensation. 
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activities could involve intelligence sharing, sea and air patrols, and 
peace-keeping missions, among others, in order to contain low-intensity 
conflicts and hostile force expansion. Multilateral activities such as 
these are likely to take years to evolve, however. 
In the meantime, key tasks for U.S. security assistance programs 
should be to improve the counter-insurgency, economic defense, and 
nation-building capabilities of local military organizations: 
• Continue economic and security assistance to defeat leftwing 
guerrillas, keep rightwing political extremists ~n check, and 
instill greater respect for civilian institutions by the 
military and security forces 
• Strengthen military leadership training, and professional and 
organizational skills, through expanded U.S. military training 
programs in the United States, the School of the Americas, and 
individual Central American countries. 
• Restrain the introduction of advanced weapons systems into the 
region, including those from Western arms suppliers. 
• Improve intelligence gathering and analysis by both the local 
armed forces and U.S. intelligence personnel. 
• Provide professional police training (presently prohibited by 
U.S. legislation) to security forces personnel. 
Such security assistance and military measures as these should be 
undertaken with care, so as to strengthen rather than weaken fragile 
civilian political institutions in Central America. The 
professionalization of the local military and security forces, including 
their subordination to civilian authorities, should thus become a key 
objective of a larger U.S. security role in the region. 
These broad policy directions would respond to both our security 
concerns and moral obligations, and should therefore evoke support from 
much of the American people. The following section addresses the 
~ontroversial issues posed by Nicaragua. 
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VI. THE CHALLENGE OF NICARAGUA 
Even if we succeed in pursuing these broad policy directions, we 
still face the question: What is to be done about Nicaragua? This is 




Can we learn to live with radical nationalist regimes in our 
"backyard" if they learn to live with us? 
How do we prevent hostile extra-hemispheric powers (like the 
Soviet Union) from gaining military positions in Central 
America and the Caribbean? 
The Cuban Revolution raised these questions in the early 1960s. 
U.S. policy responded by supporting (and later dropping) the Cuban 
exile forces, enacting an economic embargo, isolating Cuba 
diplomatically, and limiting (but not preventing) a Soviet-Cuban 
military build-up. For almost two decades, U.S. policy succeeded in 
containing Cuba and raising the costs of its policies. 
Nicaragua is not Cuba, however, and the 1980s are not like the 
1960s. Although the United States should be able to live with radical 





The Sandinistas are led by trained, dedicated Marxist-Leninists 
who are strongly anti-U.S., whereas Castro was not so clearly 
committed from the start. 
Nicaragua is on the mainland, has traditionally been closely 
linked to its Central American neighbors, and therefore may be 
more difficult to contain than Cuba. 
The Soviets may be caught in a resource bind, and may be less 
inclined to prop up another Cuba. But Nicaragua has 
opportunities to tap European resources that were not available 




Nicaragua may enlarge the Soviet-Cuban military presence in a 
time when, mainly because of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, 
regional military balances matter. In contrast, Cuba gave the 
Soviets a new military position in a time when the United 
States was the paramount superpower and regional balances 
mattered much less. 
The American public is very divided over Nicaragua, in part 
because of Vietnam and the existence of solidarity networks. 
In contrast, a strong anti-communist consensus existed in the 
early 1960s. 
U.S. policy has recen~ly responded to the Sandinistas much as it 
did to Castro. Our government has: 







sought to block funding from international organizations; 
terminated Nicaragua's sugar quota; 
sent diplomatic delegations to Europe and elsewhere to 
discourage foreign support for the regime; 
backed the anti-Sandinista rebels, first in their efforts to 
gain territory and popular support, more recently to destroy 
economic targets; 
and held large-scale military maneuvers around Nicaragua while 
building the military capablities of its neighbors. 
With this background, we examine selected options for dealing with 
the Sandinista regime and, separately, for preventing a Soviet-Cuban 
military buildup in Nicaragua. 
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OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE SANDINISTAS 
AS A REVOLUTIONARY SANCTUARY 
Critics err when they state that only the installation of Soviet 
offensive weaponry would threaten U.S. security interests in Central 
America and the Basin. As suggested by our scenarios, the spread of low-
intensity conflict alone would destabilize the region, and could require 
the United States to deploy new forces there. 
There are five approaches to dealing with the Sandinistas: 
1. Accommodation: This would have the United States accepting the 
regime, if it, too, learns to live with the United States and its 
neighbors. Each side would need to make compromises to respect key 
interests of the other. The critical consideration for U.S. security 
interests is that Nicaragua not enable an expansion of Soviet power in 
the region, by providing military bases, developing local armed forces 
under Soviet or Cuban auspices, or assisting neighboring Marxist 
revolutionary forces. 
The United States, in return, would not actively support anti-
Sandinista forces in Nicaragua and would cease its diplomatic, 
political, and economic campaign against the Sandinista regime. The 
expectation would be that, perhaps in a few years, the revolutionary 
ardor and anti-American sentiments of the Sandinistas might cool, and 
thus Nicaragua, which faces many of the same problems ~s its Central 
American neighbors, will find it in its long-term interest to cooperate 
with them. The original platform of the Sandinista movement, which 
called for democratic pluralism, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned 
foreign policy, would have been acceptable. 
The attractions of accommodation to the United States are obvious. 
• 
• 
It may lower the level of hostility in the region . 
It would be cheaper than efforts to overthrow the regime, 
though it may require U.S. economic assistance and trade 
benefits for Nicaragua. 
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• It would be widely supported in Latin America and Europe . 
• It would have considerable support in the United States . 
• It would permit a genuine rapprochement at some future date . 
Accommodation also raises several problems: 
• It means abandoning the non-Sandinista democratic elements in 
Nicaragua. The United States would have to tolerate Nicaragua 
as an authoritarian, probably repressive, Socialist state. 
• It is not clear that conservative elements in the United States 
would accept this. 
• It depends on Nicaragua altering its behavior. Right now, the 
Sandinistas do not appear to have sufficient incentives for 
curtailing tb.eir objectives: They believe that the United 
States can do little to overthrow them, that they can exploit 
divisions in th~ United States to undermine any U.S. effort 
against them, that they can exploit anti-U.S. feelings in 
Nicaragua to consolidate domestic political support, and that 
they can attract West European and Soviet economic support to 
make up for the absence of U.S. assistance. 
2. Oppose the Sandinistas primarily with non-military measures: 
This approach would emphasize diplomatic efforts to isolate the regime, 
raise its economic costs, reduce the support it receives from Latin 
America and Europe, and undermine it through continued support for anti-
Sandinista elements (with money, not weapons). 




It is comparatively cheap . 
It avoids U.S. military or paramilitary involvement . 
It arouses less opposition in Latin America, Europe, and the 
United States. 
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The principal problem with the approach is that, as with Cuba, it 
may have to be sustained for years and by itself, it may not be 
effective: It guarantees continued hostility and increasing dependence 
on the Soviet bloc and Europe without providing sufficient incentives 
for the Sandinistas to modify their behavior. 
3. Support rebels; concentrate on selective economic targeting: To 
impose an economic penalty on the Sandinistas as a price for their 
alignment with Cuba and support of Harxist insurgencies elsewhere, the 
United States could support the rebels pressuring them to concentrate 
their attacks on economic targets like power grids, oil supplies, 




It has some symmetry: Nicaraguan-backed Salvadoran guerrillas 
have waged a similar campaign virtually destroying El 
Salvador's economy. 
It is feasible and promises a quick impact. Such an effort may 
already be hurting Nicaragua and causing the Sandinistas to 








It imposes a heavy burden on the Nicaraguan people . 
It could provoke widespread anti-American sentiments in 
Nicaragua, Latin America, and the United States. 
It leaves in place a hostile regime in Hanagua . 
It makes the Sandinistas more dependent on Cuban, Soviet, and 
European aid. 
It makes U.S. policy depend on the anti-Sandinistas . 
4. Increase support to rebels in effort to overthrow the 
Sandinistas: If successful, an anti-Sandinista operation to topple the 
regime would eliminate a revolutionary sanctuary in Central America, 
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assist the Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency efforts, and 
present a major political and military setback for Cuba and the Soviets. 
But there are also costs. 
• It would increase the bloodshed and destruction and could 
associate the United States with acts of terrorism if the 






It could arouse anti-Yankee emotions that assist the Sandinista 
regime's consolidation and alienate much of Latin America. 
It increases the risk of war between Nicaragua and Honduras . 
It could result in an increased Cuban role, possibly Cuban 
volunteers in Sandinista combat units, especially if war with 
Honduras seemed more likely. 
It would intensify political debate in the United States which 
could imperil other defense and foreign policy goals. 
This risky venture would depend largely on the degree of discontent 
in Nicaragua and the ability of the rebels to weld that into an 
effective fighting force capable of defeating the Sandinistas. 
• It is not clear that discontent in Nicaragua is so widespread 
that, by providing, weapons, money, and organization, the armed 
opposition will grow. 
• It is also not clear that, with or without domestic discontent 
in Nicaragua, a force capable of toppling the Sandinistas can 
be created by infusing it with sufficient money and weapons. 
• This side of the colonial era only a few guerrilla movements 
have succeeded, and all of these have required great patience. 
Would we stick with it? Would we risk escalating? Would we be 
willing to use U.S. combat forces? Our own history of 
impatience with such ordeals suggests that we would ultimately 
tire of the conflict and learn to live with the Sandinistas (as 
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we have done with Cuba). We may thus end up abandoning the 
anti-Sandinista rebels, or seeing them turn on us. 
• The rebels have their own agenda. Even if they were dependent 
on U.S. support, they are not likely to be the willing pawns of 
the United States. Can we control them? 
Unless we can give postive answers to these questions, then a 
strategy that relies primarily on anti-Sandinista forces to overthrow 
the Nicaraguan regime seems unlikely to succeed and may not be worth the 
probable cost of the effort. 
5. Intervene with U.S. Forces. At the far end of the scale would 
be a full-scale, U.S.-led military intervention. The attractions of 




It would end the principal source of subversion in Central 
America 
It would facilitate El Salvador's counterinsurgency efforts . 
It would present Cuba and the Soviet Union with a major 
political and military setback. 
Apart from the diplomatic problem--that this approach would be 
denounced throughout Latin America and much of the rest of the world--
it may also create many military problems: 
• 
• 
It would be an enormously costly undertaking. U.S . 
intervention in Santo Domingo involved over 23,000 men to 
restore order in a single city, and there the United States 
faced virtually no opposition. Full-scale intervention in 
Nicaragua could require 100,000 men and conceivably more, to 
fight against the well-armed Sandinista army and popular 
militia. 
It would thus divert the entire U.S. strategic reserve thereby 




Unlike Grenada, there could be heavy U.S. and Nicaraguan 
casualties. 
It could bog the United States down in a lengthy military 
occupation and counterinsurgency campaign taking years. 
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OPTIONS TO PREVENT A CUBAN-SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN NICARAGUA 
The conventional military threat that may be posed by Nicaragua, 
and the difficulties that the United States might encounter in 
responding to such a threat, cannLt be discounted: Nicaragua is not a 
military threat now any more than Cuba was in the early 1960s, but like 
Cuba, it could become one. The Soviets and Cubans may gradually and 
ambiguously develop a routine, basin-wide military presence for 
reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, tactical air, 
transport, and naval patrolling. Still later, these incremental moves 
could be followed by their acquisition of local ports and bases for 
defensive and potentially offensive missions. 
As has occurred with Cuba over the past 14 years, the United States 
may find that it cannot prevent such an incremental expansion, extended 
over time, by simply, "drawing the line" because the threat remains too 
nebulou~. Eventually, the United States would be compelled to increase 
its military presence by rendering increased military assistance to 
countries in the region, enlarging its air defense and naval patrols, 
and by strengthening its basing facilities and perhaps acquiring new 
ones. With a low resource investment in the region, the Soviets could 
thus oblige the United States to make a large, costly countervailing 
investment. 
Four approaches for preventing a Cuban-Soviet military buildup in 
Nicaragua can be considered: 
1. A Negotiated or Declared U.S. Weapons Ceiling. In this 
approach, the United States would seek to negotiate with the Sandinista 
regime a ceiling on the origin, amount and kind of military equipment 
Nicaragua would acquire. Or in the absence of such an agreement, the 
United States would declare certain prohibitions, warning that a 
violation of the limits would result in U.S. countermeasures. 
This approach has several advantages: 
• It addresses our principal security concern setting aside the 
issue of whether the United States can tolerate radical 
revolutionary governments. 
• It could form part of a broader arms limitation agreement among 
the countries of Central America. 
• Thus far, U.S. warnings against the deployment of MiGs to 
Nicaragua appear to have worked. 




The Sandinistas may not consider U.S. threats, if they violate 
the limits on weaponry, to be credible. 
As we have learned from experience with Cuba, that which is not 
expressly prohibited automatically becomes permissible; that 
which is permissible will be deployed. 
A declaratory policy automatically commits the United States to 
action in every violation. The United States may not want to 
take action in every case. To not take action, for whatever 
reason, would be perceived as a reversal of policy, a loss of 
credibility. The uncertainty should lie with the Nicaraguans, 
Cubans, and Soviets. 
2. A Quarantine 
Under this approach, the United States would impose a land and sea 
quarantine to prevent the introduction of heavy weapons into Nicaragua 
by both Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. The selective blockade of 
specific types of weapons and support systems would allow the United 




It would dissuade European allies from providing the advanced 
weapons. 
It may discourage or at least delay Cuban and Soviet support . 
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Implementing a quarantine also poses serious problems: 
.. 
A quarantine would be difficult and costly to enforce; it may 
require a large deployment of air, sea, and ground units. 
It risks confrontation with the Soviets . 
In the case of Cuba, there were specific large weapons on the 
way. The quarantine had only to last a short period of time. A 
cordon around Nicaragua to prevent the introduction of certain 
weapons would require a long-term operation, lasting years. 
3. Selective Targeting 
In this approach, the United States would utilize indigenous 
paramilitary forces, under U.S. control, or U.S. regular air or naval 
forces, or special U.S. operations capabilities to attack Soviet or 
Cuban military equipment now in Nicaragua or that may be introduced 
later. While the Soviet weapons already there do not threaten the 
security of the United States, they do represent a decision by the 
Nicaraguan regime to align itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union. If 
the United States does not quickly demonstrate a willingness to prevent 
Nicaragua's gradual conversion into a Soviet-Cuban military platform, we 
could be faced later with a succession of fait acomplis similar to what 
has transpired in Cuba over the past decade and a half. 
The advantages of such an approach are: 
" 
.. 
It would demonstrate U.S. determination. 
It can be done overtly or covertly. 
The uncertainty remains on other side . 
It does not automatically commit the United States to action in 
every case. 
• It is relatively clean or "surgical" in targeting weapon 
systems and not the civilian population. 
748. 
• It is more likely to be understood by the American public than 
efforts to overthrow a regime. 
• It may indirectly help the rebels. 
Such an approach, however, raises several problems: 
• It would involve the United States more directly as compared to 




U.S. participants could be taken prisoner by the Sandinistas, 
creating a POW problem. 
It invites retaliation--possibly attacks against military or 
non-military targets in the United States. 
It could imperil the American Embassy in Managua and thousands 
of U.S. citizens in Nicaragua. 
4. Full-scale U.S. military intervention. 
The fourth option is full-sr.ale U.S. military intervention. The pros 
and cons of this option have already been discussed. 
The particular measures that might be adopted towards Nicaragua 
depend upon a host of considerations that are likely to change over 
time. Still, on the basis of our current review of the Nicaraguan 
situation, we would suggest the following combination of options: 
• 
• 
Maintain pressure on the Sandinista regime, relying primarily 
on non-military means although continuing to provide financial 
support to the anti-Sandinista rebels. 
Selectively target Cuban and Soviet military equipment (or any 
other military hardware considered threatening to U.S. 
interests). 
These measures would be coupled with continued U.S. support of 
friendly Central American governments in defeating Marxist insurgents 
and at the same time strengthening regional economic and institutional 
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capabilities to respond to legitimate demands for change rather than 
reliance on authoritarian, repressive responses. 
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Testimony by 
David Rockefeller, Chairman, 
The Americas Society 
Before the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America 
Washington, D.C. 
October 21, 1983 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission: 
My name is David Rockefeller, and I am appearing before you 
in my role as Chairman of the Americas Society and its 
affiliates, Council of the Americas, Caribbean/Central American 
Action, the u.s. Business Committee on Jamaica, Center for 
Inter-American Relations, and Pan American Society of the 
United States. I should add that the crisis in Central America 
is also of grave concern to other groups I chair at this time 
-- including the Council on Foreign Relations, and The Chase 
Manhattan International Advisory Committee. 
I believe it is fair to say that Central America 
historically has been an area largely neglected by the u.s. and 
others. And, if it were not for the security problems there 
today, it undoubtedly would continue to be so. The challenge 
-- and opportunity -- is to transform this new interest into a 
solid, lasting concern that will lead to effective longer-term 
ties of cooperation and pragmatic strategies for development, 
job creation and political stability. 
Improving relations is, I should add, not simply a 
challenge with respect to Central America, but rather a 
challenge concerning u.s. relationships with our neighbors 
throughout the hemisphere. Perhaps because the roots of so 
many Americans are in Europe, we have tended to focus our 
attention there. Latin America receives little attention in 
our schools, and, except in times of crisis, little attention 
in our media. Much the same situation is also true with 
respect to Canada to the north. As a result, we have only a 
slight understanding of our neighbors and have never developed 
a consistent, bipartisan commitment and policy toward our own 
hemisphere. While this is perhaps understandable in an 
historic context, I would suggest it is no longer acceptable in 
today's world. 
The last time I can recall a consistent and close u.s. 
relationship with Latin America that enjoyed broad public 
backing was during World War II when all nations of our 
hemisphere faced a common threat. This also was a bipartisan 
effort within the u.s. -- a fact that I can attest to since my 
late brother, Nelson, a Republican, worked hard to cement our 
Latin relations on behalf of a Democratic administration. 
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After the war, however, the u.s. went back to paying attention 
to Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada primarily in times 
of perceived need or threat to us. 
Needless to say, such attitudes build resentment among our 
neighbors who believe, with some justice, that most of the time 
we either tend to take them for granted or ignore them. Thus, 
while today we focus on Central America, I hope we will take 
the opportunity to build a firmer commitment and a broader 
policy toward the hemisphere at large. If we had had a 
consistent overall policy, even ten years ago, it would have 
been far less likely that we Hould be facing the crisis we do 
today in Central America. 
Security, economic and political issues in the Central 
American area are sometimes treated as if they were independent 
of each other. This, to me, is a serious mistake since all 
three obviously are closely intertwined. The region and those 
interested in it are, I believe, engaged in three simultaneous 
battles: the battle for stability, involving military and 
security factors; the battle for tangible improvements in the 
quality of life, involving economic and political factors; and 
the battle of ideas involving factors of ideology and 
perception. As with a stool resting on three legs, the neglect 
of any one of the concerns will probably lead to the ultimate 
collapse of the entire structure. Let me say something about 
each of these three areas. 
First, the battle for stability: while not an expert on 
military or security matters, I think a few points should be 
made that relate to both economic and political considerations. 
Neither economic nor political stability is possible in the 
midst of armed conflict. There can be no economic recovery 
and, particularly, no significant new private investment or 
commercial bank lending to the region unless the fighting 
stops and some degree of political stability is achieved. 
How to achieve these goals is a matter of intense debate 
within the u.s. A negotiated solution that meets our 
security concerns is obviously preferred, but we must do 
our best to ensure that such a solution is solid and not 
just another interim stepping stone to externally directed 
Marxist domination. Such a situation is profoundly 
difficult to achieve so long as Nicaragua remains committed 
to waging a revolution beyond its borders with the help of 
foreign assistance in both arms and men. 
Whatever the U.S. does in Central America will be 
unpopular, but it will be less unpopular if it is 
successful. Our nation historically has been very 
ambivalent about military involvement. The disastrous 
results we have seen of half-hearted interventions would 
suggest we might be wiser to have no military involvement 
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than one which is not decisive. But, is it realistic to 
rule out the use of arms under any and all circumstances? 
I believe that deserves careful consideration. 
A similar ambivalence exists among our friends in Latin 
America. Privately, many welcome and respect a firm stance 
on the part of the u.s. Unfortunately, however, for 
political reasons, this support is rarely stated in public. 
Despite this, we should attempt to the extent possible to 
make military and security efforts -- if they appear to be 
called for -- a multilateral undertaking, involving others 
with similar concerns for the stability of the region. 
Such an approach both properly spreads the responsibility 
and increases the chances of success. 
Finally, whatever military and political solutions are 
necessary should reflect the social and political points of 
view of the nations concerned. "Solutions" which ignore 
the interests of the people involved can only be 
ineffective, transitory, and lead to greater resentment and 
problems in the future. 
In this regard, there is a heated debate in the u.s. 
regarding the desirability and feasibility of democratic 
political solutions. While it is clear that the u.s. 
private sector is able to operate successfully under a 
variety of regimes, our preference, while the situation is 
still fluid, certainly should be some form of democratic 
pluralism. I do not, however, believe we should try to 
dictate to people how they should be governed or refuse to 
work with forms of government other than our own. 
Nor is it realistic to assume that we shall soon find 
democracy practiced in Central America as we know it in 
Vermont or New Hampshire. The emphasis, I believe, should 
be less on form and more on the existence of basic freedoms 
of speech, the press and political choice. The key 
differentiation to my mind in terms of u.s. interests is 
less the type of government than the degree to which 
hostile outside forces such as the Soviets and the Cubans 
are in control and are creating situations that threaten 
u.s. security. When such threats occur, I believe we have 
a national self-interest to do all we can to contain or 
eliminate them. 
At the same time, I also believe we should do all we can to 
support both friends with strong democratic institutions 
such as Costa Rica and those who are committed to 
strengthening democratic structures that are still weak, 
such as Panama and Honduras. We must make it clearer than 
we have in the past that we value democracy because we 
believe it is the best system of government, and not 
because it is an expedient alternative to Marxist rule. 
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Second, the battle for tangible economic improvements: if 
an end to hostilities is essential to attracting capital to the 
region, the reverse also is true -- a resumption of economic 
growth and tangible improvements in job opportunities are 
necessary to maintain whatever political order is established. 
My Americas Society colleagues, Seymour Milstein and Sam 
Segnar, have testified before you on the economic aspects 
of the situation, and have made a very interesting proposal 
for a new public-private entity to spur economic 
development in the entire Caribbean Basin. They have 
submitted substantial follow-up materials on this concept 
today, so I will not myself elaborate on the idea at this 
time. I do, however, urge your careful and constructive 
consideration of the concept they have proposed. Such an 
ambitious program may well be in the best interest of the 
United States at the present time. 
Spectacular economic growth and the complete and immediate 
eradication of poverty are not necessary to political 
stability in Central America. Indeed, overly rapid growth 
has in the past often proved destabilizing. On the other 
hand, moderate and sustained growth is necessary to reduce 
tensions and give people a confidence in the future which 
will permit political compromise in the present. 
In the intermediate and longer terms, I believe existing 
institutions and programs can be built upon very fruitfully 
at the same time that new mechanisms are considered and 
developed. We should build upon what exists in the 
following ways: 
Support efforts to revive the Central American Common 
Market in order to increase intraregional trade. 
This institution has been highly successful in the 
past, and it could help reinforce rules of 
cooperative behavior that would buttress moves to 
maintain peace if it were revived. 
Build upon the Caribbean Basin Initiative, perhaps by 
allowing additional products to enter the u.s. duty 
free, and by providing additional incentives for 
private sector investment -- such as, for example, 
the investment tax credit which was eliminated from 
the bill as it was finally passed. 
support the new Investment Corporation of the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
Consider mechanisms for stabilizing the prices of the 
commodities on whose export Central America is 
particularly dependent. This must be done with 
caution so as to interfere to a minimum with market 
mechanisms, but such an expedient cannot be rejected 
out of hand. 
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But there is also a short-term problem that is very serious 
and must be addressed through more direct and innovative 
economic assistance. While it is usually difficult to get 
such foreign assistance programs approved by the Congress, 
the current crisis and the threat it entails to our 
security interests provide a unique opportunity to mobilize 
support for and implement programs and policies involving 
both bilateral and multilateral economic assistance. Among 
the measures that should be considered are: 
First, and most urgent, Congress should approve the 
proposed increase in the U.S. quota for the I.M.F. 
Economic recovery in Central America is not feasible 
without the balance of payments support and 
structural adjustment loans which the I.M.F. can 
provide if its funds are not curtailed. Without our 
going along with all the other members of the I.M.F. 
in increasing their quota, the I.M.F. will be 
hamstrung at a time when its active involvement is 
vital. 
Second, it would be desirable to creat a "trade 
credit insurance program" to ensure short-term trade 
credits, which, under present uncertain conditions, 
are not being provided by u.s. commercial banks to 
Central American and Caribbean countries. A program 
involving $500 million of insurance has been 
proposed, and I believe it would do a lot toward 
bringing about a restoration of credit which is vital 
to stern further economic hardships and demonstrate 
u.s. support for the private sectors of the nations 
concerned. The case for such a facility -- as well 
as for positive u.s. action on the I.M.F. -- was made 
forcefully in an excellent editorial in Wednesday's 
washington Post. 
Third, there is a need for immediate debt relief in 
the form of longer periods for repayment of debt and 
lower interest rates for the Central American 
countries. This would allow them to devote more of 
their export earnings to internal development and 
reduce their need for outside assistance. 
Fourth, there should be additional subsidized credits 
to facilitate the import and export of goods to and 
from Central America. This is particularly crucial 
to ensure the continued viability of the Central 
American private sectors, which are important 
generators of employment and national wealth. Added 
resources for the Export-Import Bank would be 
desirable in this regard. 
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Fifth, dramatic increases in more direct forms of aid 
are essential to help friendly governments avoid 
serious economic deterioration during the current 
crisis and improve their economic performance as 
greater political order is achieved. At a moment 
when our government is experiencing huge budgetary 
deficits at home, I realize this proposal is hard to 
sell, but without it the ultimate cost to our country 
will be far greater. 
The focus of assistance should be on existing fields with 
high employment potential. The aims at this time should 
not be highly sophisticated, such as nurturing new 
industries, but rather focus on visible and rapid results 
in terms of job creation. In this regard, I believe our 
efforts should pay far more attention to the needs of 
smaller and medium-sized firms than we have in the past. 
At the same time, however, aid and related concessions 
should be part of a longer-term strategy to establish the 
groundwork for regional cooperation. Consideration might 
be given to tying concessions to regional cooperation 
somewhat as the Alliance for Progress did through the 
charter Punta del Este. 
Finally, we must keep in mind that economic recovery and 
the building of democratic and stable political 
institutions require a long-term commitment of at least ten 
to fifteen years by the u.s. Such a commitment will be 
difficult for the u.s. to make in the absence of a 
bipartisan consensus on Central America such as that I 
mentioned earlier. From the point of view of the private 
sector, there is a particular need for some predictability 
if private capital is to reenter Central America and 
contribute to the area's development. We can no longer 
afford the luxury of wide swings in U.S. foreign policy. 
Our primary task, again, must be to establish in our own 
minds and those of our neighbors just what our policy 
toward Latin America is, including the identification of 
what we consider to be hostile and unacceptable 
activities. Then we must be consistent in the 
implementation of that policy. Continued inconsistency and 
neglect can only lead to greater confusion and distrust on 
the part of our neighbors. 
Last we come to the battle of ideas: whatever successes 
are achieved in terms of security or economic development will 
be short-lived unless we do a far better job of selling the 
virtues of democracy and private enterprise than we have in the 
past. We have been fighting a losing battle in this area for 
many years. 
The creation and consistent application of a concerned and 
caring foreign policy -- a policy based on partnership, not 
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paternalism -- is essential if we are to achieve a very 
basic objective: making being "anti-American" 
unfashionable and politically unrewarding. Given the 
demonstrated strengths of democracy and free enterprise, it 
is absurd to think that Marxism has achieved the hold it 
has on the educational institutions, intellectuals and 
media of so many of our neighbors. Yet this is the case, 
and I would suggest it is largely our own fault. We have 
been clumsy, inept and neglectful. 
Many leaders in Latin America, and especially in Central 
America, view democracy and private enterprise as having 
been so distorted by us in their application as to exploit 
rather than improve the conditions of the majority of the 
area's population. Even though the private sector for many 
years now has played, for the most part, an enlightened and 
constructive role in Latin America, these perceptions from 
the past still persist. It is essential that we correct 
the outdated, simplistic and severely distorted image that 
prevails of U.S. business. 
The results of neglect and misguided past policies cannot 
be corrected overnight, but there is much that can be done 
quickly. The Americas Society, for instance, already has a 
program of cultural and intellectual exchange, yet it is 
severely limited because of inadequate resources. If 
others were involved, including the u.s. government, and if 
resources increased, the impact could be multiplied many, 
many times. 
In another area, both the public sector and the private 
sector should immediately take steps to increase 
dramatically u.s. support of student exchange programs. In 
1980, the soviets and their Eastern Bloc allies provided 
some 7,000 education grants for students from Latin 
America, in addition to 7,000 more for Cuban students. 
Cuba, in turn, educated some 2,500 additional Latin 
American students in its universities, plus 1,100 secondary 
students from Nicaragua on its "Isle of Youth." In the 
same period, the u.s. supported fewer than 750 exchange 
students from Latin America. The soviets spend over four 
times as much as the u.s. on overseas education and related 
activities, and the results show it. More attention and 
resources must be directed to u.s. student exchange 
programs. 
In addition to A.I.D. and the U.S.I.A., the u.s. has other 
public sector entities that could be major participants in 
an intensified education effort. R.O.T.C. scholarships, 
for instance, have been suggested, and it seems to me that 
the Department of Agriculture also could play a key role. 
Equally importantly, the various concerned parts of the 
private sector -- including foundations, universities, 
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groups like the Americas Society, and corporations --
should be brought more clearly into the picture and 
integrated into a substantially increased effort. 
Many other things can be done that are relatively simple 
and relatively inexpensive, yet would have lasting impacts 
on people's perceptions. The government and the private 
sector can for example join together to: 
Tell the story in Central America of what the u.s. 
has already contributed in the field of health and 
launch far-reaching new health programs. 
Tell the similar story with respect to agriculture 
and significantly increase agricultural assistance. 
Highlight case histories of joint ventures and 
cooperation between the u.s. and its neighbors that 
have been successful so as to dispel the 
imperialistic myth. 
Encourage the creation of more u.s. study programs 
within Latin American institutions so as to help 
students there overcome the stereotypes that are 
currently dominant. 
Beyond expanding exchange programs for students, we 
could also sharply step up similar programs for 
professors, intellectuals and other leaders of today 
and tomorrow. 
Most importantly, I believe that in conjunction with other 
democratic nations we should initiate a large-scale program 
of popular education aimed at countering the Marxist 
propaganda that continues to win the minds of young people 
around the world. A major reason for the allure of Marxism 
is that both its self-proclaimed successes and its negative 
caricatures of private enterprise remain unchallenged by 
those who know better. The "big lie" once again has proven 
its effectiveness. 
In conclusion, I want to underscore two points I made 
earlier. First, security, development and education are all 
interdependent. It is impossible to have development and 
confidence in democracy and private enterprise without 
education, and educated people in turn require meaningful 
employment opportunities. At the same time, little or nothing 
positive is possible when armed conflict prevails. 
Second, there are no quick or easy solutions to the 
problems of Central America. This is frustrating to me, as I 
am sure it is to all of you as well. on the other hand, I 
believe it points to a vital and long-neglected goal that the 
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u.s. must achieve -- the creation of a coherent, concerned and 
consistent policy toward our neighbors in the hemisphere, which 
is based on bipartisan support. It must be crafted with vision 
and based on reality and a true sense of partnership. If it 
is, I am convinced such a policy can both help alleviate 
existing problems and produce lasting mutual opportunities in 
the years ahead. Your Commission, Mr. Chairman, could provide 
the basis for such a policy. 
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The National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America 
The Americas Society Ad Hoc Committee 
on Central America 
Notes on a Public-Private Sector Mechanism 
To Address the Central American Economic Crisis 
In testimony before the National Bipartisan Commission September 
12; Americas Society trustees Sam F:. Segnar and Seymour Milstein presented 
on behalf of the Society's Ad Hoc Committee on Central America a proposal 
for the creation of a unique public-private sector corporate entity to 
serve as a mechanism for tapping the resources of the U.S. Government 
and business community in addressing Central America's financial and 
economic crisis. 
At that time the witnesses offered .to have prepared--and members of 
the Commission expressed interest in receiving--a follow-up document 
spelling out with greater specificity the structural composition and 
funding requirements of such an entity. This document is intended to 
serve that purpose. 
Structural Principles 
As outlined in the testimony, the type of mechanism we believe is 
required would have the following characteristics: 
1. To provide both public and private sector leadership and authority, 
both the U.S. Government and the U.S. private sector must be 
substantially involved--in policy direction, in management, and 
in the provision of resources. 
2. The mechanism must have a distinct legal identity, its own 
management, and its own funding. It would have a charter out-
lining the areas in which it is authorized to act, would be 
governed by a board of directors, and would be run on a daily 
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basis by a management with broad executive powers and responsibilities. 
3. To enable the U.S. Government to take a major funding and management 
role, and to insure that the undertaking is and is seen as an 
expression of U.S. policy responsiveness to the region's needs, 
the entity should be set up initially by an Act of Congress, coupled 
with a specific appropriation. 
4. tVhile substantially funded by a public appropriation, the entity 
would incorporate devices for tapping and leveraging various types 
of private resources. 
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5. The governing board should include representatives of key U.S. Govern-
ment agencies, the U.S. business community, the U.S. labor movement, 
and relevant non-profit institutions. (The Commission can consider 
the question of whether or not inclusion of non-U.S. nationals--such 
as Central American business leaders, international financial insti-
tution officials, or Canadian and Contadora Group representatives--
would be feasible or appropriate.) 
6. The board of directors must function as a corporate board, setting 
broad management policy for the entity's management team, with each 
member of the board exercising his/her best individual judgment in 
the interest of the entity and its tasks, not serving in a representa-
tive capacity to defend the interests of the institutions they may 
represent. 
7. The entity would be authorized to perform a range of activities--such 
' as the eight here proposed--identified as highly useful in meeting 
Central America's economic crisis. However, it would undertake 
specific programs only if it determined that no public or private 
sector organization were able and willing to undertake them immediately 
on an effective and concerted basis. Many of these programs by their 
nature could be performed by an existing government agency or private 
profit-making firm--and eventually would be under this concept. 
8. The entity should be given a limited duration of 3 to 5 years. Over 
time, as programs prove themselves in action, they could be spun out 
to the private sector or spun in to the public sector, whichever may 
be most appropriate. The entity would meet a critical need for 
intensive, creative, concerted action at the outset, but would not 
become a self-perpetuating bureac~acy. 
On the basis of these structural principles we propose the following specific 
applications for the entity's composition and management: 
The role of the U.S. Government must be the ultimately controlling one, 
since the entity would be launched by a government initiative with government 
funds, and would be undertaken in response to the perceived national interests 
of the United States in Central American economic survival and regeneration. 
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Recognizing that role, the U.S. Government should be given a majority 
and the chairmanship on the entity's governing board. Government agencies 
that should be represented on the board include the departments of State, Treasury, 
Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture; the Agency for International Development; 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; the Export-Import Bank; the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the National Security Council. 
Representatives of other U.S. agencies, or U.S. representatives on relevanu 
international agencies, may also be appropriate. Agencies would be 
represented by their highest-ranking official. In some instances, distinct 
programs within the same department of agency may warrant more than one 
official of that agency on the board. The U.S. Government component of the 
board should also include members of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
The role of the private sector as a major characteristic of the new 
entity is important to carry forward private~sector thrust and orientation 
of the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative, and is also important 
to the\most effective implementation of several aspects of the entity's 
specific mission: 
a. Management expertise. Because most of the entity's specific program 
tasks would involve marshalling and disbursing of various types of 
financial resources for ultimately business purposes, the management 
of the entity requires the experience, expertise, and streamlined 
management style of the business community. 
b. Non-Bureaucratic Procedures. The entity is needed to perform certain 
things that existing government agencies are unable to do, and some 
of their inability is rooted in the inherent impediments of govern-
mental procedures rather than in specific policy restrictions. The 
new entity should be structured in such a way to avoid those impediments 
by being classifiable at least for some purposes as quasi- or non-
governmental. The public-private entity, for instance, should not 
be subject to government salary ceilings in its recruitment of top 
management, and it should not follow cumbersome and time-consuming 
government bidding and contracting procedures in getting short-term 
infrastructure projects built. 
c. Tapping of Private Resources. Strong private sector policy involve-
ment and management predominance will facilitate the integration of 
private sector resources in numerous specific program areas where 
these could be obtained. Examples include lending of personnel, 
participation in scholarship/internship programs, possible contri-
bution of equity to program components with commercial potential 
(particularly the trading company), providing space, etc. 
d. Leveraging of Trade and Investment Confidence. If the program 
is run properly, the initial public investment will be a sinall 
portion of the total resources generated in new and revived 
trade and investment. Loan and insurance guarantees will release 
private-sector credit and capital for the region. Infrastructure 
investments will be coupled with commitments from private-sector 
investors to finance and build the specific productive facilities 
the infrastructure is to serve. Unfreezing of short-term business 
credit will not only multiply the productive sector in the region, 
but revive and expand U.S. export earnings from the region, 
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boosting the U.S. economy and saving and creating jobs here. 
However, to produce this result, the undertaking needs to generate 
the maximum level of confidence from the U.S. business community. 
The best way to insure this is by placing the operation management 
of the program in the hands of top-calibre U.S. business leadership. 
Public-Private Roles in Operation--Applications to the Board and Manage-
ment Team. The governing board would be small enough to meet and make deliberative 
decisions, but larg~ enough to tap a broad range of public and private talent, 
and too large to attempt the day-to-day management of the entity's affairs. 
The U.S. Government would hold a bare majority to provide ultimate policy 
accountability. Of the non-governmental membership, at least half and perhaps 
more would be successful top executives from the mainstream for-profit U.S. 
business sector. This business contingent would include individuals whose 
experience and/or current affiliation run the range on several spectra--both 
large and smaller, both productive enterprises and financial institutions, 
both financially interested and disinterested in Central America, and represent-
ing a range of economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, service, etc.). 
The board should also include a substantial contingent from the U.S. labor 
movement, including some institutional participation by the AFL-CIO. The 
latter would be important not only from the point of view of developing a 
broad constituency for the undertaking, but also to insure that labor resources 
are tapped in the development of specific programs (as in the case of training 
programs) and that the potential beneficial impact on U.S. export industries 
is factored in and realized. Remaining non-governmental seats on the board 
can be used to tap the talents and experience of individuals from relevant 
foundation and non-profit sectors, the academic community or other distinguished 
individuals. A board of, let us say, 45 members would thus look like: 
23 U.S. Government (perhaps 15 Executive Branch, 8 Congress) 
22 Private Sector, of which: 
12 or more Business leaders 
4-6 Labor leaders 
4-6 Leaders from non-profit and other sectors 
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The board would govern the entity within the terms of its charter 
(which would designate authorized but not obligatory program activity areas), 
and within the funding level appropriated (the appropriation itself should 
be non-program-specific, as is suitable in a situation where discretion is 
given to pursue some programs and decline others). The board would be the 
type of governing board that meets two to four times a year and makes decisions 
on the recommendation of management on such fundamental points as which 
programs to pursue and howmuchmoney to allocate to each. The board would 
also be responsible for hiring and firing the top management. (The fact 
that these would not be presidential appointees would be another feature 
non-governmentalizing the entity and reinforcing its public-private character.) 
It is anticipated that a staff of no more than 50 individuals maximum 
could carry out all the intended tasks of the entity. The board would recruit 
and hire the top management, with a mandate to recruit a top-calibre person 
from the U.S. corporate community and the authority to offer a salary necessary 
to do so. The top management would have complete authority to hire everyone 
else, both professional and support staff, and to set up the operation in 
a businesslike manner, using accepted private-sector (as opposed to GSA) 
methods of space acquisition, procurement, accounting, hiring, etc. 
The lean staffing would be possible in spite of the variety of program 
areas to be undertaken because all program activity would be at a "wholesale" 
level, operating through a variety of existing or newly created institutional 
channels at the point-of-benefit level. 
Program Operations and Funding Requirements 
The entity's broad mandate would be to spur economic regeneration in 
Central America by putting financial resources in place to close the loop 
where gaps have broken the normal commercial chain--gaps in the form of 
inability to obtain commercial credit, investment capital, business insurance, 
tlained manpower, import credit, needed infrastructure developments, etc. 
The entity would pursue its mandate in two ways--by identifying 
existing private or public entities with programs that could meet one or 
more of these needs and exhorting them to more creative effort in respect 
to Central America; and by implementing specific programs in areas where 
such action is authorized by its charter. 
As part of the latter responsibility, the entity would administer 
a variety of distinct programs, some of which would involve overlapping 
beneficiaries and possibly shared staff. The following three operating 
principles would guide its operations: 
a. All programs would involve discretionary funds rather than entitle-
ments, with the result that discretion would need to be exercised to select 
the most appropriate recipients for various types of help from among a 
much larger number of those potentially eligible. 
b. Case-by-case decisions on individual beneficiaries of credit or 
project funding would not be made directly by the entity's staff except 
in the most large-scale cases. Rath~r, it would wholesale its credit or 
stimulate other institutions through a system of guarantees, exercising 
only the degree of involvement necessary for prudent oversight. In 
implementing its programs it would seek out existing channels, employing 
both traditional and non-traditional institutions and where necessary 
stimulating the creation of new ones. Different types of institutions 
would be used for different purposes, tailored to the most effective 
reaching of the ultimate beneficiaries. Examples can be found below 
in the individual program descriptions. 
c. The entity would develop standards and criteria to be applied 
at the various decision levels in each of the program areas. A common 
priority would be the revitalization of Central American trade by fostering 
enterprises that involve one or more of three critical elements: export 
earning potential, rapid start-up, and intensive job-creation potential. 
In the testimony presented by Mr. Milstein and Mr. Segnar, we 
identified eight areas where immediate needs for breaking a financial 
logjam are not being met, and have little prospect of being met, by existing 
public or private agencies and programs. These are areas which the 
relevant U.S. Government agencies have themselves recognized as crucial 
to getting Central America past its financial crisis, but which for a 
variety of legal, technical or practical reason$, these agencies (for 
instance, AID, OPIC, Eximbank) do not feel they can or should undertake. 
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The following eight program areas are those proposed in our earlier 
testimony. In the interim we have endeavored to determine in the case 
of each a minimum amount of financial resources needed to do the job, 
what form the resources should take (capital, credit, guarantees, insurance, 
etc.), where they should come from, and to what extent they would be self-
replenishing or would require additional funding after the initial 
appropriation. 
1. A short-term trade credit facility 
This would provide supplier's credit for exports and imports to be 
repaid within the year. A system of guarantees rather than actual lending 
funds would suffice. Beneficiaries would be credit-worthy enterprises 
able to pay commercial rates but currently unable to obtain loans. An 
immediate start-up for the flow of credit would unfreeze Central America's 
private sector, start trade moving again, and stave off further bankruptcies. 
A recent U.S. Government study determined it would take $500 million to 
\ 
do this job. Because of the currently depressed state of trade and resultant 
lag in absorptive capacity, we believe a figure of $300 million would be 
adequate. Because of the short-term nature of the credit and the viability 
of the targeted enterprises, this fund would be self-replenishing for 
subsequent years after being kicked off by the first-year $300 million. 
2. A venture capital financing facility 
This would provide seed capital or risk capital to enable U.S. firms 
to invest, expand their holdings, or take on Central American joint venture 
partners, particularly in non-traditional areas, and would make such eapital 
available to Central American firms as well. Both the risk element and the 
non-U.S. participation would take this outside the range of OPIC programs. 
This credit could be wholesaled through regional institutions such as 
CABEl as well as various types of local or U.S. entities capable of 
handling relatively long-term or non-traditionally packaged credit. 
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Some effort would be required to target and develop appropriate ventures. 
If an average of ten such ventures per country were funded the first year, 
with an average investment of $50,000 per project, the initial funding 
requirement would be $3 million. We feel with creativity and strong private 
sector involvement, that target could be exceeded, and an initial amount of 
$5 million would be appropriate. Because the investments would not be 
recovered within a year, the fund would not be self-replenishing in the 
short term, and similar $5 million appropriations would be needed to 
maintain the effort at the same level in subsequent years. 
3. An export trading company 
This program or entity would function as a trading company itself 
or facilitate the creation of one or more such companies in the private 
sector specifically targeted on the Central American/Caribbean area. 
It would be product-oriented, purchasing from Central American suppliers 
and introducing the products into U.S. markets. Since it would operate 
on a profit basis, it would require only an initial amount to capitalize 
itself and begin operations; we would place that amount at $2 million. 
It would not only be self-sustaining, but would accumulate funds which 
it could use to invest in projects for which it saw or created an 
immediate demand--export trading zones within Central American countries, 
for instance, or production facilities for newly marketable products. 
One option would be to work through existing U.S. firms with existing 
or evolving world trade operations. In any event, because of the 
business-like nature of the trading company program, this would be an 
early candidate for spinning off into the private sector once it was 
launched and demonstrated as effective. 
4. A program of infrastructure investment/development 
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This program would undertake and complete projects that are traditionally 
public-sector in nature, but would focus narrowly on projects which are 
intrinsically interlinked with private-sector projects that require their 
completion. Several other criteria would also be employed to narrow the 
field of the new entity's involvement. It would undertake only projects 
capable of short-term execution and impact, and would involve itself only if 
actual commitments from identified private-sector firms to proceed with 
their part of the complex were in hand or obtained. An example would be a 
commitment from a manufacturer to build a processing plant if a port 
improvement were completed at the same time. 
The entity would coordinate closely with other agencies involved 
in infrastructure projects in the region (AID, IDB, \vorld Bank, UNDP) to 
insure absence of duplication and to spur these agencies to complete 
or undertake such projects where appropriate. The new entity would take 
care to maintain streamlined procedures so that its own construction-
stimulating efforts would not end up taking the same months and years to 
complete as the agencies from whose long-term approach relief is sought. 
Creative ways would be explored to involve the potential private-sector 
beneficiaries in planning, developing, and possibly financing aspects of 
the infrastructure projects. 
Because of the scale and expense of infrastructure projects, it is 
anticipated that the entity would only be involved in an average of one 
per country in its initial year, but that this activity would require 
a minimum of $100 million. This would have to be actual funds as opposed 
to guarantees. Because of its long-term nature, the funds would not 
replenish themselves during the lifetime of the entity, and similar amounts 
would he required in subsequent years to maintain the same level of 
activity. 
5. A new approach to·educational assistance 
Two elements of the educational challenge in Central America are 
particularly appropriate targets for the U.S. public-private sector 
cooperative effort. There is a need for highly specific education and 
training for present and future employees of productive enterprise (skilled 
labor, technical, and managerial). There is also an opportunity for the 
private sector to play a role if the U.S. comes to adopt at least a 
minimally competitive scholarship program to expose the next generation 
of young leaders to the American system. 
To address the first challenge and train personnel for immediate needs 
of Central American economic development, the new entity could assist 
some existing programs such as INCAE at the managerial level, and develop 
new types of approaches to the whole area of vocational training. These 
could include internships in U.S. workplaces, in-community or in-plant 
training programs in Central America, and experimental learning programs 
utilizing new technology. U.S. labor organizations could be tapped for 
a major role in organizing and implemen~bothon-site and U.S. based 
training opportunities. 
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To address the second challenge, the new entity would play a catalytic 
role in devising and packaging innovative approaches to the provision of 
U.S. educational experiences for Central::Am.erican young people who represent 
the region's potential leaders (whether still in school or in the early 
stages of a career). While not attempting the role of being a major 
channel of traditional scholarship funds, it would develop model programs 
combining the resources of government, academia and the business community, 
in which a Central American participant would have some classroom experience 
as well as some practical working experience in his or her chosen field, 
along with some financial assistance. Several experimental projects of 
this nature currently being funded by AID could be enhanced and led in 
creative new directions by the new entity. 
Funding for the new entity's educational programs would be based on 
the assumption that its activities would be largely focused on areas of 
education and training with some short-term relevance to the region's 
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economic revitalization, and would combine public funding with extensive 
marshalling of human and in-kind resources from a range of business, labor, and 
., 
academic instititions both in the U.S. and in the region. While U.S. firms 
operating in the region feel keenly the need for a better-funded general 
U.S. scholarship program to compete effectively with the massive programs 
offered by the Soviet bloc nations, funding for such an effort might better 
be attempted through the Democracy Program or traditional program channels. 
To carry ou~ the innovative, catalytic, industrially targeted efforts of 
the new entity, an annual appropriation of $45 million would be ample. 
6. Credit for small independent enterprises 
This program would fill a major gap by making credit available to the 
large sector of Central American businesses that are capable of paying 
commercial rates but are unable to get loans because they have no collateral. 
This type of enterprise poses administrative problems for commercial 
lenders (high paperwork load for tiny loan amounts), but collectively it 
represents an enormous sector capable of quick expansion and job-creation. 
The new entity would not fund this credit directly, but would operate a 
system of guarantees for lines of credit targeted toward this market. It 
would work through a variety of disbursing channels, selecting local 
institutions whether of a financial or developmental nature which meet 
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two criteria--institutional and cultural rapport with the micro-entrepreneur, 
and a record of sound financial management. An initial amount of $5 million 
would be adequate to initiate this program on a large scale, since the 
individual loan amounts tend to be small. And because these loans tend 
to be relatively short-term and the micro-entrepreneur typically has a 
high repayment record, the fund would be self-replenishing. 
7. A reconstruction and development fund for financieras 
This fund would assist responsible medium-term lending institutions 
in the region to get past current problems that threaten their survival 
but are not the result of poor management. The help might be directed 
toward restructuring the debt of the lending institution itself, or helping 
it provide restructuring for responsible borrower firms that are commercially 
viable but got caught in the foreign exchange squeeze. The proposed entity 
would engage in direct lending (as opposed to guarantees) for this effort, 
but would not take an equity position in any of the aided institutions. 
Because only fundamentally sound institutions would be aided, the funds 
would be repaid once Central American trade starts moving again, and the 
fund would be self-replenishing. It could also be used to develop new 
financiera-type institutions where they do not now exist and a need is 
found. A revolving fund adequate to the task could be set up by an 
initial appropriation of $200 million. 
8. A system of ineurance guarantees 
This non-cash assistance, which could be channeled through insurance 
firms already working in the region, would reach two groups whose current 
needs are not being met--U.S. firms unable to obtain OPIC insurance because 
the ventures are in countries past OPIC's ceiling, and Central American-owned 
firms and joint ventures unable to obtain commercial insurance at attractive 
rates, particularly when their operations are located in areas considered 
to be high-risk. The guarantee program would remove the obstacle that 
the unavailability of such insurance currently poses to the making of 
new investments in projects that otherwise have low risk and every 
prospect for commercial success. This program would not require cash 
outlays, and since the reserve fund would require replenishing only to 
cover payments against actual losses, it could replenish itself from 
its own operations. An initial guarantee level of $40 million would be 
adequate to launch the program. 
Summary of Funding Requirements 
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In addition to the program funding, it is projected that an annual 
expense of $3 million would be ample to cover the administrative expense of 
the entity's staff and operations. This would need to be included in the 
initial appropriation, although in subsequent years it may well be coverable 
out of the entity's earnings on invested reserve funds, trading company 
profits, and savings in program areas from donations in kind. 
From this it can be seen that an initial appropriation of $700 million 
would be required to fund the first year's program operations and administration, 
if the entire amount represented by guarantee programs were to be included. 
Approximately half the $700 million would require actual expenditure of funds. 
In subsequent years, the same level of activity in all program areas 
could be obtained by annual funding of $150 million, exclusive of additional 
administrative funding requirements if any. All other elements would be 
self-replenishing. Thus the entire program over its three-year period 
of minimum life would represent a public investment of approximately 
one billion dollars, of which two thirds would be expended and the 
remaining third merely the potential expenditure represented by guarantees. 
This public investment would in turn leverage substantial inputs 
of human,'. business, labor and academic resources in the areas of program 
activity, and more significantly leverage far greater amounts in private 
sector trade and investment transactions, these in turn producing economic 
revitalization in the region along with increased exports, earnings and 
jobs in the United States. 
Developing a Consensus 
Such an effort could be undertaken successfully only with the 
leadership of the Administration and the support of Congress as well 
as major segments of the business and labor communities whose involvement 
would be critical to the success of the undertaking. Developing a 
consensus for such an undertaking, and the commitment of the required 
U.S. Government funds on its behalf, would be premised on convincing 
the various relevant constituencies of the following facts: 
1. That Central American economic revival is critical to the 
national security and economic wellbeing of theUnited States. 
2. It is impossible without dramatic intervention of the types 
described. 
3. The described programs and expenditures will in fact result 
in the expected substantial increases in trade and investment 
activity, with the anticipated benefits to both the region's 
and the U.S. economy. 
4. A broad-based constituency of bipartisan leadership, business, 
labor and other relevant.institutional sectors are prepared 
to support and take active part in such an effort. 
We believe the second and third of these premises can be demonstrated 
cs a factual matter. The persuasiveness of the first premise will depend 
largely on the conclusions of your Commission and the forcefulness and 
urgency with which those conclusions are projected. The burden of 
demonstrating the fourth premise is one which our Ad Hoc Committee is 
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prepared to undertake. convinced that the work of developing the nucleus 
of such a constituency must begin at once if the Commission's final report 
is to be greeted by a U.S. private sector prepared to act upon it. 
We are persuaded that, if those four premises are accepted, 
it will not be difficult to gain acceptance of the conclusion that 
the substantial expenditure of tax money we are calling for is justified 
and necessary, on the grounds that (a) the protection of our vital national 
interest is worth it; (b) we will recover the entire cost and more anyway 
from increased export earnings; and (c) the potential cost of doing 
nothing is far greater. 
Aside from the funding challenge, the major remaining task we see 
in refining this proposal from the conceptual stage to an enactable one 
is devising a structural format to implement the public-private sector 
board and management concept that will meet legal and constitutional 
requirements along with the test of practicality. While that task will 
require careful attention and some creativity, we have been content to 
leave those issues for later resolution, persuaded on the basis of 
historical precedent that once a consensus of purpose is reached at 
the policy level, the resolution of structural issue·s can follow at 
a technical level. 
The Americas Society Ad Hoc Committee on Central America will continue 
to explore both sets of issues raised by our proposal, and are prepared 
to assist the work of the Commission in any way you might find useful. 
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REMARKS 
LORET MILLCR RUPPE 
I AM VERY HAPPY TO BE HERE_TODAY TO PRESENT THIS COMMISSION 
WITH WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT FURTHER 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEACE CORPS TO LONG-RANGE UNITED STATES 
OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. 
I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT A NEW VISION 0~ 
THE PEACE CORPS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA; A VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS 
AS PLAYING AN EXPANDED ROLE IN THE PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES 
ECONOMIC~ SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONCERNS IN THIS 
REGION, 
MY TRAVELS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS 
HAVE GIVEN ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE FIRST-HAND THE PROBLEMS 
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH EXIST IN THE AREA. 
AT THE SAME TIME~ MY DISCUSSIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS~ AS WELL AS WITH OUR OWN AMBASSADORS AND PEACE CORPS 
VOLUNTEERS~ CONVINCE ME THAT THIS AGENCY~ WITH TWENTY-THREE 
YEARS' EXPERIENCE~ REMAINS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS AN 
EVEN MORE IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OVERALL U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE 
REGION, 
ALTHOUGH NOT MANDATED AS SUCH~ THERE IS NOT DOUBT THAT THE 
PEACE CORPS IS A "POLITICAL PRESENCE" WHEN THE VOLUNTEER LIVES 
AND WORKS AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL. AT A TIME WHEN THE CUBANS 
HAVE MOVED MASSIVELY IN THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AREA OF CENTRAL AMERICA) 
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WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK OUR PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERSJ THESE ORDINARY 
AMERICANS WITH EXTRAORDINARY COMMITMENT WHO LIVE AND WORK 
SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH PEOPLE AT THE VILLAGE LEVELj SPEAKING THEIR 
LANGUAGEJ RESPECTING THEIR CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND CARING ABOUT 
THEIR WELL-BEING; THE LASTING FRIENDSHIPSJ UNDERSTANDING AND 
RESPECT CREATED BY THE PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERSJ NOT ONLY WITH THE 
PEOPLE BUT ALSO WITH THEIR COUNTRY'S LEADERSJ IS OF PARAMOUNT 
IMPORTANCE TO OUR LONG TERM FOREiGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. 
SEVERAL MONTHS AGOJ THE PEACE CORPSJ IN COLLABORATION WITH THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATEJ PREPARED A REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON 
HOW THE PEACE CORPS CONTRIBUTES TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. 
INCORPORATED IN THIS REPORT WERE COMMENTS FROM VARIOUS U.S. 
AMBASSADORSJ IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHEREJ CONCERNING HOW 
THEY SEE PEACE CORPS CONTRIBUTING TO U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVESJ 
AT THE SAME TIME IT REMAINS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC 
ORBIT. LET ME QUOTE A FEW OF THESE COMMENTS WHICHJ 1 BELIEVEJ MIGHT 
SERVE AS A FOCUS FOR THIS COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS ON THE PEACE 
CORPS' ROLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: 
- FROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA: 
"MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS LIVING IN 
REMOTEJ AND OFTEN DIFFICULTJ CIRCUMSTANCES IN RURAL AREAS OF 
GUATEMALA ARE THE LIE TO PROPAGANDA BEAMED FROM HAVANA AND MANAGUA 
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TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS ONLY TO EXPLOIT 
GUATEMALANS AS PART OF AN IMPERIALIST DESIGN ... PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
HAVE REMINDED THOUSANDS OF GUATEMALANS AND ALL SUCCESSIVE CABINETS 
THAT AMERICANS DO IDENTIFY WITH THEIR PROBLEMS AND ARE READY TO 
WORK SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER TO ADDRESS THEM.H 
-FROM ANOTHffi ~BASSADOR: HTHE PEACE CORPS IS WITHOUT DOUBT 
THE MOST IMPORTANT EVIDENCE WE CAN FURNISH OF OUR DEDICATION TO 
PEACEJ DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN IDEALS,H 
FROM THE U.S~ AMBASSADOR TO BELIZE: HECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
CAN ALLEVIATE BELIZE'S PROBLEMS. IF BELIZE CAN ACHIEVE A 
MEASURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTHJ ITS CITIZENS WILL FEEL A GREATER STAKE 
IN ITS FUTURE. IT WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO FALL PREY TO INTERNAL 
DISSENSION AND IT WILL HAVE A GREATER FEELING OF SECURITYJ 
MAKING IT LESS LIKELY TO SEE A NEED TO CALL ON COUNTRIES SUCH 
AS CUBA OR NICARAGUA FOR SUPPORT. (IN THIS REGARD) THE PEACE 
CORPS IS IDEALLY EQUIPPED TO CONTRIBUTE TO BELIZE'S DEVELOPMENT.H 
THESE EXAMPLES PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF HOW THE PEACE CORPSJ 
DESPITE ITS AUTONOMOUS POSITION SOMEWHAT APART FROM THE DAY-TO-
DAY CONCERNS OF TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY, CONTRIBUTES TO LONG RANGE 
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, 
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WHAT IS MOST INTERESTING ABOUT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSES 
-
IS THAT THEY COVER A WIDE RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES; GRASS 
ROOTS DEVELOPMENT~ ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT~ LOCAL INITIATIVES~ uGIVING 
THE LIE TO CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN PROPAGANDA" AMONG OTHERS. So THIS 
NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS THAT WE SEE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA IS~ 
IN MANY WAYS~ A REAFFIRMATION OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING ALL 
ALONG WITHOUT PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT RECOGNITION. BUT IT IS MORE 
THAN THAT; IT IS A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO DOING MORE TO DIRECTLY 
CONTRIBUTE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA AND 
THAT IS WHY I AM HERE TODAY. THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE LORPS 
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA SUPERCEDES ANY MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE LONG-HAIRED 
HIPPIE IMAGE OF PEACE CORPS OF THE 1960s. IT INTRODUCES TODAY'S 
VOLUNTEER OF THE 1980s: OLDER~ BETTER-TRAINED~ A HIGHER 
PERCENTAGE HIGHLY SKILLED AND BETTER PROGRAMMED IN COLLABORATION 
WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT WHERE HE/SHE CAN DO THE MOST GOOD. 
THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA 
CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE THE uHUMAN ELEMENTu AND AT THE SAME TIME 
INCREASES THE ATTENTION TO THE AREA'S ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEEDS, I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU TODAY THAT DURING YOUR DELIBERATIONS 
PERTAINING TO SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS~ THAT YOU CONSIDER THE 
uHUMAN ELEMENT~u THIS PERSON-TO-PERSON GRASS ROOTS CONTACT BETWEEN 
NORTH AMERICANS AND CENTRAL AMERICANS. AT TH1S POINT I BELIEVE 
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YOU WILL WANT TO GIVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO AN EXPANDED PEACE CORPS 
ROLE IN THE REGION. 
I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION NOW A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW OF OUR PRESENT PROGRAM IN THE REGION) TOGETHER WITH 
NEW INITIATIVES WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE WITH APPROPRIATE 
BUDGETARY INCREASES) AND SOME THOUGHTS ON SPECIAL PROGRAMS WE 
COULD CONSIDER TO FURTHER ENHANCE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LONG 
RANGE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA, THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE 
BUT THEY ARE EVIDENCE OF THE DIRECTION WE FEEL MOST QUALIFIED TO 
PURSUE, THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS FOR THE AREA~ MORE 
CLOSELY INTERWOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECtiVES 
AND UNITED STATES· INTERESTS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA) IS WHAT WE ARE 
ALL ABOUT TODAY AND WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO BE HEADING TOMORROW, 
AT THE PRESENT TIME1 TWO MAIN THEMES CHARACTERIZE THE PEACE 
CORPS PROGRAM STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA, ONE IS STANDARD 
OF LIVING IMPROVEMENT -- PROGRAMS TO INCREASE THE HEALTH~ EDUCATION) 
AND OPTIONS FOR A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA, 
THE OTHER MAIN THRUST IS DIRECTED TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THAT IS1 PROGRAMS AIMED AT DIRECTLY INCREASING THE ~COMES OF 
FAMILIES, 
IN THE AREA OF STANDARD OF LIVING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS) THE 
PEACE CORPS CONTINUES TO HAVE ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS 
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IN RURAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION EDUCATION AND SANITATION IN 
BELIZE) GUATEMALA) AND HONDURAS. OVER FIFTY PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
ARE ENGAGED IN REFORESTATION EFFORTS TO STEM WIDESPREAD EROSION 
CAUSED BY THE RAVAGES OF UNCONTROLLED DEFORESTATION, THESE 
EFFORTS ARE COUPLED WITH FOREST AND FIREWOOD CONSERVATION EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS, PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ARE WORKING TO INCREASE RURAL 
YOUTH AGRICULTRUAL AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS TO PROVIDE INCREASED 
OPTIONS IN THEIR RURAL ENVIRONMENT, 
IN THE CATEGORY OF ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT -- OVER 
ONE HUNDRED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ARE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURAL 
AND BUSINESS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING 
SMALL FARMERS FROM SUBSISTENCE INTO A CASH ECONOMY WITH INCREASED 
LOCAL FOOD SUPPLIES. IN SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT) PEACE CORPS 
VOLUNTEERS ARE WORKING TO ASSIST SMALL BUSINESSES AND COOPERATIVES 
TO LEARN AND TO UPGRADE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES. THE 
GOAL HERE IS STABILIZATION) EXPANSION) AND DIVERSIFICATION OF 
PRODUCTION OF PROCESSED AND MANUFACTURED GOODS) ESPECIALLY IN 
RURAL AREAS. THE PEACE CORPS HAS ALSO DEVELOPED A LINKAGE WITH 
A NUMBER OF U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS AND FIRMS TO 
PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN THIS CARIBBEAN BASIN 
INITIATIVE EFFORT. FOR EXAMPLE) WE HAVE JOINED WITH 120 UNITED 
STATES HISPANIC CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE ON A PROJECT TO INCREASE 
BUSINESS SKILLS AND MARKET OUTLETS FOR PROMISING SMALL AND MEDIUM 
SIZED CENTRAL AMERICAN BUSINESSES. 
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FINALLY~ IN THE AREA OF HOUSING~ A TEAM OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
IN COSTA RICA HAS BEGUN AN INNOVATIVE PILOT SELF-HELP HOUSING 
PROJECT DESIGNED TO ASSIST POOR RURAL FAMILIES TO BUILD THEIR 
OWN HOMES. OVER 2~500 PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT FROM THIS ENDEAVOR. 
THIS PROJECT~ OF WHICH WE ARE PARTICULARLY PROUD~ IS A COMPREHENSIVE 
APPROACH TO ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY SELF-HELP 
EFFORT THAT ADDRESSES A VARIETY OF NEEDS. LAND~ FOR EXAMPLE~ 
IS DONATED BY THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. AID HAS DONATED $300~000 
TO FINANCE MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES. THIS MONEY GOES INTO A 
REVOLVING LOAN FUND TO PROVIDE THE HOMEBUILDERS A LOW INTEREST 
MORTGAGE. OVER EIGHTY HOUSES ARE NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION. I 
JUST LEARNED TODAY THAT THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL~ THAT 
AID HAS SET ASIDE OVER 1 MILLION DOLLARS TO EXPAND THE PROJECT 
IN 1984, WITH A GOAL OF EXPANDING THE NUMBER OF HOUSES TO 2,000. 
THESE PROGRAMS, AND THEIR EXPANSION, REPRESENT THE PEACE 
CORPS' QUICK AND EFFECTIVE REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE, A CALL FOR INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE 
REGION. SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, THE PEACE CORPS HAS 
SENT FIFTY ADDITIONAL HIGHLY SKILLED VOLUNTEERS TO WORK ON THE CBI IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA. THIS INITIATIVE, FOCUSING ON SUCH KEY TARGETS 
AS BRINGING THE RURAL POOR FROM SUBSISTENCE LEVEL FARMING TO 
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS WHICH EARN MONEY AND INCREASE LOCAL FOOD 
SUPPLIES WHILE DECREASING THE NEED FOR COSTLY FOOD IMPORTS~ HAS 
MERGED EFFICIENTLY WITH ONGOING PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA, THIS INITIATIVE HAS GIVEN THE PEACE CORPS AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO SUPPLEMENT WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DOING WITH MORE VOLUNTEERS 
AND MORE FOCUS TO ALIGN OUR PROGRAMS MORE CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S 
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE OBJECTIVES. 
MANIFESTING THE PEACE CORPS DESIRE TO MORE CLOSELY COLLABORATE 
WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WITH MUTUAL OBJECTIVES~ 
PETER McPHERSON AND I IN 1981 INITIATED AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
AND A SERIES OF STAFF PLANNING CONFERENCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH THE TWO AGENCIES COULD COMPLEMENT EACH 
OTHER IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORT, 
THIS INTERCHANGE HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN THREE JOINT PROGRAM 
INITIATIVES. ONE OF THESE IS THE "SMALL PROJECTS ASSISTANCE 
FUND." UNDER THIS AGREEMENT~ AID HAS SET ASIDE FORTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS THIS YEAR IN EACH OVERSEAS MISSION FOR USE IN BEGINNING 
SMALL PEACE CORPS ASSISTED PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION) 
SMALL BUSINESS AND ENERGY. WHILE THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS MAY SEEM 
MINISCULE~ FROM THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE OF THE PEACE CORPS~ IT IS 
CONSIDERABLE; FOR EXAMPLE~ A WOMEN'S COOPERATIVE MAY NEED ONLY 
THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS TO START A BUTTER-MAKING BUSINESS IN AN 
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ISOLATED RURAL VILLAGE. HERE WE EMPHASIZE THE CONCEPT~ AGAIN~ OF 
THE "COMPLEMENTARY" ASPECT OF THE PEACE CORPS; WHILE AID~ BECAUSE 
OF ITS SUPERIOR FUNDING LEVELS CAN~ AND DOES1 OPERATE ON A MACRO-
ECONOMIC LEVEL1 THE PEACE CORPS STANDS PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE 
OFTEN MISSING INGREDIENT--THE GRASS ROOTS~ PERSON-TO-PERSON 
MICRO-ECONOMIC INPUT1 NOW SO HIGHLY PRAISED BY DEVELOPMENT 
EXPERTS~ THAT IS OFTEN LACKING IN MANY OF OUR LARGER FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. 
THE PEACE CORPS WOULD BE READY TO TAKE A LONG~ HARD LOOK AT 
ENGAGING OURSELVES MORE ACTIVELY IN LITERACY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT 
CENTRAL AMERICA. ADULT EDUCATION -- LITERACY CAMPAIGNS -- CAN 
PROVIDE A MORE IMMEDIATE BENEFIT TO THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE IN A 
COUNTRY'S CIVIC~ ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION. THIS IS SOMETHING 
THe CUBANS DO SO WELL IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA~ AND 
A CONCEPT ON WHICH THEY PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS. THIS CERTAINLY 
WOULD BE AN AREA WHERE (ffiA AND ITS SOCIALIST DOCTRINE WOULD EXIST 
IN DIRECT COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE STANDARD 
OF EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO WHAT 
OUR COUNTRY IS TODAY. 
THIS IS NEITHER THE TIME NOR PLACE TO ENGAGE IN ONE OF 
THOSE LONG ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER -- OR HOW MUCH THE UNITED 
STATES SHOULD EXPORT ITS VALUE SYSTEMS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. 
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HOWEVER1 AN EXPORT OF CERTAIN ¥ALUE SYSTEMS IS IMPLIED IN THE PEACE 
CORPS CONCEPT1 PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF LITERACY. EDUCATION HELPS 
MAKE A FREE MAN1 FREE TO CHOOSE AMONG COMPETING POLITICAL SYSTEMS1 
FREE TO CHOOSE HIS OWN WAY. 
DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS1 PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS HAVE 
PARTICIPATED ON A LIMITED SCALE IN ADULT EDUCATION IN SOME 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. 
IF THE PEACE CORPS WERE INVITED BY THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL 
AMERICA TO TAKE ON A LARGER ROLE IN LITERACY CAMPAIGNS IN THE 
REGION1 WE COULD RESPOND QUICKLY BY PROVIDING VOLUNTEERS WITH THE 
APPROPRIATE KINDS OF SKILLS. WITH AUGMENTED RESOURCES1 THE PEACE 
CORPS COULD CONDUCT SPECIAL RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO 
ATTRACT HISPANIC-AMERICANS ALREADY FLUENT IN THE SPANISH LANGUAGE 
ONE OF T~OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES THE CUBANS HAVE IN THIS REGARD --
AND OTHER COMPETENT SPANISH-SPEAKING AMERICANS. WE COULD ALSO 
DRAW ON THE LARGE NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE TRAINED AND HAVE 
WORKED IN ADULT EDUCATION. 
MOST OF THIS PROPOSED LITERACY PROGRAM WOULD TAKE PLACE 
IN THE RURAL AREAS WHERE THE NEED IS GREATEST} THIS IS WHERE 
THE PEACE CORPS HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AT ITS BEST AND THIS 
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SPECIALIZATION AND TALENT IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD BE EASILY 
TRANSFERRED TO A LITERACY PROGRAM IN THESE SAME PARTS OF THE 
COUNTRIES, 
IN MY PREVIOUS REMARKS I HAVE NOTED THE PEACE'CORPS' ABILITY 
AND WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND CURRENT PROGRAMMING IN CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE ARE ALREADY WELL ESTABLISHED -- AT THIS 
TIME BELIZEJ COSTA RICAJ HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA. I WOULD HERE 
LIKE TO STATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO RE-ESTABLISH PROGRAMS I~ COUNTRIES 
WHERE THE NEED IS GREATJ THE INTEREST IN HAVING US IS THERE;~R HAS 
BEEN RECENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT -- FOR EXAMPLEJ PANAMA --
AND WHEREJ OF COURSEJ CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT OUR VOLUNTEERS COULD 
BE CONSIDERED SAFE. IN ADDITION TO ALL THISJ WITH RELAT1VELY MODERATE 
INCREASES IN RESOURCES, THE PEACE CORPS COULD UNDERTAKE SEVERAL 
NEW INITIATIVES TO MEET THE EXPRESSED NEEDS OF OUR NEIGHBORS IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA AS WELL AS TO INVOLVE A WIDER RANGE OF AMERICANS IN 
OUR PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND TECHNICAL DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. 
FIRSTJ MIDCAREER TECHNICIANS AND PROFESSIONALS: THE PEACE 
CORPSJ IN OUR LAST COMPLETED FISCAL YEARJ 1982J SUPPLIED TO THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD ALMOST 5,000 VOLUNTEERS OF WHICH NEARLY 50% PERCENT 
WERE IN AREAS WE CONSIDER SCARCE SKILLS. CENTRAL AMERICA HAS A 
HIGH NEED FOR MANY OF THESE HIGH SKILL AREAS; PARTICULARLY THOSE 
RELATED TO AGRICULTURE AND HEALTH, EXPERIENCED WORKERS IN MANY 
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OF THESE AREASJ BY THE TIME THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR EDUCATIONS 
AND HAVE FIVE OR MORE YEARS OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OFTEN FALL IN 
THE 30 TO 50 YEAR OLD RANGE -- A DIFFICULT AREA TO RECRUIT 
NORMALLY DUE TO HEAVY FAMILY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, WE 
ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF EXPLORING A NEW INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA 
WHICH WOULD: 
-- ATTRACT THE MID-LEVEL TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL WORKER 
\~ITH SEVERAL OR MORE YEARS OF RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE; AND 
--HELP FILL THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S CRITICAL NEED FOR PEOPLE 
WITH TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE ANDPRACTICAL EXPERIENCE. 
ANOTHER POOL OF AMERICANS THE PEACE CORPS IS EAGER TO TAP 
FOR THE VARIED NEEDS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND WHICH COULD BE DONE 
WITH MODERATE RESOURCE INCREASES FOR FOCUSED RECRUITMENT 
AND SPECIAL TRAININGJ IS THE SKILLED TRADES WORKER AND THE 
EXPERIENCED RETIRED TECHNICIANS, THE PEACE CORPS WOULD LIKE TO --
AND CAN -- REACH OUT FURTHER TO THE RETIRED AMERICAN AND TO BOTH 
THE MID-CAREER AND YOUNGER SKILLED TRADES WORKER, 
THE DEMAND FOR SKILLED TEACHERS IN SCIENTIFIC AND VOCATIONAL 
AREAS EXISTS AT THE UNIVERSITY AND RELATED HIGHER EDUCATION LEVELS 
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IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE PEACE CORPS1 INTHIS REGARD1 IS WILLING 
TO EXPLORE A ONE YEAR TEACHING PROGRAM WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE 
AND CROSS CULTURAL TRAINING. IN THIS MANNER THE PEACE CORPS COULD: 
--UTILIZE ITS ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH UNIVERSITIES TO 
ATTRACT SEASONED PROFESSORS P~ANNING SABB~TICAL YEARS1 INTO A 
ONE YEAR SPECIAL SERVICE ARRANGEMENT; 
-- PURSUE AN ALREADY OPENED DIALOGUE WITH THE ASSOCIATION 
OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENTS TO ATTRACT PROFESSIONALS 
CURRENTLY TEACHING VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS. 
ON A RELATED SUBJECT1 THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO FIELD 
FAMILIES IN PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE 
CUTS ACROSS A NUMBER OF THE NEW INITIATIVES I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED. 
EXTREMELY LIMITED FUNDING HAS FOR THE PAST HALF DOZEN YEARS FORCED 
THE PEACE CORPS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES IT 
COULD ACCEPT INTO THE PEACE CORPS. HOWEVER, WITH AUGMENTED 
FUNDING, WE COULD PROFIT BY THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES OF FAMILIES 
LIVING AND WORKING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS -- A 
REAL NEIGHBOR-TO-NEIGHBOR PROGRAM. 
THE PEACE CORPS HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN READY AND ABLE TO 
PROVIDE VOLUNTEERS TO DIRECT SERVICE AREAS SUCH AS WORK WITH 
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REFUGEE POPULATIONS, WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT~ 
THE PEACE CORPS COULD DO EVEN MORE TO MEET THIS AREA'S CRITICAL 
NEEDS, 
ANY OR ALL OF THE EXPANDED~ NEW AND RENEWED INITIATIVES I 
HAVE MENTIONED ARE AREAS THAT THE PEACE CORPS IS WILLING AND ABLE 
TO EXPLORE IN ORDER TO ENSURE AN EXPANDED AND POSITIVE PRESENCE 
OF U.S. CITIZENS OF ALL BACKGROUNDS AND NEEDED SKILL AREAS IN THE 
IMPORTANT uPERSON TO PERSONu DEVELOPMENT WORK SO NECESSARY FOR 
PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. 
FORMER AMBASSADOR TO A PEACE CORPS COUNTRY~ DR. SAMUEL~ 
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE~ WHO IS A MEMBER 
OF THE CARLUCCI COMMISSION HAS SAID THAT THE "EXPENDITURES 
THAT THE U.S, GOVERNMENT MAKES OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' MONEY ON THE 
PEACB CORPS ARE PERHAPS THE BEST EXPENDITURES THAT ARE MADE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS~ AND CLEARLY~ THE MOST EFFECTIVE." 
WITH THIS IN MIND~ LET ME GIVE YOU NOW AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND 
OF FUNDING WE ARE TALKING ABOUT: FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED 
MILLION DOLLARS OVER FOUR YEARS -- OR 25 MILLION DOLLARS PER 
YEAR -- WE COULD TRIPLE THE NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA~ 
UNDERTAKE INCREASED HEALTH PROGRAMS AND FURTHER BEEF UP OUR 
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CBI PROGRAM1 PURSUE INCREASED RECRUITING EFFORTS AIMED AT 
HISPANICS AND OTHER SPANISH-SPEAKING AMERICANS TO DEVELOP 
LITERACY PROGRAMS IN THE REGION; AND BEGIN SPECIAL PROGRAMS AIMED 
AT MEETING THE SPECIAL NEEDS Of AMERICAN OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. 
ONE OF THE PEACE CORPS' THEMES IS "BUILDING BRIDGES." AT 
A TIME WHEN THIS COMMISSION MEETS TO DETERMINE NOT ONLY LONG-
RANGE OBJECTIVES BUT ALSO THE STRATEGY NEEDED TO MEET THESE 
GOALS1 "BUILDING BRIDGES" WOULD SEEM TO BE AN APPROPRIATE THEME. 
WE AT THE PEACE CORPS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THIS AGENCY CAN 
SERVE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY~ BETWEEN 
GOALS AND POLICY1 AND FURNISH AN INPUT IN THE BEST A~HIGHEST 
AMERICAN TRADITION. THE PEACE CORPS HAS COME A LONG WAY IN 23 
YEARS1 AND1 IF YOU WISH1 WE ARE PREPARED TO DO EVEN MORE TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE REALIZATION AND PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND 
INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
I'LL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. 
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ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. 
Remarks before Central American Commission 
September 13, 1983 
I will not bore you by reiterating points that the Commission has 
surely heard all too often in recent days. I imagine that most of us 
can agree that the underlying cause of the Central American tragedy is 
history's awful legacy of poverty, oppression and underdevelopment; 
that an immediate cause is the not unreasonable desire of people living 
in Central America to rebel against their historic fate; and that a 
contributing cause may well be the exploitation of this rebellion by 
outsiders eager, among other things, to make trouble for the United 
States. 
The question arises whether the United States can take effective 
steps to get at those underlying causes of Central American unrest: 
poverty, oppression and underdevelopment. I speak with diffidence, 
for I am far from being a Central American expert. But in the early 
1960s I was involved in these matters as an adviser to President Kennedy 
on hemisphere affairs, and I am therefore a veteran of the attempt made 
twenty years ago to improve Latin American conditions through the Alliance 
for Progress. That experience may still have relevance to your delibera-
tions today. 
The Alliance for Progress represented a belated U.S. recognition 
of the fact that the persistence in the western hemisphere of savage 
contrasts between poverty and oligarchy both guaranteed local unrest 
and invited extracontinental meddling. Based on ideas drawn from Latin 
American economists and political leaders, the Alliance proposed three 
goals: economic growth, structural change, political democratization. 
These goals were, in theory, reciprocally dependent. Structural change 
and political democratization were deemed indispensable in order to 
incorporate the campesinos into the national community, in order to 
create a modern market and in order to assure more efficient distri-
bution of the gains of and therefore of incentives for economic growth. 
The implication was that U.S. economic assistance would be conditioned 
on, or at least associated with, reform performance -- tax and land 
reform in particular. 
We understood that in the short run there might well be conflict 
among these three objectives. We also supposed, or hoped, that in the 
long run they would be mutually reinforcing. But the Alliance never 
received the long-run test. After President Kennedy's death, the new 
administration abandoned two of the three Kennedy goals -- structural 
change and political democratization. The Alliance lost its distinctive 
thrust and became just another U.S. economic aid program, employed less 
to serve the goals of development and democracy in Latin America than 
to serve as a political arm of U.S. foreign policy and as an economic 
accessory of the U.S. business community. 
The Alliance was by no means ineffective as a stimulus to economic 
growth. An original goal, laid down at Punta del Este in 1961, was a 
growth rate of 2.5 per cent per capita per year. Actually from 1961 to 
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1967 Latin America grew at the average annual rate of 4.5 per cent; but, 
because population grew even faster, the per capita rate was under 2 per 
cent. It is impossible to determine how much of this achievement was 
due to the Alliance, but a good part certainly was. Over the decade this 
was not a contemptible record, and the Alliance was clearly responsible 
for the allocation of some of the gains of growth to social development --
the building of schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, roads, sewage sys-
tems, irrigation, electric power, public health and so on. 
For all this, the Alliance accomplished far less than its founders 
had hoped. A great deal of the new capital brought into Latin America 
was offset by an outflow of capital to service and repay external debts 
and to remit profits to foreign investors. The Alliance did not lighten 
the weight of Latin America's external debt, nor did it improve Latin 
America's share of world trade. It reduced neither unemployment nor the 
inequality of income distribution. It did not significantly increase 
literacy. The abandonment after 1963 of the original political and social 
goals meant that the effort did not come close to bringing about the 
structural changes considered essential to economic growth as well as to 
political democratization and stability. 
What can we learn from this experience? Some in retrospect have 
condemned the Alliance on the ground that it was oversold, created excess-
ive expectations and produced inevitable disillusionment. I am not im-
pressed by this indictment. No doubt the men of the New Frontier were 
enthusiasts; but, as Emerson said, "Nothing great was ever achieved without 
enthusiasm." The Alliance was an effort to alter the consciousness of a 
continent, and this is not to be done by understatement. Nor, for that 
matter, did the administration conceal the magnitude of the problem. 
President Kennedy emphasized the difficulties in speech after speech. 
"The task we have set ourselves and the Alliance for Progress," he said 
a few days before his death, " •.• is a far greater task than any we have 
ever undertaken in our history." 
Excessive expectations were a problem less for the people of Latin 
America than for the people of the United States. The Second World War 
and especially the postwar occupations of Japan and Germany had nourished 
ideas in our o~~ breasts about our superhuman capacity to work out the 
destinies of other nations. The Marshall Plan confirmed this sense of 
national omnicompetence. The resulting illusions were crystallized in 
a pompous term that enjoyed considerable vogue among government officials 
and political scientists --"nation-building." In fact, our successes in 
Europe and Japan proved very little except our capacity to help nations 
that already possessed the industrial discipline, the managerial skills, 
the educated work force, the physical infrastructure and the historical 
and cultural prerequisites for development. The problem we faced in those 
areas was reconstruction of war-battered economies, not creation ex nihilo. 
The task of economic development raises a different set of questions. 
I am not an economist or a banker, only an historian, and will not venture 
into technical areas already surveyed by those far more expert than I. As 
an historian, I surmise that an all-out magic-of-the-marketplace approach 
would be as mistaken as an all-out statist approach. The United States 
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itself developed through a mix of public and private initiatives. Latin 
America will very likely develop that way too. The essential problem, 
in my judgment, is less economic technique than it is political will. 
President Kennedy recognized from the start that the future of the 
Alliance depended on Latin government, parties and leaders honestly 
committed to the Punta del Este goals. He never supposed that the United 
States had the ability to build nations from without. "Only the most 
determined efforts of the American nations," he said in 1962, "can bring 
success to this effort. They and they alone can mobilize their resources, 
enlist the energies of their people and modify their social patterns so 
that all, and not just a privileged few, share in the fruits of growth." 
He also believed, though he was too polite to say so, that "they and they 
alone" could purge the public administration of graft and corruption, ex-
pand the educational system, control the military and restrain the greed 
of the oligarchy. "If this effort is made," Kennedy concluded, "then 
outside assistance will give vital impetus to progress; without it, no 
amount of help will advance the welfare of the people." 
The Alliance was thus a wager on the capacity of the progressive 
democratic governments and parties of Latin America to bring about social 
and economic development. Even Fidel Castro granted that the Alliance 
was "a good idea" although "overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the 
moment, under constraint •••• Despite all that I am willing to agree that 
the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily 
rapid course of events in Latin America." But Castro went on to predict 
that Kennedy's "good ideas aren't going to yield any results ••• The trusts 
see that their interests are being a little compromised ••• the Pentagon 
thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all 
the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage 
the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him." 
Everyone except the parties of the center-left, the moderate reform 
parties flowing, twenty years ago and today, in two distinct but allied 
streams --the social democratic parties, of which Romulo Betancourt's 
Accion Democratica in Venezuela was then the most prominent, and the 
Christian Democratic parties, among which Eduardo Frei's Chilean party 
was then foremost. Where such parties were in power, the Alliance made 
a difference. Where they were not in power, the Alliance suffered under 
mortal handicaps. The wager failed, because, for diverse reasons, the 
democratic parties in too many Latin countries were rendered impotent by 
their two deadly enemies -- oligarchy and revolution. 
In short, the first condition for success is a strong local govern-
ment dedicated to the project of national development for the general 
welfare. Herein it seems to me lies the fallacy of the 'military-shield' 
thesis -- the notion that, if we provide the military shield, we can 
persuade the government we have taken under our protection to carry through 
the changes necessary to win political support and establish the basis for 
economic growth. 
The counter-insurgency delusion began in the Kennedy years and expanded 
in the years thereafter. The trouble is that regimes that call for military 
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shields to defend themselves against their own people don't care a damn 
about their own dispossessed. That is precisely why they are under attack. 
As soon as we insert our marvelous shield, moreover, we lose most of our 
leverage; for the guarantee of military protection means that we renounce 
our own ultimate sanction-- the withdrawal of support. Once we make the 
declaratory commitment to a government under siege, we will find it increas-
ingly hard to force a beleaguered oligarchy to take measures it honestly and 
perhaps correctly sees as fatal to its privilege and power. It becomes the 
policy of the blank check. 
When we thus bind ourselves to a client government, we tend to become 
the client's prisoners. Nor dare we forget that many nationalist leaders 
in the Third World are practiced and skillful con men, virtuosi in the arts 
of sweet-talking and swindling the superpowers. They will promise anything 
to get the support they need to stay in power. Delivery on such promises 
is not to be taken very seriously once the shield is in place. 
I think that we must be extremely wary of military involvement in the 
interest of regimes that on their own motion have shown no concern for their 
own people. The military-shield concept works when it helps governments 
already committed to an agenda of democratic reform; but Betancourt 
(Venezuela) and Magsaysay (Philippines) were the exception, not the rule. 
Most of the time the military-shield approach only nourishes the folly and 
arrogance of the regime whose suicidal obstinacy has got it into such bad 
trouble. 
In any event, unilateral military intervention by the U.S. in Latin 
America can only be, in the last quarter of the 20th century, a gross 
error. Prudence enjoins a role of restraint. Let us throw the lead to 
the Contadora group. The Contadora states know the problems and the ter-
rain far better than we do, are more directly threatened by adverse develop-
ments and are quite as determined as we are to protect their national 
independence. Nothing has got us into more trouble through the long years 
than the delusion that we know the interests of other countries better than 
they know their own interests. Whatever we do in Central America, we must 
do on a multilateral basis; and, if the countries on the firing-line do not 
see the threat as apocalyptically as we do, who is to say that they are 
wrong and we are right? Do we really understand their own world better 
than they do? 
If the Contadora group fails to pass a miracle, we may have to resign 
ourselves to turmoil in Central America for some time to come -- turmoil 
beyond our power to correct and beyond our wisdom to cure. Yet turmoil, 
after all, is the historical process through which nations, including our 
own, achieve their national identity. Parturition rarely takes place 
without pain. 
I trust your Commission will make a realistic assessment of the extent 
to which the USSR can really exploit this turmoil. The Soviet Union obviously 
derives immense Schadenfreude from our predicament. But Central America for 
Moscow is a windfall, a target of opportunity, not a target of deep strategic 
purpose. The Kremlin knows that it cannot establish nuclear bases in the 
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western hemisphere in 1983 any more than it could in 1962. It already 
has conventional military installations in Cuba; and it knows that installa-
tions in Central America would be hopelessly vulnerable, to be snuffed out 
at once in event of trouble. The so-called domino effect is quite as 
likely -- I would judge even more likely -- to strengthen anti-communism 
than communism in the hemisphere. As for financial aid to Marxist states 
in Central America, supplying financial aid is about as popular in Moscow 
as it is in Washington; and in any case the Soviet Union would be foolish 
to make a major investment in Latin American economic development. Why, 
as the Latin Americans themselves put it, would Moscow wish to fatten a 
lamb in the jaws of a lion? 
The future of Central America does not lie in our hands. It lies in 
the hands of the Central Americans. I still believe that an approach along 
the lines of the Alliance for Progress offers the best hope in the long run. 
U.S. assistance can be effective as what Dean Acheson used to call the 
"missing component" when the domestic will is democratic, organized and 
resolute. But, as the Alliance experience suggests, it cannot replace such 
a will where it does not exist. The best we can do is to help that will 
to emerge -- and the way to do that is not to commit the prestige of this 
noble republic to the support of rulers, whether of left or of right, whose 
survival in power depends on the elimination of the democratic alternative 
and who in the meantime torture and murder their own democrats. 
I know it is against the American grain to suppose that there are 
problems we cannot readily solve with sufficient arms and money. Abstention 
may be a difficult choice. But history takes its own time. The ways of 
history are inscrutable and often tragic. Peoples have to find their own 
paths to nationhood, and these paths are sometimes bloody. As a wise 
British ambassador to Washington (Lord Harlech) once said, "Every country 
has a right to its own Wars of the Roses." 
In the struggle for nationhood, the role of the United States, great 
and powerful as we may be, can only be marginal. We cannot play God to 
history and decide the destiny of other peoples. Maturity requires a 
willingness to live for a season with ambiguity. As President Kennedy 
once put it: ~We must face the fact that the United States is neither 
omnipotent nor omniscient -- that we are only six per cent of the world's 
population -- that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 per cent 
of mankind -- that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity 
and that therefore there cannot be an American solut.ion to every world 
problem." 
DR. NEVIN S. SCRIMSHAW 
Statement for Kissinger Commission 
My name is Dr. NevinS. Scrimshaw and I am an Institute Professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the MIT-Harvard 
International Food and Nutrition Program. I also direct the progra~ on "Food, 
Nutrition and Poverty" of the United Nations University whose headquarters are 
in Tokyo, Japan. After obtaining a Ph.D. in Physiology from Harvard University, 
I received the M.D. degree from the University of Rochester and served an 
internship in Gorgas Hospital, Panama. In addition, I have a degree from the 
Harvard School of Public Health. 
I went to Central America in 1949 to establish the Institute of Nutrition of 
Central America and Panama (INCAP) under the sponsorship of the Pan American 
H~alth Organization. In this capacity I worked closely with Ministry of Health 
and other government officials in all six member countries and spent a good deal 
of time in nutrition studies in rural areas of these countries. Although I left 
the directorship of INCAP in 1961 to go to MIT, I returned for several months 
each year until 1975 for field research, and in many of these years directed a 
summer field course in clinical and public health nutrition. I have continued 
my involvement in Central America through the participation of INCAP as an asso-
ciated institution of the The United Nations University for research and 
trainin~ in applied nutrition. 
The problems of Central America are not due to Marxist intervention or the 
East-West conflict. They are rooted in landlessness, poverty, and injustice; 
in governments that protect the already privileged, and tolerate, for most of 
the people, a lack of education, health, food, housing, water, sanitation--
almost everything essential for social well-being. 
794. 
I will summarize briefly the past and present nutritional and health 
situation of the countries of the region before making a number of specific 
suggestions. 
INCAP was established for three purposes: 1) to determine the nutritional 
and related health problems of the countries of Central America and Panama, 
2) through research to fina practical solutions to these problems, and 3) to 
assist in the application of these solutions by training personnel and assisting 
governments. The first two parts of the task were well accomplished in the 
early years. 
It soon became apparant that once breast milk was no longer adequate as the 
sole source of food, growth and development slowed, morbidity from diarrheal and 
infectious disease rose alarmingly, and the mortality rates for children under 5 
years of age were among the highest in the world. I have worked in villages in 
both El Salvador and Guatemala where more than one-third of the children born 
alive died before 5 years of age, and where children entering school at age 7 
were four years retarded in weight for age. 
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In Central America, as in most other developing countries, protein-calorie 
malnutrtion is the most prevalent and serious form of malnutrition. 
Unfortunately, it has no easy technological solution because its roots are in 
poverty and lack of social justice. In 1950 a dedicated director of public 
health in El Salvador explained to me that the government was on a tightrope. 
With no social progress, unrest and violence were inevitable, but if the govern-
ment tried to tax or limit their privileges, it was cheaper for the few ~xtended 
families that controlled most of the good agricultural land and other economic 
resources of the country to arrange for a revolution than to pay increased 
taxes or give up land. This observation, more than any other, helped me to 
understand the realities of Central America and the limited social progress in 
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Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and, until recently, Nicaragua, despite the 
dedicated efforts of public health workers and considerable external assistance. 
INCAP studies have also been instrumental in demonstrating the synergism 
between malnutrition and infection. Malnutrition weakens resistanc~ to infec-
l 
tion and leads to increased frequency and severity of diarrheal and respiratory 
diseases and others of inf~~tious origin. Conversely, each episode of infection 
worsens nutritional status by reducing appetite and leading to significant inter-
nal and external metabolic losses of protein and other essential nutrients. It 
is for these reasons that control of infections is important to prevention of 
malnutrition and vice versa. Because of the unsanitary environments and poor 
personal hygiene in which most of the population lives, diarrheal disease is a 
particularly common cause of morbidity and mortality. 
INCAP field studies have also highlighted the social and economic consequen-
ces of dietary energy intakes that are limited by poverty and underprivilege. 
Men work hard at agricultural tasks for a few hours and then must rest for the 
rest of the day to stay in energy balance and avoid chronic weight loss and 
death. They are not paid by the hour but by the task because there is so much 
variation in what workers can accomplish and how long it takes. They have 
little energy to spare for the discretionary activities so essential for house-
hold improvement and community development. As Fernando Viteri and co-workers 
at INCAP have shown, additional food results in a dramatic increase in physical 
activity of social, economic, and recreational value. He has also demonstrated 
that the same kind of restriction is observed in the play activity of 
malnourished children. 
Adolfo Chavez of the National Institute of Nutrition in Mexico has shown 
that with less interaction between undernourished young children and their phy-
sical and social environment, performance on tests of learning and behavior is 
reduced. Supplementary feeding increases activity and results in improved 
cognitive test performance. Both Mexican and INCAP studies have provided strong 
evidence that retardation in physical growth and development is paralleled by 
poorer performance on tests of learning and behavior. This conclusion has been 
reinforced by studies at the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia by McKay 
and others. 
The more definitive INCAP's identification of the nutrition and related 
health problems of Central America and Panama, the more glaring was INCAP's ina-
bility to achieve the desired progress in their prevention. Surveys conducted 
in the same Mayan Indian villages in Guatemala in 1950 and again in 1975, 25 
years later, showed no change in food intakes or in the degree of growth retar-
dation. 
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In the 1960's with economic improvement there was a reduction in the number 
of cases of the severe form of protein-calorie malnutrition known as 
kwashiorkor. However, with inflation and the drop in coffee and sugar prices of 
the late 1970's pediatricians now state that the malnutrition of the 1950's has 
returned. While meat production has increased, local meat consumption per 
capita has actually declined because local purchasers could not compete with the 
higher prices offered for meat in the U.S. 
In El Salvador we were dealing with a high proportion of landless laborers 
who had only seasonal employment and no access to land of their own. According 
to data prepared by FAO in 1969, the average per capita calorie intake in El 
Salvador was the lowest in Latin America, except for Haiti. More significant, 
the FAO report noted that the average nutritional intake had been declining for 
the last decade. 
In both Guatemala and £1 Salvador the severe retardation in growth and 
development of the preschool years was not made up during the school years. In 
fact, in the rural areas of Guatemala it became worse during the school years. 
In Honduras, conditions were similar but there was some small improvement in 
weight for age during the school years. 
In Somoza's Nicaragua the situation was equally bad and at the highest 
levels the government was almost totally indifferent or resistant to INCAP and 
PAHO recommendations despi!~ the fact that Nicaragua, like most developing 
countries, had some dedicated middle and lower level health personnel. For 
example, the iodine deficiency responsible for widespread endemic goiter can be 
prevented effectively by iodization of salt and can be achieved by decree at no 
cost to the government and with no justification for raising the price of salt. 
This was achieved in all of the Central American countries, and endemic goiter 
was eliminated as a public health problem- except in Somoza's Nicaragua. One 
of the first health measures in Nicaragua after the overthrow of Somoza was the 
iodization of salt. 
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As INCAP came under increasing criticism for the persistence of malnutrition 
in Central America despite a budget that amounted to nearly four million dollars 
by 1980, it turned more and more to analyzing the multiple social and political 
factors responsible and attempted to assist its member governments in the devel-
opment of policies that would improve food and nutrition in their countries. 
You are aware that in Guatemala 80% of the good agricultural land is in the 
hands of a limited number of large land owners and that rural unemployment pro-
bably exceeds 30%. What is not so well recognized is that the negligible taxes 
on land allow the large land owners to use their land inefficiently or leave it 
idle without serious penalty. On the Pacific coast of Guatemala, exceptionally 
fertile volcanic soils are being used for large cattle farms producing meat pri-
marily for export. If these were used for labor-intensive food and cash crops, 
the rural employment situation in the area would be quite different. 
An AID PL 480 Title II program evaluation in El Salvador in July, 1971 is 
illustrative. After noting that 70% of all children under 5 years of age were 
malnourished, it states that 11 although the malnutrition problem justifies a 
larger program ••• there is no broad public commitment and program for attacking 
El Salvador's malnutrition problem. Few leaders .•• seem to have a sense of 
urgency about nutritional improvement ... 
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This attidue have never really changed. T~n years later, in 1981, the per-
centage of malnutrition was reported to be slightly higher- 73%. The tradi-
tional power groups that have always dominated Central American governments, the 
large land owners and business men, and their military supporters and paramili-
tary forces, block attempts at basic public health measures as well as land 
reform, housing assistance, and community development. I found in my files a 
number of ambitious agricultural and health programs drawn up for El Salvador 
that have never been implemented. 
A tiny 2% of the population of El Salvador continues to own 60% of the land, 
and 80% of the population earns less than the minimum needed to buy the 
necessities of life. Unemployment rates not only remain very high, as much as 
one-third of the rural labor force, but also work remains highly seasonal. 1970 
AID ROCAP data for El Salvador suggested a 64% rural unemployment rate at the 
end of September, dropping to 8% for the coffee harvest, and rising rapidly 
again thereafter-- ideal for the large land owners and disastrous for the rural 
populations. 
I have not been back to El Salvador recently, but in July of this year two 
of my colleagues, Dr. John Stanbury of MIT and Dr. Carola Eisenberg of the 
Harvard Medical School, visited El Salvador with five other distinguished health 
professionals for the U.Sr sponsored by the American Public Health Association 
and other health groups. From interviews and site inspections they conclude 
that there is a virtually complete breakdown in the health care system and that 
the training of health personnel is at a near standstill. Worse still, they 
found systematic repression and violence against health workers. Any criticism 
of the government can lead to discharge and often death at the hands of the 
army, security or paramilitary forces. Treating persons who are suspected of 
being insurgents or even the collection of health statistics renders health 
workers liable to reprisal. An estimated 30 to 40% of physicians have left the 
country since 1980, many as the result of death threats. 
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One country, Costa Rica, stands out as the exception in achieving dramatic 
improvements in nutritional and health status. In the early 1950•s infant and 
preschool mortalites were high, the degree of growth retardation of preschool 
children the same as in the highlands of Guatemala, and both kwashiorkor and 
marasmus were hyperendemic. As recently as 1966, 14% of the preschool children 
were still more than 25% retarded in weight for age, i.e., second and third 
degree malnutrition by the Gomez classification. By 1982 it was only 4.8%. 
Moreover, infant mortality was only 17 per 1,000 live births and less than one 
per 1,000 for children 1 to 4 years of age. These are the mortality levels of 
Europe and North America. Moreover, avitaminosis A and endemic goiter have been 
eliminated as public health problems. With enhanced child survival and improved 
living conditions, family planing has become increasingly accepted. In 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras infant and preschool mortality remain high. 
This occurred with economic resources proportionately less than those of the 
other Central American countries. The difference was political commitment, a 
government that cared and gave a high budget priority to education and health, 
particularly that of the mothers and young children. Government policies 
targeted goods and service~ (health, nutrition, housing, environmental sanita-
tion, education and welfare activities) to the most deprived population groups. 
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This provision of social services has been part of a dynamic process of redistri-
bution of national income enforced mainly in the 1970's. 
Costa Rica has recently fallen on hard economic times, but its social and 
health gains are apparently being maintained. A recent article in the Boletin 
of the Pan American Health Organization points out that in Chile, with a long 
history of a national health system with wide coverage and emphasis on primary 
health care, health has not deteriorated despite the present adverse economic 
circumstances. Nicaragua, despite severe economic constraints and all of its 
external and internal problems, appears also to be achieving major health gains 
at long last. 
The conclusion is unmistakable. It is not natural resources, the physical 
environment, or gross national product that explain differences among the 
Central American countries in nutrition, health, and educational levels, but 
rather the policies that governments have followed. Where they have been 
responsive primarily to the interests of the large land owners and 
industrialists, have allowed starvation wages, and have failed to spend suf-
ficient money on education and health to achieve broad coverage, social unrest 
has increased and indices of nutrition and health have remained low and statis. 
This is a very sketchy and superficial account of a complex set of problems. 
Moreover, most measures that can be identified as useful for improving any 
aspect of the situation in Central America are multiple and interacting. It 
follows that there is no single, simple, or rapid solution. Furthermore, most 
measures that one can identify as helpful are likely to run squarely into 
governmental unwillingness or inability to implement them. Without a dif-
ferent set of government actions in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, there 
is no hope for significan~ improvement. Worse, the situation in these countries 
can only continue to deteriorate. 
What influence the U.S. has must be exerted toward desirable social change 
and not to maintenance of the status quo. The U.S. should encourage and support 
the efforts of Central American governments to improve education and health, and 
to achieve greater social equity. It should not be supporting mili~ary forces 
that are used for the repression of dissent, slaughter of present and potential 
leaders, and maintenance of the privileges of a tiny fraction of the population. 
There is simply no way that more military support at this time will help the 
region. Conversely support for greater social equity is not incompatible with 
international policies favorable to the U.S. as the example of Costa Rica 
illustrates. As I stated at the beginning, the problems of Central America are 
rooted in poverty, injustice, and landlessness, in governments that protect the 
interests of a rich minority, and in inadequate health care, food, housing, edu-
cation, water, and sanitation. Assistance policies that address these issued 
could have dramatic effects on the social and economic development of the 
problem countries of Central America and on their political stability. I will 
briefly summarize some possible lines of action. 
First, promote strong integrated programs of primary health care. There is 
need for a strong effort to extend primary health care to all populations, 
including those in remote rural areas. As WHO and UNICEF are emphasizing, there 
are a number of proven measures that would be effective. Curative medicine is 
not the most important part of health care. More important is a group of 
actions that include education in nutrition and health principles, the use of 
growth charts to identify malnutrition in young children, the promotion and pro-
tection of breast-feeding, a comprehensive program of immunizations, the distri-. 
bution and use of salt and sugar packets to make up fluid for the oral rehydra-
tion of persons with diarrhea, and improved environmental sanitation and per-
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sonal hygiene. When these measures take hold, so do the family planning efforts 
that must be part of the package. 
For their success, these measures require thousands of auxiliary health 
workers and community health volunteers. They must be community-based, but 
given strong logistic support by the health system. They have already proved 
successful in Costa Rica and there is a major effort at their implementation in 
Nicaragua. What is most important is not the individual measures in isolation, 
but their introduction as a package. Their effectiveness will be increased if 
they include improvement of community water supplies, and mosquito vector 
control for the prevention of malaria. 
Second, promote and support~ strong rural development program to include 
agricultural policies that will increase both agricultural production and rural 
employment. Access roads, better communications, and improved land tenure and 
taxation policies will be needed. So will industrial developments that will 
absorb surplus and seasonal labor and make urban migration less necessary. Food 
storage and processing facilities and services to provide agricultural inputs 
will provide additional,jobs. This should be undergirded with available rural 
credit, strong agricultural extension services, and relevant agricultural 
research. Once again, isolated measures will be of limited benefit. As 
integrated package of improvements will be required. 
Third, support helpful regional agricultural and economic measures. A 
number of regional mesures based on economic and political cooperation among the 
countries of Central America will be more effective than dealing with individual 
countries. I will mention only two of these, both entirely within U.S. capacity 
to help. One would be an agreement with the region to buy guaranteed minimum 
quantities of the key exp~rt commodities, coffee, bananas, and sugar. A 
regional agreement will avoid the present distortions of country quotas and have 
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the advantage of requiring cooperation among the countries. Similarly, a 
regional grain reserve program could stabilize prices and ensure continuity of 
supplies. Once established with U.S. PL 480 commodities, it could be maintained 
by production of the countries themselves. 
Fourth, support regional research and training institutions. The countries 
of Central America are individually too small to mount effective and sophisti-
cated research needed in the areas of nutrition, health, agriculture, and tech-
nology. Fortunately, regional institutions for these purposes have already been 
established and are among the best in the developing world. However, the poli-
tical and economic turmoil in Central America threatens their very survival. 
These institutions-- in nutrition, the Institute of Nutrition of Central 
America and Panama in Guatemala; in health, the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory in 
Panama; in technology, the Central American Institute of Science and Technology 
(ICAITI) in Guatemala; and in agriculture, the Central American Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture in Costa Rica (CATIE) merit strong support from the U.S. 
and the international community for their capabilities in both applied research 
and training appropriate to the region. 
Fifth, encourage and support~ regional entitlement plan. There is a need 
for some kind of regional entitlement scheme that would provide a safety net for 
those most impoverished. Whether this takes the form of a food stamp plan or 
income subsidies, the experts must work out. Although controversial, both 
approaches have proved their effectiveness where they have been given a fair 
trial. Because the total population of Central America and Panama is only about 
22 million people, external assistance to make this feasible is possible if 
inflation can be kept in control. Whatever the macroeconomic policies adopted, 
some kind of floor needs ~o be put in place for the very poor. The cost of 
doing so must be balanced against the cost of not doing so. 
Time does not permit elaboration of these proposals or any attempt at their 
detailed justification, but I will be glad to answer questions. 
Thank you. 
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STATEMENT FOR THE KISSINGER COMMISSION 
PART II: MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
BY DR. NEVIN S. SCRIMSHAW 
Possible Lines of Actions Suggested in the Original Testimony 
No.1. Promote strong integrated programs of primary health care. 
There is need for a strong effort to extend primary health 
care to all populations, including those in remote rural 
areas. As WHO and UNICEF are emphasizing, there are a number 
of proven measures that would be effective. Curative medi-
cine is not the most important part of health care. More 
important is a group of actions that incude education in 
nutrition and health principles, the use of growth charts to 
identify malnutrition in young children, the promotion and 
protection of breast-feeding, a comprehensive program of 
immunizations, the distribution and use of salt and sugar 
packets to make up fluid for the oral rehydration of persons 
with diarrhea, and improved environmental sanitation and per-
sonal hygiene. When these measures take hold, so do the 
family planning efforts that must be part of the package. 
For their success, these measures require thousands of auxil-
iary health workers and community health volunteers. They 
must be community-based, but given strong logistic support by 
the health system. They have already proved successful in 
Costa Rica and there is a major effort at their implementa-
tion in Nicaragua. What is most important is not the indi-
vidual measures in isolation, but their introduction as a 
package. Their effectiveness will be increased if they 
include improvement of community water supplies, and mosquito 
vector control for the prevention of malaria. 
Specific, Implementation: 
U.S. AID should supplement WHO and UNICEF support of a package of primary 
health care measures for Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras that have already 
been proved effective in Costa Rica in reducing morbidity and mortality from 
malnutrition and infectious disease in countries with the nutritional and health 
problems of Central America. These include: 
806. 
a. Monthly weighing of infant and young children within their own com-
munities with the growth records kept by the mother for the purpose of detecting 
the need for supplementary feeding and/or medical treatment. 
b. Promotion of breast-feeding and of appropriate supplementary feeding 
once breast milk is no longer sufficient as the sole source of food. 
c. Effective comprehensive campaigns of immunization against five major 
childhood killers: tetanus, polio, tuberculosis, whooping cough and measles. 
d. Widespread distribution of packets of oral rehydration salts for the 
treatment of diarrheal dehydration combined with intensive education for their 
use, latrine construction and improved water supplies. 
e. Extensive programs of nutrition and health education for mothers and 
the general public. 
f. Provision of essential medicines and medical treatment at the local 
level. 
No.2. Promote and support ~ strong rural development program to 
include agricultural policies that will increase both agri-
cultural production and rural employment. Access roads, 
better communications;-and improved land tenure and taxation 
policies will be needed. So will industrial developments 
that will absorb surplus and seasonal labor and make urban 
migration less necessary. Food storage and processing faci-
lities and services to provide agricultural inputs will pro-
vide additional jobs. This should be undergirded with 
available rural credit, strong agricultural extension ser-
vices, and relevant agricultural research. Once again, iso-
lated measures will be of limited benefit. An integrated 
package of improvements will be required. 
Specific Implementation: 
The action elements under this objective should be increased training, pro-
duction of those products for which the region has a comparative advantage, and 
increasing primary food production marketing and agribusiness. The focus should 
be on close working relationships between the public and private sectors that 
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are socially responsive as well as economically viable. The elements of such a 
strategy should include: 
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a. Sector Study. There should be an in-depth sector analysis for com-
modities that can be produced efficiently in the rural sector to (1) increase 
the region's ability to meet its own basic food requirements to bring availabi-
lities to minimum daily requirement level for all people in the rural and urban 
sector in ten years, (2) focus on those high value products that can be grown in 
the tropics for which the Central Americans have or can develop a comparative 
advantage in fresh product exports, (3) develop agro industry and tropical food 
processing as an additional market for the region's products and (4) develop the 
technical, research extension credits and marketing system which can support the 
above-mentioned goals: 
These studies should be carried out following a scope of work developed 
so that the results would meet international assistance institution criteria. 
Each phase of the four suggested should result in preliminary project descrip-
tions in areas offering high opportunities for financing. The six studies could 
be carried out almost simultaneously. Studies should project new needs for 
longer term development (e.g., for five to ten years) in the areas identified. 
Study cost for six countries: $ 1,750,000. 
b. Training. 
1. Graduate Level. Develop a region-wide graduate program for agri-
culture, agricultural economics, forestry, marine fisheries, etc. Training in 
the U.S. at the M.Sc. and Ph.D. level should be developed immediately. Since 
many senior trained technicians become administrators of public or private sec-
tor agencies or divisions, all should receive management as well as technical 
training, as an initial step, scholarships should be offered on a competitive 
basis in each country by the U.S.A.I.D. mission to that country. For the first 
five years, fifty graduate level scholarships should be provided per country 
annually. A manpower study of graduate trained personnel needs should be 
carried out in the third year of the program to determine needs of the following 
decade. All candidates selected should agree in writing to return for two years 
of public sector service for each year of training provided. Preference should 
be given to those who propose to study in research-critical areas, on tropical 
products having high employment and/or income generating capacity. 
Fifty scholarships/country: 
times six countries: 
times five years: 
Total cost: $20.0 Million 
2. Undergraduate Level. The agricultural colleges of Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua are overcrowded, inadequately staffed and lack land on 
which students can gain practical field experience in production, marketing, 
etc. It will be necessary to relocate the colleges of agriculture, construct 
new facilities, retrain many staff members, etc. for long-term agricultural 
progress. Since it will not be feasible to relocate and upgrade the physical 
plant of the three countries at one time, it is proposed that the facilities be 
relocated in Guatemala (the poorest of the three in terms of 
facilities/students) on an appropriate area of land to be provided by the 
G··atemalan government in 1985-87, and a similar change made in El Salvador in 
1986-88 Jnd in Nicaragua in 1987-89. 
Cost of construction: 
A. Guatemala (2500 students) 
B. El Salvador (1500 students) 






Staff for these and the other colleges of agriculture in the region 
should receive refresher or graduate upgrading. At least five staff members per 
college should be permitted annually to return to graduate school for further 
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~trengthening in their area of specialization until all have had an opportunity. 
This professional upgrading should be for a one-year period. Each would be 
expected to carry a full course load. A substitute professor should be made 
available to replace the Central American professor while he is on training from 
the University of Puerto Rico or any U.S. Land Grant University that can provide 
Spanish-speaking counterparts. 
Five professionals per country 
from six countries for the 
initial five years 
5 x 6 x 5 x $40,000 for two year 
A.I.D. financed scholarships: $ 6.0 Million 
c. Vocational Agricultural Education. The primary source of all extension 
agents in the region as well as agro-industrial (fertilizer salesmen, production 
promoters for processing plants) and farm managers for many years will continue 
to come from the Vocational Agricultural schools of the region. Each country 
has at least one. All are extremely limited in facilities, land available for 
field study in several is too small to permit real learning-by-doing practice. 
The U.S. has a number of vocationally-oriented colleges that could work with the 
C.A.P. governments and upgrade the quality of their graduates (hold to current 
three-year training) as well as doubling the number of students in all but 
Guatemala (it is probably the largest and best-equipped but still inadequate). 
Also upgrade the quality and uniformity of training by holding regional short 
courses annually. 
Cost of upgrading facilities in 
the region's schools $10.0 Million 
Cost of a five-year instructor 
upgrading programs (6 countries) 4.0 Million 
The Escuela Agricala Panamericana (Honduras) is considered to be one of 
the best U.S. private sector developing country vocational junior colleges in 
the world. It has received some outside assistance on facilities and has an 
excellent staff. The school has for other than actual classrooms, dormitories 
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and possibly some additional staff, the ability to at least double its 
enrollment. Its graduates are frequently considered to be the best trained 
(with those of the University of Costa Rica) in the region. It needs more core 
budget support and scholarships for an additional one hundred each year. The 
students if qualified would come from any of the Central American and 
Panamerican countries. The. school should agree not to initiate a B.Sc. level 
curricu1um in order to continue focus on the training level in which they have 
been a real success. 
This program should be privately financed by invitation of U.S. 
Agricultural companies. 
Estimated Costs: 
100 students/year for 3-year 
training course 
Additional classrooms and 
dormitories 
$ 2.5 Million 
1.0 Million 
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d. Ministry of Agriculutre Improvement: The ministries of agriculture have 
made considerable strides to improve their facilities, staff, technical capacity 
and experiment stations. No new experiment stations appear warranted at this 
time. They do need further chemical and physical analytical capacity, access to 
larger computer system for research and planning analysis, upgrading their use 
of area frame sampling, vehicles for researchers, market technicians, extension 
personne), etc., and improving their experiment station facilities. A grant is 
proposed after an initial needs survey to upgrade their capacity to conduct 
research and train farmers in new methods of production. An estimate of the 
cost of such an upgrading is difficult to arrive at at this time. Its total 
cost may be in the neighborhood of three to six million dollars per country. 
Estimated Costs: $30.0 Million 
e. Farm Training. With increased income the demand for basic food crops 
will increase by at least an estimated 20% in the first five years of the 
region's development program. Although wheat consumption would increase faster 
than other basic food products, these (corn, beans, rice and sorghum) are 
expected to rise by at least 30% in the first five years. This thirty percent 
includes a current estimated shortfall of 10% which the region is purchasing 










(30% of 2,283,000) 
(30% of 240,000) 
(30% of 413,000) 
(includes est. 40,000 for 
Nicaragua & 30,000 for Panama) 
To meet this shortfall additional credit, technical asistance and 
research will be required by the countries. 
The estimated extension and farmer education resources needed annually 
are (x $1,000): 
Country Corn Beans Rice Sorghum 
Total 
Guatemala $1,400 $108 $ 61 $ 89 $1,658 
El Salvador 656 51 69 184 960 
Honduras 448 56 53 60 617 
Nicaragua 336 80 87 53 556 
Costa Rica 117 16 280 56 469 
Panama 31 10 256 40 397 
$3,048 $321 $806 $482 $4,657 
(Calc. Method: Agent reaches 200 farmers growing 100 cwt x 2 crops on 2 Ha per 
year divided by 20 to get tons, divide results by 1/3 of present production and 
multiply by $8,000 [est. cost of extension agent].) 
f. Reform of Land Taxation, Distribution and Use. An expanded land reform 
program is needed throughout the region to permit a growing number of rural 
people to acquire and use ~and for agronomic purposes. The program should 
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contribute to better land use, recognize that farm size and production mix of 
crops and livestock over time will require a flexible ability to adjust to the 
changing economies of scale and use first quality land for intensive crops or 
animal production as well as permit many who do not wish to farm to sell their 
land. The system should set a limit on farm size on a national basis and put an 
upper limit to the amount of land that any one person can purchase under the 
program. The suggested new approach would establish for all agricultural land 
in the area to be classified by its productive potential (e.g., land use capabi-
lity classification). Each farm holding in each country would be taxed on a per 
area basis according to its soil productive potential using a tax that increases 
with a higher land use capability of the soil. The tax could start low in the 
first years and gradually be increased until farmers are forced to use their 
land more efficiently or sell it. The tax proceeds would be deposited in 
national land banks and loaned to other potential farmers for land purchase at 
low interest with up to 30 years for repayment. The farmers must meet certain 
criteria for purchase such as (a) the amount of land they can control (total); 
(b) they must live on their farms; (c) they must plant at least one-half of 
their land into permanent crops; and (d) a maximum income level to qualify for a 
loan. Preference should be given to farms in the five to twenty hectare size 
class and to the development of more economic units from small fractioned land 
holdings (e.g., minifundia). 
The costs involved would be approximately (five-year period): 
1. Development of a land use 
capability map for each 
country 
2. Development or completion 
of a modern land mensuration 
and titling system for 
each country 
3. Continuing technical assistance 
and training 
Total 
$ 20.0 Million (est.) 
60.0 Million 
6.0 Million 
$ 86.0 Million 
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g. Agricultural Diversification Program. The Central American region has 
such a varied ecology that it can produce almost all crops grown in the United 
States plus an additional one to two hundred other of tropical origin. Many of 
these have considerable developed-country demand in the United States, Canada, 
Europe and the Caribbean markets. Most have a high employment-generative capa-
city and income potential considerably above basic food crops. Some of the 
fruits and vegetables also have a significant demand when processed by canning, 
freezing or drying. Production for the winter fresh fruit and vegetable window 
in the U.S., Canada, and Europe for some is particularly attractive. In addi-
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tion there is room for considerable growth in the production of deciduous fruits 
for the Central American market and increasing demand for flowers, spices, and 
foliage plants for regional and extraregional export. 
Capital and technical assistance will be needed to make this become a 
reality. Producers must be trained in modern production and packaging methods. 
Credit for imports and appropriate plant material must be multiplied, research 
must be initiated to develop cost and result effective solutions to existing and 
new problems. The estimated costs for a program to expand production of the 
traditional or non-traditional crops would depend upon the commodity mix 
involved. It is proposed that approximately 20,000 hectares of permanent crops 
and 5,000 of annual crops be financed during the first five years among the six 
countri e·s. 
Production credit: 
1. Finance 20,000 hectares of tree 
crops (fruits, beverages, and 
spices) at an average of 
$2,000/Ha. Loan subtotal 
2. Finance 5,000 additional 
hectares of annual crops 
(vegetables,- spices, flowers) 
for export in fresh form or 
for processing at $2,500/Ha. 
Loan subtotal 
$ 40 • 0 M i 11 ion 
12.5 Million 
3. Technical assistance grant: 
provide senior technical 
assistance for research, 
extensive and supporting in-
frastructure (irrigation, 
packing sheds, etc.) develop-
ment. Grant subtotal 
4. Agro-industrial enterprise 
loans to packing plants, food 
canning processors, freezing 
plant construction. Loan subtotal 
Total 
$ 6.5 Million 
25.0 Million 
$ 84.0 Million 
h. Forestry Improvement, Natural Resources Conservation and Utilization 
Program. The improved use of natural resources is imperative if the region is 
to continue as a viable economically active area in the future. Forests are 
being cut at an alarming rate, soil is being washed away in increasing amount 
due to denuding hillsides and filling rivers and dams, natural fuelwood is being 
depleted to such an extent that some households must spend six to eight hours 
weekly to collect the wood that is needed for cooking. Likewise since forests 
and watersheds are being denuded water is not being held so that efficient irri-
gations systems can be developed for increased food production during the dry 
season. 
This program would begin to analyze the area•s forest and watershed 
management practices, determine adequacy of laws and their enforcement, train 
national staff on ways of developing a national consensus and local action to 
conserve and carefully use the region•s natural resources. Using satellite 
maps, forest reserves, improved forest harvest methods and prevention of forest 
fires and floods through improved forest and water management systems. Stored 
water for use in irrigation of intensively grown crops will be channeled by per-
manent water distribution systems and community irrigation districts. Taxation 
systems for their maintenance, improvement and expansion will be evolved to con-
tinue the process indefinitely. A public training and education program via 
radio transmission will form part of the outreach activities. 
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During the first five years the following activities should be 
contemplated: 
1. Natural resource mapping: 
satellite macromapping of 
the area (at 1:10,000) 
18 month activity. 
2. Technical training of forest 
rangers, water use and soil 
conservation specialists. 
5 year activity. Train at 
least 300 subprofessional 
specialists per country in 
five years in 1-3 month short 
courses. The government will 
be expected to pay salaries and 
transport costs and the program 
will provide senior technical 
counterparts to national tech-
nicians. Training grant--
3. Development of a national 
strategy and action program 
for sustained maintenance and 
harvest of the forest resources 
in the region. 2 year activity. 
4. Development of a small farm 
forest management project 
involving at least 10,000 (total) 
family hands in at least 3 
countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Panama) in a 5-year period. 
Loan funds --
5. Develop small and medium sized 
irrigation systems for the 
production of vegetables and 
other high value commodities. 
Areas and water are available 
on the Pacific coast of Guatemala, 
the coastal areas of El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama 
and on the Atlantic coast of 
Honduras. At least 200,000 
hectares could be irrigated with 
well designed systems and well 
managed water use. Irrigation 
also contributes to increasing 
the effectiv~ use of all types of 
infrastructure. Irrigation system 
installed on 10,000 Ha. in 5 years 
$ 2.0 Million (est.) 
2.5 Million 






No.3. Support helpful regional agricultural and economic measures. 
A number of regional measures based on-economic and political 
cooperation among the countries of Central America will be 
more effective than dealing with individual countries. I 
will mention only two of these, both entirely within U.S. 
capacity to help. One would be an agreement with the region 
to buy guaranteed minimum quantities of the key export com-
modities, coffee, bananas, and sugar. A regional agreement 
will avoid the present distortions of country quotas and have 
the advantage of requiring cooperation among the countries. 
Similarly, a regional grain reserve program could stabilize 
prices and ensure··continuity of supplies. Once established 
with U.S. PL 480 commodities, it could be maintained by pro-
duction of the countries themselves. 
Specific Implementation: 
a. Regional Marketing Agreement~ The United States presently purchases 
coffee, cacao, sugar, bananas, cotton and beef from the Central American region. 
These traditional exports are a major factor in the economic vitality of the 
region. At the same time, only a small portion of the total U.S. needs for any 
of these products are from Central America. In the framework of a new economic 
relationship the U.S. could sign a regional purchase agreement with these 
countries for minimum amounts of each of these products in a similar manner as 
the U.S. has done with the U.S.S.R. Such an agreement should operate for at 
least five years with renewal options for additional periods. The amounts 
purchased would move upward as rapidly as is possible to absorb existing stock-
piles of coffee and sugar and promote increased planting for the future. This 
would give the countries an assurance of a market and create a large number of 
jobs throughout the six country area. Since the U.S. is presently purchasing 
these products there would be little additional cost in this approach. 
b. Regional Quotas on Central American Exports. There are export quotas 
imposed on the six countries by either the U.S. or commodity world-wide 
agreements (International Coffee Agreement is an example), which restrict 
exports or cause distortions of normal trade practices (e.g., backroad shipments 
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of export products between countries to balance quotas, etc.). It should be in 
the best interest of the U.S. to promote cooperation and interdependence among 
these countries. Toward this end if the U.S. were to take the leadership in 
establishing a block quota for any products that must be import controlled into 
this country; this would then permit the countries themselves to negotiate indi-
vidual quotas among themselves and make periodic adjustments among themselves to 
compensate for unexpected shortfalls due to weather changes or other factors. 
No cost would be involved in such a new mode of operation. 
Similarly the U.S. could work to support block quotas in the 
International Coffee Agreement and other international fora. The U.S. could 
also support existing quotas in the region to permit removal of the stockpiles 
that exist for coffee, sugar, and any other controlled product. 
c. Regional Basic Food Crop Credit Fund. In order to promote increased 
production of basic food crops, additional capital for production loans are 
needed. These funds should total approximately 10% of production cost for the 
four grain types produced and consumed in the region. The new production would 
not be expected to be produced in all countries in relation to their present 
production levels. More of the increase will be produced in Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, with only modest increases in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama. 
Thus, the loan fund should be provided through the Interamerican Development 
Bank to the Central American Bank (C.A.B.E) and from this regional institution 
to national agricultural banks. As an alternative, it could be provided by 
A.I.D. to C.A.B.E. (using I.D.B. funds would decrease the U.S. direct funding 






B.F.C. Production Credit Needs 
570,000 Tons*x $ 80/Ton = 
180,000 Tons x $220/Ton = 
309,000 Tons x $300/Ton = 






Est. in 75% of annual production shortfall since two crops are produced and 
some rollover will occur. 
d. Regional Strategic Food Reserve. In order to respond to short-run 
scarcities of the basic foods needed to maintaining socio/nutritional standards 
and political stability, a regionally-managed storage program should be created. 
The silos should be located at the Guatemalan, El Salvador and Honduras border 
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and at the Costa Rican, Panamanian border for easy access to each country. The 
silos should be constucted under and managed by a board of directors consisting 
of the Ministers of Agriculture of the region. Funds should be controlled under 
their direction by the Central American Banks (C.A.B.E.). The grain can ini-
tially be provided by PL. 480 as a donation to the region. Countries could pay 
for grain withdrawals either in kind or by cash payments within one year of the 
withdrawal. Countries would agree to first use the regional strategic reserve 
before purchasing offshore. The reserve could be rolled over periodically to 
maintain its quality by exchange for current crop grain. The strategic reserve 
should be approximately ten percent of the region•s current production. 
(1981) Current Regional Production (1 ,000 Tons) 
Country Corn Beans Rice Sorghum 
Guatemala 1,052 81 46 67 
El Salvador 487 38 52 138 
Honduras 338 42 40 45 
Nicaragua 250 60 65 N/A 
Costa Rica 88 12 210 42 
Panama 68 7 192 N/A 
Subtotals 2,283 240 413 254 
10% Stock (x 100 tons) 283 24 41.3 25.4 
Corn Beans Rice Sorghum 
Est. Delivered Price 
per 1,000 Tons $ 80,000 $ 220,000 $ 40,000 $ 120,000 
Est. Cost 22,640,000 5,280,000 16,520,000 3,036,000 
Cost of Storage 
Facilities 5,660,000 4,800,000 8,260,000 5,080,000 
Subtotal Cost 
per Product $28,300,000 $10,080,000 $24,780,000 $8,116,000 
.. 
Est. Total Cost: $71,276,000 
No.4. Support regional research and training institutions. The 
countries of Central America are individually too small to 
mount effective and sophisticated research needed in the 
areas of nutrition, health, agriculture, and technology. 
Fortunately, regional institutions for these purposes have 
already been established and are among the best in the deve-
loping world. However, the political and economic turmoil in 
Central America threatens their very survival. These 
institutions -- in nutrition, the Institute of Nutrition of 
Central America and Panama in Guatemala; in health, the 
Gorgas Memorial Laboratory in Panama; in technology, the 
Central American Institute of Science and Technology (ICAITI) 
in Guatemala; and in agriculture, the Central American 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Costa Rica (CATIE) merit 
strong support from the U.S. and the international community 
for their capabilities in both applied research and training 
appropriate to the region. 
Specific Implementation: 
a. Core Budget Support to Regional Institutions. The regional institu-
tions of Central America (SIECA, CABEI, INCAP, ICAITI, INCAE, ICAP, CATIE and 
OIRSA) conduct most of the leading edge research, train national technicians, 
provide ~echnical backstopping and many other vital functions in the six 
countries. All are financially supported by the member countries and secure a 
large part of their resources for research and training from outside sources. 
They are generally underfunded in the core budget area and could carry out more 
research and training if their funding problems could be solved. 
The U.S. should agree to match the Central American country contribu-
tions to these regional agencies for core funding and increase its financial 
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support for regionally useful research and training. The core budget support 
could be channelled through the State Department's Office of International 
Organizations. The research and training should be developed through the Agency 
for International Development's Regional Office (ROCAP) located in Guatemala 
City. 
1. Per year estjmated cost core 
budget support 
2. Funds for research and training 
through the regional institu-
tions per year 
of which: 
Total 
SEICA would receive 
INCAP would receive 
ICAITI would receive 
INCAE would receive 
ICAP would receive 
CATIE would receive 








$ 22.0 Million 
SIECA funds would be for socio-economic research on regional 
problems. It would be expected to involve all of the countries and their tech-
nical people in the prioritization and implementation of specific studies. 
Results would be used for regional (and possibly national) policy determination. 
INCAP funds would enable it to update its equipment, maintain the best 
nutrition library resource in Latin America, maintain and expand its training 
program~ and expand its research directed toward the solution of the practical 
food and nutrition problems of the region. All of these are currently 
threatened by the economic problems of the member countries and reduced availa-
bility of funds from NIH and other U.S. sources. 
ICAITI would expand its support to natural resource, marine, food, fiber 
and other product processing and industrialization and for holding training 
courses for private sector companies, associationsg and cooperatives on ways of 
using industrial methods for expanding the market for the raw materials produced 
in the region. 
ICAE would use its research funds for conducting extra regional market 
analysis on products that can be produced in the CAP region and case studies and 
\ 
other types of applied research on regional industrial and agribusiriess 
enterprises and business opportunities. INCAE would be of great help in 
assisting national governments to adopt business practices and in influencing 
policy changes which would stimulate production trade and the training of a new 
cadre of small and medium sized businesses. 
!CAP would conduct research on the public sector of member countries, 
its organization, operations and management. Results should be utilized in 
improving governmental efficiency, training public sector employees and 
improving the linkage between public and private sector institutions. 
CATIE would be expected to use these new funds to increase commodity 
research on coffee, cacao, plantain and bananas, dairy production, vegetables 
and spices producable in the region. They would be expected to expand their 
graduate school and provide increased training in improved plant and animal hus-
bandry, especially on the small farm. 
In order to better integrate U.S. assistance to the six countries of 
Central America and Panama, the present A.I.O. organization should be modified. 
Instead of six separate missions developing programs for each country and a 
separate mission to work on regional problems, it is proposed that a single CAP 
mission be created with offices in all six countries. Programs having a common 
objective for several countries could be developed and administered by the offi-
ces under guidance of the regional office. Support staff in a number of tech-
nical areas could be located in the regional headquarters and would work region-
wide assisting country offices. 
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No.5. Encourage and support~ regional entitlement~- There is 
a need for some kind of regional entitlement scheme that 
would provide a safety net for those most impoverished. 
Whether this takes the form of a food stamp plan or income 
subsidies, the experts must work out. Although controver-
sial, both approaches have proved their effectiveness where 
they have been given a fair trial. Because the total popula-
tion of Central America and Panama is only about 22 million 
people, external assistance to make this feasible is possible 
if inflation can be kept in control. Whatever the macroeco-
nomic policies adopted, some kind of floor needs to be put in 
place for the very poor. The cost of doing so must be 
balanced against the cost of not doing so. 
Specific Implementation: 
This will require more time. I will be out of the country for the next 
three weeks, but will plan to forward a specific Central American entitlement 
proposal to the Commission before the end of November. 
Special Note: 
I am greatly indebted to Mr. Donald Fiester, former Director, Office of 
Agriculture, A.I.D., who has had more than twenty-plus years of experience with 
the agricultural problems of Central America and in whose judgment I have great 
confidence. For further details on recommendations 2, 3, and 4 you may wish to 
consult him directly. 
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Good Morning, Members of President Reagan's Bi-partisan 
Commission on Central America. It is indeed an honor to come 
before such a distinguished body to present our views on U.S.-
Central American relations. I am Arnoldo S. Torres, National 
Executive Director for the League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC), this country's oldest and largest Hispanic organization, 
with over 110,000 members in 43 states. LULAC National President 
Mr. Mario G. Obledo was unable to travel to Washington for today's 
session, but I bring his greetings. In addition, Mr. Obledo wanted 
me to convey his views of the importance this commission can have 
on the future of our relations with Central America and Hemispheric 
security. Also, Ambassador Abelardo Valdez, former Chief of Protocol 
with the Carter Administration, was prepared to join us today but 
was called away on other business. Ambassador Valdez has served 
as advisor to the League on U.S.-Latin American relations. 
" 
This testimony is primarily a brief overview of the growing 
concerns Hispanic-Americans have regarding U.S.-Central American 
relations. Portions of the following discussion appeared in an 
editorial in U.S.A. Today July 25, 1983. 
Hispanic-Americans have a growing concern about the problems 
in Central America and the role of the United States in this ever-
volatile region. Many of us are finding that the cultural insen-
sitivity and ignorance which is prevalent in U.S.-Latin 
American policy, and the insensitivity and misunderstanding of 
Hispanic-Americans are interrelated. Our continued reference to 
Central America as "our backyard" is indicative of our paternalistic 
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and crisis-oriented mentality. We have a history of neglect and 
disregard for Central America and that neglect cannot be rectified 
simply by defensive responses to Cuba and the Soviet Union or by 
throwing money into wars. It is this neglect and disregard that has 
helped create the desperate need for change. 
This mentality is also reflected in U.S. Ambassador Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick's suggestion that development assistance on the scale 
of the Marshall Plan ought to be implemented in order to thwart 
Soviet-backed "subversion" in Central America. Such a plan only 
considers the problems of development in Latin America in a Soviet-
U.S. contest and not in the context of foreign and independent 
countries. It is indeed unfortunate that an "expert" on Latin 
America should think of cultural exchange, education and develop-
mental assistance only in terms of a response to Cuban literacy 
programs, fellowships, and other programs provided to our southern 
friends by the Soviet Union. 
As the days pass, the inevitable trajectory of our present 
Central America posture becomes even more evident and ever more 
foreboding. The Administration seeks a military solution in 
Central America which will have Hispanic-Americans fighting in 
disproportionate numbers against our fellow Latin brothers. 
Hispanic-Americans will be the first on the front line carrying 
out this unrealistic and mistaken policy and we will be the targets 
of the frustration of the American people as seen in the callous 
reference of "fleet people". In view of the paranoia and treatment 
of the undocumented worker, it is conceivable that under war condi-
tions we could hear the extremist calls of the far right for the 
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establishment of internment camps for "Latin Communists". LULAC 
does not view this matter as a liberal versus conservative issue 
but rather as a disastrous policy which has historically been wrong 
and is now threatening to cause even more irreparable harm. It 
could have been avoided and we hope it is not too late to alter our 
course now. We Hispanics are becoming much more involved in this 
debate and many of us are committed to providing our direct military 
participation. 
It is the shared obligation of the decision makers in Congress 
and the Administration to see that national and international laws 
are obeyed, that peaceful coexistence with our neighbors is sought 
and maintained, and that the lives of American citizens are protected. 
As those obligations are increasingly violated and as the number of 
deaths of Americans in Central America increases, we must ask, who 
in Congress or in the Administration wishes to bear responsibility 
for failing to meet their shared obligations? That failure means 
further military involvement: The finger being pointed will be that 
of war. 
Under most circumstances, a foreign policy which has caused 
the loss of over 45,000 lives, countless human suffering and the 
ever growing human tragedy would have warranted major changes. 
Unfortunately, none appear forthcoming. Is it un-American or unfair 
to question or criticize the sanity of such a policy? I certainly 
hope not. 
The above concerns have received a great deal of attention 
and appear to be growing in their acceptance by Hispanics and many 
others. Contrary to the contention that the struggles in Central 
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and South America result from the larger conflict between East-West 
interest, it is clear that the instability has as its roots under-
development in all facets of life. Perhaps the Peruvian author 
Mario Vargas Llosa said it best in his article "Inquest in the 
Andes", New York Times Magazine July 31, 1983, in which he describes 
the reasons behind guerrilla warfare in Latin America and the 
struggle for democracy. He writes: "Perhaps this story helps to 
clarify the reason for the mind-shattering violence that character-
izes guerrilla warfare in Latin America. These guerrilla movements 
are not "peasant movements". They are born in the cities, among 
intellectuals and middle-class militants who, with their dogmatism 
and their rhetoric, are often as foreign and incomprehensible to 
the peasant masses as Sendero Luminoso is to the men and women of 
Uchuraccay. The outrages committed by those other strangers --
the Government forces of counterinsurgency -- tend to win peasant 
support for the guerrillas. 
Put simply, the peasants are coerced by those who think they 
are the masters of history and absolute truth. The fact is that the 
struggle between the guerrillas and the armed forces is really a 
settling of accounts between privileged sectors of society, and the 
peasant masters are used cynically and brutally by those who say 
they want to "liberate" them. The peasants always suffer the 
greatest number of victims: at least 750 of them have been killed 
in Peru since the beginning of 1983. 
The story of the eight journalists reveals how vulnerable 
democracy is in Latin America and how easily it dies under military 
or Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. It is difficult for people to 
defend a free press, elections and representative institutions when 
their circumstances do not allow them to understand, much less to 
benefit from, the achievements of democracy. Democracy will never 
be strong in our Latin American countries as long as it is the 
privilege of one sector of society and an incomprehensible 
abstraction for all the others. The double threat -- the model of 
General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and the model of Fidel Castro 
in Cuba -- will continue to haunt democratic government as long as 
people in our countries kill for the reasons that the peasants of 
Uchuraccay killed". 
This observation is perhaps the most eloquent and accurate 
in describing the continued struggles in the southern hemisphere. 
They should serve to put to rest the simplistic and extremely 
dangerous contention that communism is under every rock and at the 
root of all instability in Latin America. It is sad to say that 
despite such accurate descriptions this administration has 
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virtually ignored the underlying reasons for these continued 
struggles. As Hispanics who have had to undergo the same tribula-
tions in seeking equity in this country, it is safe to conclude that 
the interest and involvement by Hispanic-Americans will continue 
growing as the injustices facing Latin Americans continue to 
parallel our own here in this country. 
Thank you. 
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